The Volokh Conspiracy
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Neither the Constitution Nor Common Sense Supports the Argument the Debt Ceiling Is Unconstitutional
Professor Prakash dispatches the arguments for unilateral Presidential authority to disregard the debt ceiling.
As negotiations between Congress and the White House over the debt ceiling proceed, some continue to argue that the President should invoke the 14th Amendment as authority to circumvent the debt ceiling. As I noted before, this is not a new debate, but the claims continue.
In Thursday's WSJ, University of Virginia law professor Saikrishna Prakash explains why "neither the Constitution nor the law nor common sense" supports the argument that the debt ceiling can be disregarded. Professor Prakash starts with the text:
The 14th Amendment is often cited but rarely quoted. Section 4 both repudiates Confederate debt and promises to honor U.S. debt. The provision at issue provides that the "validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law . . . shall not be questioned." Section 4 doesn't address default or other failures to honor terms of a debt contract. It bars repudiation. A debtor who is late on a payment isn't questioning the debt's validity; he is merely tardy. To my knowledge, no one on either side of the debate is suggesting that the U.S. repudiate its debt.
Further, even if one assumes the 14th Amendment bars debt defaults, it nowhere authorizes the president to take whatever measures he deems necessary to prevent default. It no more empowers him to take such measures than it does you or me. As per the Constitution, Congress, not the president, has the power to "borrow money on the credit of the United States." If the Constitution bars default and more money is needed to prevent default, Congress must act. The president can't issue debt on his own say-so.
Prakash further notes that insofar as the 14th Amendment obligates the President to act to ensure that debts are paid, this would require the President to prioritize paying such obligations over making other appropriations.
If Congress fails to raise the debt ceiling, the only reason there would be a default is if the executive fails to pay the interest on the debt as it comes due. But if the executive branch believes there is a constitutional requirement to pay the interest, why would it even consider refusing to do so? To my knowledge there is no law that prevents the executive from prioritizing interest payments above all other spending.
In fact, there is an argument that having by statute pledged the "faith of the United States Government," Congress implicitly prioritized the payment of the interest and principal. If the debt ceiling isn't raised, the Treasury should pay the interest as it is due and spend less than Congress appropriated. That would be the best solution in the wake of a mismatch between total inflows (taxes plus new borrowing) and Congress's desired spending.
Not only does the President lack the authority to disregard the debt ceiling, he also lacks the constitutional authority to borrow funds without congressional authorization.
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The House has already passed legislation to raise the debt ceiling. If the issue is that critical then the Senate should also pass it and the president should sign it.
The House plan includes spending cuts which Biden and the Senate Dems don't want; therefore they are threatening to do nothing and blame Republicans for the result.
You’re acting like Biden’s request for a clean debt limit increase is some kind of Democratic Party power play. In fact it is what any responsible country would do. He wants the U.S. to pay its bills — most of which were run up by Republican Administrations.
Administrations don't in any serious way "run up bills". Congresses do that.
And, no, no serous country would act as if debt can grow to the sky at an insane rate.
This is not about the debt growing. It is about paying the existing debt, which is by now largely a Republican creation.
"This is not about the debt growing. It is about paying the existing debt"
Except the only reason that not raising the debt ceiling might conceivably lead to a default on existing debt is because the government has for decades been paying off old debt with new debt.
But doing that converts interest into principle which increases the total debt.
What they have been doing is like you using one credit card to pay off another.
I used to buy the argument that the National Debt was the sum of appropriations over time minus taxes collected over time.
Then President Biden evaporated or attempted to evaporate about a half trillion worth of student debt, thereby spending a substantial sum without appropriation. Although that's still in the court, I came to no longer believe the assertion that all of the debt represents duly appropriated funds.
-dk
Correct, it is. They don't want to reduce spending because that's how you buy votes so you can win so your spouse's latent investment genius will rise to the surface and manifest.
"Tell 'em...tell 'em we're about to run over a cliff, and we just can't tap the breaks even a little bit."
"Hehe. What a bunch of idiots."
Of course the time to correct back to fiscal sanity is when spending and the budget is being considered, not when the time comes to pay for what has already been spent.
