The Volokh Conspiracy
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Do Victim Impact Statements Help Promote Justice?
My new co-authored article reviews 168 victim impact statements from the Larry Nassar sentencing hearing and concludes that these statements show a victim voice at sentencing can improve justice.
Professor Edna Erez and I have a new article supporting victim impact statements. It is entitled "How Victim Impact Statements Promote Justice: Evidence from the Content of Statements Delivered in Larry Nasar's Sentencing." We will be presenting it at Marquette Law School later today.
In brief, we examine the 168 victim impact statements (VISs) presented at the sentencing of Larry Nassar for sex abuse. The article culls insights about what crime victims include in their VISs through quantitative and qualitative analysis of the statements presented. We conclude that content analysis of the 168 statements provides strong support for the use of VIS in criminal cases.
Here's the introduction:
Over the past several decades, crime victims' rights advocates have sought to amplify the victim's voice in the criminal justice process. A key part of that effort has been giving crime victims the right to deliver a victim impact statement (a "VIS") at sentencing before a sentence is imposed. Today, the federal system and virtually all states allow VISs in the United States.
While VISs are now firmly entrenched in the American criminal justice landscape, the wisdom of allowing such statements is sometimes disputed. Yet many arguments for and against VISs rest not on empirical data but rather on theoretical speculation about what those statements might look like, what victims' motives are in delivering them, or what effects the statements produce at sentencing. This reliance on speculation stems from the fact that surprisingly little is known about VISs. To be sure, anecdotal examples of particular statements have been cited by scholars, including by us. And various scholars have theorized about what VISs might usually contain. But, relatively little empirical work exists regarding VISs, either quantitative or qualitative.
This dearth of empirical research is partially explained by the difficulty in studying a "typical" VIS. Different crimes perpetrated by different offenders in different ways cause different forms of victimization. And even when the victimization stems from the same legally defined crime, the crime may take varying forms or be perpetrated in different social contexts, with different offender-victim relationships producing variable harms. Because each crime—and each victim—is unique, it is hard to determine whether victims' assertions in their VISs result from their unique circumstances. And that difficulty has left scholars wondering what factors might drive victim impact statements and their content generally.
Recently, a unique data set of VISs developed. In January 2018, Michigan Judge Rosemarie Aquilina allowed 168 direct and indirect victims of former USA Gymnastics team doctor Larry Nassar (or the victims' representatives) to all deliver VIS. The nation was riveted as Nassar's victims explained how Nassar had sexually abused them. The resulting set of VISs is rich in details about what kinds of assertions victims make in them. Nassar committed similar crimes against each of his victims, allowing a robust research approach to answer questions about the content, motivations for, and benefits to victims of submitting VISs. Specifically, it is possible to explore the question of whether (roughly) the same crimes produce (roughly) the same VISs. This data set also has the advantage of the absence of significant utilitarian motives for submitting the VISs, such as the desire to affect the sentence. When the victims prepared and delivered their VISs, they already knew that Nassar would spend essentially the rest of his life in prison. Thus, the opportunity to present the VIS itself drove victim participation. Further, the victims essentially had complete freedom in what they discussed and to whom they addressed their statements; their statements were completed without any "guidelines or control" from criminal justice personnel, as has been the case in some other sentencing hearings.
To explore issues surrounding the content of VISs, this article relies on a thematic content analysis of the VISs presented at Nassar's sentencing. The analysis generates both quantitative and qualitative information, focusing on such questions as why a victim chose to present a VIS, which audiences the victim was addressing, the types of harms the victim suffered, and the meaning of the opportunity to present a VIS. With those findings in hand, this article returns to the core question about VISs: Do they promote justice?
This article proceeds in seven parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the conventional understanding of VISs. The existing literature provides a general understanding of what victims say at sentencing but does not sufficiently capture the variegated experiences of victims.
Part II turns to the victims who delivered the victim impact statements analyzed here—specifically the 168 presenters (direct and indirect victims or victims' representatives) who made statements at the Nassar sentencing.
Part III describes the methodology used to review, code, and analyze the statements' content.
