The Volokh Conspiracy
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From Windsor to Brackeen
Scalia was right: "The only thing that will 'confine' the Court's holding is its sense of what it can get away with."
I started teaching in August of 2012. One month earlier, the Court decided NFIB v. Sebelius. And one month later, a cert petition was filed in United States v. Windsor. At the time, I and everyone else recognized that DOMA was doomed. The only question concerned on what grounds the Court would rule. Would it be the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection "component" of the Fifth Amendment? Or would Justice Kennedy adopt a federalism-based argument--perhaps along the lines of a brief submitted by several Volokh conspirators. Ultimately, Justice Kennedy did what he did best: sprinkle a bit of Due Process, grate some Equal Protection, add a pinch of dignity, let it simmer over a low flame of federalism, and voila--Liberty!
No one really cared about the reasoning. What mattered was the bottom line--love wins! And more importantly, Justice Kennedy gave a green light to every judge to strike down marriage laws. But one part of the majority opinion seems especially relevant for Brackeen. The Court discussed at some length why the federal government, historically, "has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations." Indeed, the Court relied on this principle to show that the federal Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional.
One would think that Brackeen should have addressed Windsor. While DOMA merely defined marriage for purposes of federal law, leaving state laws intact, ICWA forces every state to enforce a federal domestic law. But Justice Barrett does not even cite Windsor. Look how quickly she cabins unhelpful precedent:
It is true that Congress lacks a general power over domestic relations, In re Burrus (1890), and, as a result, responsibility for regulating marriage and child custody remains primarily with the States, Sosna v. Iowa (1975). See also Moore v. Sims (1979). But the Constitution does not erect a firewall around family law.
Barrett cites several cases in which federal law pre-empts state family laws. But none of these cases comes even remotely close to what ICWA does. We aren't merely talking about preemption--ICWA dictates, even commandeers, states to award custody of children to tribal members. There is no precedent on point. Rather than cabining non-originalist precedent, Justice Barrett--as well as the other two Trump appointees--quietly extends federal power without any hesitation. And she drags James Madison into this sordid business:
Petitioners are trying to turn a general observation (that Congress's Article I powers rarely touch state family law) into a constitutional carveout (that family law is wholly exempt from federal regulation). That argument is a nonstarter. As James Madison said to Members of the First Congress, when the Constitution conferred a power on Congress, "they might exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Constitution of the States." 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791). Family law is no exception.
Justice Alito, in dissent, does cite Windsor, and calls out how unprecedented this holding is:
As the majority observes, we have held that federal legislation that regulates certain "economic aspects of domestic relations" can preempt conflicting state law. . . . But we have never held that Congress under any of its enumerated powers may regulate the very nature of those relations or dictate their creation, dissolution, or modification. Nor could we and remain faithful to our founding. "No one denies that the States, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, possessed full power over" ordinary family relations; and "the Constitution delegated no authority to the Government of the United States" in this area. Haddock v. Haddock (1906). It is a "most important aspect of our federalism" that "the domestic relations of husband and wife"—and parent and child—are "matters reserved to the States and do not belong to the United States." Williams v. North Carolina (1945).
In Brackeen, Justice Barrett has a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose approach to stare decisis. When the petitioners failed to fully consider every conceivable precedent, they failed to meet their burden. When petitioners identified that precedent does not support the respondents' case, they still failed to meet their burden because the Court set a new precedent.
Justice Scalia in Windsor was right, as always: "The only thing that will 'confine' the Court's holding is its sense of what it can get away with."
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ICWA = Indian Child Welfare Act? You don't state that.
There is a larger issue with overtones of the Holocaust here -- are Indians "Citizens" or are they "Indians", and I mean this in the sense of the Nuremberg Laws and all that followed -- Jews defined as "Jews" instead of "Germans."
It's one thing to attempt to place Black children with Black foster parents, Jewish with Jewish, etc., but you are still dealing with the "best interest of the child." Here the "best interest of the child" is ignored because of the race of the child. How does that not have overtones of Nuremberg?
Tribal Indians are of course NOT just US citizens. They have dual citizenship. Now, Alito makes a point of the fact that tribes are extending their claims to NION-tribal Indians, which complicates things....
For convenience, here are the Brackeen opinions:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-376_7l48.pdf
I argue that one can not be a dual citizen -- and that once was official US policy.
I think it's still US "law", isn't it? I'm more than a little concerned about the way the courts extend the Supremacy clause to "policy", even where that policy contradicts the actual laws the clause makes reference to.
FWIW https://www.usa.gov/dual-citizenship
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”
— U.S. Const. Am. XIV Sec. 1
So much for “one can not be a dual citizen.”