To summarize the standoff
A faction of republicans want adult supervision of the governments fiscal spending policies. (not all republicans, but a significant faction)
All the democrats are actively trying to have spending policies consistent with Argentina, Venzuala, greece.
But all the house is offering in exchange for their desired policy preferences is to lift the debt ceiling. They should be blamed. All it takes to left the debt ceiling is to lift the debt ceiling. Trying to extract extra policy preferences is on them, because this is unnecessary to lift the debt ceiling. They just want them, and without any reciprocal policy concessions. That is why it's a ransom, not a negotiation. If there is any negotiation at all, it is just about the ransom price.
Blah, blah, blah.
The (D)s want unrestricted spending even more than the (R)s, and the (R)s will give it to them. That this involves political horse trading is just SOP.
But all the (R)s are offering to trade is to lift the debt ceiling. Nothing else. Just one horse... And the (R)s know they'll eventually have to give up this horse anyway. The list of want they want in exchange is much much longer.
So what?
As I wrote, "The (D)s want unrestricted spending EVEN MORE than the (R)s..." So they can maybe get something for it, and if they can why should they not?
Not an informed response.
What nonsense you post, Gandydancer. Republicans have never tried to stop, or even to slow, increases in Federal spending, at least, not since the 1970s. The Republicans just say they want to. This is not disputed any more by any serious economist, historian, or accountant.
Revisionist history: Basically every debt ceiling crisis has been the Republicans trying to stop or slow increases in federal spending. They've failed, yes, and maybe not even tried as hard as they might have, but that's not the same as never trying.
Hitting the debt ceiling is basically the only occasion that allows forcing a debate on spending levels anymore. If you don't use it for that, the debate never happens.
These debt ceiling crises only happen when the Democrats control the White House. Otherwise, the GOP just raises the debt ceiling without any fuss.
The notion of a debt ceiling was imposed when Congress stopped determining specifically how to fund each and every appropriation - right down to, if borrowing was required, bond interest rate, term, and amount - and instead delegated that task to the Executive with limits set on how much the Executive could borrow.
If Congress' intent was that for the next 100+ years Congresses would just rubber stamp raising the debt ceiling every time it was in risk of being exceeded, why did they bother to impose one at all? That would make little sense. So obviously it was anticipated that future Congresses would NOT just rubber stamp without conditions increases in the debt ceiling.
Perhaps Congress shouldn't have delegated that task, just as perhaps they shouldn't have delegated so much of their power to the EPA or the FDA or any other of the agencies in the Executive, but they did -- and placed limits on that power. I've not heard that Biden is calling for Congress to take back all those improvidently delegated powers - perhaps he should.
Your formulation begs the question of what "the issue" is.
But suppose biden ignored the debt ceiling. Would anybody have standing to stop him?
And if any new bonds were sold and financial institutions held them, would courts unwind all of this?
Even if prakash's constitutional argument is correct, would there be standing to make it and/or would the courts enforce damages by invalidating financial instruments?
A great argument is of less use if there is no place to make it or no realistic expectation of substantive relief.
The next president could declare those particular bonds illegal and default on them, and them only. So purchasers are going to be very wary, I think.
Just declare? Something has to be debt in order to default on it. Default isn't possible on non-debt. And the validity of debt must not be questioned.
Read the damn article. The validity of debt AUTHORIZED BY LAW shall not be questioned. "Debt" authorized by Biden can be ignored, and it would be salutary to do so.
The courts might do so as well.
Congress should just announce that unauthorized debts won’t be honored.
Since money can’t be spent unless it’s appropriated, the Treasury probably doesn’t have the authority to pay back unauthorized debts anyway.
I'm assuming that one of the gimmicks that have been proposed would be used, not just that new debt would be sold by fiat. It wouldn't be clear that it was unauthorized until a court so held.
Nonsense. It would be perfectly clear that the debt was unauthorized even if some out of control court were to hold otherwise.
It wouldn’t be clear that it was unauthorized until a court so held.
The issue would be finding lenders happy to lend on so flimsy a prospect of repayment as "it isn't clear that it's unauthorized."
There's a question of whether debt issued by the executive without house approval would be legitimate. After all the constitution says only Congress can borrow on the credit of the United States.
