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Anthony Sanders (Institute for Justice) Guest-Blogging About "Baby Ninth Amendments"
I'm delighted to report that Anthony Sanders, a senior attorney and Director of the Center for Judicial Engagement at the Institute for Justice—one of the country's foremost libertarian public interest law firms—will be guest-blogging this coming week about his new book:
Here's the summary, from the book jacket:
Listing every right that a constitution should protect is hard. American constitution drafters often list a few famous rights such as freedom of speech, protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and free exercise of religion, plus a handful of others. However, we do not need to enumerate every liberty because there is another way to protect them: an "etcetera clause." It states that there are other rights beyond those specifically listed: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Yet scholars are divided on whether the Ninth Amendment itself actually does protect unenumerated rights, and the Supreme Court has almost entirely ignored it. Regardless of what the Ninth Amendment means, two-thirds of state constitutions have equivalent provisions, or "Baby Ninth Amendments," worded similarly to the Ninth Amendment.
This book is the story of how the "Baby Ninths" came to be and what they mean. Unlike the controversy surrounding the Ninth Amendment, the meaning of the Baby Ninths is straightforward: they protect individual rights that are not otherwise enumerated. They are an "etcetera, etcetera" at the end of a bill of rights. This book argues that state judges should do their duty and live up to their own constitutions to protect the rights "retained by the people" that these "etcetera clauses" are designed to guarantee. The fact that Americans have adopted these provisions so many times in so many states demonstrates that unenumerated rights are not only protected by state constitutions, but that they are popular. Unenumerated rights are not a weird exception to American constitutional law. They are at the center of it. We should start treating constitutions accordingly.
And from the blurbs:
"In this provocative work, Sanders carefully traces the adoption and interpretation of the Baby Ninths across time and space—masterfully illustrating how studying the history and development of state constitutional provisions can enhance our understanding of both the federal Constitution and the rights that it and the state constitutions protect."
—Maureen Brady, Harvard Law School"For more than two centuries, Americans have included 'Baby Ninth Amendments' in their state constitutions, aimed at securing all of our rights, not just the few that drafters are able to enumerate in a bill of rights. Courts, however, have largely ignored those amendments—and with that, have undermined the rule of law. Thanks to Anthony Sanders, we now have a deeply researched account and analysis of that history. This book is a major contribution to the scholarly effort of the past several decades to reestablish the fundamental principle of American constitutionalism: individual liberty through limited government."
—Roger Pilon, Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies and Founding Director Emeritus, Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute"Anthony Sanders has drawn upon a long career of advocacy and scholarship on state constitutionalism and individual rights to offer a novel, insightful, and refreshingly controversial take on the question of whether the text of our state constitutions are all inclusive. Spoiler alert: There are unenumerated rights! He takes us through the architecture, theory, and ideology of these baby ninth amendments to reveal a truly new way of thinking about the scope of governmental power-at the subnational level, whether the rubber really meets the road-and the contours of our vital civil liberties. There is much to learn, and much to argue with, in this terrific book by this learned lawyer."
—Daniel B. Rodriguez, Harold Washington Professor and former Dean, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law"Alexander Hamilton once said that human rights 'are not to be rummaged for among old parchments,' but 'are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature.' But in this book, Anthony Sanders does the 'rummaging' necessary to show us that the rights of human nature aren't just a matter of theory—they're embedded more deeply in our constitutional law than many of today's scholars or judges are willing to admit. With his combination of scholarship and advocacy, Sanders has done us a tremendous service—helping revive one of the most important and unjustly neglected elements of our country's 200+ year constitutional tradition. I predict that this will prove to be the decade's most important book on constitutional law."
—Timothy Sandefur, Vice President for Litigation, Goldwater Institute, author of The Conscience of the Constitution"If the federal Ninth Amendment is misunderstood, one can imagine the misunderstanding of the 'Baby Ninths' in many state constitutions. Anthony Sanders' book successfully confronts this situation at an important point in the continuing discovery of state constitutions and their importance. Sanders provides in-depth analysis of the origins and spread of these state provisions as the country expanded and state constitutions evolved. He assesses and criticizes the state courts' interpretations of the provisions and gives some prescriptive opinions for the future. This book will be the standard work on Baby Ninths for the foreseeable future."
—Robert F. Williams, Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, Rutgers Law School, author of The Law of American State Constitutions
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"Unlike the controversy surrounding the Ninth Amendment, the meaning of the Baby Ninths is straightforward"
How exactly does that work, for identically worded amendments?
