Today in Supreme Court History: May 29, 1917

5/29/1917: President John F. Kennedy's birthday. He would appoint two Justices to the Supreme Court: Byron R. White and Arthur J. Goldberg.

President Kennedy's appointees to the Supreme Court

 

Comments

[Dan Schiavetta]

Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 550 U.S. 618 (decided May 29, 2007): Title VII lawsuit as to sexual discrimination in employment (after 18 years plaintiff found that she was getting paid less than newly hired men in the same division) must be brought according to statutory language within 180 days of the act of unequal payment whether or not she knows about it (and of course she wouldn’t, unless she has a way to access the company’s payroll files every six months) (wording of statute changed to fix this result in January 2009 by the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the first bill signed into law by Obama)

​Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. — (decided May 29, 2018): police needed warrant to enter driveway and inspect stolen vehicle that was under a tarp, even though it was visible from the street and was parked in the same position as in photo of the (uncovered) stolen vehicle on defendant’s Facebook page

​Lagos v. United States, 584 U.S. — (decided May 29, 2018): lender defrauded by Mr. Lagos not entitled after guilty plea to reimbursement of its private investigation expenses ($5 million) under Mandatory Victims Restitution Act which applies only to out-of-pocket expenses incurred in participating in government prosecutions (for example, child care, lost pay, train fare, etc.)

PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (decided May 29, 2001): ADA required professional golfer with circulatory condition (?? how could he play a round of golf?) to be allowed to use golf cart because golf course was “public accommodation” (Scalia’s dissent as to “this incredibly silly question” and “Platonic golf” is pretty funny)

​Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (decided May 29, 1990): Double Jeopardy clause precluded prosecution for homicide after defendant pleaded guilty to DUI because arose out of the same conduct (Brennan and Marshall retired, and this was quickly overruled by United States v. Dixon, 1993; now Double Jeopardy protection applies only if the elements charged are the same)

​NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, 532 U.S. 706 (decided May 29, 2001): nurse supervisors were not “employees” entitled to be included in collective bargaining because they exercise “independent judgment . . . in the interest of the employer” as defined in the National Labor Relations Act though (exercising Chevron deference) affirms NLRB rule that employer has burden of showing supervisor status

​United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214 (decided May 29, 1922): voiding merger of railroads under Sherman Act; effect was to “materially reduce the free and normal flow of competition in the channels of interstate trade” (even though buyer had propped up seller by guaranteeing notes to the United States)

​Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485 (decided May 29, 1911): dispute between users of river that flowed from Montana to Wyoming and back again would be decided by common law as if there were no state boundaries

Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (decided May 29, 1911): Oklahoma legislature could change capital from Guthrie to Oklahoma City in a manner different from that specified by Congress in the Act admitting the state to the Union (suit was brought by Guthrie businessmen)

​Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat’l Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (decided May 29, 1973): radio station’s flat ban on political viewpoint ads did not violate First Amendment or Fairness Doctrine (since abolished) and did not violate “public interest” obligation placed on network by FCC (at issue were anti-Vietnam War ads by a private business group and DNC ads expressing Party views and asking for funds)

[Dilan Esper]

The Southern Pacific railroad case reminds me of a different railroad merger case in the 1980's when Southern Pacific tried to merge with Santa Fe-- the merger was invalidated as anti-competitive because it would have given the combined railroad complete dominance in the Southwest.

The problem is, the railroads started repainting their cars and engines with the new "SPSF" logo before the merger was approved. The joke was that "SPSF" stood for "Shouldn't Paint So Fast".