There isn't just a question about it, there's an answer: It wouldn't be.
Congress itself. They get standing when the executive violates a law, and they get authority to stand in an defend a law if the executive won't.
Whether congress will try to step in or not is, of course, a separate question.
And it’s quite obvious to anyone who thinks the law is the written text. If you think your feelings are the law, you may be confused though.
You’re right. Adler. But it’s ridiculous to have a budget process and a separate debt process. The only sensible thing to do is either eliminate the debt ceiling or tie it automatically to the budget, as it was under the Gephardt rule.
What does "sensible" have to do with the doings of the Federal government?
Not a serious response.
I suspect the issue is the Senate's legilslative filibuster rule. The reconciiation relaxation which allows budgetary laws - tax and spend, subject to various conditions - to pass with a bare majority, does not include increases in the debt limit.
Thus if you are in the position the Dems were in in 2022, you can pass a yuuuuge budget (with the necessary reconciiation gimmicks) without having to deal with a filibuster, and you can kick the consequent debt limit problem down the road. And then say "c'mon you wreckers we've passed the budget already !"
So the problem is really different rules for the two bits. Either the budget and the debt limit should require the 60 votes, or neither.
A practical solution would be to wait until late October in a Presidential election year, where things look pretty even in the polls (so neither side feels it has an inherent advantage) and then agree a Senate rule change to bring the debt ceiling within the budget reconciliation rule. That way you can do the budget and the debt ceiing at the same time.
One aspect of the ridiculous argument about the President being able to raise the debt ceiling via the 14th Amendment is the concept that Congress has the power of the purse. I think the Framers really intended for this power to be substantial, but from the very beginning the Executive branch made this power much more limited than intended. For example, the Executive could commit the country to undeclared war, and it has been very difficult for Congress to do anything about it.
And, raising the debt ceilign is not the same as defaulting on debt. The Executive, as stated in this article, must pay the interest on the debt without borrowing additional funds. That means lots of spending is cut off. Will we even notice?
It has been politically difficult for Congress to do anything about it, not legally.
Except one could argue that the 14th Amendment overrides that power of the purse, given that it was ratified some 75 years after Article I.
I disagree only with your assignment of cause. The Executive branch did not "make" Congress' power of the purse more limited - Congress did. They ceded their own authority in the name of party politics and actively allowed the Executive to fill the power vacuum. Executives through the years were wrong for giving in to the temptation but Congress was more wrong for putting that temptation in front of them.
Congress has the power of the purse. It is debatable whether the executive can unilaterally cut spending. If some members of Congress want to argue that the President does have that power, Biden could propose targeted cuts that only impact the districts of those members of Congress who argue that the President has the power to do that. That might cause those members of Congress to rethink their position.
Anyone understand the notion of consol bonds? My understanding, which could be far afield, is that they are bonds with a face value, sold at auction, with interest rates so high that the bids come in well above the face value. They are redeemable at face value after a period sufficient to assure the purchaser whatever return is necessary to make the deal work.
The point of mentioning them is that they seem to offer a means to raise money to keep the government going without increasing the debt ceiling. With a face value lower than the auction sales price, they bring in more money immediately than they add to the debt, so they are capable to drive total national debt down instead of up. The bid money above face value can be used to pay off other bonds.
Long term, of course such high interest rates may prove troublesome. Maybe short term too, if selling consols affects the prices of other bonds. But an argument I read about the concept insisted that issuance of consol bonds can satisfy every legal requirement, while raising money to keep the government going, without raising the debt ceiling.
Not my field at all. I am skeptical that I have even understood this concept. I would welcome correction. I would like to hear from anyone with bond expertise.
Consol just means "consolidated" and refers to the practice of refinancing a bunch of other bond issues with a new "consolidated" one. Traditionally consols were issued as perpetual debt, redeemable at the issuer's option. So in modern finance speak, a perpetual annuity with an embedded issuer call option.
There's nothing inherent in the concept, or in past practice, that implies a weirdly high interest rate.
