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Family Court Ordered Grandmother, Who Had Custody of Child, Not to Testify Against Father at His Parole Hearing
The N.H. Supreme Court reversed the order.
From In re Guardianship of J.H., decided today by the New Hampshire Supreme Court (in an opinion by Justice Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi):
J.H. is a six-year-old child. His father has been incarcerated since December 2017 and has a history of criminal charges involving domestic violence and drug possession. J.H.'s mother died in 2019 when J.H. was less than three years old. His grandmother was appointed guardian of J.H.'s person and estate shortly thereafter, and J.H. has remained in her care since.
The guardian and the father have been at odds throughout this case. When the guardianship petition was filed, the father was subject to a no-contact order barring communications with J.H. Subsequently, the father sought contact and visitation with J.H. Over the guardian's objections, the court ordered that the father could communicate with J.H. by mail and eventually progress to video visits. Both parties have accused the other of violating the court's orders. Adding to the conflict, the guardian has petitioned to terminate the father's parental rights. In an April 2022 order, the court expressed its frustration that "[d]espite [J.H.'s] tragic young life that has seen him lose both of his parents before his third birthday, both sides of [J.H.'s] extended family are not able to put their differences aside and cooperate for [J.H.'s] benefit."
The court placed restrictions on both parties, including limiting the content of father's communications with J.H. The court also imposed restrictions on the guardian. In an October 2022 order, the court ordered that the guardian and her husband "are enjoined from testifying against father's release at any parole or similar hearing without first seeking leave of this court." The guardian moved for reconsideration, arguing that this restriction violated her right to freedom of speech. The court denied her motion, reasoning that "[J.H.'s] best interests outweigh the guardian['s] free speech rights to keep father incarcerated if he becomes eligible for a parole hearing."
The order wasn't authorized by New Hampshire statutes, the court held, and thus avoided the need to decide whether the order also violated the First Amendment (as I think it did):
RSA [Revised Statutes Annotated] chapter 463 confers exclusive jurisdiction over the guardianship of minors to the circuit court. RSA 463:8 permits the court to "appoint a guardian of the person or of the estate or of both," and grants the court authority over the guardianship proceedings. Once the court has appointed a guardian, RSA 463:12 sets forth the guardian's powers and duties….
Subsection I of the statute conveys the "powers and responsibilities of a parent regarding the minor's support, care, and education." Subsections II and III then articulate specific powers and responsibilities related to the minor's overall wellbeing, encompassing the minor's health, property, and legal and financial affairs. The statute empowers and obliges the guardian to exercise control over many aspects of the minor's life to ensure the general wellbeing of the minor. Subsection IV then authorizes the court to "limit or restrict the powers of the guardian or impose additional duties."
Read in the context of the whole statute, the "powers" and "duties" contemplated here relate to the guardian's role as custodian of the minor's affairs and welfare. Restrictions on the guardian's and her spouse's participation in a parole hearing, however, bear no connection to the guardian's management of the minor's affairs. They are unrelated to the guardian-minor relationship. If we were to read subsection IV [the "additional duties" provision] as broadly as the father suggests, the court could impose restrictions that extend far beyond the guardianship and into the personal life of the guardian. We decline to read the statute so broadly, and thus conclude that the restriction here is not permitted under RSA 463:12, IV….
Anthony J. Naro (Bernazzani Law, PLLC) represents the grandmother.
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Another moron judge. The parole board is a quasi-judicial institution, charged with determining a matter of public importance. The notion that a potential witness can be barred from testifying is obnoxious to the administration of justice. I have never heard of a court ordering someone not to testify in another proceeding.
"His father has been incarcerated since December 2017 and has a history of criminal charges involving domestic violence and drug possession. J.H.’s mother died in 2019 when J.H. was less
than three years old"
The judge is an even bigger moron. So the grandmother can't tell the parole board she's afraid of this guy and what he might do to her or the kid?
There is a not-so-short and continually growing list of examples of judges ignoring law and making up law as a basis for issuing orders to make the world a "more perfect place" [sic]. It is long past time for people so burdened with illegal orders (the gag orders imposed on Donald Trump coming first to mind) to flat out ignore illegal orders and to violate them publicly.
Yes, I know that the first brave few who do this will immediately be placed under arrest for (having) contempt of (the majestic) court/magistrate, and incarcerated in especially vile circumstances. Sadly, some of them may even be Epstein'ed. Exercise of a private right of action may ultimately become necessary. But a foundational principle remains unchanged: Freedom isn't free! It never has been.
The judge is a moron, and an arrogant one too.
I'm sorry, but have these people never seen "Kindergarten Cop"?
We know how this ends and it ain't pretty.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_TlF7iUsyRQ
Dude, the father is in jail for domestic violence and drugs. Granny may not be the most sympathetic person on the planet, but the father sounds like a piece of work.
