Today in Supreme Court History: February 27, 1901

2/27/1901: Champion v. Ames argued.

Comments

[Dan Schiavetta]

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (decided February 27, 1990): mentally ill prisoner could be treated with psychotropic drugs against his will; finding that he was danger to himself and others by panel of correctional officials and medical professionals comported with due process

Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. --- (decided February 27, 2019): Eighth Amendment prohibits executing prisoner who no longer remembers crime; here, Court remands for finding as to whether post-conviction mental condition (caused by series of strokes) consisted of specific delusions or just overall dementia (hearing was never conducted due to Madison's ill health; he died on Death Row a year later, age 69)

Patchak v. Zinke, 583 U.S. --- (decided February 27, 2018): Congress did not violate separation of powers by stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear claims as to specific land given by Interior Department to Michigan tribe for casino use (the fact that Native Americans survive by fostering gambling always depresses me, even if they think they're putting one over on the White Man)

Raygor v. Regents of University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533 (decided February 27, 2002): pendency of federal suit (dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds) does not toll statute of limitations for state suit (this was an age discrimination suit against a state university)

Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (decided February 27, 2001): dismissal of diversity suit in California based on California statute of limitations did not bar subsequent suit brought in Maryland state court subject to Maryland's longer statute (suit was for "inducement of breach of contract and various business torts")

[apedad]

Re: Champion v. Ames

Facts of the case

The defendants in the case were arrested and convicted under an Act of Congress of 1895 that made it illegal to send or conspire to send lottery tickets across state lines.

Question

Did the transport of lottery tickets by independent carriers constitute "commerce" that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that lottery tickets were indeed "subjects of traffic," and that independent carriers may be regulated under the Commerce Clause. The Court emphasized the broad discretion Congress enjoys in regulating commerce, noting that this power "is plenary, is complete in itself, and is subject to no limitations except such as may be found in the Constitution." The Court argued that Congress was merely assisting those states that wished to protect public morals by prohibiting lotteries within their borders. (oyez)

Here's a short essay which expands on this case: https://constitutingamerica.org/champion-v-ames-1903-guest-essayist-joerg-knipprath/

[Dan Schiavetta]

It was argued on this date in 1901, reargued twice, and the decision finally came down on February 23 of 1903 (which I commented on last week). Odd.

[Commenter_XY]

Patchak v. Zinke...So how often does Congress strip a federal court of jurisdiction to even hear claims? Is that typical?

[Dan Schiavetta]

Art. III, §2 allows Congress to make “exceptions” to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. It also allows Congress to create any “inferior courts” (art. III, §1) it wants (and of course to abolish them too). I don’t know how often Congress has actually stripped jurisdiction, but put these two clauses together, and I suppose that gives Congress the power to.

[apedad]

Re: Madison v. Alabama

Facts of the case

Vernon Madison has been on death row in Alabama for over 30 years and has had several serious strokes, rendering him unable to remember committing the crime for which he is to be executed. He also exhibits other symptoms of brain damage, including slurred speech, blindness, inability to walk independently, and urinary incontinence. Madison was originally scheduled to be executed in May 2016, and he challenged his competency in state court. The court denied his claim, and Madison then sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that he was incompetent to be executed.

In November 2017, the US Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief in Dunn v. Madison, finding that the state court’s determinations of law and fact were “not so lacking in justification” as to give rise to error “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” as required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).

Madison was rescheduled for execution for January 2018, and he again petitioned state court for relief, this time with new evidence that the court-appointed expert upon whose testimony the prior courts relied had been suspended from the practice of psychology. The court again denied his petition, finding Madison competent to be executed. Madison then sought asked the US Supreme Court to consider the constitutional issues underlying his claim, rather than the AEDPA ones it ruled on earlier.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment and the Court’s jurisprudence prohibit a state from executing a prisoner whose mental disability leaves him with no memory of the commission of the capital offense?