What you're looking for is simply a bond issued at a premium. ie one issued with an interest rate above the current market rate, so lenders will pay more than the redemption amount to buy it on issue. If you were a corporation and you did that, you would have to include the initial issue price, not the redemption amount, as your liability in your financial statements. Otherwise you'd be going to the pokey.
But if you're the federal goverment, maybe you can get away with saying you only have debt of the redemption amount, for the purposes of the debt limit.
I've been following discussions
You don’t need more borrowing or to increase the ceiling to pay the interest. Government’s tax stream incoming can pay it direcly.
Other stuff gets shorted. But the debt payments won’t.
Hypotherical president: We must pay interest on debt timely. Therefore I am paying it out of the year round stream of tax money. Ahahahahaha, good one. Both sides are facetious assholes.
Wouldn’t it be fun to be one of the people chucking things into the top of echo chambers, and see the automata scurrying around to burp it up, watching them enjoying the sweet, sweet activation of the feeling (voice of Jar Jar) “Meesa good person!”
“Look! You can see their pleasure neurons activating as they start feeling the goodness from barfing up the shit we just
fed themordered them to believe!”I’ve been following discussions among people more qualified than I, and two sides seem to be sorting themselves out. One uses the argument Professor Adler identifies as coming from Professor Saikrishna Prakash.
The other seems to assume the President is being presented a debt ceiling choice resulting, no matter the decision, in a constitutional violation. That is...
• Constitutionally, Article 3 Executive cannot usurp Article 1 (Section 8) Powers of Congress “To borrow Money on the credit of the United States.”
• Constitutionally, Executive must spend the money Congress appropriates (SCOTUS 1998 Clinton v. City of New York rejection of line-item veto).
Both sides have lots of cites and arguments supporting their positions (e.g., Prof. Prakash saying "Section 4 doesn't address default or other failures to honor terms of a debt contract' while others say that's exactly what it does.
I am not qualified to judge whose underlying constitutional assumptions are correct. But as far as I can interpret it, a President could argue that, given the failure of Congress to resolve its own constitutional contradiction (voting to both mandate spending exceeding income and block debt acquisition to pay for it), the Executive must make the decision enabling the lesser of the two violations, and most in the spirit of constitutional requirements—not the least being to:
… form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity…
Both sides of this crowd seem to consider the 14th Amendment argument—“The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law … shall not be questioned”— [even by Congress], as not dispositive, but more logically advanced as evidential support.
Biden hinted at that in mentioning the 14th Amendment last week, but also included a caveat about triggering legal action that might end up causing a debt default anyway.
I really hope all this never comes into play because, if SCOTUS must ultimately resolve the question, that resolution may come too late.
Those arguing the President has some unilateral power to ignore the debt ceiling conflate "debts" and "liabilities", but they are not the same thing. Debt (and the "public debt") is only the amount owed on borrowed money. It does not encompass every financial liability such as wages payable. Prof. Adler notes the absurdity of those calling on the President to "invoke the Fourteenth Amendment" because its language actually undercuts their position. And common sense and reality tell you if you have $1000 in obligations, but only have $500, you just have to prioritize, and there's no reason not to prioritize interest on debt.
That second point is one that also has been discussed before: the Executive must spend _available_ funds as Congress dictates.
"A Nation cannot plunder its own treasury without putting its Constitution and its survival in peril. ... Failure of political will does not justify unconstitutional remedies. ... It follows that if a citizen who is taxed has [a] the measure of the tax or [b] the decision to spend determined by the Executive alone, without adequate control by the citizen's Representatives in Congress, liberty is threatened. Money is the instrument of policy and policy affects the lives of citizens. The individual loses liberty in a real sense if that instrument is not subject to traditional constitutional constraints." The same voices who made that statement provided useful clarifying logic and examples.
Yes, congress is putting the Constitution and its survival in peril if it forces the president to choose between two unconstitutional options.
Constitutionally, Executive must spend the money Congress appropriates (SCOTUS 1998 Clinton v. City of New York rejection of line-item veto).
Not spending Congressionally appropriated money has nothing to do with line item vetoes. The latter concerns the constitutional processes for making law, and the consequences if they are not followed. The former concerns what the President does with a law whose constitutionality is not in question.
