The Volokh Conspiracy
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Should There Be Three-Judge Panels for National Injunctions
A proposal to limit state AG (and other) forum-shopping for national injunctions.
There is widespread concern that it has become too easy for ideologically motivated plaintiffs--such as state attorneys general of the opposite party of the sitting president--to seek and obtain nationwide injunctions against federal policies they oppose by selecting the right district court in which to file the suit. Thus conservative plaintiffs file suit in single-judge divisions in Texas, while liberal plaintiffs file suit in uniformly liberal divisions in California. Such forum shopping can increase the likelihood of obtaining a favorable judgment and, with increasing frequency over the past decade, an injunction that halts a federal policy nationwide.
One way Congress could address this is by enacting legislation requiring that suits that seek such relief be filed in particular places. Under the Clean Air Act, for example, suits challenging regulations of nationwide scope and application generally must be filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, whereas suits against more localized decisions (such as individual permits or state implementation plans) get filed in the relevant district courts.
In a Bloomberg essay, Professor Alan Morrison suggests another potential fix: Requiring suits that seek nationwide injunctive relief against the federal government to go before three-judge panels. This approach is used for some other types of litigation, such as some election-related lawsuits, and used to be required for suits seeking to enjoin federal laws on constitutional grounds. Morrison thinks it might also make sense here.
From Morrison's article:
Eliminating forum shopping at the district court level is a much larger and perhaps unsolvable problem, but Congress can significantly lessen its effects on national injunctions by enacting a statute—providing that no injunction against a federal agency or officer may benefit any person beyond the named plaintiffs unless it is by a three-judge district court, which includes at least one circuit judge.
Under that statute, a plaintiff seeking relief for others would have to include a request for a three-judge court in the complaint, and the district judge to whom such a case was assigned would have no power on their own to issue any form of injunctive relief beyond the named plaintiff.
The statute should also provide that further review of a grant or denial of either a preliminary or permanent national injunction shall be by a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, filed within 30 days of the order to be reviewed. . . .
Under the proposed statute, forum shopping would continue, and opponents of actions by the Biden administration would probably file in the Fifth Circuit, just as those who disagreed with the Trump administration often chose the Ninth Circuit.
The biggest change would be that the law would require two judges to issue an injunction that extended beyond the immediate parties.
This statute would also be consistent with many federal laws that provide for direct review of an agency's final rule in the courts of appeals, where a stay can be issued only by at least two members of a three-judge panel.
Details need to be worked out, but the first step is to recognize that the Supreme Court will not and cannot solve this problem. Congress must start addressing it directly, hopefully by enacting mandatory three-judge court legislation for national injunctions.
I am sure there are some non-obvious downsides to this approach, but it seems like a proposal that merits serious consideration.
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I'd be interested in the math re odds of getting a good panel (i.e., 1 bad draw is OK) vs. a single judge in a highly slanted judicial district.
Seems like some sort of mandatory stay pending completion of the appeal process would make more sense....
Perhaps a statutory requirement to expedite all appeals could also be part of the solution toolbox.
If it's that important, it's reasonable to expect quick resolutions.
I proposed a version of it that would be basically impossible for a plaintiff to really game.
https://dilanesper.substack.com/p/nationwide-injunctions-are-a-problem
Well, points for honesty, I guess…
Yup 🙂
This is all the perfectly predictable consequence of “Lawfare” – ie the use of the courts to continue the political war by other means. This was positively celebrated in lefty-liberal circles when they hit on the “lawfare” meme.
But war is only fun so long as the enemy just stands there and takes incoming fire, and doesn’t shoot back. Now the right is shooting back, there’s a problem with “lawfare.”
The only real solution is for both sides of the political divide to agree – and mean it – that judges should be chosen otherwise from the ranks of political hacks. There is no sign whatever of any such consensus. Indeed we’ve moved in the opposite direction.
None of these administrative solutions tackle the real issue – hacktivist judges – and so they’re just palliatives. Practically the most effective palliatives are those that reduce the power of District Judges to act beyond their jurisdiction. But Appeals Courts can be hacktivist too.
I suppose I should add that while the game being played is Lawfare, then any system that allows the politically active and their lawyers, with the assistance of allied members of the judiciary, to gum up the works of the federal government and its agencies, on balance favors the right, or at least that part of the right that leans in the direction of small government.
Sure there will be some issues where the right want the government to do something, or make another rule, but for each such issue, the left will have at least twelve.
So the horror of national injunctions is much more horrible for lefties than for righties. Righties - while we're playing Lawfare - should be happy with national injunctions and single judge panels. Gumming up the federal government is basically a right wing hobby.
You are misreading the situation. Lawfare favors the people who have control of the Courts.
Expecting the Federal Government to be "gummed up" via Lawfare only works if you can get judges who will willingly gum up the system. If you have judges who are willing to act immediately to prevent that gumming up, any attempt to use Lawfare to gum up the works is going to be short-lived.
