The Volokh Conspiracy
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Against a Broad Reading of Title VII's Religious Accommodation Provision
A very interesting item by Adam Unikowsky, defending the Court's relatively narrow reading in TWA v. Hardison (1977) of the Title VII duty to grant religious exemptions from generally applicable work rules. The Court is now considering reversing that decision in Groff v. DeJoy; James Phillips guest-blogged here last month in favor of such a reversal (and supporting Justice Marshall's dissent in that case, which was joined by Justice Brennan), and I'm glad to also present Unikowsky's largely contrary view. An excerpt, though the whole thing is much worth reading:
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is illegal for an employer to "discriminate" against an individual "because of such individual's … religion." The term "religion" is defined to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."
What does "undue hardship" mean? In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme Court held that requiring an employer to "bear more than a de minimis cost" would constitute an undue hardship. Hardison has acquired a poor reputation among proponents of religious liberty, who view it as conferring insufficient protection to religious employees. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a new case, Groff v. DeJoy, in which the plaintiff asks the Court to overrule Hardison and replace it with a new standard in which the employer must accommodate the employee's religious practice unless it would impose a significant cost on the employer.
In this post, I will argue that Hardison should not be overruled. Clarified perhaps, but not overruled. In my view:
- It is an "undue hardship" when employers are forced to inflict more than de minimis harm on non-religious co-workers to accommodate the religious practice of religious employees.
- It is an "undue hardship" when employers are forced to pay more than a de minimis amount of cash, out of pocket, to accommodate the religious practice of religious employees.
Under this standard, Title VII would still offer important protection to religious employees. It would allow them to be exempted from generally applicable rules—for instance, an employer's no-beards policy could generally not be enforced against an employee whose religion requires him to wear a beard. It would require the employer to offer flexible scheduling and assignment of tasks. But the employer wouldn't have to inflict harm on co-workers, and wouldn't have to finance its employees' religious practice.
I advocate this standard for a simple reason. Title VII should be interpreted in line with the American tradition of religious liberty, and this standard embodies that tradition.
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So what happens if I’m an employer with sincere religious or conscientious beliefs that compel me not to take on more than de minimis cost in order to accommodate the particular religious practices of an employee?
Say I’m a solo medical practitioner in Chelsea, a neighborhood in NYC with a high proportion of gay residents. I strongly believe in providing top-notch medical care to gay and trans patients, a belief rooted in my Christian faith but also in my general conscientious principles as a doctor. I hire a single nurse to assist in my office. One day, she comes to me and tells me that, due to her Christian beliefs, she no longer believes she can administer care to gay or trans patients, including especially those who are coming to me for PrEP prescriptions or referrals for gender-affirming care.
I cannot accommodate her beliefs except by performing her duties for some (who knows which) patients, by hiring another nurse on at least a part-time basis who can come in to serve those patients, or by somehow adjusting my practice so that it doesn’t include as many gay or trans patients. Any of these represent more than a de minimis burden on my practice, but let’s stipulate that they would not represent a “significant cost” or rise to whatever level James or others would say reflects an “undue hardship” under Title VII. Thus, on some views, I would seem to have an obligation, under Title VII, to take on that burden.
But what of my religious and conscientious beliefs? I am being required to subsidize – either literally or in effect – another person’s religious practice, whose beliefs are not only contrary to mine but are ones that I deeply abhor. If that’s the case, aren’t we running into issues under federal RFRA and the First Amendment?
"(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees"
Where in my hypothetical did I say I didn't have fifteen employees?
"I hire a single nurse to assist in my office. "
I am not going to fight with you over the hypothetical. I can just stipulate that the practice meets the necessary conditions to be subject to Title VII.
If you're not up to the task of responding to the actual point I've raised, then you can go find some other corner of the internet to torture with your inane and pointless trolling.
My trolling totally has a point. Unlike yours.
To be fair, I think the 15-employee-mininum is a reasonable factor as a proxy for whether you're essentially 'big enough' that it should simply become your responsibility to have to accommodate such varying beliefs. (Relatedly, we don't have the same expectations for the level of disability accommodation when someone only has 1-2 employees...)
On the other hand, if what you're getting at is that your *religion* says it's wrong to accommodate *her* religion -- that may indeed raise a valid dilemma, but only to the same extent someone could say so about not wanting to accommodate someone's disability (and I'm honestly not sure how far that goes, but suspect it hinges on sincerity...).
Yes, the general point is that what might be an undue hardship for a small business, would probably not be for a large employer. The interesting thing about the TWA case is that it would have been trivially easy to accommodate the employee's religious foibles, if the company had not had a union agreement that prevented it from deploying its vast army of employees sensibly.
In another context, maternity leave is often very difficult for a small employer to cope with, but easy for a large employer. Likewise vast tracts of government regulation.
I think a reasonable standard would be to equate "undue hardship" with whatever level of regulation would qualify as a "taking" - ie if the government were to make an employer do, or refrain from doing X, and that wouldn't be a taking, then it's not "undue hardship" for an employer to be required to do X by way of religious accommodation.
As to a clash of religious principles between employer and employee that seems quite straightforward. Forcing the employer to compromise on religious principles is obviously undue hardship. So what would not be undue hardship for one employer might be undue hardship for another.
