The Volokh Conspiracy
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Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions
Voting districts, work uniforms, and hunter harassment.
Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature from the Institute for Justice.
Friends: IJ is off to the races with an exciting new free-speech case! For decades, Minnesotan Leda Mox has taught equine-massage classes. But Minnesota says she can no longer teach her classes (read: can't talk to her students about horse massage) unless she pays the state thousands of dollars in fees and submits her horse-massage curriculum to regulators for approval. A First Amendment violation? Yes. Yes it is. Read about the case—and see Leda's noble steeds—here.
- Circuit-split alert? Whereas the Seventh Circuit famously enjoys contrasting judges with truffle pigs—in the context of scolding parties for not supporting their factual claims with record citations—the First Circuit has staked out a bold preference for contrasting judges with ferrets. Based on some hard-hitting investigative journalism, your editors have confirmed that this split is a mature one. Possibly the first judge-versus-ferret metaphor came from the Fifth Circuit's Judge Goldberg in 1983 ("Judges are not ferrets!"). And since the late '90s, the "anti-ferret rule" has become a peculiar fixture in the District of Puerto Rico, whence it trickles upward occasionally to the First Circuit. While we're on the subject, shout-out to Judge Johnston, of the Northern District of Illinois, who has done yeoman's work trying to get bloodhounds into the mix.
- Inmate: Prison officials ignored my letters informing them that people were smoking inside, thus exposing me to high levels of secondhand smoke in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Second Circuit (unpublished): Discovery is necessary to identify who may have received his letters, so back down to the district court this case shall go. (NB: Congrats to Seton Hall law students for getting the W on appeal!)
- Inmate: A prison official placed a cup of juice on the tray into my cell and deliberately catapulted it into my face, which is excessive force. Second Circuit (unpublished): No case law (case. law.) indicates that purposely spilling a cup of juice on an inmate constitutes more than a de minimis use of force, so, say it with me now, qualified immunity.
- Muslim member of the Fairfax County, Va. school board is pulled over for running a red light. After she refuses numerous commands to produce ID and step out of the car, she is pepper-sprayed, arrested, and booked, where she is forced to take mugshots without her hijab. She sues, alleging a RLUIPA violation for the mugshots (among other claims). The district court orders the mug shots destroyed. Fourth Circuit: And since the mug shots have indeed been destroyed, the sheriff's appeal of that part of the ruling is moot.
- Fourth Circuit, caring about procedure: District courts can't just assume prisoners are filing in forma pauperis, no matter how common that may be. Which means inmates at a Virginia prison were not required to file separate actions (and pay separate filing fees) to claim that the IRS illegally refused to give them COVID-19 stimulus payments during their incarceration.
- Fourth Circuit, caring about procedure: District courts can't just deny a preliminary injunction without explaining their reasoning. Which means pretrial detainees in Prince George's County, Md., will get another crack at arguing that the county is unconstitutionally over-detaining people despite judges' ordering them released.
- Golden Girls fans still debate whether that out-of-left-field chronic-fatigue-syndrome two-parter is inspirational or unhinged. The Blanche of the federal circuits (a/k/a the Fifth Circuit) doesn't answer that precise question, but it does hold that the marketplace of ideas—rather than tort law—is the way to hash out medical disputes over controversial chronic diseases. (For those who may object that Blanche, an Atlanta native, hails from the Eleventh Circuit, not the Fifth, pump the brakes: Her formative years were spent in the Old Fifth, long before enactment of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980.)
- Galveston County, Tex., had a judicial district that was majority-minority if you add the Black and Hispanic populations together, but not a majority of either group on its own. And not majority-minority at all after redistricting in 2021. District court: Under Fifth Circuit precedent you can aggregate minorities together under the Voting Rights Act for purposes of vote-dilution claims. Fifth Circuit: Yeah, we know we said that, but we were "wrong as a matter of law." Even so, we're stuck with that error for now, though "[w]e request a poll on whether this case should be reheard en banc at the earliest possible date."
- Should Louisiana have one Black-majority congressional district? Or two? After a five-day hearing, the district court issues a 152-page ruling concluding that the Voting Rights Act requires two. Louisiana Secretary of State seeks a stay pending appeal. Fifth Circuit: Which we deny. The district court's opinion isn't perfect, but a stay pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy. We're expediting the appeal, though, and the merits panel is free to disagree with us.
