The Volokh Conspiracy
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A Likely Win for Free Speech
Last week's argument at the Supreme Court in 303 Creative v. Elenis.
Last week, the Supreme Court heard argument in 303 Creative v. Elenis, the latest wedding vendor case–this time concerning a web designer who does not wish to design sites for same-sex weddings. The wedding vendor cases typically present a conflict between free speech, including religiously-motivated speech, and equality in the marketplace for goods and services. Based on last week's argument, it seems the Court is ready to rule in favor of free speech this time, as I explain in a post today at First Things:
Resolving [the designer's] claim requires the Court to answer a basic, conceptual question under the Court's precedents: As applied to Smith's web design business, does CADA regulate speech or conduct? If the former, CADA would have to satisfy a test known as "strict scrutiny." Colorado would have to show that prosecuting Smith was "necessary" to promote a "compelling" state interest. By contrast, if the law regulates conduct and only incidentally affects speech, Colorado would have to satisfy a more lenient test known as the O'Brien standard. Colorado would have to show only that CADA "furthered" an "important" or "substantial" state interest unrelated to the suppression of speech.
At last week's argument, Colorado's lawyer argued that CADA is directed principally at conduct. Were Colorado to prosecute Smith, he explained, it would be because Smith had discriminated against customers based on sexual orientation, not because she expressed an opinion on same-sex marriage. Smith could not be required to praise same-sex marriage expressly—but she would have to design websites for all comers. Appearing on behalf of the Biden Administration as amicus curiae, Deputy Solicitor General Brian Fletcher agreed. Declining categorically to design websites for same-sex weddings, he told the justices, would be "a form of status-based discrimination properly within the scope of public accommodations laws."
This argument appeared to persuade progressives like Justice Sonia Sotomayor—but not the Court's conservatives. For example, Justice Neil Gorsuch stressed that Smith had said repeatedly that she would "serve everyone," straight, gay, or transgender, and would decline to design websites for same-sex weddings no matter who requested them. She objected to expressing a message with which she disagreed, not to serving customers of different sexual identities. When it came to designing wedding websites, Gorsuch emphasized, "the question" for Smith wasn't "who," but "what."
Justice Gorsuch didn't mention it, but a recent case from the UK Supreme Court, Ashers Bakery, supports his argument. In that case, decided four years ago, a bakery in Northern Ireland refused to bake a cake with a pro-gay marriage message. The UK court ruled that the bakery had not violated UK anti-discrimination law because it had drawn a distinction based on the message conveyed, not the identity of the customer–the "what," not the "who," in Gorsuch's terms. Ashers Bakery isn't exactly analogous to 303 Creative. In the UK case, the bakery declined to bake a cake with an express pro-gay marriage message, whereas the designer in 303 Creative doesn't wish to design any website for a gay wedding, even a generic one without an express message. And, anyway, this Court probably won't feel comfortable relying on a foreign decision in a First Amendment case. But the cases are awfully close, and the reasoning in Ashers Bakery may ultimately control the outcome here as well.
If the Court does decide that CADA regulates speech and so must pass strict scrutiny, it seems unlike the Court will uphold the law. I explain why in my post. The Court's decision is expected by summer.
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If they decide it’s speech and not conduct it becomes a 1st Amendment issue and the 1st is incorporated upon the States.
Here’s your next challenge Josh.
A Christian group reserves a large room at a restaurant in Virginia. The restaurant takes the reservation. Then roughly an hour before the reservation, the restaurant calls the group and cancels the reservation, telling the Christian group, that the restaurant doesn’t share the values of the Christian group and that group makes their staff feel uncomfortable. So the group is not welcome to dine there.
Is this illegal discrimination?
https://www.wric.com/news/local-news/richmond/local-restaurant-refuses-service-to-conservative-advocacy-group/
No, it’s the wrong the analogy. In this case, the Christian group was refused due to its political stance , and both sides in the 303 dispute agreed that if the plaintiff was approached by Human Rights Campaign, or the DNC or the KKK or the Knights of Columbus, she would be within her rights to refuse.
The issue under debate is whether an SSM wedding is an expression of a political viewpoint or..a wedding.
Nope, they were refused for their religious beliefs, but thanks for playing you hypocritical totalitarian.
