Today in Supreme Court History: June 2, 1952

6/2/1952: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer decided.

Comments

[Dan Schiavetta]

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (decided June 2, 1952): President cannot seize private property (steel mills which would cripple Korean War effort due to impending strike; steelworkers were willing to work for the war effort but mill owners sued) without Congressional authorization (Congress had refused to act) (this was just a motion for a preliminary injunction, i.e. the “shadow docket”, but Court decided entire case)

Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (decided June 2, 2014): international agreement criminalizing chemical weapons as codified by Congress did not apply to vengeful wife who spread toxic chemicals on husband’s car, mailbox and doorknob

Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (decided June 2, 1969): amusement park was not “private club” under exception to Civil Rights Act of 1964 so cannot have segregated snack bar

United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (decided June 2, 2008): defendant who received commissions from bets in illegal lottery not guilty under money laundering statute which refers only to “proceeds” and defendant did not share in lottery profits

Ann Arbor Railroad Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 658 (decided June 2, 1930): vacating Interstate Commerce Commission order rejecting rates proposed by railroads for transporting fruit from California because its reasoning was based on wording of a joint resolution of Congress as opposed to standards and procedures set forth in Interstate Commerce Act

Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (decided June 2, 1969): Miranda (applicable to trials after June 13, 1966) is not retroactive on retrial where first trial was before that date

Denver First Nat’l Bank v. Klug, 186 U.S. 202 (decided June 2, 1902): involuntary bankruptcy, now rare, allows a creditor to sue the debtor except if the debtor is a farmer (11 U.S.C. §303(a)); here the Court held it had no jurisdiction to review a jury finding of “farmer” for a couple of boring procedural reasons, but I didn’t even know there was such a thing as involuntary bankruptcy until I read this case

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (decided June 2, 1969): death sentence vacated because defendant not questioned about the voluntariness of his guilty plea and defense of hearing on sentencing was cursory; Court could rule on these questions even though not brought up in state court appeal

Capital City Light & Fuel Co. v. Tallahassee, 186 U.S. 401 (decided June 2, 1902): City did not owe business to electric company which was successor in interest after bankruptcy of municipal corporation chartered to provide city with power

Compaigne Francaise De Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (decided June 2, 1902): state had power to exclude foreigners from quarantined city despite Constitution giving power to Congress to regulate trade with foreign nations (art. I, §8, cl. 3); Congress could preempt local law but had not acted (I suppose this means there is no “Dormant International Commerce Clause”)

[Dilan Esper]

this was just a motion for a preliminary injunction, i.e. the “shadow docket”, but Court decided entire case

One of Professor Vladeck's compelling points about the shadow docket is that in the past, the Court usually took cases up, scheduled emergency oral argument, etc., in big cases that came up in a shadow docket posture, such as Quirin, Youngstown Sheet & Tube, and New York Times Co. v. United States. Nowadays, a case like Youngstown might generate a short per curiam with very little reasoning plus some dissents, and without full briefing and argument.

[Dan Schiavetta]

True.

Motions in appellate courts are (as far as I've been involved) decided only on papers, except when a temporary stay is requested. That's when you have to alert your adversary you are going to make the motion, and you both show up at the courthouse and make your arguments, typically before a single judge. It's a brief, cursory process, and sometimes there are no opposing papers at all. The Supreme Court has a slightly more expansive procedure, but it's still brief with an immediate decision. The problem has been that stays have been granted in a manner which in effect decides the full appeal.

[apedad]

Re: Daniel v. Paul

Petitioners, Negro residents of Little Rock, Arkansas, brought this class action . . . to enjoin respondent from denying them admission to a recreational facility called Lake Nixon Club owned and operated by respondent, Euell Paul, and his wife. The complaint alleged that Lake Nixon Club was a 'public accommodation' subject to the provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, . . . and that respondent violated the Act in refusing petitioners admission solely on racial grounds. After trial, the District Court, although finding that respondent had refused petitioners admission solely because they were Negroes, dismissed the complaint on the ground that Lake Nixon Club was not within any of the categories of 'public accommodations' covered by the 1964 Act. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, one judge dissenting. We (Supreme Court) reverse.