Part IV presents the quantitative and qualitative findings of the content analysis. We explore issues surrounding the victims' reasons for delivering a VIS; the length, structure, and manner of their VISs; the victims' descriptions of Nassar's crimes; the apparent intended audience for the VISs; and the possible therapeutic benefits from delivering the VIS for victims.
After presenting the content analysis results, Part V explores the implications of our findings for the debate over VISs in the criminal justice process. Our findings suggest that VISs are a useful feature of criminal justice. Most of the information the victims provided went directly to relevant sentencing issues. In addition, delivering VISs appeared to produce useful therapeutic benefits for victims. The VISs also served educative and perceived fairness purposes without appearing to impair the sentencing proceedings.
Part VI summarizes some of the limitations of our study.
Part VII briefly concludes by suggesting that our findings support the conclusion that the role of crime victims in the criminal justice process should continue to expand.
You can download the whole article here.
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Done well, I think victim impact statements could aid the court by setting forth the specific ways that the victims have suffered and the losses that they have incurred that might shed some light on an appropriate punishment. But that hasn't been most of the victim impact statements I personally have observed. They mostly consist of hurling invective at the defendant with little more. And while allowing the victims to vent may make the victim feel better, I don't see that it really aids the court in assessing an appropriate penalty.
And since most of the criminals are Sociopaths anyway they probably enjoy hearing the victims statements. This is one thing the Ear-Ronians do right, letting the Victim's family get in a few stab wounds immediately before the Execution. (And no modern "Lethal Injections" or even semi-modern "Drop" hangings, the old fashioned "Suspension" variety, just like they did in England 500 years ago)
And I understand with their version of Hanging, there's a very low Recidivism rate.
Frank
If justice includes “right-sizing” the sentence to the proportionality of the crime, it seems fine.
My Spidey Senses anticipate a Reverend Sandusky comment in 3, 2, 1,
Oh, yes, it will contain the words "Bettors" and "Klingers" only misspelled.
Frank
While interesting in some important ways, there is no way that a study of a single case can possibly support the claimed conclusion that VISs "can improve justice". 168 victim impact statements but only one sentence. No control.
Having made such an obvious logical fallacy, I can't help being skeptical about the author's methodology and other conclusions.
And you should be - it's an activist "paper", rather than real scientific research. They admit your point in the paper itself, as a point in their favor, of all things. Because previous research (one study) had shown no impact of VIS on sentence length, it doesn't matter that they can't show an impact.
Really, they're all in the on "therapeutical" value - which is probably why about half of the almost 90 pages of content is excepts from the court transcripts or the VIS themselves, rather than, say, numbers or analysis.
One can go through the ceremonial forms of social science, collecting interviews and such. But the question of what outcome constitutes “justice” is sufficiently value-laden and subjective thst going through these ceremonial forms can no more ensure that ones interpretation is scientifically justified than going through the ceremonial forms of building a runway, making radio sets out of coconuts, etc. can ensure a cargo cult that it will land a plane.
This article does nothing to address the main arguments against VIS. Justice shouldn't depend on the victim and unless the crime is a results crime (like murder) then treating offenders differently for the same conduct because the victim had a different reaction isn't promoting justice. It promotes the idea that some victims are worth more than other victims.
To the extent the VIS isn't about getting a judge to factor that into the sentence then a criminal proceeding isn't a place for that. There has been a very clear and important line between criminal trials were society is the victim and being represented by the government and civil proceedings where the individual is the victim. The mixing of the two isn't good for justice, its good for arbitrariness
Sentences in most indeterminate sentencing schemes are not based solely on the "conduct." For example, we allow offenders themselves to make statements to the court before sentences are imposed, with the assumption that those statements could affect the judge's sentencing. Why is it okay to treat offenders differently for the same conduct based on the offenders' post-conduct statements but not the victims'?
Because it is about like being treated as like. That includes both the offense and the offender. Someone who has a criminal history should be treated differently than a first time offender. When the offender speaks it gives judges information about the offender.
But an offense/conduct isn't worse just because the victim reacted differently. Criminal law is about the harm to society not the individual, that is what civil punishment is for. Nor is it worse because it impacted family or others differently. A drunk driver who kills a well respected and loved teacher isn't worse than the drunk driver that kills a guy with a history of domestic violence and an offender himself isn't worse because the victim reacted differently.