If it had been a church, or a Sunday School class, or something like that I’d agree. This was explicitly a group of political advocates. While their views are grounded in their faith, that doesn’t mean they aren’t political advocates. A group of social justice folks, whose views are grounded in long-held Catholic social teaching or their belief that Jesus meant what he said in the Sermon on the Mount, would be advocates if they banded together for political lobbying and made a similar reservation on their trip to lobby. They would be protected in DC itself, but not in too many other jurisdictions.
The group that did the refusing at the restaurant claimed the refusal was because of the group’s religious beliefs. Are religious beliefs just the same thing as political stance?
Do you mean the group that was refused? There’s nothing in the linked article where the business says it was the faith beliefs, rather than the political beliefs, of the group that led to the refusal. Indeed, the owners tie the refusal to political/lobbying actions.
If the restaurant would likewise refuse to serve a secular group with the same values, then there is no illegal discrimination (in Virginia).
Was Title II of the Civil Rights Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000a) repealed for Virginia?
Of course not. But if the restaurant equally would refuse to serve a secular or religious group because of their identical views, I don’t see how Title II is violated (they aren’t discriminating on the basis of religion).
Not sure that argument really works.
If a restaurant refuses to serve people who don’t eat pork, based on their views, religious or secular…or people who are wearing turbans…for religious or secular reasons…
It’s pretty clear what’s going on. The supposed views are acting as a surrogate to discriminate against people with certain religious beliefs.
And yes, there are Jews who eat pork, and non-Jews who don’t. Yet, regardless…
Likewise, I’m sure you can find a few individuals who are secular and pro-life. Yet, when you discriminate against people with pro-life views….that overwhelmingly is associated with their religion.
Now, a better argument could be made if it was the particular message being made that you were forced to replicate. I.E., as a website designer, if you disagreed with a pro-life message, and we asked to make one, you could potentially say no.
But, if a person came up to you as a website designer, and asked for a standard business website, on something innocuous…say Auto Parts. And then you proceeded to look them up, and find that they had donated to a Christian pro-life organization. And said “We don’t serve your type of people here”…
That begins to look like religious discrimination.
Now, your argument seems to be, that you can look up anyone based on their “values” and discriminate against them, no matter what they are asking for.
So, if you find a record that someone has donated to a pro-life organization in the past…you can deny them services in a restaurant, or in a hotel, or in bank. Based on their “values.” Which may or may not correlate with religion.
But if you can do that, can’t you do the same in regards to select organizations that promote or support other things?
“Yes. I don’t see a legal problem with that”
And if you don’t see a problem with that…the obvious rejoinder is this.
Have you supported gay marriage? If so, you can be discriminated against for your support of gay marriage. And they can reject your business.
“I disagree. There are plenty of secular pro-life people. And refusing to serve them is evidence there isn’t a pretext for religious discrimination.”
And there are plenty of non-Jews who don’t eat pork.
But overwhelmingly, secular people are not pro-life. They are pro-choice.
https://swbts.edu/news/religious-faith-church-attendance-aligns-with-more-pro-life-views/
She didn’t violate anything. She doesn’t make wedding websites. This case is about “But what if I did suddenly decide to make wedding websites?”
The question of whether CADA regulates particular conduct or not is entirely a question of state law. The parties stipulated that CADA regulates the conduct in question, and the defendents were Colorado officials.
If the Supreme Court suspects the defendants’ construction of their own law, which is their business to enforce, was wrong, the proper course would be to certify the state law question to the Supreme Court of Colorado before deciding on the matter further. It could suggest to the Colorado court that the parties’ interpretation might give rise to serious constitutional questions. If the Colorado state court agrees with Professor Movsesian’s interpretation of CADA, the Supreme Court could then dismiss the case as moot. Otherwise, it would need to decide the speech question.
I don’t think the Supreme Court should generally be construing states’ laws against the opinion of the states’ own officials.
Fortunately, the SC can determine whether Colorado can enforce its law in this situation, despite the First Amendment. Hence the question presented to the court:
“Whether applying a public-accommodation law to compel an artist to speak or stay silent violates the free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment.”
I disagree. If Professor Movsesian’s view that wedding web site design is not actually a public accommodation within the meaning of the challenged Colorado law turns out to be correct, then the question presented would become a strictly hypothetical one, there would be no case or controversy over it, and the Supreme Court would lack Article III jurisdiction to answer it.