For the avoidance of doubt - none of these rules about accommodating religious practice should apply to private employers. and particularly to human ones.
I think at best, the employer would have to raise a RFRA defense since Title VII only protects the employee's religious beliefs.
Why should the employer not be able to argue that an infringement of his/her religious practice was ipso facto an "undue hardship" - without ever having to leave the four corners of Title VII ?
(A point which underlines the fact that Unikowsky's interpretation is relentlessly secular.)
That's possible, but not supported by precedent that I am aware of.
A counter argument is since Congress specifically protected the religious beliefs of only employees, an "undue hardship" on the employer cannot include violating a religious belief.
I think the counter argument is weak. The purpose of the provision, as you say, is to protect the religious practice of employees. Subject to a general limitation to the protection offered – when it causes “undue hardship” to the employer.
There’s no reason to limit “undue hardship” to hardship inflicted on other employees, or to financial hardship. If the hardship inflicted was, say, to require the (non-religious) employer to slaughter his first born son, it’s difficult to see why that wouldn’t fall within the general words “undue hardship.” Likewise there’s no reason why “undue hardship” would exclude religious hardship.
The fact that the provision is aimed at protecting employees religious practice doesn’t imply that religious hardship is excluded from the limitation. Moreover if "undue hardship" covered any king of hardship except hardship inflicted on religious practice, that would be iffy on free exercise grounds.
Killing your first born violates the law.
Title VII doesn't cover every type of hardship.
I think Lee Moore is right; you are construing "undue hardship" narrowly as only applying to some issues, while the statute does not actually do that.
However, the "undue hardship" has to be one of the actual employer. If the employer is a corporation/LLC/etc., then the individual doctor in the hypo couldn't raise that issue, and would have to rely on RFRA.
Is it OK to exclude as an undue hardship an accommodation that prevents the employer from going to a Yankee game because he has to be on site to meet the accommodation? If so, that too would exclude some issues and doesn't seem to me to be a problem.
Well, there is an explicit textual limitation on the scope of “undue hardship” :
“without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business“
So it has to be undue hardship that impacts “the conduct of the employer’s business.”
I don’t quite agree with Nieporent – if I have understood him right – that the hardship has to be suffered by the employer himself (or itself if it is a corporation) because a hardship that falls on an employee (as a result of his duties) seems to me to be one that impacts the conduct of the employer’s business. The morale and satisfaction, not to mention limbs, of employees at work seem to me to be matters within “the conduct of the business.”
Likewise if the conduct of the business is arranged in such a way as to accommodate the religious precepts of the shareholders a la Chick-fil-a or Hobby Lobby, then an accommodation forcing the employer to depart from that way of conducting business, seems to be within the words.
But the “undue hardship” of having to miss a Yankees game seems a bit more of a stretch. The hardship itself has nothing to do with the general mode of conducting the business – it’s only connection to the business is that a worker – in this case the employer – has to miss out on some private fun. I’m not saying it’s impossible since there a particular connection with the conduct of the business, but it seems more tenuous.
When does a religious belief impact the conduct of a business rather than merely personally impacting the owners of the business? Neither Chick-Fil-A nor Hobby Lobby engage in businesses that are religious in nature.
If the owners of a business have a policy of not opening the business on Sunday, for religious reasons, that is how the business is conducted. If an employee wants to work on Sunday for some religious reason, and the result is that the business is required by this anti-discrimination law to open on Sundays, then there is an obvious effect on the conduct of the business, which is obviously adverse, since absent the anti-discrimination requirement, the business would not have opened on Sunday.
This is no different from the TWA case. TWA chose to operate with heavy union restrictions on how it could deploy and redeploy workers. That meant it was unable to accommodate the religious employee’s requested accommodation. The court did not say to TWA – there’s no hardship here , just can the union agreement and you can accommodate this guy easily.
Having to open on Sunday would easily qualify as an undue burden be it for religious or secular reasons.
C'mon Josh, you're not playing the hypo.
OK, let's say it's not opening on Sunday, let's say that the owner's religion requires that the business always be conducted with a splash of lamb's blood daubed on the outer door of all the business premises (to encourage the Angel of Death to pass them over.)
But one employee then joins a religion that that welcomes the Angel of Death and requires adherents to scrub off any lamb's blood they see daubed on doors. Employee seeks an accommodation, permitting her to scrub.
The fact that the employer conducts its business, for religious reasons, with the daub of lamb's blood requirement (however batshit crazy ye unbelievers might think that is) means that any accommodation that requires the employer to permit the employee to scrub off the lamb's blood is a hardship. And a serious one since it exposes all the employees to the Angel of Death.
The point is that conducting the business in accordance with the religious precepts of the owners or managers is still conducting the business. Mess with that and you're causing hardship on the conduct of the business.
The same, obviously, goes for conducting the business in accordance with any other precepts that the owners or managers have in mind. Whether that be always referring to fellow employees by their preferred pronouns, singing the company song in a hearty voice, or always closing and giving a day's paid holiday to employees on the founder's birthday.
If we are talking about a secular business (e.g., Hobby Lobby or Chick-Fil-A) that happens to have an owner who requires lamb's blood on their doors, I don't think that religious belief and practice is part of the conduct of the business.