Those different reactions belong in civil not criminal proceedings
But you’re begging the question by arbitrarily assuming what does and doesn’t count as “like”.
There’s a wide range of conduct that constitutes a violation of any given statute, and ignoring those distinctions means that unlike cases will be treated alike. And “amount of harm inflicted” certainly seems like one of the relevant things to take into account.
Two people separate bar fights.
1st person punches a guy in the face he gets a black eye
2nd person punches a guy in the face, same place and force, eye injury results in being blind for life in that eye.
As I see it, and to be clear given a post later down this is all my opinion, those 2 indiviudals are the same for criminal purposes they did the same exact thing. The greater injury inflicted is 100% relevant to civil claims, so please don't think I'm claiming these things never sould have relevance. But in terms of societal harm, which historically has been the thing that is looked for in making something criminal rather than just civil, is the same because those people have done nothing different from each other. Obviously if the crime itself is a results based crime (homicide offenses, some assaults differentiate based on bodily injury) then that matters. But I think importantly that matters as an element of the offense, not just a factor the judge considers.
Now if the amount of harm inflicted is different because the conduct was different, even if the statute violated is the same, then yes that should be treated different because it is different. I don't know if every state has assault with a weapon as a different crime but say they don't just as way to explain what I'm saying. Two people get charged with aggravated assault one used their fist to hit someone in the face. The other used a baseball bat. Same offense, but not the same conduct. They should be treated differently.
I think there is a big danger in continually mixing these. That is why I think caps on punitive damages is good idea. That is bringing the criminal sphere into the civil. We treat criminal and civil wrongs differently for a reason.
I do think some of these dangers can be alleviated, though not removed, if there is a more narrow definition of harm, or maybe victim. I come back to the example I gave about the drunk driver killing a teacher or domestic abuser. It is very easy to say that the killing of the teacher caused more harm. But I don't think justice is served by making some people worth more than others. The current trend, however, that we see in saying what is harm and who are victims is getting us into that territory, if not already there.
I admire you for willing to state this so frankly. I think this is loony, but not disingenuous or anything.
But how do you (I mean, you personally, not an abstract you) deal with the fact that restitution is often an explicit part of a criminal sentencing scheme? That means that the harm caused directly gets factored in to the sentence, even if the conduct was identical.
1. I would prefer restitution to be handled a little differently than it is. I don't think it fully has to be in the civil realm, even though I do think that is the best place, but I do think we should separate punishment and restitution. VIS are fine for restitution, imo. It is punishment that is the issue. I don't see restitution as punishment, it is more like compensatory damages. So hand down a sentence and then have a restitution hearing would be my prefered method.
2. If it is restitution for a monetary crime I think that the value is important for the crime (e.g. Embezzlement, theft, fraud, etc) So they should properly be entered in the guily phase itself. But if it was enterd in the sentencing phase I don't think that specifically runs the same dangers as stuff like physical and emotional harm. It isn't going to be variable victim to victim but for the defendants actual conduct.
those 2 indiviudals are the same for criminal purposes they did the same exact thing
I know what you mean, in the sense that their act was the same, and their intention was the same (I stipulate) and their moral fault was the same. What differed was the consequence.
The consequence was probabalistic - ie either consequence was a known possibility for that particular act. But I don't think that it necessarily follows that person 2 has been hard done by, if he gets a longer sentence than person 1.
Suppose that persons 3 and 4 each steal a packet of cookies from the supermarket. And suppose the penalty prescribed by law is that all cookie stealers get to spin a roulette wheel. If it comes up black they get a $50 fine; if it comes up red they gets 7 days in jail, and if it comes up zero, they get off scot free. Person 3 spins and gets 7 days, person 4 spins and gets off scot free.
I wouldn't say that person 3 has been treated unfairly, simply because his punishment is greater than person 4's. The penalty was published, it just happened to be probabalistic. He was unlucky with his spin, compared to person 4, but he had exactly the same chances.
