The Volokh Conspiracy
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§ 230 and the Civil Rights Modernization Act
My testimony today before a House Subcommittee on Communications & Technology hearing on proposed revisions to § 230.
You can see the PDF of my testimony (and the other witnesses' testimony as well), but I thought I'd also blog the text; I commented separately on five different proposals, so I thought I'd break this down accordingly. As I noted, my plan was mostly to offer an evenhanded analysis of these proposals, focusing (in the interests of brevity) on possible nonobvious effects. I also included my personal views on some of the proposals, but I will try to keep them separate from the objective analysis.
[V.] Civil Rights Modernization Act
This bill would, among other things, allow liability (civil or criminal) for "target[ed]" paid "advertisements" that may violate
- "(A) any Federal, State, or local law, any part of which prohibits discrimination or other adverse action on the basis of a protected class or status [i.e., actual or perceived race, color, ethnicity, religion, national origin, sex (including sexual orientation and gender identity), age, disability, familial status, pregnancy, genetic information, or citizenship or immigration status];"
- "(B) any other Federal law that is administered or enforced, in whole or in part, by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice; or"
- "(C) any Federal, State, or local law that prohibits the dissemination of false or misleading information intended, with respect to an election for public office, to prevent voters from casting their ballots or to prevent voters from voting for the candidate of their choice."
"Targeting" is defined as using technology "to deliver or show a covered advertisement to any particular subset of users who are part of or have a protected class or status."
This would likely cover discriminatorily targeted ads for employment, housing, and the like (under (A)). And it would also potentially hold platforms liable (under (C)) for accepting ads that ultimately prove "false or misleading" in a way "intended … to prevent voters from casting their ballots or to prevent voters from voting for the candidate of their choice," so long as the ads are targeted based on, for instance, age or familial status—or for that matter on citizenship status, in trying to focus on eligible voters.
This latter provision, related to elections, is potentially dangerous, because it puts platforms in a position where they can be liable for ads containing "misleading information." Platforms often know little about particular elections, and about whether particular statements about those elections are likely to be seen as false or misleading by a future judge or jury. And if "misleading information intended … to prevent voters from casting their ballots or to prevent voters from voting for the candidate of their choice" includes information intended to dissuade voters from voting or from voting for a candidate (and not just to dupe them into voting, say, at the wrong time or the wrong place[10]), platforms would potentially be still more exposed. Indeed, some jurisdictions do have statutes that purport to ban false statements about election campaigns; lower courts are split on whether such statutes are constitutional.[11]
The simplest way for platforms to avoid the risk of such liability is to require that any political ads as to which any question might arise—e.g., all political ads that criticize rival candidates and thus might be seen as including "misleading information intended … to prevent voters from voting for the candidate of their choice"—be run in a purely untargeted way (since the bill would only strip away immunity for allegedly false or misleading ads that are targeted). I'm not sure whether this would on balance improve election-related discourse or unduly interfere with it.
[* * *]
[10] See Eugene Volokh, Are Douglas Mackey's Memes Illegal?, Tablet, Feb. 9, 2021, https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/douglass-mackey-ricky-vaughn-memes-first-amendment.
[11] For cases upholding such statutes, see In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000); State v. Davis, 27 Ohio App. 3d 65 (1985). For cases striking them down, see Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2016); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014); Commonwealth v. Lucas, 472 Mass. 387 (2015); State ex rel. Public Disclosure Comm'n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 135 Wash. 2d 618 (1998).
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This is a literal torpedo to the First Amendment. It should be the top news story everywhere yet theres hardly a peep about this as everyone ocds about other nonsense.
Volokh should disclose that he opposes the public utility view of social media. He is acculturated to the degenerate culture of LA, and a strong advocate for the unjust enrichment of these platforms. He has no credibility, and is trying to fool the Congress.
There is, of course, no "public utility view of social media." Media by definition is not a utility.
but the infrastructure around it is. Otherwise why are libs whining about net neutrality?
Sorry David N but, annoying as DavidB is, in this case he's ... Well, not completely right but closer than your comment is. Prof Volokh acknowledges the arguments about a "public utility view of social media". That the essence of the 'treat them as a common carrier' argument.