I am skeptical about the First Anendment claim.
If this violates the First Anendment, why couldn’t any privilege that could be asserted by a criminal defendant - spousal privelege, attorney-client privilege, doctor-patient privilege, etc. etc. - also violate the First Amendment?
The scope of testimonial privelege is a matter of common law and statute, not the Constitution. It’s not the job of federal judges to say when states can impose a testimonial privelege and when they can’t.
What the family court judge tried to impose strikes me as an analog of a testimonial privelege. Unauthorized by statute? The court here so found. Bad policy? Maybe. But unconstitutional? I doubt it.
Counterpoint: it's not analogous to a testimonial privilege.
Why not? What is a testimonial privilege, functionally, for constitutional purposes, other than that somebody is prohibited from testifying?
(1) Privileges protect certain relationships -- attorney/client, spouses, priest/penitent, doctor/patient. The law wants to protect the ability of people to speak freely to others in that relationship.
There was no such relationship here, and in fact they were fighting like cats and dogs. The judge was not trying to protect a confidential relationship, he was trying to withhold relevant testimony from the parole board. (I mentioned above, the judge is a moron, IMO.)
(2) Privileges are generally invoked by people who don't want to be forced to testify. They are a shield from the force of the law requiring relevant testimony from every citizen. Here, the person wanted to testify.
(One exception to this is the attorney-client privilege, which belongs to the client. An attorney cannot testify as to privileged information without client consent.)
There wasn’t? Of course there was. A state can reasonably find that in the modern age of extended families, the co-guardians of a child have a relationship meriting protecting. You may disagree with the policy. But being the co-guardians of a child IS a kind of relationship. Whether to protect it or not is a policy question.
Your argument makes no sense. Courts aren't free to make up privileges willy-nilly. Second, dr/patient privilege and the atty/client privilege exist upon inception and thus they act as a waiver of 1A right to disclose by protecting the reliance interests of the privilege holder. Spousal privilege stems from idea that a married couple has a sacrosanct bond. No such rationales exist here. Thus, the 1A engages.
Go back to kiddo table.
Why not? The appeals ol ourt found this state’s statutes don’t authorize it. But that’s not a constitutional issue.
If the First Amendment doesn’t prohibit a state from passing a statute, why would it prohibit a court from issuing an order? It’s the job of courts of equity to craft solutions not specifically provided for by law, and some states have more flexible notions of equity than others. If a state’s legislature can do something why couldn’t its judiciary? At any rate, why does the FIRST AMENDMENT prohibit the judiciary from doing what a legislature could do?
Why can’t a state or a judge decide that since marriage these days is hardly as sacrosanct as it used to be, it’s more appropriate to supplement the concept by protecting non-traditional relationships that meet some of what the state or a judge might regard as similar to or sharing some of the original purposes of marriage, such as being co-guardians of a child?
It may be bad policy. But it strikes me as a way a state could potentially decide to address the changing nature of the family. A state could decide, as this judge did, that since both co-guardians are needed for the child’s welfare, neither ought to be able to testify against the other.
Bad policy? Maybe. But a non-traditional privelege is no more a violation of the First Amendment than traditional priveleges. States get to update these things to changing times and mores as they see fit. And if they want to let individual judges do it, the First Amendment doesn’t stop them.
NH Rev Stat § 641:5 (2022)
641:5 Tampering With Witnesses and Informants. –
A person is guilty of a class B felony if: I. Believing that an official proceeding, as defined in RSA 641:1, II, or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to: … (b) Withhold any testimony, information, document or thing; or…
I'm in favor of the judge being charged with either this, or the federal deprivation of rights under color of law statute.
And whenever judges invoke rules of evidence disallowing testimony, are they committing felonies? If a federal judge invokes Daubert and says a purported expert’s testimony isn’t reliable enough to allow, or a lawyer’s or a spouse’s because a defendant invokes a privelege, are they committing felonies and violating the would-be witness’ constitutional rights? Judges disallow people from testifying for one reason or another all the time.
Not quite sure how the father is litigating this case since the unfortunate child apparently “lost” both his parents years ago.
Ouija board ?
The opinion says that father is prison. That's what they mean by "lost" as to the father.
I know. I am commenting (adversely) on the usage.
Wow, a case that violated the dictum of a law professor involved in researching the decisions of David Souter for activist groups during his confirmation: "all I know from reading decisions of the New Hampshire Supreme Court is that I wouldn't want to be a member of the New Hampshire Supreme Court".
So, why do I suspect that if the further hearing on the issues of custody or loss of parental rights ends up before the same trial judge, he, or dad’s lawyer, will ask grandma if she testified against dad at the parole hearing, and if grandma’s lawyer objects, the judge will overrule the objection?