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 enacted a sweeping prohibition of discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin at places of public accommodation whose operations affect commerce. This prohibition does not et end to discrimination or segregation at private clubs. But, as both courts below properly found, Lake Nixon is not a private club. It is true that following enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Pauls began to refer to the establishment as a private club. They even began to require patrons to pay a 25-cent 'membership' fee, which gains a purchaser a 'membership' card entitling him to enter the Club's premises for an entire season and, on payment of specified additional fees, to use the swimming, boating, and miniature golf facilities. But this 'membership' device seems no more than a subterfuge designed to avoid coverage of the 1964 Act. White persons are routinely provided 'membership' cards, and some 100,000 whites visit the establishment each season. As the District Court found, Lake Nixon is 'open in general to all of the public who are members of the white race.' 263 F.Supp., at 418. Negroes, on the other hand, are uniformly denied 'membership' cards, and thus admission, because of the Pauls' fear that integration would 'ruin' the 'business.' The conclusion of the courts below that Lake Nixon is not a private club is plainly correct-indeed, respondent does not challenge that conclusion here. (wiki)

Raise your hand if you feel integration would ruin a business or our country.

C'mon now, be proud of your bigotry and racism!

[Michael P]

New York University asks you to hold its beer and watch this: https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/08/24/nyur-a24.html

[apedad]

So you’re saying you didn’t actually read the story you linked to especially where it says, “All floors are open to all students, who request residency on a specific floor prior to the start of the academic year.”

[Dan Schiavetta]

apedad:

To add a wrinkle to this view . . .

I lived in a small city in the deep south, cotton country, in 1980 – 1982. Though technically integrated, there was a black side of town and a white side of town. As a good Northern liberal, I hung out with black friends, and babysat their children, despite the warnings of my (Southern) white housemate, who said that people in that neighborhood would think I was a “narc”.

What struck me, as I accompanied my black friends here and there to stores and restaurants, was how degraded the black-owned businesses were. While the white-owned businesses on the main strip, with both white and black customers, thrived.

What I’m saying is: The only people who were hurt by desegregation were the black owners of the black businesses, less wealthy and living more on the edge, who couldn’t compete when the customer base integrated. In the Daniel case, if there was a black-owned recreational facility that only black people went to, it probably went bankrupt afterward.

That was a long time ago and I imagine the situation has improved somewhat, with black people moving into positions of power within the integrated market. At least I hope so.

[SRG]

Lake Nixon was subsequently purchased and is apparently still flourishing: https://lakenixon.com/about-lake-nixon/

[Syd Henderson]

Of course, what Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer has to do with Korematsu is anyone's guess. (The text link at top does go to the right link. Good case, too.)

[Dr. Ed 2]

Unless they feared being drafted,I never understood Youngstown sheet & tube because if the employees want to work, how do you have a strike? I know that the Korean conflict was not popular with the vets, who were pissed that they had to go back and fight another war, but the factory owners didn't have to go.

So who benefited?

[apedad]

The United Steelworkers of America wanted to strike not the individual company workers.

https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/343us579

[Dr. Ed 2]

Why WASN"T Bond charged with terrorism? The homeland security laws have been expanded to punching bus drivers (not cool, but not terrorism), etc/

[Michael P]

She was charged, and convicted. The Supreme Court overturned that conviction. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bond_v._United_States_(2014)

[SRG]

As a matter of English definition, terrorism requires that the victims not be the alleged malefactors against whom the criminal is reacting. Otherwise it’s just revenge.

[apedad]

Whoa! I've been involved with anti-terrorism issues for over three decades and have never seen that slant.

Here's the law's definition: http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title18/part1/chapter113B&edition=prelim