Well, in that case you would be wrong 🙂
As I say, the point is not restricted to religious precepts used in the conduct of the business, it applies equally to any other kind of precepts so used.
The determination, for example, of the owners of the business - pre Civil Rights Act - to deploy their employees in racially segregated units, or in racially comingled units is, whether you like it or not, how the business is conducted.
That these deployments may, or may not, be profit maximising is irrelevant. That these deployments may be motivated by political or moral thoughts is also irrelevant. The conduct of the business is so.
Can a secular business owner fire a Jewish person because his religion does not permit him to hire Jews? Given that Title VII has an explicit exemption for religious businesses that allow such a firing, I highly doubt it. The same distinction applies to the requirement for a religious accommodation.
Sorry, your point escapes me.
42 U.S. Code § 2000e–1 reads in part:
Thus, a religious business can discriminate on the basis of religion, including not providing a religious accommodation, presumably because of the employer's religious beliefs. But, a secular business cannot do so. Therefore, it would be very strange for an undue burden to include the religious beliefs of a secular business.
Thank you. I didn’t spot a definition of “religious business” but if it includes what you describe as a “secular business” conducted according to the religious beliefs of the owners/managers, then we wouldn’t need to discuss the question. So we can stipulate that such secular businesses are not included, and so they have to take their chances along with all other businesses not qualifying as religious.
But that’s not all. Even bona fide qualifying “religious businesses” are only exempt “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion” not generally. So as respects “accommodations” there’s no exemption. So even “religious businesses” are subject to the rules – with a carve out for being allowed to discriminate in the employment of co-religionists.
But, a secular business cannot do so.
“so” being refuse a religious accommodation, unless the employer can demonstrate undue hardship in the conduct of the business.
Therefore, it would be very strange for an undue burden to include the religious beliefs of a secular business.
This seems a complete non sequitur. To the extent that secular businesses run subject to religious precepts (and religious business apart from their co-religionist exemption) are within the scope of the rule, why on Earth would they be unable to run the same defense as any other secular business. To wit – we conduct our business this way because that’s in accordance with the owners’ precepts and we can’t accommodate this particular religious practice because it would cause undue hardship to our conduct of the business.
Take a super-green company which forbids its employees from using private cars to travel to work, to save the planet. If an employee’s religion requires him to travel to work by private car, how would accommodating him not cause undue hardship on the conduct of the business ?
And if it were not greenery which provoked this company rule, but amish-ness, why would that make any difference ?
Although the text of Title VII says the exemption for a religious employer only applies to employment, I would be very surprised if it did not also apply to religious accommodations of employees. Otherwise, the logic for having the exemption falls apart. That being said, I am not aware of any caselaw on the question.
I would think the prohibition against using a private car to drive to work is not included as part of how employer conducts his business. But if it is, I agree it would not permissible to only allow that as an undue burden for secular reasons.
Is this a "responsibility" that the federal government can impose, consistent with the RFRA and the First Amendment?
Isn't this addressed by my hypothetical?
Your hypothetical is that you are a single doctor practitioner with a single nurse employee. What are the other 14 employees doing? Two or three might be doing billing or other administrative tasks, but not 14.
Fighting the hypothetical. Go back to your crayons, BL.
I'll take your advice. And moot you. Hypotheticals that have no real world application are mere tools for playing games. I don't have to buy into your games.
This is a legal academic blog, I’ve got bad news for you about hypotheticals around here.
(To be clear, I do think its okay to fight the hypothetical if you don’t think it properly isolates the principle it’s trying to get at, but this is a blog full of the legal/philosophical equivalent of spherical cows in a perfect vacuum on an infinite frictionless plane.)
Maybe, but I don't see anyone challenging my hypothetical on those grounds. They're just saying, "But Title VII doesn't apply because you've only mentioned two employees!," or, "If we assume another set of facts where the requested accommodation would not be burdensome, we see that there's no burden in providing the accommodation." Classic 1L errors - not even that, really. Philosophy 101.
Not even answering the question posed, which is whether the Title VII accommodation requirement runs afoul of RFRA or the First Amendment, if we allow it to mean more than imposing de minimis burdens on employers with sincere religious beliefs of their own.
I agree. The single provider with 14 support staff is just to simplify things. 2 people with the same beliefs also works - bucking a nonmaterial part of the hypo is indeed a 1L move.
Or the move of someone who doesn't like where the hypo is going.
Oh, no. Please, don't. I just can't bear to live without your insightful contributions. Gosh.
They're all DEI compliance officers, two are kids of local Congresspersons.
Hey now!!!!!!!!
The problem with your hypothetical is that under any definition of "reasonable accommodation" you would not be required to hire the second nurse.
To make it more realistic, what if you have five nurses on staff, and one nurse has the same request. All that need be done is ask one of the other four nurses to do the job. It's more than de minimis, but certainly doable, with some juggling.
Or, let's change it a bit. All five nurses have no problem assisting any patient that needs them (within their competence as a nurse.) However one is a Seventh Day Adventists and wants off every Saturday. She is willing to work every Sunday. Let's say the clinic is open seven days a week. Her request can be accommodated with some schedule juggling. And some nurses will be inconvenienced in having to work Saturdays, although they will get off Sundays (on some rotation. Of course, since the clinic is open seven days a week, even if this nurse were not hired, other nurses would still have to work Saturdays.) So there is some inconvenience to both management and co-workers.