Regardless of what the Ninth Amendment means, two-thirds of state constitutions have equivalent provisions, or “Baby Ninth Amendments,” worded similarly to the Ninth Amendment.
Similarly, not identically. Presumably we have to read the book or the upcoming guest posts to find out how the state versions are different.
Also, he refers to the “controversy surrounding the Ninth Amendment” as compared to the meaning of the “Baby Ninths.”
For my part, I always understood the Ninth Amendment as meaning exactly what it says. Judges/Justices may have a difficult time figuring out whether a claimed, unenumerated right is protected, but they can’t ignore the claim with a dismissive “but the Constitution doesn’t say you have that right.” They have to find some consistent way to address those questions.
[edit:]I think that the controversy surrounding the Ninth Amendment is coming from judges/justices that would rather ignore it.
judges/justices that would rather ignore it.
E.g., Bork
"but they can’t ignore the claim with a dismissive “but the Constitution doesn’t say you have that right.” They have to find some consistent way to address those questions."
Ah, if only that were actually so. In practice, they actually do somehow manage to just ignore it.
"How exactly does that work, for identically worded amendments?"
The federal 9th deals with 3 parties that might have power, feds, states, the people.
Baby 9ths deal with 2 parties that might have power, states, the people.
That's a significant difference. With 3, there's much more ambiguity.
So obvious but glad you stated it for English-impaired.
Yep. Since women had no say in the laws or the Constitution until the 1920's, the Ninth Amendment reserved their rights until they had a say. I'm sure everyone here welcomes their contribution
Nope. What they didn’t manage to get put into the Constitution isn’t there, and no one has leave to insert it. If it wasn’t a by-men recognized right when the Constitution was written then the Constitution doesn’t protect it.
I don't think you understand the premise
So you agree with Bork, and basically deny that 9A has any meaning.
Most men didnt either
BUT women had the vote in NJ before there was a Constitution
You want the iron hand to grab people by the throat and say "Yes, they have a right"
Virtually every right in the Bill of Rights has multiple attestations in the 20 State Constitutions that preceded the American Constitution.
He takes us through the architecture, theory, and ideology of these baby ninth amendments to reveal a truly new way of thinking about the scope of governmental power-at the subnational level, whether the rubber really meets the road-and the contours of our vital civil liberties.
Especially on the theory part I expect mostly magic and handwaving. I could be mistaken, and would be delighted to be mistaken. Let's see how much attention gets paid to how practical ability to vindicate a right affected interpretation of its meaning and theory at the time of its constitutional creation.
Also, will we be satisfied by ideological arguments offered as justifications, by lawyers unacquainted with the historical context of the ideologies in question, and competent mainly to offer interpretations based instead on the ideologies of today?
Finally, as almost always when considering origins of American constitutionalism, this looks to be another opportunity to get things wrong by lawyerly concentration on the wording of statutes and legal treatises, to the neglect of variations among common law practices, outcomes, and localities.
Please show me enough insight to suggest the points above were not ignored, but actually considered as challenges, so I can justify buying the book.
Shorter Lathrop:
I am not a lawyer so I don't understand the process of lawyering. Also, I have not read this book but it's probably wrong.
P.S., I am not a crank.
No, Nieporent, you misjudge my critique. What I purport to understand has nothing to do with the process of lawyering. Stick to that and I will leave you alone. It's not my field.
My critique has to do with processes attempted by lawyers who do not understand the processes of history, but who go ahead anyway to rely on the processes of lawyering, while they attempt a process to create historical inferences. They mismatch their accustomed methods to their unfamiliar attempted processes, and make a mess. Some of them, like you, hate it when someone able to recognize a historical mess suggests need for a cleanup.
Stephen, screw history.
Seriously, I said it. No, that's right, we aren't historians. And you know what, historians aren't lawyers. And for good reason. I can't tell you whether John Marshall's belief in an expansive federal Constitution was part of a larger cross-national movement towards judicial supremacy in constitutional systems. A historian probably could. But it's totally irrelevant to the law.
We have a common law system we inherited from the British, which is based on case precedent and legislative supremacy, and case-by-case adjudication. It works reasonably well. Some judges want to introduce more history and tradition into it, others do not. But nobody in my field is doing academic history, and for a very good reason- because there's ZERO EVIDENCE THAT THE WORK OF ACADEMIC HISTORIANS WOULD MAKE FOR A GOOD LEGAL SYSTEM. Not a shred. They are doing something totally different- something that has value and generates interest, but something that has nothing to do with what my profession is doing.
