The Volokh Conspiracy
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Today in Supreme Court History: June 13, 1977
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Guess which case flew under Josh's radar:
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (decided JUNE 13, 1966): asking questions of detained witness without advising of right to remain silent violates Fifth Amendment guarantee against self incrimination (Congress tried to supersede this holding by statute, but the statute was struck down in Dickerson v. United States, 2000)
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (decided June 13, 1994): jury can consider defendant's previous death sentence (for a concomitant killing) in determining sentence for murder
United States v. Bryant, 579 U.S. 140 (decided June 13, 2016): upholding statute increasing penalties for domestic violence on Native American Reservations if two previous convictions in Native American courts because defendants have right to counsel in Indian courts even though not in all situations Sixth Amendment requires
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (decided June 13, 1977): denying college financial assistance to resident aliens violates Equal Protection
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 579 U.S. 115 (decided June 13, 2016): Puerto Rico statute allowing public utilities to file for bankruptcy preempted by federal Bankruptcy Code
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (decided June 13, 1996): court can bar defendant from arguing he was intoxicated as a defense to mental state required for crime (here, murder by gunshot wound) (his blood alcohol was 0.36% even some hours after the incident! 0.5% will kill you)
Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672 (decided June 13, 1966): returning case to trial court for evaluation of whether new Voting Rights Act allowed U.S. citizen (born in Puerto Rico) to be denied voting privileges in New York; she had been rejected for inadequate English proficiency but VRA §4(e) prohibits denying voting rights to anyone with a sixth-grade education
Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (decided June 13, 1966): contempt against person who spoke back to HUAC and didn't answer questions reversed because Congress never authorized the committee's investigation
From Souter's dissent in _Montana_: "I have no doubt that a State may so define the mental element of an offense that evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication at the time of commission does not have exculpatory relevance and, to that extent, may be excluded without raising any issue of due process. I would have thought the statute at issue here had implicitly accomplished such a redefinition, but I read the opinion of the Supreme Court of Montana as indicating that it had no such effect, and I am bound by the state court's statement of its domestic law."
More unintended(?) consequences of _In re Winship_, forcing philosophers to make fine distinctions of elements and allowed presumptions and disallowed presumptions and allowed affirmative defenses and disallowed affirmative defenses.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (decided JUNE 13, 1966): asking questions of detained witness without advising of right to remain silent violates Fifth Amendment guarantee against self incrimination (Congress tried to supersede this holding by statute, but the statute was struck down in Dickerson v. United States, 2000)
Reality means nothing to the lawyer, only procedure. Why? Procedure produces lawyer jobs. The question is whether the statement is true or not. Then despite the Miranda rule, 25% of exonerated defendants falsely confessed. This decision coincided with soaring crime rates.
As a generality, no witness testimony, not even a confession, should be admissible in the absence of objective evidence.
Re: Dickerson v. United States (under Miranda)
Facts of the case
During questioning about a robbery he was connected to, Charles Dickerson made statements to authorities admitting that he was the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies. Dickerson was then placed under arrest. The timing of his statement is disputed. The FBI and local detectives testified that Dickerson was advised of his Miranda rights, established in Miranda v. Arizona, and waived them before he made his statement. Dickerson said he was not read his Miranda warnings until after he gave his statement. After his indictment for bank robbery, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the statement that he made on the ground that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The government argued that even if the Miranda warnings were not read, the statement was voluntary and therefore admissible under 18 USC Section 3501, which provides that "a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." The District Court granted Dickerson's motion, finding that he had not been read his Miranda rights or signed a waiver until after he made his statement, but the court did not address section 3501. In reversing, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings, but held that section 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. The court held that "Congress enacted section 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court."
Question
May Congress legislatively overrule Miranda v. Arizona and its warnings that govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation?
Conclusion
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture," wrote Rehnquist. "Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. We decline to overrule Miranda ourselves," concluded the Chief Justice. Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, blasted the Court's ruling, writing that the majority opinion gave needless protection to "foolish (but not compelled) confessions."
(oyez)
I was trained (in the 90s), that if a witness or suspect makes a voluntary admission to a crime prior to Miranda, then the officer must immediately issue the Miranda warning and then proceed with the interview.
thanks!
Lawyers denying reality to make crime soar, and to generate lawyer jobs. You people need to be ashamed.
Why does the Volokh Conspiracy continue to publish this shoddy work, long after captcrisis and others have demonstrated the shameful lack of quality?
The answer seems obvious and is illuminative.
Carry on, clingers.
Stills-heavy studio version.