These are more realistic hypotheticals, where the standard makes a difference.
The same thing applies to time off over Christmas. Astonishingly employees with children like time off over Christmas. For employees without children it's not so much of a big deal. It can be worked out.
But the difference is that if you can't work that sort of situation out, nobody gets to sue you.
Just call them fucking cunts, and like in "Office Space" the "Glitch" will fix itself.
Fighting the hypothetical here, too.
I have used a specific hypothetical just to get traction on the core problem, which could also be posed in the abstract: Suppose that an employee requests a religious accommodation from their employer, as required under Title VII. Currently, that request need be granted only if the accommodation would not impose more than a de minimis burden on the employer. The employer may have their own religious beliefs that require not accommodating the employee, and so might challenge Title VII's accommodation requirement on RFRA or First Amendment grounds.
However, they arguably should not prevail, because one might be able to argue that imposing a de minimis accommodation burden on employers narrowly serves the compelling interest of preventing discrimination on the basis of religion; similarly, while the employer may have a sincere, religious belief that they should not accommodate the employee, the "accommodation" is only de minimis, and so does not meaningfully impact the employer's own religious freedom.
Now, suppose that "undue hardship" is re-interpreted to heighten the burden threshold. We interpret Title VII so that it requires an employer to accommodate the employee's request even if it results in a significant burden on the employer. Does that still pass muster under RFRA? Under the First Amendment?
If that's too hard for you to follow, flip the values of my hypothetical and see where your intuitions and hypothetical-fighting lead you. Imagine a doctor who believes he shouldn't be providing PrEP access or gender-affirming care to patients, and the administrative assistant who believes she should take all comers for appointments.
Stipulating in the first case that the burden imposed on the employer's religious practice is indeed de minimis (from the religious employer's perspective) then I agree that re-interpreting "undue hardship" to mean "significant" necessarily increases the chance that there may be a clash between the employee wanting his religious practice protected, and the employer not wanting his not quite rising to significant, but definitely not de minimis, religious practice infringed.
In which case the free exercise clause might, or might not, overtrump the statute.
Of course this clash will only arise if we have
(a) a religious employer, with
(b) not quite rising to the level of significant, but definitely not de minimis religious concerns that are being trodden on
Secular folk tend to be rather weak at estimating how significant different religious beliefs and practice, regarding them all as worthless nonsense, so it would make for an interesting case.
However, the fact that an interesting case might arise does not seem to me to justify the interpretation that the employer's get out clause should swallow the protection that Congress wrote in. If they had meant "any hardship rising above de minimis" they'd probably have written that.
Well, let's suppose a job applicant is blind. And let's suppose the potential employer's sincere religious belief is that blindness signifies that one has been accursed by G-d and that the only valid thing to do with blind people is to leave them alone in the wilderness to fend for themselves until they die; helping them in any way is a mortal sin. Therefore, the employer cannot hire such a person, let alone provide accommodations to him. Obviously such a stance by an employer would violate the ADA. Would RFRA save him in that context? I think we can all predict that it would not. I don't see how yours is any different, RFRAwise.
It's a neutral law, so under Smith there's no free exercise issue for the employer. So that leaves us, I guess, with an argument that requiring a significant religious accommodation is an establishment clause violation? My guess is that this position would garner three votes with SCOTUS.
1) I don’t believe “undue hardship” includes the employer’s religious beliefs under the statute. The statute seems concerned with the functioning of the employer’s business as a business. Title VII specifically says, “without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business." I could be wrong, but that’s how I read it.
2) I don’t think RFRA would provide a defense because, unless I’m misreading RFRA—and I could be because I’m no expert in this area of law—RFRA only applies when the government is a party. If the nurse sues the doctor under Title VII, then RFRA simply doesn’t apply.
3) I think the doctor could make an as-applied First Amendment challenge to Title VII under your hypothetical.
I hadn't realized RFRA might require the government to be a party. As of a 2014 Josh Blackman post, there was a circuit split on the issue.
Assuming the government has to be a party in a RFRA case, it seems to me the doctor is likely to lose because his First Amendment challenge likely fails under Employment Division v Smith (Title VII is a neutral law of general applicability).
Let's not. If you have to hire someone you would otherwise not have to hire then that's a significant cost, and you should be able to fire the recalcitrant nurse. Looks to me like you're begging for sympathy over being forced to do what you ought not have to do when in fact you wouldn't be forced to do it.
I had hoped to elicit at least one serious, critical response, potentially even a concession that re-interpreting the “undue hardship” threshold to mean something more than a de minimis burden would be constitutionally problematic, and so should not be done, for that reason.
But in lieu of that, I’m somewhat satisfied to see some of the usual cranks demonstrating so cleanly that they’re completely unable to engage in a serious theoretical conversation on these topics.
And sometimes a hypothetical just sucks.
Given the hypo, the nurse's refusal either significantly affects running the practice or it doesn't and falls on one side of the standard accordingly.
The doctor's beliefs are irrelevant and just muddy the scenario.
Go back and find a new hypo if you think your point is so irreplaceable.