Not spending authorized money may be, depending on the precise circumstances, a breach of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. But the fact that impoundment was not unusual prior to 1974, and that to regulate it, an Act was considered necessary, demonstrates clearly that there is no constitutional obligation to spend authorized money.
So these two constitutional principles allegedly duking it out, in fact constitute one actual constitutional principle and one piece of common or garden statute law, which excitable "Borrow More Now !" folk have dressed up in a constitutional clown suit. And which is in any event highly unlikely to apply when the President declines to spend money he hasn't got.
It seems obvious what a president should do if Congress refuses to raise the debt ceiling. Professor Adler is right: Congress would be forcing a violation of the Constitution, sure, but that would not justify the president in unilaterally appropriating the necessary funds or unilaterally somehow raising the debt ceiling on his own authority. That is, as Professor Adler points out, the exclusive privilege, authority, and obligation of the Congress, which the president cannot and should not try to usurp.
What the president should do instead, is: have those members who vote against raising the debt ceiling arrested, and hold them in Federal prison until they fulfill their responsibility and comply with the requirement to raise the debt ceiling.
Since they would be at risk if exposed to the general population, the recalcitrant congressmen and senators should be held in segregated housing (aka “the hole”) while they are in prison.
If they need to vote in person, have them be escorted to the floor of the House or Senate, in orange jumpsuit and shackles, like any inmate who needs to leave the prison for administrative reasons.
Here's the idea:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kKdUsJU-cQ0&t=90s
That would obviously violate the speech and debate clause.
I think your formulation is incorrect. The money has already been appropriated. The debt ceiling is preventing the spending of that money as there's no money to spend without more borrowing.
Congress would be forcing a violation of the Constitution, sure,
No. Failing to spend money that the President doesn't have available to spend, even if it is authorized to be spent, is not a breach of the constitution. Indeed it's only very doubtfully a breach of statute law - the Impoundment Act is written in terms consistent with a deliberate Executive Branch decision or plan not to spend money, rather than in terms of an empty kitty.
As to a breach of statute law, it seems unlikely that a law commanding you to present yourself in court in Dallas next Tuesday at 10am could be enforced against you if the reason for your absence was that you were being held in federal prison in Little Rock. Ditto Presidents with empty pockets.
but that would not justify the president in unilaterally appropriating the necessary funds or unilaterally somehow raising the debt ceiling on his own authority.
True - those would be actual breaches of the constitution.
That is, as Professor Adler points out, the exclusive privilege, authority, and obligation of the Congress, which the president cannot and should not try to usurp.
Nearly right, except Congress is under no such obligation.
After that you move off into somewhat brownshirty, or Red Guardy, territory.
"The provision at issue provides that the "validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law . . . shall not be questioned." Section 4 doesn't address default or other failures to honor terms of a debt contract. It bars repudiation. A debtor who is late on a payment isn't questioning the debt's validity; he is merely tardy. To my knowledge, no one on either side of the debate is suggesting that the U.S. repudiate its debt."
I think this goes a bit too far.
The purpose of the clause is to reassure creditors. In my experience creditors are much more concerned about whether they actually get paid, than whether you abstractly acknowledge the debt. Admitting that you owe them the money while nonetheless not paying them does diddly squat for their bottom line.
But I guess I understand: There's a desire here to pretend we haven't repeatedly violated this clause of the 14th amendment. For instance, when FDR 'paid' debts that specified they had to be paid in gold, and nothing else, with inflated currency instead, violating the explicit terms of the loan.
Admitting we've violated it before might normalize such behavior, lower the threshold for doing it again.
Anyway, I think it's worth pointing out that, while borrowing money without Congressional approval is a constitutional violation, and not paying our debts is a constitutional violation, as is spending money without an appropriation, not spending appropriated money is merely a statutory violation. It was perfectly legal, and an accepted power of Presidents, until 1974.
When the only choices are constitutional violations or a statutory violation, there is no choice: It is the statute that must be violated. That's what it means to say that the Constitution is the "highest" law of the land, after all.
I wonder what it's like to be so devoted to ever increasing federal spending that even the prospect of reducing spending levels to circa 2018 levels, (Which is where we'd have to cut spending to, to balance the budget tomorrow.) strikes you as so outrageous that you'd rather either outright violate the Constitution, or invent some stupid ploy that would prove to our creditors world-wide that we were, finally, utterly unserious?