Does the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment preclude a state from executing a prisoner who suffers from severe cognitive dysfunction such that he cannot remember the crime for which he was convicted or understand the circumstances of his scheduled execution?

Conclusion

The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a state from executing a prisoner who cannot remember committing his crime, but it does prohibit executing a prisoner who cannot rationally understand the reasons for his execution, whether that inability is due to psychosis or dementia.

In a 5-3 opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court reviewed its precedents on the scope of the Eighth Amendment as applied to mentally incompetent death row prisoners. In 1986, the Court held in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of a prisoner who has “lost his sanity” after sentencing, relying on a “moral intuition” that “killing one who has no capacity” to understand his crime or punishment “simply offends humanity.” In Ford, the Court also pointed out that there is no “retributive value” in executing a person who has no comprehension of the sentence. In 2007, the Court in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, provided more specific criteria for how to identify prisoners ineligible for execution, identifying the “critical question” as whether a “‘prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by a mental illness’ that he lacks a ‘rational understanding’ of ‘the State’s rationale for [his] execution.’”

Although the parties disputed in the lower courts whether the lack of memory of commiting the crime, alone, disqualified a prisoner from execution, Madison accepted Alabama’s position that it does not, under Panetti. Likewise, the parties disputed in the lower courts whether Panetti applies only to prisoners suffering from psychosis, and categorically excludes those suffering from dementia, and Alabama accepted Madison’s position that it does not. The remaining issue, then, is whether the prisoner is unable to rationally understand the reasons for his sentence; if so, the Eighth Amendment forbids his execution. This is a question for the lower court on remand.

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. The dissent would not have reached the second question, opining that Madison presented only the first question in its petition and that Madison’s counsel raised the other question only after concluding that the first argument was unlikely to prevail.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. (oyez)

Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch wanting to execute a guy who had several serious strokes, symptoms of brain damage, slurred speech, blindness, etc.

“A society should be judged not by how it treats its outstanding citizens but by how it treats its criminals.” ― Fyodor Dostoyevsky

[SRG]

Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that he didn't give a shit about the state of the prisoner now, he should be executed and let God sort it out.

[David Nieporent]

and he challenged his competency in state court.

I think that should read that "he" challenged his competency in state court.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

Although of course it’s not legally relevant, I like to look up the crimes of these Death Row inmates.

“Madison shot Julius Schulte, a police officer in Mobile, Alabama, twice in the back of the head as Schulte supervised Madison’s move out of his former girlfriend’s house, court papers said.”

https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/feb/27/supreme-court-vernon-madison-death-sentence-dementia-ruling

He had three trials, and on the third try, the conviction stuck. Since then he’s been on Death Row.

It does sound inhumane to keep him on Death Row for so long, and if such a prolonged period on the Row had been part of the sentence ordered by the court it would no doubt have been cruel and unusual. Though I’d suspect his time on Death Row was prolonged by repeated appeals, giving him time to develop his major medical problems.

[Dan Schiavetta]

His crime was pretty mild compared to in some of the other cases I’ve summarized.

In the main, the Court’s death penalty cases deal with horrible people who did horrible things. They were guilty as sin. Though I usually agree with the Court when it rules in their favor on the issue presented.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

Perhaps I have a morbid curiosity about the underlying crimes.

[Dan Schiavetta]

I hope they’re not “inspiring” you.

[SRG]

Noting that Washington v Harper lets the decision to administer antipsychotics against a prisoner's will be left to an internal panel including correctional officers, I am willing to bet that the number of COs on such panels who have opposed such administration is approximately zero.

[Dan Schiavetta]

Probably it was a "stacked jury". Looking at evidence tailored in favor of drugging him up and with nobody to argue against it.

[SRG]

Yup. It's completely asymmetrical. From the CO perspective, there is no upside in not drugging an unwilling prisoner, and no downside in approving it.

And I can conceive a classical psychology argument, that the prisoner's unwillingness to consent to being drugged tells you how serious his condition is, so he must be drugged.