Who is anyone to pronounce the American tradition of religious liberty, when we have a Supreme Court to pronounce it for us? If that were a matter left to the citizens at large, or to scholars among them, or to the legislatures, what assurance could anyone have that only dates would be taken into account which were especially critical and necessary to the Court's accurate interpretation?
That's an obvious strawman (and I assume you left off a "/sarc") but to what purpose I cannot fathom. Is this newfound interest in restricting what SCOTUS decides a product of Dobbs?
I am pleased to see that at least one customer found the shoe comfortable.
How come this isn’t looked at as a ‘taking’ by the govt?
The govt is forcing a private company to expend resources it may not want to.
And why can’t this also just be looked at under employment law where an employment contract is agreed to and if one side doesn’t adhere to it, then civil action can be taken?
There was a Muslim truck driver hired by a distributor which (among other things), distributed alcohol.
He won his case about his religion saying he wasn’t allowed to distribute alcohol.
The company should have written a contract and added drivers
may be required to distribute alcohol, and then the candidate can agree or decline the job.
It should be looked at as a "taking" but takings law has been so thoroughly gutted by prior precedents that it's almost no protection at all any more.
For more, look at the article just a few days about the different definitions of "viable" which noted that it's no longer even considered a "taking" unless there is no remaining viable use for the property.
It should be looked at as a “taking” but takings law has been so thoroughly gutted by prior precedents that it’s almost no protection at all any more.
Wait what?
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-107_ihdj.pdf
That some of the most egregious violations of private property rights are still not allowed is no response at all to the observation that "takings" law has been gutted.
This is one of those things that drives Prof. Kerr crazy: people pronounce that they have some maximalist view of the 4th amendment, and that some recent decision is part of some trend narrowing the 4th amendment from its historical roots, thus proving they don't have the first clue what those historical roots are.
No, there is no such "gutting" of takings law by precedents such that it's "almost no protection any more." Takings law is far more protective than it ever has been, historically.
Was it suggested that the gutting was recent ?
Yes. The "any more" bit implies exactly that, IMO. That's not a formulation you would use if the "gutting" had taken place in the 19th Century.
Bullshit. The "protectiveness" of takings law has "historically" had ups and downs, and its present "protectiveness" is by no means a historic maximum.
For the same reason you can’t enforce an employment contract that requires an employer to be white, or to abstain from same-sex relationships: employment law (the Civil Rights Act) says so.
But I'm not suggesting that.
I'm simply saying the employment contract says (for example), 'drivers may be required to transport alcohol,' and in no way am I (the company) addressing the candidate's qualifications, i.e., No Muslims, etc.
It would then be up to the candidate to accept or reject that job qualification.
Stop being reasonable, apedad. You'll give the contrarians here paroxysms
That smacks of a social media ad: "Click on this link to learn about the one weird trick to avoid having to provide religious accommodations!"
Thirty seconds of thought should reveal why "Well, we tell employees when they're hired that we don't accommodate their religious beliefs" cannot be a defense to Title VII. The law requires such accommodation (unless, of course, it would be an undue hardship to the employer). The employer can't contract around that requirement.
"He won his case about his religion saying he wasn’t allowed to distribute alcohol."
He presumably shouldn't have. If his oddball religion prevents him fro distributing his employer's present or future products then he ought to assume the burden of leaving his job if that turns into a conflict with his employer's ability to use him.
No, the company should NOT have had to write a contract that explicitly said its drivers had to consent to delivering alcohol. Why should it have to anticipate every crazy future whim of its employees?
may be required to distribute alcohol
I haven’t read more than the excerpt in this post, so it’s certainly possible the author addresses it. But I do find it curious that he interprets Title VII as requiring almost no accommodation at all, if it is inconvenient to the employer or costs money, but reasonable accommodation requirements under the ADA routinely impose costs and burdens that by any measure are more than de minimus. I totally understand that many people (in fact, in 2023, probably the vast majority of people) don’t believe that being asked to do something at work in violation of your religious beliefs is akin to being expected to do a task at work that is painful or impossible because of one’s disability, but I’m not sure the law should see them as different (at least not in a way that disfavors the religious side). But this is likely a minority view, except perhaps in the 5th Circuit and maybe SCOTUS.
There's an establishment clause, but there's nothing in the constitution about disability.
Many do have a beef that statutorily-created rights are held up as legally more important than Constitutionally-guaranteed rights, in that it requires overriding the Constitutional right.
Not sure what you’re getting at. No EC issue with private employer making an accommodation of course. So I assume you’re arguing the EC could be violated if Congress required ADA type accommodation process for employees asserting a religious exemption to certain work rules, requirements, or duties? (Correct me if that’s not what your EC reference meant.) If so, I don’t think that’s in line with SCOTUS’s current EC jurisprudence (FWIW, and understanding you may disagree with how the Court currently interprets the EC).
There's nothing in the Establishment Clause requiring religious accommodations.
I don’t think it’s especially incongruous that two different accommodation standards in two different statutes, enacted decades apart, to be identical?
Sure, they can have different standards, IF the statutory language is different. If the statutory language is the same or similar, the courts should not be creating different standards under the different laws.
It's not him interpreting Title VII this way; it's SCOTUS. The current binding precedent is that Title VII requires almost no accommodation at all. But the ADA — a different statute, of course — requires extensive accommodation.
