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Federal Circuit Rules Temporary-but-Recurring Flooding of Property by the Government is an Automatic per se Taking
If the government floods private property on a recurring basis, it is automatically required to pay compensation, and owners' claims are not subject to a balancing test.

In its recent decision in Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United States, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that temporary, but continuously recurring, flooding of private property by the government qualifies as a per se taking under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It thereby automatically requires payment of "just compensation." It is not subject to a balancing test of the kind that applies to other non-continuous flooding cases. The Federal Circuit is the appellate court whose duties include (among other things) hearing appeals of takings cases filed against the federal government. So its takings jurisprudence has great precedential force.
In this case, the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Fish and Wildlife Service had adopted changes to previous practices controlling the flow of the Missouri River, resulting in recurring flooding of land belonging to property owners in the area, including farmers whose crops were damaged or destroyed. The evidence suggests that the agencies will keep engaging in such intermittent flooding indefinitely. Here is the key passage from the court's takings analysis, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Kimberley Moore:
The trial court accepted based on the parties' stipulation that the flooding in this case is permanent, not temporary, in nature. Phase II, 151 Fed. Cl. at 592–93. In short, the Government has not ceased and does not plan to cease flooding Plaintiffs' lands. To the extent Arkansas Game & Fish II's narrow holding and reiteration of the well-established principle that permanent yet intermittent physical invasions are per se takings is not enough, the Supreme Court's decision in Cedar Point, issued after the trial court
decision in this case, makes that abundantly clear. It stated that the "approach in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission reflects nothing more than an application of the traditional trespass-versus-takings distinction to the unique considerations that accompany temporary flooding." 141 S. Ct. at 2078–79….In contrast to the temporary intermittent flooding at issue in Arkansas Game & Fish II, Cedar Point explained that permanent intermittent flooding is a physical taking subject to a per se rule. Id. at 2071…. The "government likewise effects a physical taking when it occupies property–say by recurrent flooding as a result of building a dam. These sorts of physical appropriations constitute the 'clearest sort of taking,' and we assess them using a simple, per se rule: The government must pay for what it takes." Id….
This is not to say that an analysis of whether a permanent taking or a trespass has occurred might not overlap in part with the Arkansas Game & Fish II analysis of whether a temporary taking or trespass occurred. But sometimes distinguishing between takings and trespasses will be much simpler. This is such a case. Where the government takes a permanent right of access, akin to an easement in gross, even if used only intermittently, it is unquestionably an appropriation of the owner's right to exclude. It is undisputed that the Corps has permanently burdened Plaintiffs' land with a right to access their land with flood waters…. And, as in Cedar Point, where California granted union workers "a formal entitlement to physically invade" the farmers' land, 141 S. Ct. at 2080, here the Government has permanently caused recurring physical occupation of Plaintiffs' land by floodwaters. The fact that the floodwaters come and go during the year, i.e., are intermittent, does not negate the existence of a taking. Those considerations "bear only on the amount of compensation." Id. at 2074.
I think C.J. Moore is right to cite the Supreme Court's ruling in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid (2021). If indefinitely recurring mandated access by union organizers is a per se taking, the same goes for indefinitely recurring flooding. If anything, the latter is likely to be far more intrusive and far more disruptive of the property owners' rights.
But I would have taken the point further. Cedar Point did not merely say that indefinitely recurring physical invasions are per se takings. It held that, as a general rule, "a physical appropriation is a taking whether it is permanent or temporary." Even temporary physical invasions qualify as per se takings under this reasoning, without the need for any complex balancing tests. To my mind, the same reasoning applies to temporary deliberate flooding, which - as already noted - is an even more severe physical burden on property rights than most other physical invasions, including the one at issue in Cedar Point.
In fairness, the Federal Circuit didn't need to go that far to decide this particular case. But she also need not have indicated that multifactor balancing tests should continue to apply "[i]n cases that are closer calls than this one." After Cedar Point, that should not be the case, at least not in situations where the government has deliberately authorized or undertaken the physical invasion at issue.
I expect this will not be the last case where courts seek to apply Cedar Point to situations where the government engages in deliberate flooding of private property.
Robert Thomas has a helpful and detailed discussion of various aspects of this decision at the Inverse Condemnation blog.
I wrote about the Supreme Court's ruling in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States (2012), which established a multifactor balancing test for most flooding takings cases, in this article, published soon after the decision came down. I and other commentators predicted that the decision would lead to litigation on how to apply its far-from-clear test. And that has indeed happened in the years since.
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Riparian ripeness -- capable of repetition, but evading review.
(Unless, perhaps en bank.)
Mr. D.
Now if you can somehow inject the stream of commerce, you will be good.
I do wonder about the how the river’s natural “uncontrolled” state, the much more controlled river of the peak Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) engineering, and a reversion to a controlled, but less-controlled, state should play out.
Compared to the pre-intervention river, “By March 2005, 95 percent of the River floodplain was developed for agricultural, urban,and industrial uses. J.A. 52,862.” All well and good, and I think there’s a strong reliance argument that can be made that deliberately flooding a specific parcel in the 95% is a taking.
What if the Corps simply declines to keep channelizing the river as aggressively, so that 10 or 20 years later only 90% of the former floodplain remains reliably dry while 10% (up from 5%) periodically floods? What’s the line between a “taking” and “natural process that the gov’t merely declines to stop from occurring”?
In another example, the Hawai’ian islands erode over time; the Pacific will eventually win. If the gov’t maintains a piece of shoreline for 5 or 10 or 50 years but decides to stop to restore a natural shoreline, is it a “taking” if someone’s property eventually falls into the sea due to erosion? Same issue with East coast barrier islands disappearing in hurricane storm surges. The gov’t didn’t take the land, the hurricane made it not exist.
I gave the same hypothetical below. It seems to me that under a per se rule there is no comparison to the previous state of things. If the government takes any action it becomes responsible and has to pay, which would seem to be quite a disincentive against government taking any action.
And not likely in the property owners’ interst, either.
Right, the net increase in land utility of having 95% of the former flood plain used seems beneficial to a lot of people.
Bottom line is that I'm curious about a lock-in effect: does any action by a government that merely fails to uphold a prior engineered solution against mother nature constitute a "taking"?
I think there's room for argument that government inaction is not necessarily a "taking". But having read the opinion, it doesn't really grapple with that Q, and the discussion of that facts is not that nuanced.
Suppose a river floods every year at a variable time and for a variable duration.
The government does an improvement project whereby the river still floods every year, but at a predictable time and for a predictable duration.
Has the government effected a taking?
Under a per se rule, it has. One doesn’t compare the situation after the government action to the situation before. The government action is per se a taking.
So if the government wants to do any sort of less-than-perfect flood control, it can’t under a per se rule. Once it takes any action, any flooding that occurs becomes attributable to it. Best to leave the river alone.
Though under that scenario, the value of the land before the improvement project is presumably low - the before/after comparison is a necessary part of the valuation of the taking.
The government might even be able to argue that "regular, predictable flooding" provides an increase in value, so there's no compensible taking. Facts like that are a part of the equation, and the decision in the OP doesn't really address those issues.
It's certainly interesting.