Well, maybe. Of course it's possible for activist judges to issue lawfare rulings to force the federal government to take positive actions when it would prefer to do nothing. But it's much more likely that activist judges will have opportunities to act by preventing the federal government from doing something that it wants to do - eg by saying it's exceeding its powers, or its actions are unconstitutional. So - my thesis runs - judges are better placed, on average, to play as blockers, than as quarterbacks or running backs.
Secondly, yes I accept that there may be judges willing instantly to try degumming any gumming that other judges might do. But those are going to have to be appeal court judges. Who usually act slooowly. And if the appeal court judges are also activist then you're going to have to waaaaaiiiiiit for SCOOOOOOTUUUUUS. Years. Maaaaybe decaaaades. Maybe forever. Perhaps we just have a different perspective on "short-lived."
But if it's just an activist gummer in one district and an activist degummer in another district, that's a hard one for the degummer to win. A District A judge can't reverse a national injunction from a District B judge. The best the District A judge can do is rule that the federal government isn't merely allowed to do that thing it wants to do, but is legally required to do it. But it's a much harder ask - even for an activist judge - to come up with a semi-plausible opinion, ruling that the federal government is legally obliged to promulgate some rule, rather than merely that the rule is within its powers.
And even then the District A judge doesn't nix the District B judge's injunction - it just sets up a conflict which will have to be resolved higher up.
The mandatory stay is better than my solution -- original jurisdiction for circuit courts.
There more I think about it, there may be a meta-partsian angle here i.e., many Texas and/or rural districts only have 1 judge, thus are now improper venue for these kind of claims.
Isn't part of the problem at the Appeals Court level?
File in Texas and win, and the appeal is heard by the 5th Circuit.
Maybe appeals of national injunctions should be assigned to circuit courts randomly. If it's a nationwide matter then why should the appeal be heard regionally?
I note this in my substack piece, but generally three judge panel decisions bypass the COA. They either stand or get reviewed by SCOTUS.
With nationwide injunctions this would be a feature and not a bug. Indeed, the expansion of en banc practice with respect to shadow docket cases is another abuse that has been occurring in recent years. En banc proceedings are supposed to be limited to circumstances where you have conflicting rulings from panels within a circuit and some courts (like the 11th Circuit ) have been using them to take cases away from panels they don’t like.
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How about no court can issue rulings beyond it's own jurisdiction?
Isn't that supposed to be why there are jurisdictions?
Anything else and lower courts usurp the purpose of the supreme court.
EXACTLY!!!!!
One striking point. When Trump's blue-ribbon attorney team files frivolous lawsuits for the sole purpose of partisan posturing, the attorneys involved risk sanctions. Some have been sanctioned. Why should state attorneys general colluding for similar purposes enjoy immunity? Can anyone think of a way to sanction state attorneys general for frivolous, politically partisan legal claims?
More generally, as a non-lawyer it is hard for me to grasp what amounts to frivolity. I might presume that a suit which requires overturn of long-settled legal principles to deliver a remedy could be construed frivolous. In fact, something like that seems to have played into the sanctions handed down against some Trump attorneys. I have an inkling that no such jeopardy would apply to a state attorney general who did likewise. What reasoning ought to guide that kind of distinction?
I see no legal barrier to sanctions against state Attorneys General or the states themselves. If you take a case to a court you are responsible for following that court's rules and are subject to that court's disciplinary authority.
Requiring a case to be filed in a court of appeals already provides three judges, without any requirement that the case be in any particular circuit. But such cases would have to be confined to the administrative record. Going direct to the appeals court does not work for rules that were not the product of notice and comment rulemaking. The other side of the story is not in the record.
Another form of gaming involved OSHA's emergency COVID rules, which were supported or opposed along the usual partisan lines. The challengers were in conservative circuits or joined challenges in conservative circuits. But there was a way to move the challenge into another circuit. Groups that supported the rule filed pro forma cases against it in liberal circuits. They wanted to lose.
Along the spectrum of local to national the extremes are easy to identify but the middle gets muddy. In the spring the Federal Highway Administration is set to release new rules on traffic signs. Let's say I or the city of Boston wants to challenge the new rules. (We both submitted comments to the docket.) It is difficult to grant effective relief to just me or just Boston. The rules are uniform nationwide, by design. Would our relief be treated as a nationwide injunctions?
A fictitious example. Traffic signals must comply with FHWA rules. Decades ago there was an experiment putting little white strobe lights in red lights on high speed roads to draw attention to the signal. The experiment was terminated as a failure. What if that experiment had instead resulted in a final rule from FHWA approving such fast-flashing signals? A hypothetical plaintiff who suffered epilepsy might sue on the grounds that the lights triggered seizures in violation of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Let's say he was the only one to raise the disability issue during the comment period, but the court finds that he was right and FHWA was wrong. What relief should the court grant? Our plaintiff might drive anywhere.
How about no? District judges should stay in their districts.
But I would support a system (actually a rule by congress) that any judge that is overturned by higher three times is fired.