You take it for granted that lawyers should listen to historians, but we really shouldn't. We're doing something completely different, for a completely different purpose.
Esper, I am not an originalist. Which means I am pretty much fine with everything you say, except with regard to old precedents cited for the purpose of deciding today’s cases.
You seem to presume legal acumen gives you context sufficient to tell you what those meant. Usually legal acumen cannot do that unassisted. For instance, unassisted legal acumen cannot tell you that the same precedent could convey 3 different meanings in the eighteenth century, depending on whether the interpretation was done in England, Virginia, or Massachusetts.
The interpretation in England might well be the actual opposite of both interpretations in the two colonies. But colonial interpretations would nevertheless differ in ways sufficient to make either one of them unsuitable for use to decide a U.S. constitutional meaning today. History can tell you that, and mere legal acumen cannot.
Lawyers ignore that at the risk of writing the gibberish which Thomas put into Bruen. In class-bound England gun laws written in language of universal privilege were interpreted far more as gun prohibitions than otherwise. Everyone was expected to know such privileges applied to English freemen, and not to the vast majority. In class-deferential Virginia, the same precedent might be read to empower a larger fraction, but still be interpreted capriciously with a particular eye to the social status and presumed trustworthy character of a person under legal jurisdiction. In Massachusetts, interpretations might vary almost as much, but with less eye to class, and more attention to locality.
One advantage an eye to history can bring to a problem of that sort is insight to infer that the 2A could not logically be interpreted to intend at that time one particular right to arms applicable alike to all Americans in all the colonies. No such interpretation could have been found that would not have aroused factional resistance and blocked ratification. Cross-regional gun culture existed. Cross-regional agreement on what gun culture applied was non-existent. Hence, the militia right, which could command support everywhere, was the intended meaning of the 2A. The other distinctions were thus left to be sorted out differently, at the pleasure of the various states, and protected variously by those states.
If you can show a purely legal analysis could deliver that level of insight to interpret the 2A, then my hat is off to you, and I defer to you. Alas, the SCOTUS version of purely legal analysis on the same question commands no such deference. It will stand as a threat to the legitimacy of the Court until it is overturned.
Plus one other thing. It is fortunate that historians know they are not lawyers. It would be all but impossible to find an elite historian who would presume to say what any law should be. It is unfortunate that elite lawyers so often always presume to say what history should be. On that basis, the nation has little to fear from historians making up law. It has a great deal to fear from lawyers making up history.
You seem to presume legal acumen gives you context sufficient to tell you what those meant.
What things "mean" always involves a fair amount of application of prior principles to current legal problems. It also involves selecting levels of generality, and sometimes involves deciding to dispense with a precedent.
Historians can't help us with any of that. Chasing the "true" meaning might be interesting in a discipline that cares what people meant; that's not really what the legal profession is about, though.
Again, illogical. unless you allow an infinite regress and nothing ever means what it says.
Why are the magic 'prior principles' (which presumably are in words) not subject to any obscurity ????
THe legal profession is only about true meaning which is why we have the ancient legal concept of ἐπιείκεια
epikeia may be used in three cases: (1) when the observance of the law would be sinful by reason of a higher law, epikeia is obligatory; (2) when compliance with the law demands heroism and effort out of proportion to the purpose of the law, epikeia may be used; (3) when particular circumstances unforeseen by the legislator would indicate that it was not his mind or intention to bind the subject, epikeia may be used.
again, you argue against yourself since we know full well what most ratifiers thought they were ratifying. and your last paragraph is farcical. Read the Federalist Papers, Madison Notes on the Constitution, or the many anti-Federalist and debate proceedings and we know , sometimes exactly, what they were buying into. Elite lawyers and historians are at a fatal remove from all that, which shold be obvious.
Your reply is hte classic case of 'proving too much". by your logic the Constitution might as well be thrown out. Whatever bedrock you see in it you are afraid to point out for fear you will actually be the dreated Originalist yoursefl 🙂
You mention 2A and overlook 20 state constiutions that preceded it !!!!
What is unclear to you in the following:
Article I, section 21 of the Pennsylvania State Constitution states: “The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”
You were doing okay but overstated things.
Scalia said that historian Joyce Lee Malcolm was the reason for the SCOTUS stand on the 2nd Amendment. Her book on the history of gun rights saved the day.