So when we come to person 1 and person 2, we just have a different kind of roulette wheel. When you punch someone in the eye, the likelihood is that you won't do much harm, and you'll get a light sentence. But there's always a chance that you will do a lot of harm, and you'll get a heavier sentence. But assuming equal punches, you had an equal chance to any other eye puncher, sentence-wise.
Moving away from theoretically equal punches, there's also practicalties. In reality it's not possible to say whether person 4's punch was equal to person 3's. But if person 4's punch blinds someone, while person 3's doesn't, then the probability (thank you Mr Bayes) is that person 4 punched harder. So by leaving the higher punishment to be decided by results, we err on the side of punishing the heavier punch.
That's mse326's earlier primary point. I think you're misstating it a little, in two ways.
First, the position seems to grant that different levels of punishment based on neither like cases treated differently, nor unlike cases being treated alike, isn't promoting justice (if it's EITHER/OR but not AND, and one side of that is begging the question, so is the other).
Second, yes, "a wide range of conduct" means that the “amount of harm inflicted” by that conduct will differ greatly. And the place to verify the amount of harm inflicted is during the trial (with rules of evidence and testimony under oath), because, even for conduct that is (hypothetically) exactly alike, different victims will have vastly varying reactions based on things far beyond what can be verified in court.
Paul Cassel has made a career on monetizing victim impact and I agree that if differential victim impact has a place in the criminal justice system, it would be in sentencing guidelines (and in the civil justice system, damages granted, which it already does). But I think Cassel has always greatly exaggerated that, and this paper is just one more attempt at furthering that goal.
Why does it include the offender, but not the victim? I think you're just begging the question here.
And you took the low-hanging fruit by talking about criminal history. (Which we do not need the defendant to provide in a pre-sentencing statement to the court, as that's just a matter of public record.) What about remorse?
I think offender matters where victim doesn't because we are punishing the offender. I don't know that I can be said to be begging the question, per se, when for most of countries history the focus was solely on offense and offender. Giving the victim more acceess in a criminal trial is relatively new.
I am largely a retributivist when it comes to sentencing ideals but that would mostly create a somewhat narrow range that the utilitarian factors can work within to say where. Remorse would be factored into rehabilitation. The motives of the defendant may shed light on what would be needed for deterrence.
When two people do the same act, I generally belive they should be treated the same because they are just as culpable. On shouldn't be treated more harshly because of the defendants reaction and one shouldn't be treated leniently because of dumb luck that less "harm" occurred. Basically punishment should be for what is in their control, not as much what is out. That is where I think civil claims by the victim is the proper place to do it. You are liable in civil claims based on what you did but the redress has been about what you caused. I think the proper role of government punishment in criminal matters should be almost solely for what you did. As I said homicide crimes are properly punished more I'm not completely absolutist. I just think the more individual victim harm gets injected the more we get variable sentencing that isn't really reflective of whether the two different offenders are actually different. It also creates a situation where the government essentially would value some lives over others (teacher v wino, doctor vs domestic abuser). I'm not unsympathetic to that thought or blinded to realities, but I don't want to be in a society where that is the status quo. Because it won't stop at the dichotomies we can all agree on. Each judge will over their own biases on whose life matters more.
I think the conduct itself should be the main driver of what is a just punishment. The differences between the offenders is for small adjustments within that range. Redressing the specific harm can and should be handled civily
The problem is, taking that to its logical conclusion, drunk driving where you run over a pedestrian in a crosswalk and kill him is not any worse than drunk driving where the pedestrian dives out of the way and you make it home. Firing a gun into a crowd isn't any worse if someone dies than if someone is only wounded or even if you get lucky and nobody gets hit. The difference in each case is things outside your control.
As I said, specifically with homicide offenses I'm not a complete absolutist. But I do think hitting someone is in your control even if your drunk. Maybe that is more what some would consider a legal fiction if put into practice but I don't think being inebriated enough that you can't drive safely means you lose all control. Even if you are passed out while I agree factually you aren't in control hitting someone is still a different thing you did. It isn't variable to the victims experience. Every victim that is hit by drunk driver is hit by a drunk driver, so I consider that conduct, not what would be part of a victim impact statement which is about what harm came of being hit. So hitting someone even if not intentional is different conduct. Whether that results in death, I agree it's not, but that is where I'm not fully absolutist.