Where I think DavidB misses the mark is that I've not seen anything to suggest that Prof V personally endorses or opposes that argument. All I've seen from Prof V are discussions of the conditions under which that approach might or might not be constitutional.
Common carriers and public utilities are different concepts, though.
If there is an overall point to this mini-series of threads about Section 230, it is not yet evident to me. I do have a suggestion though. Problems with twists and turns inherent in these down-in-the-weeds plots to let government adjust the content of online publishing will overwhelm any benefits. Mostly it is the conditionality of the proposals which invites the trouble.
There is no need for that. To reform online publishing, to fix almost all the problems which focus widespread current objections, and to assure that government censorship does not get into it, only one simple action by Congress is necessary. Repeal Section 230. Repeal it unconditionally, for all publishers.
That is the only even-handed, 1A-compatible way to deal with this failed experiment. It is clearly out of control, and already inflicting on the public life of the nation costs which the nation cannot afford to pay.
The result of repeal would be reversion to a legal regime for publishing which proved successful for generations. That is hardly a bad thing. First, put that back in place.
Then experiment with other ways to optimize the publishing potential of the internet. One aim might be to find a way to create broader access to opinion publishing, exploiting the enormous economic advantages of the internet medium. A further goal would be to avoid re-creating the vices of Section 230's world-wide, cost-free, no-editing publishing model—which encompasses everything under management of a few giantistic platforms. Rules governing advertising sales might provide leverage to achieve such a goal. They are the methods which we now know should have been explored in the first place.
I love how confident you are about things that make no sense.
Care to say more, benji? Maybe you could begin by reviewing your own estimate of the costs the public life of the nation has paid in lost news gathering capacity, increased swill publishing, proliferating conspiracy theories, and internet-leveraged election disruptions, all to the accompaniment of censorship threats from would-be private monopolists, and would-be government censors alike.
Or maybe you discount those costs to zero, and think on that basis that the status quo is just peachy. If so, you could say that.
If neither applies, then try to be forthright, and just tell us which censorship scheme you are demanding—government censorship or private censorship—and why it will be harmless to press freedom to implement your preference. No doubt you have thought all this through, and are plenty confident you know what to do.
Look, it's today's example of Lathrop calling for mass censorship for the sole purpose of empowering worthless newspaper publishers as gatekeepers because he used to be one of those.
Just to reiterate, because I know Lathrop will come along with more obfuscation: the only purpose of repealing 230 is to limit speech.
Now, the proposal to rewrite Section 230, C2A?
It currently reads, "that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected."
It's proposed to change that to, "that is not constitutionally protected or that the provider has an objectively reasonable belief is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, or harassing."
I thoroughly approve of this change, it discourages, rather than promoting, censorship. Much mischief has come of that "or otherwise objectionable" being read as a blank check.
Setting aside whether it's constitutional for the government to privilege some constitutionally-protected speech based on its content as you propose — something I strongly doubt — that would of course prevent ICSs from banning spam.
"This would likely cover discriminatorily targeted ads for employment, housing, and the like (under (A))."
Does anyone have an example of this?
What is a "discriminatorily targeted ad?"
One of the big companies, I think Facebook, had an option to select the target audience for an ad. Among the options was race. You could target users that the computer thought were black or at least acted black. Or omit them. A reporter discovered that you could do this for housing-related ads. The Internet and politicians were outraged. So Facebook (or whoever) disabled the race option on housing ads. (I don't think the option was illegal, because the relevant law regulates the content rather than the location of ads. But it was embarrassing to Silicon Valley.)
It is easy to present an option that is not described as race-related but still targets the "right" and not the "wrong" kind of people. Say Twitter offers three check boxes, for people who tweet in English dialects X, Y, and Z or appear to be affiliated with such people. Everybody might know that X is upper-middle and upper class white folks, Y is lower class white folks, and Z is Black Twitter. But nobody needs to say so.
Modernism is a(n) heresy and the foundation of ecumenism. Ecumenism is piggish-latin for progressivism.