No; whether it’s a public accommodation under Colorado law is a merits question, and thus not jurisdictional. SCOTUS routinely assumes a particular legal interpretation for the purpose of reaching a related legal question.
The question of whether CADA regulates particular conduct or not is entirely a question of state law.
Correct. But whether that application is permitted by the First Amendment is within SCOTUS jurisdiction. And the conduct-speech distinction is a First Amendment one. A state cannot avoid the First Amendment by labelling something conduct.
Indeed. But Professor Movsesian is arguing that the Colorado state law doesn’t actually prohibit the conduct the plaintiff wants to do. The parties stipulated it covered it. But he’s arguing the parties are wrong. Courts don’t have to accept parties’ stipulations about what the law is, so maybe he has a point. If Professor Movsesian is right, then any constitutional decision would be an advisory opinion about some hypothetical law that did cover it. That’s just not the Supreme Court’s business under Article III. The proper course would be to dismiss the case without deciding any constitutional question, and with instructions to vacate the opinion below and dismiss.
Or they could certify the question to the Colorado Supreme Court. Not likely, though.
Bigots have rights, too.
But not the right to have educated, reasoning, modern people accept the silly claim that bigotry is improved by a cloak of religion, or believe that superstition transforms bigotry into anything other than bigotry.
So carry on, disaffected clingers. You know the rest . . .
NPC Alert.
Is that incel for ‘I find this comment inconvenient for my right-wing positions, which incline me to dislike criticism of gay-bashing bigotry?’
It’s incel for something anyway. Doesn’t really matter what.
For some reason, Youtube has lately been suggesting snippets of SCOTUS arguments to me. I listened to a few on this case.
Sotamayor asked a really silly question, IMO. She wanted to know what is the difference between this case and website designer who won’t design a site for an interracial wedding. The answer to that is there is no difference. The First Amendment protects speech even if Justice Sotamayor or anyone else finds it offensive. As I have said before, if the Nazis had the right to march in Skokie, this lady has the right to not design websites with messages she disagrees with.
Tell that to Alito.
I am.
I’m not sure why this is a silly question, unless you presuppose that this business isn’t a public accommodation (or that public accommodation law and the civil rights act should be overturned, but since it’s still the law it would still be a good question)
For example, Justice Neil Gorsuch stressed that Smith had said repeatedly that she would “serve everyone,” straight, gay, or transgender, and would decline to design websites for same-sex weddings no matter who requested them. She objected to expressing a message with which she disagreed, not to serving customers of different sexual identities. When it came to designing wedding websites, Gorsuch emphasized, “the question” for Smith wasn’t “who,” but “what.”
Glad to see someone there got this obvious point. This is based on message, not the person’s sexual orientation. The test for that is if a gay person asked her to design a website for some other purpose, like promoting a business. She has made it clear she would. The State and others here tie themselves into knots trying to avoid this obvious point.
Again if the answer to the “who versus what” question is so obvious, then the limo driver would also be exempt from serving a same-sex wedding (he too is objecting to the “what”, not the “who”). The justices aren’t going there are evidenced by Kavanaugh’s line of questioning.
Three’s a difference between designing a website (expressive, hence subject to 1A) and driving a limo (not).
Indeed. But as I read Bored Lawyer’s comments (including in prior posts), he isn’t making that distinction (I’m pretty sure he believes the limo driver isn’t discriminating against gays based on the “who” versus “what” question).
And after what I wrote above, he did indeed draw that distinction for the Constitutional question below. But, I remain pretty sure he believes the statute permits the limo driver to turn down the wedding (he can correct me if I got that wrong).
I do think that the statute permits that, but that issue is not before SCOTUS. They have to assume that the limo driver could not make that refusal.
Is it though? A limo driver doesn’t decorate the car? There are no “just married” signs involved?
If they do weddings at all then how would an onlooker know that one couple inside is straight and another is gay as the limo goes down the street?
See my comment above. That may work at the state level, but at the federal level it’s a First Amendment issue, that only applies to speech/expression. Driving a limousine ain’t it.
I’m not so sure the “what” versus “who” question plays a role in the First Amendment analysis. If Smith would not design a website for any gay person because she thinks gays are sub-humans, why isn’t that protected speech?
Josh, thinking that gays are subhuman is protected by the First Amendment — as is actually saying it. Treating gays differently is conduct which is not.