As for firing into a crowd, or doing anything dangerous into a crowd I agree that that stuff isn't necessarilly in your control but I would also say the conduct there my retributivist baseline is more based on the probability that it would hit someone than that it didn't. So the person that hit someone would get what about what most people would consider appropriate but the person that didn't hit anyone isn't getting less than that for being lucky.
Perhaps this is where you and I have somehat talked past each other, though not completely. I treat the conduct as, as serious as the consequences are likely to be. Not based on a no harm baseline. So a person doesn't get less time because it didn't cause that much harm just like a person doesn't get more time because it caused more.
The offender's statement might reveal remorse, which could reasonably be considered in sentencing. A victim's statement might reveal facts about the impact of the crime, but the prosecution should be responsible for assembling that sort of factual information. But their purely emotional response doesn't seem like it should be relevant to sentencing.
Ah yes, "We're from the government, and we're here to tell you, the victim, what justice is, because you peasants are too stupid to figure it out the way we want."
Are you under the impression that the victim gets to choose what justice is?
Are you under the impression that is a reasonable interpretation of what I wrote?
Are you under the impression I am a lawyer arguing some fine point of law?
Are you under the impression that you are a lawyer arguing some fine point of law?
How should I take your statement then. If the government through prosecution and then a judge isn’t tasked with deciding what is a just result, who is?
Well, everyone. We are all entitled to our opinion as to what a just result would be, it's just that the judge's opinion (within the limits of the law) wins, in terms of practical consequences.
Although there is much highfalutin verbiage offered about crimes being offenses against the state and the majesty and dignity of the law, in reality the crime is an offense against the victim. But when the government steps in and prevents the victim (if still alive) from exacting his idea of justice, the government does not act "in loco victim" - it acts for itself.
Thus when the defending counsel peels his onion and launches into his heartrending tale of his client's tragic youth and eternally good intentions, that is one the actual parties involved in the crime exercising its right to appeal emotionally to the eternally, and eternally misguided, kind and gentle hearts of the jury / judge. What the perp thinks would be just is not concealed from those who decide what would be just on behalf of the state.
But the prosecution does not, as I say, represent the victim, it represents the state.
So there's no good reason why the other actual party involved in the crime - the victim - should not offer his twopennyworth on what a just result would be. So long as the actual deciding is done by those majestic and dignified officials of the state.
A guy kills a single woman/daughter.
A guy kills a mother/wife/daughter.
Same act (killing), same immediate victim (one female dead), but the full victim impact is different.
My point is that shouldn't be relevant in criminal proceedings. We have civil claims for that. But criminal law and justice should not be elevating one victim over another just because of their circumstances. They latters life isn't worth more than the formers
Why not? The total harm inflicted by the crime seems like a relevant and appropriate thing to think about.
No, we don’t.
There are tons of civil claims.
wrongful death, loss of consortium, Intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, etc.
And as in the OJ case, they stink of double jeopardy.
I don't think do specifically because they are to remedy different things (legally they definitely aren't but I know that wasn't your argument)
To be sure, there certainly are civil claims that could be brought by many crime victims. But many of the harms that crime victims suffeee, including some of the most salient l aren’t even theoretically compensable through a civil claim. Not to mention that the overwhelming majority of criminals are judgment proof.
What does the question whether a criminal is judgment proof have to do with the seriousness of the crime? Should Donald Trump's hypothetical murder in public in NY be less criminally punishable because he has resources to pay off his victim's estate?
Can you see that to suppose that supposes a class of defendants so privileged to do crimes that their resources put them above the law? That would leave them at liberty to offend at will, so long as resources to pay compensation did not run out.
How would that differ from a legal system which privileges nobility to molest commoners with impunity? Apparently, only because title of nobility cannot be exhausted like a bank account.
What, may I ask, the fuck are you talking about?
mse326 argues that harm to the victims can be and currently is properly taken into account by civil litigation. My response is that it is not. What on earth in that response could lead you to think I am suggesting that an offender’s wealth or lack thereof has anything to do with the severity of the offense?
Are you under the impression that the only victim of a murderer is the dead body?