These problems are better solved by allowing people to freely associate how they see fit.
Regardless of whose feelings get hurt.
But if we are in regime where people are forced to associate and accommodate then we should do that consistently and uniformly and equitably and not cherry pick and make carve puts for favored groups.
You mean like the carveouts for religious groups under discussion here?
There should be no carveouts or everyone should get accommodations.
Is this you, Charlie? I couldn't agree more.
What part of "freedom of association" contains big words you don't understand?
This is a policy view. Isn’t that a legislative role?
Congress used similar language for religion and disability. Why should similar language get different meanings? If the same language can get different meanings because judges have different policy views on the subjects (aka different views of “the American tradition”), then why bother having a Congress? Let judges just give the words any meaning they want.
I think the best legal argument in favor is stare decisis. Congress has lived with this interpretation for close to half a century and not seen fit to change it. Wrong readings of statutes are more easily remedied than wrong constitutional reafings. And if the Supreme Court had gotten it wrong, you’d think Congress would have changed it some time in the last near half century. Let Congress change the law if it’s not happy with it.
But “we’re going to read two similarly worded statutes completely differently because we think for our own reasons that the policy should be different” strikes me as not legitimate judicial interpretation.
Your third and fourth paragraphs are in conflict with each other.
Myself, I don't give much weight to stare decisis. If its intent can be determined (by the opinion-writer) and the courts have screwed it up then Congress shouldn't have to say "yeah, we really meant it" to authorize dumping a bad interpretation.
I love how the legal world has suddenly discovered Unikowsky. He's been writing good stuff for awhile.
People who write stuff tend to get discovered when they write things that those who discover them approve of. When they write stuff that is less to the taste of those in the commenting community, they get covered up again.
A second legitimate legal argument would be the Court’s “too much accommodation” line of cases. The original such case, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, involved a Connecticut statute requiring Sabbath accommodations. If only religious people get to have their chosen Sabbath off and everyone else doesn’t, the argument ran, that so incents observing a religious sabbath that it amounts to government establishing religious sabbath observance.
So the Court could say that if the plaintiffs get their way, that would result in a situation resembling the Connecticut law the Court had struck down as too much accommodation, and since the standard whatever it is can’t be unconstitutional establishment, the plaintiff must lose. It could decide the case on those grounds.
That would also be a legal argument, not a policy one. The Court could of course overrule Estate of Thornton or simply distinguish the Connecticut law from this one, and still find for the plaintiff. But it doesn’t have to.
ReaderY said, "A second legitimate legal argument would be the Court’s “too much accommodation” line of cases."
As an atheist, I also think about "too much accommodation" at times. It makes me feel like a second class citizen if I'm entitled to fewer accommodations than a religious person. So to me, the de minimus standard sounds just about right.
Yeah, I'm not holding out hope that the Court that ruled the Free Exercise clause mandates we pay a jizyah in Trinity Lutheran and Carson v. Makin is going tongive a shit about making us further second-class citizens.
No one was required to pay a jizyah in Carson v. Makin. The education subsidy wasn't any more for a student going to a religious school than for one going to any other non-public school.
I think the problem there was there was an absolute right to have the Sabbath off, as opposed to reasonable accommodation. There is something in between de minimis burden and absolute right, which arguably does not offend the Establishment Clause.
IIRC, some states also require accommodation with a higher threshold than the federal law has required. I don't think they violate the EC.
That seems to be a one-sided establishment entangling. The other side is companies can ignore religious aspects of their employees’ lives, sabbath-wise.
Compare vs. property taxes. To exempt churches entangles, but to tax entangles more. Consider a church behind on the tax. Government seizes the church. At this point, a law, taxes, is interfering in the free exercise thereof. Merely abstaining from collecting taxes does nothing near that.
Best to let politicians think they’re being gracious to churches, and that they could tax ’em if they wanted to be irascible. It isn't even an issue until you presume taxing churches is ok.
Taxing churches is perfectly ok, as long as you are not taxing them in a discriminatory fashion. And of course so is seizing churches if they fall behind on their bills, and not just tax bills.
I hate this entire argument.
You have a 1A right to practice your religion. You have a 1A right to have the government not prevent you from doing so.
You have no right to any job you want, and no right to demand that your employer accommodate your religion. If you can't do the job you were hired to do, then you should get fired.
If your religion is that important to you, that is the only choice you should be offered. Nobody else gets to demand shit of their boss and hide behind religion as an excuse why their demands must be met.
Do your job, or find a new one.
Do you feel the same way about disability?
How is government forcing a private employer to alter their rules for one individual because of that individual’s religion in line with “religious freedom”?
How is government forcing a private employer to tolerate a symbol of a religion they find abhorrent in their workplace in line with “religious freedom”? If there is a “no beards” policy and one employee flexes their Title VII muscle to get an exemption, that beard in that workplace becomes a visible religious symbol.
Surely business owners don’t give up their enumerated constitutional rights when they cross the threshold of their own business.
A policy against hats in a workplace that ends up with various religious employees still wearing headgear isn't a religious symbol, but only shows that the workplace has people of various religions, which one could reasonably infer to start with if the employer is not refusing to hire people practicing such religions.
Certain forms of headgear are generally associated with a particular religion and therefore become just as much a symbol of that religion as a piece of jewelry showing a human figure nailed to a cross does.
