The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
Today in Supreme Court History: December 13, 1873
12/13/1873: Justice Samuel Nelson died.
To get the Volokh Conspiracy Daily e-mail, please sign up here.
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please
to post comments
United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (decided December 13, 1920): Constitutional right to travel (art. IV, §2) does not apply to state action (quashing indictment of Arizona sheriff who rounded up 1300 striking miners and sent them in cattle cars without supplies to New Mexico and threatened them with death if they returned to Arizona) (in effect overruled by United States v. Guest, 1966)
White v. United States, 154 U.S. 661 (decided December 13, 1880): owner of vessel had no recovery against government for wartime damage caused by refusal of ship’s master to obey military commander
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (decided December 13, 2004): arrest valid even though based on probable cause of crime (impersonating an officer) that is not related to the crime that ended up being charged (secretly audiotaping arresting police officer’s questioning, which was in violation of state law)
Re: Devenpeck v. Alford
Facts of the case
Tony Alford was driving when Washington state police, concerned Alford was impersonating a police officer, pulled him over. During a search of Alford’s car, police found a tape recorder recording the traffic stop. The police arrested Alford and said he had made an illegal recording of a private conversation – a violation, they said, of the state’s Privacy Act. A state court judge dismissed charges against Alford, ruling – as another state court already had – that the Privacy Act did not apply to public police work.
Alford then sued the officers in federal district court, alleging his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for the officers.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the officers violated Alford’s Fourth Amendment rights. The facts and law were so clearly established that no reasonable officer could believe Alford violated the Privacy Act. Therefore the officers lacked probable cause for the arrest and were not protected by qualified immunity. The court rejected the officers’ argument that the arrest was constitutional because there was probable cause Alford committed the crime of impersonating a police officer. That was not the reason police gave during the arrest. The Ninth Circuit said there was only one instance when an arrest for a reason the police did not articulate was constitutional: if that reason was closely related to the stated reason for the arrest. Impersonating a police officer was not closely related to violating the state Privacy Act. Other circuit courts disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s “closely related offense doctrine.”
Question
(1) Does an arrest violate the Fourth Amendment when a police officer has probable cause to make an arrest for one offense, if that offense is not closely related to the offense articulated by the officer at the time of the arrest? (2) For the purposes of qualified immunity, was “closely related offense doctrine” clearly established given that different circuit courts disagreed on its application?
Conclusion (Unanimous!)
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that police had probable cause to arrest Alford for impersonating a police officer, despite the fact that this was not closely related to the offense police identified during the arrest. A warrantless arrest by a police officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if, given the facts known to the officer, there is probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed. The offense establishing probable cause need not be closely related to the offense the arresting officer identifies at the time of arrest. An arresting officer’s state of mind, except for facts he knows, is irrelevant to probable cause. (oyez)
Fully agree with this decision.
Cops can pull you over if they suspect you of crime.
That may turn out to be a non-crime but if they (legally), find evidence of another crime then obviously they can then take appropriate action – they certainly can’t just ignore it.
And yes (like every other rule or policy), cops DO abuse this priviledge and pull people over for very minor or non-existent suspected criminal activity, e.g., minor traffic violation.
Once the car is stopped, they can use the “plain view” exception and seize upon anything they see.
And then some. Even though it’s not necessary for the police to get the car’s VIN, they can move things around in order to find it, in the process uncovering something incriminating. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
Thanks.
I picked this case because it was an interesting situation. Not only was the guy apparently impersonating an officer, he had a tape recorder running. He was evidently planning an exposé of some kind.
Luckily now the recording part is legal.
How do you legally record cops in a 2-party recording state?
I don’t see how these folk get around that– OR how cop cams can legally record either.
IL is a 2 party state, but the ACLU sued to allow recording of police, and the state later they amended the law to specifically exempt recording of police from needing consent. Presumably police body/dash cameras were always exempt as part of their official duties.
Edit does not seem to be working today.
2 party rules also seem to apply only when there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, and courts have found that police conducting their duties in public do not have such a reasonable expectation.
The White case, which *was* from the Civil War some 16 years earlier, is interesting. US Govt chartered the boat to transport men and horses up a river — had the boat been damaged by enemy action, the US Govt would have paid, but not for normal wear and tear. The captain (master) didn’t want to land where the Army did, and allegedly there wouldn’t have been damage had he left the beach after having offloaded the men and horses but I don’t see how as the boat would have been riding higher empty, she would have hit bottom when heavier.
But the court starts by saying that the waiver of damages like this in the contract was the basis for the decision — I thought it was something dramatic like a Confederate blockade runner being sunk, but it wasn’t.
Thanks !