Killing a wino on Sixth street who no one even knows his name leaves a different number of victims than killing someone with friends and family and co-workers who mourn his passing. It doesn't make killing winos less murder, but it does mean one has more victims than the other.
Crap about murder being only a crime against society is just so much crap.
In a criminal proceeding yes. In a civil proceeding no. That is what I’m trying to say. We are mixing the two in ways I think is harmful
And we are just going to have to agree to disagree on on your wino vs family man exaple. I don't think criminal law should be treating one life as more important that another. Civil law does that
By your argument, a country should treat threats against the life of the country's president exactly the same way as threats against anyone else?
This is where "societal" harm is important in criminal proceedings rather than "individual" harms. A threat against the President (or other public servant) is a greater harm to society because it is a direct threat against the civil order. Think of it as a threat against the office rather than the individual even if the individual holding the office is the reason. That is different conduct. But the President as an individual isn't more important. So to go to the drunk driving example if the driver hit an killed the President and there is nothing to suggest the President was a target then he should be treated no differently than if he hit a "normal" person.
So the conduct is different when something is directed at the President or public official BECAUSE of their office. The individual holding the office isn't above others but the office is because it is a greater societal harm to attack it's officers directly.
Then you agree that "criminal law should be treating one life as more important that another", you just have a narrower idea of which lives should be treated as more important.
Obviously I don't see it that way. The individual isn't more important, the office he/she holds makes it a different crime when that is the motivating reason for the crime. The conduct is different. If their position wasn't relevant to the crime or motivation then they are treated no differently. The individual life is not more important
Legislatures have significant freedom to change traditional forms. Just as a state can create an LLC which is a sort of hybrid between a corporation and a partnership, it can create a hybrid kind of legal process which lies somewhere in between purely private prosecution and purely public prosecution.
As in any hybrid, departing from a traditional pure form involves acquiring some of the disadvantages as well as some of the advantages of the other pure form.
People can have different views of what constitutes “justice.” I am skeptical that Professor Kassell’s use of the forms of social science adds anything to his personal views other than establishing that a substantial number of other people agree with him. He didn’t claim his study was a poll or had a basis to claim representativeness.
But yours is not the only view of “justice” either.
I never claimed it was the only view. I asserted it as my view, which it is, and said Cassel's article doesn't address those issues, which is true. That is the extent of what I said. I don't think I need to put "imo" in every post I make to say I'm only stating my opinion. When something is a matter of opinion, like justice, then the statement is a matter of opinion and by definition not the only one.
I've seen where the VIS presented evidence of the amounts in criminal fraud/embezzlement cases, which weighed on the amount of the restitution order. Different/unique situation though.
I agree the amount is relevant. I think there is something wrong if that can only be presented in a VIS though. If that is where the jurisdiction requires it then I think that should change, but a VIS about that is perfect acceptable to me
That would not even seem to count as a victim impact statement per the definitions used in the article above, though. Amounts embezzled leading to amount of restitution would be a factual element of the crime. Those would be objective measures presented against standards of proof and with established protocols to challenge the results. By contrast, the VISs described in the article above are inherently subjective.
If I recall correctly, the defendant pled to a lower charge but the aggrieved was able to get a restitution order for a higher amount, and the VIS was part of establishing that, but I don't know if that was the only component. The restitution order was even higher than the amount that was necessary to prove the original charges, as the detective and prosecutor went for the very low hanging fruit. In a handful of instances where clients have experienced embezzlement by key employees, it seems like prosecutor's offices and police departments are completely unable or unwilling to expend the necessary time and resources to even begin to fully investigate, and the client has to pay their own way if they want to bother with it.
So if none of the victims gave statements, Nassar would have gotten what sentence? I say the same.
So does Prof. Cassell!
I see no value in victim impact statements when the sentence is predetermined. They are pointless theater that does not promote anything worthy of the name "justice." If she wants therapy add the therapist's bill to the criminal's restitution order.
This piece doesn't really address the question about the effect of VIS on justice and even the claims of thereputic benefit seem pretty unsupported. Sure, you cite a study showing that people who give VIS may have these better features but absent comparison to a similar population denied that opportunity it's unclear what direction the causation goes.