[David Nieporent]

Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 550 U.S. 618 (decided May 29, 2007): Title VII lawsuit as to sexual discrimination in employment (after 18 years plaintiff found that she was getting paid less than newly hired men in the same division) must be brought according to statutory language within 180 days of the act of unequal payment whether or not she knows about it (and of course she wouldn’t, unless she has a way to access the company’s payroll files every six months) (wording of statute changed to fix this result in January 2009 by the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the first bill signed into law by Obama)

That's not correct. The issue in Ledbetter was whether each discriminatory payment was a separate violation of Title VII that restarted the statute of limitations clock, or whether the actionable event was the initial setting of discriminatory pay. SCOTUS held the latter, but it did not hold that she couldn't have argued for tolling. In fact, Ledbetter's attorneys never argued for a discovery rule, because it wouldn't have helped her because she actually did know about the fact that she was purportedly discriminatorily underpaid. (There's no dispute that she was paid less, but whether that was for discriminatory reasons was never established, and because she waited decades to sue, she'd have made it almost impossible to address that issue in litigation; the people who set her pay were gone/dead by the time she sued.)

Moreover, her attorneys had inexplicably dropped her Equal Pay Act claim, which would have awarded her relief under her theory about the case, as it, unlike Title VII, does apply to each underpayment.

[Dan Schiavetta]

My summary is correct as far as it goes.

We don't know why she abandoned her Equal Pay Act claim, or why she did not argue for a discovery rule. She did argue that pay disparity is hard to detect. And from all accounts, she didn't find out about the disparity until she was about to retire. She herself says so here
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K1LSW4GPuAc

Discriminatory reasons were established by the verdict in the District Court. See the Circuit Court opinion, 421 F.3d 1169, 1176.

[David Nieporent]

We do know why she didn't argue for a discovery rule, not in the sense of her lawyers coming out and saying, "We didn't argue for a discovery rule because…", but based on the fact that she admitted in her deposition that she had learned about the pay disparity many years before she brought her suit.

[Dan Schiavetta]

Can you can give me a direct cite to the deposition testimony? I can't find one and it's not mentioned in the court opinions.

[SRG]

Scalia’s dissent in Grady states. “But that Clause guarantees only the right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, and has been interpreted since its inception, as was its common law antecedent, to permit a prosecution based upon the same acts, but for a different crime. ”

This is decidedly not true in English common law, and I am surprised therefore, that it’s true in American common law – unless Scalia is mistaken. Of course, the double jeopardy clause does restrict the right to “offenses” not “acts”.

[Mr. Bumble]

Does it matter when the dual sovereigns get two bites of the apple?

[SRG]

It should, but it doesn’t. However, one can distinguish many of those “Mississippi-Burning”-type cases by noting that as the defendants were not in actual jeopardy, no double jeopardy attached, cf one of my favourite cases, the Illinois case of Aleman, who was acquitted of murder at a bench trial, but the judge had been bribed and so it was ruled later that he was never under jeopardy, hence a retrial was permissible.

[David Nieporent]

but the judge had been bribed and so it was ruled later that he was never under jeopardy, hence a retrial was permissible.

Law & Order ripped that case from the headlines.

[SRG]

BTW the Ledbetter case reminds me of Lance Armstrong's argument that he only lied once about taking steroids, because all the other times he was merely repeating the same lie and that didn't count

[Dan Schiavetta]

Yes — that was the defense used!

[SRG]

Yup - and utterly preposterous that it succeeded.

[David Nieporent]

Nope. (Well, nope if you're talking about Ledbetter. See my comment above.)

[SRG]

Just saw your analysis. With the leave of the court, I preserve my "utterly preposterous" claim but attach it to Ledbetter's attorneys' actions instead. Lance Armstrong is still a lying POS, though.

[Dan Schiavetta]

See my response to David above.

[Krayt]

Businessmen sued because their businesses were in Guthrie. Maybe others didn't like that, or had their own land in the other place. I wonder if any motives were pure.

[Dan Schiavetta]

The issue was how they moved it. Congress had specified that it should be at Guthrie until at least 1913 but Oklahoma formed a new constitution and moved it in 1910. This was Congressional overreaching and I suppose an application of the Tenth Amendment. Lurton’s opinion mentions other objections to that constitution which the Court didn’t pass on because they were matters of state law.

Certainly what was really at issue wasn’t some Tenth Amendment principle but a battle for $.