Look at it this way — I consider Kwanzza to be a holiday made up by terrorists and want nothing to do with it. So I refuse to bake any Kwanzaa cakes — for ANYONE. But I will sell a Christmas cake to ANYONE. And I cook with lard or something that isn’t Kosher — as long as I am up front about that (i.e. list my ingredients), I am not discriminating against anyone, even though some people won’t be able to eat my cakes. (They can go to a Kosher bakery if desired.)
Oh, and as to Kwanzaa — https://anncoulter.com/2020/12/30/happy-kwanzaa-the-holiday-brought-to-you-by-the-fbi-7/
There is a middle ground where “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct. There “a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
OK. So which matrix entries are speech, which are expressive conduct and which are conduct (with supporting precedent if it exists)?
That is a case by case determination based on an evidentiary record, the application of which determines the standard of review. As the Tenth Circuit opined, 303 Creative is a pure speech case. “The websites Appellants intend to offer ‘celebrate and promote the couple’s wedding and unique love story’ by combining custom text, graphics, and other media. . . . The websites consequently express approval and celebration of the couple’s marriage, which is itself often a particularly expressive event.”
Ford has to sell me a car — but they don’t have to sell me one with purple polka dots.
I think they do (in Colorado) if they sell it to gays but refuse to sell to you because you are straight.
Josh, Ford only has to sell cars in the colors they sell them in — they don’t have to offer me one in a special paint job that they aren’t routinely selling, i.e. purple polka dots.
Ford doesn’t have to sell you a car.
If i walk in with cash and am willing to pay list price, and they have one in stock, they don’t?
Look into why used car dealers have to put the vin number and/or disclaimers in print ads.
Dr Ed.
No. They don’t. So long as they aren’t discriminating against you on the basis of a protected class.
There could be many reasons for it. Perhaps they have an add-on fee that you’re unwilling to pay. Perhaps they’ve promised the car verbally to someone else. Perhaps they think it’s shady you’re paying all cash for a car and something’s wrong.
But they don’t have to sell to you.
Other cases — maybe Obergefell itself — have held that discriminating against gay weddings is tantamount to discriminating against gays. And that extends to other kinds of weddings (interracial) I’m pretty sure. You can’t hide behind “who” vs “what” when the “what” is so closely tied to the “who.”
I suspect most of the court would be willing to overturn that protection here. Some of the court (Evilito) would even say that gay marriage is especially unprotected, that is, it counts as a “what” even if interracial marriage counts as a “who.”
But that’s simply the old “ssm marriage bans are not discriminatory because they apply to straight people too” fallacy, slightly repackaged. The only message expressed by a wedding website is “these people are getting married” so if you don’t want to convey that message when it comes to group x, you are indeed discriminating against group x, no matter who actually ordered the website.
I don’t see how a case from the UK Supreme Court has any relevance to this case. It is a different country’s court relying on the interpretation of different laws. Whatever they ruled, it should have no effect on the US Supreme Court’s decision.
I decided to play devil’s advocate and argue against your position, so I asked the AI to pen a rebuttal (Internet commenters are SHOCKED by this new method of improving debate!):
There are several points that could be used to rebut the statement that a case from the UK Supreme Court has no relevance to a case being considered by the US Supreme Court. Some potential arguments could include:
The UK Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court are both high courts of appeal, and they both have the authority to interpret and apply the law in their respective countries. As such, the decisions of these courts can provide useful precedents and insights that can be applied in similar cases.
The legal systems of the UK and the US have many similarities, including a common legal heritage and a shared commitment to the rule of law and fundamental human rights. As a result, the decisions of the UK Supreme Court can provide valuable guidance and perspective on legal issues that are also relevant in the US. The UK Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court both have the power to review and overturn previous decisions, and they often look to each other’s decisions for guidance and inspiration. For example, the US Supreme Court has cited the decisions of the UK Supreme Court in its own rulings, and vice versa.
The global nature of many legal issues, such as human rights, environmental protection, and international trade, means that the decisions of courts in different countries can have implications and repercussions beyond their national borders. For this reason, the US Supreme Court may find it useful to consider the decisions of the UK Supreme Court when considering cases with international implications.