- Member of Louisiana's mandatory state bar association sues, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. "Why should I have to pay the Bar so that they can tweet about charity drives, student debt, and 'the purported benefits of walnuts'?" he queries. Fifth Circuit: You shouldn't! Though you can still be forced to pay for advocacy that's actually germane to the bar association's purpose—at least until the Supreme Court holds otherwise.
- Allegation: Burleson County, Tex. judge—and owner of a restaurant called "Funky Junky"—sexually assaults a county-attorney clerk on several occasions, both at Funky Junky and at his office. She sues Funky Junky, the judge, and the county. All claims either settle or are dismissed except the Section 1983 claim against the county. Fifth Circuit: Although the judge may have been a policymaker with final decision-making authority for Funky Junky, his alleged acts of sexual assault were not within his policymaking authority as a county official, so the county's not liable.
- Tesla requires certain line workers to wear uniforms to cut down on "mutilations" of the company's products. Some of the workers instead wear union t-shirts until Tesla tells them to stop. NLRB: That's an unfair labor practice. Union garb is protected. Fifth Circuit: Yeah, no. That would mean all dress codes are invalid. Also, as an aside, there's a Major Questions Doctrine problem here.
- In a case about whether your school district has a problem with pervasive gender-based harassment, it's probably a bad sign if the Sixth Circuit needs to drop a footnote to clarify the multifarious forms of "Jane Doe" it has employed to identify the many juvenile victims of gender-based harassment in your school district.
- In 2016, Wisconsin amended its hunter-harassment statute to include in its definition of harassment various forms of recording a hunter's activity. Flagrant violation of the First Amendment, or empty act of political theater? Seventh Circuit: The first thing! (Dissent: I'm not saying it's empty, but it's empty enough that none of these plaintiffs has standing.)
- Defendant: The Fourth Amendment requires you to weigh the violence of the police's entry against the likelihood of an exigent circumstance, and here, there wasn't enough chance of exigency to justify using a sledgehammer. Seventh Circuit: The door was locked. The sledgehammer opened it. Why are we still talking about this?
- News you can use from the Seventh Circuit: When you go to the emergency room with a plastic device in your mouth that can convert a firearm into a fully automatic weapon, it can probably be used as evidence against you if the doctors make you spit it out while treating you.
- St. Louis, Mo. police officer gets into altercation with protester and uses pepper spray. Photojournalist 20 feet off to the side gets hit by spray and sues for First Amendment retaliation. Eighth Circuit: There's no evidence the officer even knew you were there or who you are, so you can't win on a claim that he was retaliating against your journalism.
- This sad-all-around case features a deadly standoff on a Colorado bridge. On the one hand, the suspect (confronted for suspected possession of child pornography) said that he wasn't "going back to jail without a fight" and was holding a handgun with a high-capacity magazine. On the other hand, he was arguably more suicidal than homicidal. And the cops shot him in the back. District court: No qualified immunity. Tenth Circuit: Wrong. In fact, the cops acted reasonably. Summary judgment to the police.
- In which the Tenth Circuit respects the narrow parameters of its appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a district court's denial of qualified immunity. But! In which it also throws caution to the wind by releasing its opinion in Century Schoolbook instead of Times New Roman, a typographical decision that is sure to trigger en banc review! (Editors' note: Look, man, you try reading this many appellate opinions every week. You'd get excited about this kind of thing, too. Though the real bombshell will be when the First Circuit stops writing its opinions on Underwood typewriters.)
The First Amendment isn't just for horse-massage lessons; it protects lots of other speech too! Like the speech of Clarence Cocroft, who wants to publicly advertise his licensed medical-marijuana dispensary in Olive Branch, Miss. Under state law, Clarence's business is totally lawful. But telling people about that totally lawful business? Totally unlawful. A First Amendment violation? Yes indeed. Which is why Clarence has teamed up with IJ to institute some justice in the Magnolia State. Click here to learn about the case.
You know what else the First Amendment protects? Reading e-mails. Jay Fink helps Californians flag deceptive spam emails that might be actionable in court. Mostly that means sitting at his desk and going through his clients' junk folders. You probably know where this is going. Yes, California's calling him an unlicensed private detective. And in what might be a burden-to-benefit record for an IJ client, the state wants him to work for 6,000 hours—in fields like investigative journalism, military policing, or arson investigation—before he can get back to reviewing junk mail. A First Amendment violation? You decide! Or more precisely … one or more federal judges will decide, because Jay and IJ are suing the California regulators.
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Why is the smoking case. brought under section 1983, an 8th amendment issue instead of a 14th amendment one?