How is the debt issue more 'constitutional' than all the other parts of the constitution ignored by the federal government?
Well, it's not, of course. And the list of constitutional clauses that are routinely violated is getting pretty long.
Still, why add to it?
"To my knowledge there is no law that prevents the executive from prioritizing interest payments above all other spending."
Actually, there is an argument being made that the "Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act" of 1974 does in fact prevent the executive from choosing not to spend money. There's also an argument that the presentment clause of the constitution does the same.
And if the president could choose to not spend money Congress has appropriated, wouldn't that give him a defacto veto over appropriations?
It seems to me by just setting a hard limit on spending of already appropriated money, Congress is dodging its constitutional responsibility to determine the spending or budget cutting through a deliberative process. It's just leaving the spending decisions entirely up to the executive where it doesn't belong under the spirit of our constitutional framework.
Nobody is saying that he can choose not to spend money. If he doesn't have the money in the first place, then he's not choosing not to spend it.
In any case, there are other ways he could go besides borrowing money without authorization. There's the trillion dollar platinum coin, which is statutorily authorized. There's selling off assets — there's an awful lot of federal land out west that would bring in lots of money.
But if he could just unilaterally borrow money in defiance of both the debt limit and the U.S. constitution, then why couldn't he just raise taxes unilaterally?
The argument is that by authorizing spending without providing a funding mechanism, Congress has implicitly authorized the issuance of debt. In fact, if the executive needs an authorization to issue any debt, then how is any debt being issued today? I don't think Congress is passing anything to specifically authorize the issuance of debt. The executive just routinely does it when expenditures exceed revenues -- up until the point they run into the 1917 debt ceiling, which is arguably superceded by new legislation like the authorization of spending, or the 1974 law.
You say the executive could sell land, but can they without Congressional approval? Didn't Congress choose to buy that land for a purpose and can the executive just decide on its own that it's no longer going to fulfill that purpose?
The bottom line is that Congress told the executive to spend X dollars on specific things but essentially provided no revenue stream to pay for it. A plain English reading of the 14th amendment says that the executive can't default on debt. And the constitution and statutes would seem to say that the executive can't fail to spend the dollars on the things that Congress said to spend them on.
Now, if a platinum coin is a statutorily authorized mechanism, then I would say yes, the executive has to take that approach because that means Congress would appear to have directed it to use that means for the funding.
What law authorized that?
If that isn't authorized, then the implicitly authorized borrowing argument seems to me the only route. You ask why couldn't the executive raise taxes on its own and the reason is the constitution explicitly states in ARTICLE XVI -- "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes".
I see nothing in the text that says that the power to issue debt belongs solely to Congress and, in fact, this has historically been an executive function. If you see somewhere that gives this power to Congress, please share.
That's what the debt ceiling is. Calling it a ceiling is a misnomer; it's not a ceiling, but an authorization to borrow.
Originally, each time the treasury had to borrow $X, Congress had to authorize that specific borrowing of $X. Eventually, they decided that was inefficient, and Congress passed a law saying, "The treasury can borrow up to $XYZ." And they keep bumping up the number $XYZ. They're not capping borrowing; they're authorizing it.
I found the clause in the enumerated powers that I was somehow not seeing. You're right. I don't see any other way to read it than to say Congress must authorize the issuance of the debt. It's the formulation of it as a limit in the press that is incorrect.
As a practitioner, I wonder what people are thinking about the overall quality of the judiciary.
I have remarked that the increasing politicization (both federal and state in many jurisdictions) has led to a marked decrease in the quality of judges- or, at least, the predictability of some areas of the law recently. I know that in my area, local surveys have shown a small (but notable) decrease in the ratings that practitioners have provided the judges.
This is not universal, of course (there are many quality judges, including many quality judges recently appointed by both parties), but just throwing this out to see if anyone else WITH ACTUAL EXPERIENCE has noticed this as well.
One strains to understand what the phrase “authorized by law” could possibly mean if it compels incurring debt not authorized by law.