Partly the point; a beard is more ambiguous than either as a religious symbol.
Not in a workplace where beards are forbidden except to certain Special People. Then there's nothing ambiguous about it.
It's not at all clear that the Very Special beard represents a religious consideration, though. Lots of beards grown for other reasons; relatively few people wearing "[c]ertain forms of headgear ... associated with a particular religion" except for religious reasons.
I'm finding it difficult to understand where various commenters stand on this.
My own reaction is that Unikowski's two suggestions seem reasonable to me.
I don't, of course, think that "the American tradition of religious liberty" has much to do with it. I agree with the broad notion that we value religious freedom, though not always and everywhere, but doubt that that fact helps us decide these employment rules.
I'd go so far as to say that trying to rely on such tradition opens the discussion up to lots of highly subjective views of what that tradition consists of.
Perhaps "American tradition of religious liberty" type arguments are tailored to appeal to this Supreme Court.
How about last week's 7th circuit Kluge v. Brownsburg, a school pronoun undue burden case?
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/21-2475/21-2475-2023-04-07.html
Terrible decision. How was it an undue burden on the school if Kluge addressed students by their last name?
But, no, tranny-huggers insist we all tranny-hug.
First point.
When Congress passes similar laws with language that is identical in places designed to cause similar results, the courts should use similar interpretation of that language.
In this particular example, we have Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which protects employees with religious beliefs from discrimination, compared with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which protects employees with disabilities from discrimination. Both use identical language ("undue hardship") to describe the when the requested accommodation is unreasonable. The courts should interpret this phrase identically in regards to these laws.
Undue hardship, under the ADA, is defined as an "action requiring significant difficulty or expense." That should be the standard for employment discrimination, for all laws that use the phrase "Undue Hardship". The courts should not be able to pick and choose "winner groups" and "loser groups" when Congress uses exactly the same language in basically identical situations (employment discrimination against a minority). Doing so basically allows the courts to create their own laws. Interpretation should be consistent.
If you just want consistency, why shouldn't both be interpreted as only de minimis hardship is a due hardship and anything more than de minimis is per se undue?
You could do that. It would gut the ADA if that was the standard.
Given the way the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 made the definition of "disability" overbroad, gutting the ADA may be a plus.
Simple question: Why?
I think we would both agree that different statutes could define the same term differently for purposes of their own usage. One could say that "undue hardship" means "action requiring significant difficulty or expense," while another could say that "undue hardship" means "any action requiring greater than a de minimis burden on an employer's operations." So the question is why, when one statute defines the term for its own purposes, but another statute does not, the definition to be found under the former should control the latter; or indeed why we couldn't go traipsing about the USC even more broadly for different uses of the same two words together.
Your assertion carries the limitation: the same words would have the meaning where they are "designed to cause similar results." But you don't seem to notice that you've imported into your clean textualist standard a fuzzy intentionalist one, where judges would have to evaluate whether one statute really is "designed" to achieve "similar results" as another one.
Now, intentionalism is not the bugaboo for me that it often is for most outcome-motivated conservatives, but if we're having to make a qualitative evaluation of whether two statutes are "designed" to cause "similar results," it's no longer obvious why the words must be construed the same way in each place. Why wouldn't an intentionalist standard review intentions of each usage and adjust the meaning accordingly? Don't you kind of just hoist yourself up on this standard?
Simple answer: Because then courts make the laws, as opposed to interpreting them.
Words have meanings. When they are in a similar context, they should have the same meaning. If the courts decide on quite different meanings for words, despite being in the same context, they effectively make the laws. Congress can't make the laws effectively, even using the exact same words, because the courts can just interpret the words...in the new laws...like they want.
Let's use a very extreme example to demonstrate the point. This is a piece of text in the US Constitution.
"No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,"
Straightforward, yes?
Now, let's say you're a radical Justice who thinks people should be able to be Representatives after just 2 years. You could interpret the word "years" to mean years...in Mercury. The US Constitution doesn't define what a year is. But simultaneously, the 25 years should be Earth years, in your opinion.
You've changed the law. And if Congress passes an new law, you can interpret it again, to be how you want it.
Same word. Different interpretation, based on where it is.
I'm honestly a bit insulted how stupid this is. Good grief.
You know, it's funny, because while you're making an argument about how "words have meaning," your own words are equivocal and euphemistic. You treat the distinction between "making" and "interpreting" law as being plain and self-evident, but it's not, and neither is it obvious or given that judges shouldn't be doing one or the other of those things. You're citing a simplistic slogan, which carries with it a whole ideology about the judiciary and jurisprudence - and then you're telling me that, you know, words just mean what they mean, right?
Suffice it to say that I don't agree with your basic distinction. Judges make law. They do not legislate, but their holdings have the force and are treated as binding law. They do this partly by interpreting statutes and applying the to specific cases. Sometimes that process is straightforward; other times it requires a lot of thought.