My question was what would kill him faster. Second hand smoke or the other inmates when they find out he is the reason they can't smoke
Yeah, I wonder about this. Inmates are still citizens of the state and entitled to know what the courts are doing, wonder how popular Braxton will be when the CO's say they have to toss the cells for tobacco because of his lawsuit.
In any event, this case seems like a barking dog with fleas. To the extent there's a tort claim here, the primary tortfeasors are the smokers. It's already against policy to smoke, if a location can be held liable for smokers breaking the rules, then nowhere is safe. Despite the dire warnings, people sometimes smoke on airplanes too, let's all sue United!
I recognize that jails don’t get to hire the best and brightest, but how inept must jail management and employees be to fail to recognize and stop smoking in a jail?
A sixth-grade graduate from Arkansas or West Virginia should be able to handle that task.
Is Kurkland really as stupid as he pretends to be?
While in CA, DC and NY it would take until at least the eighth grade.
If visitation is allowed, some visitors are willing to smuggle tobacco in their ass, and it's incredibly easy to create a spark? Pretty damn hard. The mail is another vector. So are corrupt attorneys. Keeping illegal substances out of prisons is incredibly hard because of the numerous entry vectors and the restrictions imposed on searching them. Had you finished sixth-grade or had any real life experience, you might understand this better. As it stands, I'm hoping that "Rev." is self-described and you have no actual parishioners.
Seems you all are assuming the COs were not the ones doing the smoking. Considering the presence of illegal drugs in almost all prison facilities, it would seem reasonable to include tobacco smuggled in by COs and the use of tobacco by COs in the facility.
Sigh.
Guys, I love ya, but going into a Federal court to argue that the right to advertise a business that is illegal under Federal law is somehow protected by the Federal constitution is silly.
If it's that silly, you should be able to document your reasoning with something more than "it's silly".
His explanation seems quite clear and simple. Ross's claim that the business is "totally lawful" is patently false. It may not violate any state laws, but clearly violates federal law.
Well, let me qualify that. While dispensing "medical marijuana" clearly violates federal law, federal law also prevents Justice Department funds from being used to interfere with state medical marijuana operations. It's, at best, a "gray area".
Oh, maybe that's what he meant by "silly".
/sarc
No, that about sums it up. It is patently ridiculous to tell a state that it must allow advertisements of businesses which by their nature violate federal law.
I don't see why a state can't condition a license to do an otherwise illegal thing (sell pot) on agreeing to not advertise it.
After all, you don't have to accept the state license.
And this is "medical" marijuana.
Can you imagine the outrage if Big Pharma were to advertise Schedue II Drugs in the ways that Mississippi prohibits this purported drug from being advertised -- the lawsuits over opiates were for far less than this.
Sure. I figured reasonably-bright people could figure it out by implication, but if you’d like me to spell it out, complete with a quote from the Supreme Court, here you go:
Per Central Hudson (1980), “there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity.” Selling medical marijuana is illegal throughout the United States under Federal law, and therefore is not lawful activity anywhere in the United States. And despite some vigorous pressing of claims to the contrary from 1860 to 1865, the United States includes the State of Mississippi. Therefore there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of Clarence Cocroft’s commercial messages about his unlawful activity.
1861-1865
While amongst the first to secede, Mississippi didn't do so until January 9, 1861.
Damn. I knew both that South Carolina seceded in 1860 and that Mississippi was the second to secede, and I didn't bother to check the exact date for Mississippi.
I think the gunshots coupled with the bullet holes in the door of the apartment (and the casings in front of the door) indicate possible exigent circumstances allowing the police to open the door with a sledgehammer to make sure someone's not bleeding out on the other side.
Once they were in, there's a better argument that the lack of blood would indicate a low possibility that an injured person was hiding elsewhere in the apartment.
Hold up there, court, that’s quite the admission in that footnote. The cops in fact did *not* appropriately tailor their search to the exigency. And that matters because it calls into question whether their search of closets was *really* to find seriously wounded people who somehow got shot and managed to hide in another room without dripping any blood on the way.
That’s not “just as possible”. But even setting aside the probability of that scenario, I’m not sure that it qualifies as exigent circumstances if the person doesn’t want treatment and doesn’t want to talk to the police.
(The blockquotes in my post were correct. Don't know why the commenting software did that to them.)
Workaround: Put some non-blockquoted text first.
The website is messing up old comments that previously displayed correctly.