The Volokh Conspiracy
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When Parties Agree to Religious Arbitration, Arbitrator's Religious Decision Is Enforceable
In S.I. v. M.I., decided Friday by the New Jersey appellate court (Judges Morris Smith and Lisa Perez-Friscia), an Orthodox Jewish couple divorced, and in the midst of the divorce proceedings agreed to religious arbitration as to whether the husband had to give the wife a "get" (the Jewish religious divorce that is required for a divorce to be viewed as valid within the Orthodox community). The arbitrator ordered the husband to give a get, but the state trial court refused to enforce the arbitrator's decree:
[P]laintiff moved to confirm the arbitration award…. [T]he judge denied the motion[], finding the court lacked "jurisdiction to confirm an award which would in effect order somebody to give a get—a religious divorce in the Jewish faith." He reasoned "the effect of that confirmation [would] … put the State of New Jersey Superior Court['s] stamp on an arbitration award telling one person they have to do something that … in their religion that is really beyond." Further, the judge found no precedent "would compel [him] … to order anyone of the Jewish faith to give another person of the Jewish faith a get."
No, said the appellate court:
[O]ur "civil courts may resolve controversies involving religious groups if resolution can be achieved by reference to neutral principles of law, but … they may not resolve such controversies if resolution requires the interpretation of religious doctrine." The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized "that parties should be granted as much autonomy as possible in the ordering of their personal lives" and therefore "[i]t is fair and reasonable that parties who have agreed to be bound by arbitration in a formal, written separation agreement should be bound." Unquestionably, New Jersey has a strong public policy in favor of settling disputes through arbitration, including in family litigation.
Here, confirmation of the award can be granted under neutral principles of law and without interpretation of religious doctrine. We therefore conclude the Establishment Clause is not violated because the parties' arbitration agreement regarding a get serves the "purpose of enforcing the parties' contractual obligations" and "encouraging divorce litigants to resolve disputes by negotiating and entering" into marital agreements.
Additionally, enforcement does not infringe on the Free Exercise Clause as the parties voluntarily entered into the MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] arbitration provision and agreement. The record demonstrates the parties freely and knowingly agreed to resolve the issuance of the get through arbitration; thus, we conclude there is no interference with their practice of religion.
In summary, we conclude confirmation of the award pursuant to the parties' MOU and separately signed arbitration agreement falls squarely within "principles of civil contract law, not rabbinical law." Rabbi Twersky's decision to grant plaintiff [wife] the get under rabbinical law "remained solely within the province of the bei[t] din [i.e., the religious court -EV]" and did not require interpretation by the judge. Confirmation of the award strictly required a determination of defendant's [husband's] contractual obligation…. The parties' MOU, arbitration agreement, and Rabbi Twersky's decision mandate confirmation of the award requiring defendant provide plaintiff with a get in accordance with the beit din….
Ira Treuhaft (Treuhaft & Zakarin, LLP) and Boaz I. Cohen, Jonathan M. Wagner, and Daria Schieferstein (Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP) represent the wife.
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Did Prof. Volokh oppose pseudonymity in this case? He often seems to go out of his way to disparage and defeat pseudonymity; in this case, does he even mention it? Could the apparently conservative nature of these two ostensible adults -- fighting over superstition for nearly eight years in the context of eight children -- have influenced the professor's assessment of the pseudonymity issue?
I knew this post was Kirkland-bait, but I didn’t expect him to be baited this quickly.
The Rev is disappointing, but he doesn't disappoint.
Bell rings, dog salivates. -- Dr. Ivan Pavlov.
Pseudonymity is standard in marital disputes, particularly those involving children.
.
As when
-- a court decision uses a vile racial slur, triggering someone's automatic daily Google search
or
-- a legal or quasilegal development involving trans rest rooms, lesbians, trans AI, drag queens, trans athletes, Muslims, trans sorority drama, racial slurs, or trans anything occurs, triggering someone's automatic daily Google search
or
-- something constituting partisan red meat that would lather a crowd of right-wing bigots and faux libertarian, on-the-spectrum misfits occurs, and comes to the attention of a disaffected blog operator
or
-- a white, male, conservative blog publishes bigot-flattering, partisan red meat for a carefully cultivated collection of conservative commenters
that kind of thing?
Less than an hour before this was posted I was telling somebody about the inability of civil courts to compel a get. My world has been turned upside down.
Do you think a court here would have reached the same result if the matter had not gone to arbitration first? (ie, If a couple went to regular family court, and--once there--asked that judge to order Spouse X to give a Get to Spouse Y?)
Not a rhetorical question. I am not sure what my own answer would be. I am guessing that, if there were a prenup or post-nup in place, then ordering a Get is merely interpreting the language in a contract, which courts do every day, of course. But if a Get is not contracted for between the parties, then a secular judge ordering one does seem to come close to/over the line of having to analyze and rule on religious beliefs.
I think arbitration is the key here.
In Israel, where there is more entanglement of government and religion, I recall a man was jailed for refusing to grant a get.
Do courts have jurisdiction to compel arbitration findings?
I worked for a grain marketer. The purchase contracts,(fine print) stipulate contract disputes would be settled by arbitration by a named entity. Do courts have jurisdiction to compel the decision?
They confirm, not compel, the decision. That's the rule under the FAA and the equivalent laws of every state I know of.
Confirming means, the arbitration award becomes a judgment of the Court. Which can be collected on or enforced.
Superficially, this decision sounds right — but what if the husband is obstreperous? Wouldn't that force the court to adjudicate whether the husband had complied?
And why would such a determination violate the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses?
How does the court determine whether the husband has given a valid get, as required by the order?
(Or would it be referred back to the arbitrator to make that decision?
That's not a rhetorical question; I don't know.)
Perhaps if the husband gave a get of questionable validity. But if he did nothing, which is the usual situation, it seems like the court doesn't have to delve into religious law to determine that he did not follow the arbitration order.
Why wouldn’t the arbitrator be the one to determine that?
If there’s an agreed religious aribtrator, then if a religious dispute arises, such as whether a party complied with the arbitrator’s orders (for example, if a purported get is religiously valid), then the court can just refer the religious aspects of the matter to the arbitrator.
Get it while the gettin's good.
There's a possible breach of Jewish law by going to a secular court after a Jewish court has decided. More than you want to know:
https://bethdin.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/The-Prohibition-Against-Going-to-Secular-Courts-by-Rabbi-Yaacov-Feit.pdf
However, note:
one who wishes to have a judgment from beit din confirmed or enforced in secular court is permitted to do so. Here too, the claimant is petitioning the secular court to enforce a decision of beit din that was already rendered, rather than adjudicate a dispute between parties
Sounds like she was chained, unjustly.
Huh. Seems like excessive entanglement. If there's a binding arbitration agreement that requires someone to pray for a certain thing, can the courts order him to pray?
The key is “if resolution can be achieved by reference to neutral principles of law.”
Your hypo would turn on whether there’s a way for a judge to determine (using secular legal principles) if the prayer had taken place. There’s probably not.
In the divorce case, it was easy to determine the husband had not taken the relevant action that the arbitrator determined was required.
And this all turns on the arbitrator, not the judge, having resolved the religious question first.