Don’t strain yourself too badly. Per the relevant definition of the word entitled used in such as TITLE 31 USC 13: APPROPRIATIONS and (for DoD appropriations for example) TITLE 10 USC 114: Annual authorization of appropriations…it“ could possibly mean” entitled, appropriated and obligated.
And what does this have to do with the interpretation of the 14th Amendment? And within a statutory framework, what does authorization of an appropriation have to do with authorizing borrowing on the credit of the United States? Congress chose to impose an explicit ceiling on borrowing.
Plenty of people authorize buying things they can’t afford, but that doesn’t automatically extend their lines of credit. The United States’ credit limit is imposed by Congress, and it is solely for Congress to deal with the situation.
"The 14th Amendment is often cited but rarely quoted"
The number of times I've seen "authorized by law" left out of quotations in the media is astounding.
This is a duopoly problem, and it's one of the foremost examples of an issue which a third party could address.
The nation turns its lonely eyes to Ross Perot.
But I just searched and found that he died in 2019.
I think Dan Vacek of the Legal Marijuana Now Party is still alive.
“I’m not questioning the validity of the debt; I’m just not paying.” A tenant should try this defense when he defaults on rent.
The better approach is to construe Congress as authorizing Presidential budget cuts – indeed, if Congress appropriates money but fails to provide the taxes or loans to fund the appropriations, then what other option does the President have? Cut the non-debt-payment part of the budget until it’s all covered by current funds in the Treasury. I think the author actually endorses this.
The only reason this doesn't get discussed more is that the Democratic side of the debate regards spending cuts as literally unthinkable. They refuse to acknowledge that they're even among the options.
And since the media are in the tank for the Democrats, it's damned hard to get reported on pointing out that this is actually the constitutional response to hitting the debt ceiling.
“I’m not questioning the validity of the debt; I’m just not paying.” A tenant should try this defense when he defaults on rent.
Mrs Moore relates a tale from her days as a trainee, before admission to the bar. She was instructed by the partner to attend court on behalf of a client who owed money - the first and only time she appeared in court on behalf of a client. It wasn't a client she had had anything to do with - it was just that she was the only peon in the office late one evening when the partner needed someone to go and argue a hopeless case the following morning.
She was simply to say "Our client has instructed us to say that he does not intend to pay."
And no more. Except that before that she was told - make sure you tell the judge that you have not been admitted to the bar yet.
So that's what she did. Opposing Counsel launched into a long impassioned argument about how the money was owed, the court had already determined that the money was owed, and it was outrageous etc etc. After that the judge turned to Mrs Moore and said "What do you have to say to that, young lady ?"
She replied :
"Our client has instructed us to say that he does not intend to pay."
This routine was repeated one more time, and the judge finally said with a smile "Well, the young lady says her client isn't going to pay, so I guess he isn't going to pay." And that was that.
It helps to be cute.
It's not a defense; that's the whole point as to why it doesn't violate the 14th amendment.
Balkinization has been running rings about the Volokh Conspiracy on this one.
So the Federalist Society sends Prof. Prakash -- a Thomas clerk -- on a tricycle.
Carry on, clingers. So far as better Americans permit.
Sure, it's unconstitutional for the president to ignore the debt limit.
It's also unconstitutional for the president to ignore the budget and pretend they have a line-item veto.
Not sure it's terribly persuasive that the former is "more" unconstitutional then the later though. And the later doesn't crash the economy.
I have a question. In the days when US money was in silver and gold, every paper bill was a note, an instrument of debt, in which the Treasury promised to pay the bearer the face sum in gold or silver on demand. Paper money is still called “notes” despite having become fiat money backed by nothing. But a legal fiction is maintained in which they are still considered instruments of debt, and they are notes in that legal-fiction sense.
Why couldn’t the same thing be done with other instruments of government debt? Why couldn’t they simply become negotiable fiat money, with regarding them as instruments of debt becoming simply a legal fiction, maybe with internal accounting tricks, but with their status as legally debt becoming of no consequence to the holders or to the general public, as with paper money? You simply spend them, exchange them for goods or services.
I understand paper “notes” were interest-free even when meaningfully different from gold and silver “money.” I recognize that the existence of interest complicates things.