Here, you're sliding right past the point that I'd initially put to you, which is that "similar context" is doing a whole lot of work here. What counts as "similar"? Voize has very capably pointed out that the two statutes you asserted were "similar" were enacted at different times, with the latter clearly differentiating itself from the former. But you think that the same term used in each should be treated as being used in a "similar context." On what basis? You've made a judgment - the historical fact that Voize has cited is irrelevant, to you, while your judgment about the purposes of the two statutes is relevant. You're putting your thumb on the scale. "Making law," as you pejoratively put it, by disregarding the apparent intent of Congress, in defining the term with greater precision in the subsequent statute, and importing their later-definition into the earlier-definition.
You're making a different kind of point here. I wasn't asking you to justify why judges should employ the "plain meaning" of terms, or look to the original public meaning, or whatever other basis we'd have for determining a word's meaning. I was asking you to justify a very particular technique of interpreting identical terms used in different statutes in identical ways. Your Mercury-years example may be a suitable critique of the original decision to interpret "undue hardship" as meaning something constituting more than a de minimis burden on an employer. But it doesn't explain why we should interpret the term in the Title VII and ADA contexts identically.
"Judges make law."
That one sentence is disturbing, on multiple levels.
Have you not heard of the phrase "common law"?
.
You have the elements right but assemble them backwards.
The Civil Rights Act uses "undue hardship" but doesn't define it, so SCOTUS came up with a definition in 1977.
13 years later Congress passed the ADA. They also wanted an undue hardship exemption but one that set the bar substantially higher, so they included a stricter definition "for the purposes of this subchapter".
To get the result you want you either have to ignore the ADA's definition in blatant disregard of the text, or apply it outside its subchapter to statutes it was not intended for, in blatant disregard of other text.
And the ADA was passed in 1990.
It's clear what Congress meant. Unify what words mean, in similar laws.
It is clear what Congress meant, all you need to do is pay attention to the text.
Congress redefined "undue hardship" for the ADA because they wanted it to have a different meaning there than SCOTUS had assigned it in Title VII 17 years earlier.
And the redefinition was scoped "for the purposes of this subchapter" because they didn't want it to affect any other statutes.
As a result it has two meanings, because Congress wanted it to have two meanings.
I mean, that generally makes sense, sure. In the abstract.
But it makes no sense in this context, when one law tells the courts how to interpret it, and the other one, written decades before that, does not.
"Undue hardship" as used in Title VII was not defined. It was interpreted by SCOTUS in 1977 to mean no more than de minimis. Maybe that wasn't the best interpretation. Maybe it wasn't even "right," to the extent that term has meaning. But Congress has had half a century to correct/alter this interpretation and has not chosen to do so.
Now, Congress in 1990 passed an entirely separate statute, and defined "undue hardship" in that statute, choosing something different than the courts' interpretation of that term in Title VII. Of course the courts must use that statutory definition in applying the ADA. But there is no principle of jurisprudence that says that courts should retroactively apply that definition to an entirely different, pre-existing statute that had already been definitively interpreted. Congress did not sub silentio amend Title VII by defining words in a different statute. Nothing in the text of the ADA even remotely suggests that Congress was considering Title VII.
The relevant question with respect to the interpretation of Title VII is what the 1964 (or, I suppose, 1972) Congress meant by that term in that context. Not what the 1990 Congress meant by that term in a different context.
Second point:
The facts of this case are particularly egregious. The victim here was an employee for the United States Postal Service...an employer with over 500,000 employees, in a very common role (mail carrier) for USPS. He requested a very simple accommodation for his religious beliefs...he could not work on the Sabbath. USPS had no problem with this, until 2016. When suddenly, it became an issue, and they couldn't possibly accommodate these religious beliefs. In fact, they couldn't even transfer him to any position in this 500,000+ employee corporation that could accommodate his beliefs without undue hardship.
This is beyond belief. For religious protections to mean anything, this individual's beliefs need to be protected. Otherwise, people could refuse to hire women....installing a women's bathroom...just too expensive. And you'd need to put in sexual harrassment training...too expensive.
All armchair, no lawyer.
You can always tell when a powerful argument is made, when those who oppose it have no real rebuttal, except an insult.
I don’t mean to be disrespectful, and it’s a Friday night but…
If you don’t see the hole in your argument in your second paragraph is pretty dumb by Saturday morning, that’s on you.
If you think you see a hole but choose to be snide rather than plainly state your objection then you are a jackass and that's on you.
Bingo.
“…people could refuse to hire women….you’d need to put in sexual harrassment(sic) training…too expensive.”
You don’t “need” sexual harassment training when you hire a corps of males that include fags?
This is a facile analysis. USPS has over 500k employees because it operates nationwide. That doesn't do this employee or the USPS any good. They're not going to transfer the employee to Oklahoma City or bring in someone from Juneau to cover his shift. The number of employees at local post offices are what's relevant here.
Here is an occurrence from an era predating most of this. It can easily be turned into a relevant hypothetical.
A steel fabrication company I worked for had negotiated a contract with its union, stipulating that jobs requiring respirators would be assigned only to employees without beards. Obvious safety issues were implicated.
I had always been clean shaven. One day assigned to grinding slag off welds inside tanker trucks made it evident to me how not-de-minimis was the difference between a respirator job and all the others. That was the last day in my life, almost 50 years ago, when I went clean shaven. Within a few days I enjoyed contractual impunity of my own from respirator jobs.
So the hypothetical part is what happens if folks who wear beards for religious observance get impunity, and all the others get the respirator jobs?