So much for any chance that you have a clue about how the law or Constitution bears on these issues.
The 14A does not grant tribal Indians citizenship. They got that in 1924 with the Indian Citizenship Act, (Snyder Act).
Should you want to do better next time you can consult a recent discussion of this in comments here, probably on one of Somin's open borders screeds, but maybe on an open thread. Just search for "John Elk" (adjudged by SCOTUS to NOT be a birthright citizen).
If the "best interest of the child" outweighs all other consideration, then any potential adoptive parents could commit large sums of money to the child in trust funds. Barring any other demonstrable unsuitability, it would seem to be more in the best interest of the child to have OK parents plus a huge amount of money vs just having OK parents. So you end up with a bidding war for adoption. (Not that money isn't already a factor in how easy it is to adopt.)
The consideration of harm to Indian tribes (already seen in the practices of "Indian schools") seems another valid consideration; the "best interest of society" may also be implicated.
Both Alito and Thomas argue that the Federal government has no business interfering in the issue, but you are free to make those arguments to the States.
“What mattered was the bottom line–love wins!”
Not my reaction.
This is how we got to the overclass (I eschew "elites") celebrating mental disease.
Telling that Blackman doesn’t disavow the gormless glee of his younger self.
Shocker.
Telling that you aren't even smart enough to recognize sarcasm.
In case anyone is wondering — because you'll never learn it from Blackman's "Spew whatever thoughts come into my uninformed head over dozens of posts" approach — the petitioners themselves did not cite Windsor.
Do you really think that's a good excuse for the Supreme Court to make conflicting case law?
If the petitioners didn’t argue that Windsor support their position, then no: I don’t think it’s particularly incumbent on the court to explain why it doesn’t.
This is what happens when judges get comfortable with exercising power...they exercise it more and more. Whether you are on the Right or the Left, this should worry you.
That makes no sense in this context - Bracken was an example of the Court declining to exercise power. It let stand the work of the elected branches, rather than legislate from the bench.
"Bracken[sic] was an example of the Court declining to exercise power. It let stand the work of the elected branches, rather than legislate from the bench."
Wrong. Brackeen was SCOTUS allowing the Federal government to exercise power that it did not have to override a State's elected branches.
Even if that were true, it would not make Darth Buckeye's statement correct or Aunt Teeth's wrong.
Justice Scalia in Windsor was right, as always
No need to fellate Scalia, Josh - he's still dead.
As are all the brain cells between your ears.
Enactment by the First Congress is not some guarantee of a statute's constitutionality.
It's a flaw in originalism how it overreads the early history of federal statutes - the Constitution's creation was a structural departure from the English system from which many legal practices were inherited.
A lot of originalists agree, and have realized it's better to remove or at least downgrade the significance of those considerations.
I've said that myself: That the founders didn't prohibit things in the Bill of Rights because they didn't see any temptation to do them. They prohibited things they thought the government might want to do.
These people were not plaster saints, sometimes they committed the very evils they themselves had banned. You can't just be mindless, and assume that things like the Alien and Sedition acts, that were swiftly abandoned, were constitutional just because they were enacted early on.
So originalist sources, practice, and tradition must give way…to what?
This seems a loophole in originalism into which one can insert every outcome one might wish.
I think for many originalists, that is its most useful quality.
Sure is for Thomas. My OP is a paraphrase of a recent dissent of his.
Professor Blackman might be better off trying to make some sort of argument for why Windsor applies, if he can, rather than simply castigate for not applying it.
The reason it doesn’t apply is rather obvious: Indian affairs are not and have never been regarded as purely domestic (as distinct from foreign) so far as states are concerned.
Professor Blackman doesn't include the passage from the Alito dissent citing Windsor in his post. It is a fairly unremarkable "See, e.g." to a bunch of cases, including Pennoyer v. Neff.
But Blackman DOES say “Justice Alito, in dissent, does cite Windsor…”
And here it is:
““The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States, and not to the laws of the United States.” In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593–594 (1890). “Cases decided by this Court over a period of more than a century bear witness to this historical fact.” Sosna, 419 U. S., at 404. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. 744, 766 (2013); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U. S. 210, 220 (1981); Simms v. Simms, 175 U. S. 162, 167 (1899); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 722, 734–735 (1878)”
As I understand it SCOTUS decided that Congress’ motive for the DOMA was an impermissible infringement on State regulation of the marriages of their inhabitants. But the Federal government has an interest in the country’s relationship with tribes that it doesn’t have in the relationship between married citizens in one State, so there’s that.