More importantly, you try to have it both ways insisting that VIS are often considered as relevant to sentencing and that they don't increase the sentencing. Now maybe in the long term it may be true that VIS won't affect the *average* sentence but the only way this can be true is if failing to give a VIS which highlights just how bad the effects were means the offender gets a lighter sentence. That's just pure math, either they increase average sentencing or you balance the increases with decreases.
That puts victims in a bad situation where if they don't provide a VIS they know the person who harmed them might get a lower sentence. If also raises fairness issues about whether this will result in greater sentences when the victims can afford the time and attention to show up to give the statement and express themselves in a sympathetic cogent fashion.
Do we really want a system where murdering a homeless man with no friends gets a reduced sentence relative to a well liked victim? Because that's what the court personal weighing VIS logically entails.
My guess is that these statements cause serious class bias within the system, because well off people are sympathetic to jurors and judges and have the resources to compose compelling statements.
Meanwhile, a drug dealer shot and seriously injured in a drug deal gone bad may be suffering a lot of pain, but isn't going to get the same sympathetic reaction.
One objection to victim impact statements I don't think the article addresses adequately is cost. Cassel notes in passing that the judge in the Nasser case devoted roughly a week to hearing these statements and that the judge's docket "did not appear to be overwhelmed." But the sentence was essentially locked in already. In cases where that is not the case (i.e., the overwhelming majority) the defense would need an opportunity to rebut victim testimony to ensure exaggerations or outright falsehoods don't result in a longer sentence. Particularly in the case of indigent defendants, I wonder whether there is a meaningful opportunity to ensure the statements are reliable.
Cassel devotes a lot of space in his article to extolling the therapeutic benefits of these statements. The downside to this is that trial judges aren't well suited to facilitating therapy. In the Nasser case, the judge, no doubt in good faith, did a lot of handholding: "[that was wonderful"; "things are going to change"; "the system failed you"; "[y]ou are a pillar of strength"; and so on. Wouldn't a judge's impartiality be subject to question following this kind of praise for the testimony of trial witnesses in any other circumstance?
Finally, Cassell counts as a positive that these statements sometimes take aim at "enablers" or facilitators of the crime in question. He notes with approval that Michigan State trustees resigned shortly after the statements were given in the Nasser case. But is that how we want the culpability of others determined? It seems to me the alleged enablers ought to have the right to defend themselves rather than be attacked in drive-by fashion at a public hearing with no opportunity to defend themselves.
No doubt there are benefits of victim impact statements, but this article doesn't seem to grapple fairly with their costs.
"...defense would need an opportunity to rebut victim testimony to ensure exaggerations or outright falsehoods don’t result in a longer sentence."
I ask then as I am curious. Are VIS sworn statements? If a VIS is found to state a factual falsehood, would the victim be at risk for perjury? If so, has a person providing a VIS every been prosecuted for perjury?
I believe at least in some jurisdictions victims are allowed to address the court before sentencing without being sworn in. Not sure whether that is the norm or not. But even where victims are sworn, I would doubt there are any perjury prosecutions. After all, prosecutors typically coordinate and, to some extent, stage-manage victim statements. They would likely to be loathe to admit victim perjury even occurred, much less turn around and prosecute their erstwhile allies for perjury. I'll bet there have been contempt sanctions against victims, but probably no perjury prosecutions.
A stiffer sentence because the victim is better represented, can hire a better attorney, or is well-known and popular, or the crime was committed against someone whose death had more impact on the wider society because of their position, is not justice.
https://youtu.be/FmbwU3J-2kk
From page 57:
These professors are peddling particularly polemical horseshit.
At a self-described "libertarian" blog.
Carry on, clingers.
Perhaps this mixes unlike kinds of fruit, but if a VIS improves the quality of justice, what should we conclude about the merits of public executions for capital crimes? Are blood-thirsty crowds attracted to such spectacles improvements to the efficiency of the justice system, or are they cautionary reminders about flaws inherent in the jury pool?
This is the kind of "study" that makes a mockery of real science. You have a predetermined view of VIS's, you set your own goals for what "success" looks like for VIS's, and then unsurprisingly conclude that VIS's meet those self-described goals.