In conclusion, while the UK Supreme Court and the US Supreme Court are different courts with different laws and jurisdiction, they both play important roles in their respective legal systems and can provide valuable insights and guidance on legal issues of common concern. As such, the decisions of the UK Supreme Court can be relevant and useful to the US Supreme Court in its own deliberations and rulings.
And that is why the AI still needs improvement.
So it doesn’t make arguments, it only suggests possible arguments?
Starlord, the practice of SCOTUS Justices citing foreign (particularly European) courts is not new — the left has been doing it for years. The late Justice Ginsburg once asked “Why shouldn’t we look to the wisdom of the judge from abroad with at least as much ease as we would review a law review article written by a professor?”
This line of reasoning, the event instead of the customer, helps me be reconciled to the inevitable decision coming down from the Supreme Court, but what if the baker claimed a religious opposition to interracial marriage? Would Clarence and the Supremes (and Professor Movesian) be OK with that? The only argument I’ve seen here on that subject is from Dale Carpenter, that racial discrimination is somehow “different.” That’s a pretty lame legal argument.
There’s a measure of common sense that would resolve these kinds of disputes, but our legal system doesn’t work that way.
Racial discrimination is refusing to sell a Black customer a wedding cake for her two (heterosexual) white friends who are getting married. It’s the who, not the what.
Se above re Kwanzaa cakes — it’s not discrimination if I refuse to sell them to ANYONE, but it is discrimination if I refuse to sell something to Black folk, *if* I would sell it to anyone else.
“The law prohibits both poor and rich people from sleeping under bridges. No discrimination.”
“We’re not gerrymandering against minorities, we’re gerrymandering against the political party most minorities vote for. No discrimination.”
“I wouldn’t make a gay wedding website for gay or straight people. No discrimination.”
“
Show of hands — how many right-wingers recognize that they are just buying a bit of extra time for stale and superstitious thinking here, and how many conservatives genuinely expect the bigots to prevail over the long run in America?
These are the same or similar people who are on Twitter right now running through a list of conspiracies about Dems because the guy who stole hundreds of millions of dollars from them was arrested before he could rabbit to a less extradition-friendly jurisdiction. So, what do you think?
How long is haul that you have in mind? If they can get a generation or two of protection for certain religious beliefs, they’ll take it while they firm up other aspects of minority rule for the longer term.
For the reasons expressed by Professor Dale Carpenter on this blog, https://reason.com/volokh/2022/12/03/a-first-amendment-for-everyone/, I hope that SCOTUS reverses the Tenth Circuit and remands for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the First Amendment embraces website design, that application of the public accommodations act here would amount to compelled speech, and that strict scrutiny applies, but the analysis of the narrow tailoring requirement is flawed. As Professor Carpenter writes:
As to the disposition of the case, Professor Carpenter gets it right:
I very highly doubt SCOTUS will refrain from completing the strict scrutiny analysis.
I hope that the high court will confine its analysis to the compelled speech issue presented at bar and will not use this case as a vehicle to retrench on anti-discrimination law generally. It may be noteworthy that the petitioner sought certiorari including her free exercise claim and invited the Court to overrule Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), but the grant of cert was limited to the question whether applying a public-accommodation law to compel an artist to speak or stay silent violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment. https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/21-00476qp.pdf
At last week’s argument, Colorado’s lawyer argued that CADA is directed principally at conduct. Were Colorado to prosecute Smith, he explained, it would be because Smith had discriminated against customers based on sexual orientation, not because she expressed an opinion on same-sex marriage. Smith could not be required to praise same-sex marriage expressly—but she would have to design websites for all comers.
What a load of crap
1: If Smith refuses to do websites for a heterosexual marriage because he wedding coordinator who’s ordering the website is gay, THAT would be “discriminating against customers based on sexual orientation”.
Refusing to make a website celebrating a sex sex “marriage” is speech, pure and simple
2: If she has to design a celebratory wedding website for a same sex “marriage”, then shes being forced to express an opinion on that “marriage”.
Unless she’s allowed to make websites that say “celebrating the marriage of Bob and Julie” in a heterosexual case, and can insist on only producing a website that says “it really sucks that Mike and Pete are having this fake wedding” in a same sex “marriage” case.
Now, if CO will guarantee not to prosecute in that case, we’re good to go. And if she’s allowed to stick an customers for a same sex “marriage” website with an hourly fee, and up-front payments before they get any of her time, then everything is fine.
But if she faces State sanction for refusing to make a website that says “celebrating the marriage of Mike and Pete”, then she’s being punished for her speech
And that punishment is a clear violation of the US Constitution
It was part of the agreed upon stipulations.
Robert George wrote this in FT ten years ago, and I’m unaware of him recanting his views:
“Catholics have two reasons to speak out in defense of the religious freedom of Muslims, Jews, Protestants, Latter-Day Saints, and other non-Catholics, as well as their own religious freedom. The first (and more important) reason is simply that it is the right thing to do. Faith and reason bear common witness to the profound truth that religious liberty is a right held equally by all. The second reason is that the denial of religious liberty for any one group erodes the foundations of religious liberty for everyone. If you value your own religious freedom, it is prudent to defend the other guy’s religious freedom when it comes under attack. A precedent established by people in, say, Murfreesboro, Tennessee who despise Islam and see it as a pernicious force, may prove very handy to people in, say, San Francisco who have a similar attitude towards Catholicism. (I hope it goes without saying that not everyone in Murfreesboro is hostile towards Islam and not everyone in San Francisco despises Catholicism. By “people” I mean some people, not everyone or even most people in these or other cities.)”
https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2012/06/defend-religious-liberty-for-muslims
Of course not.
Refusing to provide services for a Catholic wedding ceremony is another matter.
Wrong. I know there is a difference between the marching and the website.
But Sotamayor’s question was the same facts, i.e., a web designer selling her services for profit, except the objection is to interracial rather than gay marriage. The only difference between the two is that more people find the one offensive than the other. Which in First Amendment law should mean nothing.
Why?
Alright, how about a Jewish (Kosher) wedding? I don’t have a Kosher kitchen, and hence this is a significant (and unusual) expense — and I wouldn’t have a clue how to make my kitchen Kosher in the first place.
I’ll sell them a non-Kosher cake, but I doubt any court would require me to make a Kosher one for them.
Now I’ve never been to a Catholic wedding so I don’t know how they differ from Protestant weddings, and Pope John Paul II did a *lot* to quiet down the Catholic/Protestant animosities, but to the extent it remains, I can’t be forced to express contempt for my own religion…
Race vs. sexual orientation: There’s no analytic difference in terms of speech vs. conduct or discrimination based on behavior vs. identity. There may, however, be a difference if/when the compelling government interest test is being applied. The government has significantly more interest in rooting out racial discrimination than discrimination on other grounds, including orientation.
“The government has significantly more interest in rooting out racial discrimination than discrimination on other grounds, including orientation.”
Elimination of discrimination as to goods and services in either category is a compelling governmental interest. The Court of Appeals in 303 Creative correctly recognized Colorado’s interest in ensuring “equal access to publicly available goods and services.” The Court also recognized a compelling interest in protecting the dignity interests of members of marginalized groups, albeit ruling that the public accommodations act was not narrowly tailored to meet the latter. (As an aside, I disagree with the Tenth Circuit’s analysis of narrow tailoring as to the former.)
In a case involving sex discrimination, (which FWIW is ordinarily subject to intermediate scrutiny) SCOTUS opined that “the [Minnesota Public Accommodations] Act reflects the State’s strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services. [Citation omitted.] That goal, which is unrelated to the suppression of expression, plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest order.”
You’ve never been to a Catholic wedding? I’m genuinely curious about where you live and how long you have lived there (in general terms; I’m not trying to dox anyone) for such a thing to be so.
And to ease your mind, nothing goes on in them that would make a Protestant, or anyone else, uncomfortable, let alone express contempt for one’s own religion.
“It is not the government’s job to ‘root out discrimination’ (at least where private actors are concerned).”
It is if a state legislature so chooses and enacts enabling legislation to achieve that end. The Tenth Amendment reserves that power to the states.
You don’t think that Protestants who think the Pope is the Antichrist or Jews who consider Christianity to be idol worship would have a problem with a wedding that includes Mass?
I’m aware that there are such people, though they seem to be small in number, concentrated geographically, and isolated socially. Maybe Dr. Ed 2 is one of them, which would, of course, answer my question. Or maybe he lives in a place where Catholics are so rare he has no idea what goes on in their weddings, and he doesn’t watch TV. But I wasn’t asking about what I think; I was asking about Dr. Ed 2 and how he has managed to avoid what is, for the vast majority of people, a common experience.