The Volokh Conspiracy
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When Lawyers Make Things Worse - Housing Edition
A study suggests that "right-to-counsel" in eviction cases actually leads to greater homelessness.
Tyler Cowen flags a working paper by Boaz Abramson that suggests that some policy measures adopted to help protect tenants may actually increase homelessness. The paper, "The Welfare Effects of Eviction and Homelessness Policies" looks at several policy interventions aimed to help tenants, and models their effects.
Here is the abstract:
This paper studies the implications of rental market policies that address evictions and homelessness. Policies that make it harder to evict delinquent tenants, for example by providing tax-funded legal counsel in eviction cases ("Right-to-Counsel") or by instating eviction moratoria, protect renters from eviction in bad times. However, higher default costs to landlords lead to higher equilibrium rents and lower housing supply, implying homelessness might increase. I quantify these tradeoffs in a model of rental markets in a city, matched to micro data on rents and evictions as well as shocks to income and family structure. I find that "Right-to-Counsel" drives up rents so much that homelessness increases by 15% and welfare is dampened. Since defaults on rent are driven by persistent income shocks, making it harder to evict tends to extend the eviction process but doesn't prevent evictions. In contrast, rental assistance lowers tenants' default risk and as a result reduces homelessness by 45% and evictions by 75%. It increases welfare despite its costs to taxpayers. Eviction moratoria following an unexpected economic downturn can also prevent evictions and homelessness, if used as a temporary measure.
And here's the paper's conclusion:
Despite the wide policy interest, little is known on the equilibrium effects of eviction and homelessness policies, when rents and housing supply can adjust. This paper quantitatively evaluates these policies in a dynamic equilibrium model of the rental markets in a city, in which households can default on rent and face the risk of eviction and homelessness. The model is quantified to San Diego County and is estimated to match micro data on evictions, and homelessness, as well as the risk dynamics that drive defaults on rent. I then use the quantified model for counterfactual analysis.
I find that "Right-to-Counsel" drives up default premia so much that homelessness rises by 15 percent in equilibrium. While lawyers make it harder to evict delinquent tenants, they are unable to prevent their eviction. The shocks that drive defaults, namely job-losses and divorces, are associated with persistent income consequences and therefore cannot easily be smoothed across time. Low-income households suffer the largest welfare losses, since they experience the largest increases in rent and are priced out of the market. At the same time, some richer households are better-off, as the risk-free rent they pay is lower due to the fall in housing supply and house price induced by the policy. Overall, "Right-to-Counsel" dampens aggregate welfare and is associated with an annual monetary cost of 37.4 million dollars to the County of San Diego.
Means-tested rental assistance is a more promising solution. It reduces homelessness by 45 percent and the eviction filing rate by approximately 75 percent. The insurance provided by the subsidy lowers the likelihood of default rather than making it harder to evict tenants who have already defaulted. Low-income households, who are eligible for the assistance, are the main beneficiaries. Some richer households are worse-off , since the risk-free rent that they pay is higher, reflecting the increase in housing supply and house price induced by the policy. Rental assistance improves aggregate welfare and is associated with net monetary gains: the cost of subsidizing rent is lower than the savings in terms of lower expenditure on homelessness.
Finally, I evaluate the effects of enacting a temporary moratorium on evictions in response to an unemployment shock of the magnitude observed in the US at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. I find that the moratorium prevents homelessness and evictions along the transition path. The temporary nature of the moratorium is key, as it implies that the moratorium leads to only mild increases in rents.
Although lawyers may not like to hear this, the paper supports the view that policies that affect housing costs are more important than those that enhance the legal protection of tenants or ensure greater legal defense. Abramson focuses on means-tested rental assistance as an alternative policy intervention, but insofar as the effect he finds is a function of housing affordability, it would seem to support other measures designed to make housing more accessible and affordable (e.g YIMBYism over NIMBYism). This conclusion is further supported by the finding that a measure that reduces housing supply increases homelessness.
The study is also further evidence that the intentions behind a given policy tell us little about its likely effects, and that just because a policy measure is intended to help people does not mean it will, particularly when compared to potential alternatives.
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The phrase in the headline of this post, "When lawyers make things worse" could be applied to almost any sitution, could it not? Ok, I admit it, I am just taking a cheap shot.
As far as the main point in the post, surely no one who has studied economics could quarrel with the conclusion that anti-eviction policies would make the landlords more reluctant to put rental housing in the market, thus driving up the price and lowering the supply of rental housing. The Trump administration's policy of eviction moratoriums certainly had this effect, and the Biden administration's policy to end it, disregarding of course their politically motivated efforts to appear not to be doing so when they knew full well the courts would not allow it to continue, was certainly a positive step.
The correct policy, as also should have been obvious, was to have subsidized some of the rent by government payments, required landlords to take small, temporary reductions in rents and required tenants to pay the remaining portion of the rent would have accomplished what the anti-eviction policy tried to do. Unfortunately policy makers were simply not smart enough to know that.
A cheap shot, but accurate. About the only time a lawyer isn't making things worse is when another lawyer beat him to it, and the first lawyer is fighting with him.
"Unfortunately policy makers were simply not smart enough to know that."
They were smart enough to know it, but THAT would have required an actual statute, passed by Congress, to appropriate the money. While the moratorium could be imposed by executive fiat, at least until the courts got off their asses and struck it down.
"About the only time a lawyer isn't making things worse..."
I dunno.
There is a time and place for specialists. For one example, I remember setting down with a lawyer to write our will. He asked about beneficiaries, and we said 'brother and wife'. The lawyer asked 'his current wife, or his wife at the time of your death?'. That's a pretty important question to ask, and one you're not likely to ask without having been through a few probate muddles.
I also think that prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges perform a pretty important function. Putting the guilty in jail, but not the innocent, matters. I sometimes thing Bill Buckley was right that selecting congress at random from the phone book would be an improvement, but I dunno if trials would be better if we drafted prosecutors, defense attys, and judges like we do jurors.
I'll grant you the ambulance chasers, though 🙂
I mean, at some level, I'm sure that we could keep a lot of costs down in the criminal justice system, and convict more guilty defendants, by not providing public defenders too.
And therein lies the problem. It's really fine for Cowan, Abramson, and Adler to say that the right to counsel in landlord-tenant cases fails some cost-benefit analysis: they live in safe assurance that they will never face eviction and end up on the street. It's kind of like Scalia could pop off about the Constitution not prohibiting executions of innocent people, knowing that it was Other People and not him or his loved ones who might face the harm of that legal rule.
Forcing a tenant out on the street is a drastic act, and it is made more drastic by the (entirely proper) summary processes that we allow landlords to take advantage of so they can file UD actions and get quick evictions. Allowing a tenant a lawyer who can defend those legal rights which the tenant has, to force the landlord to prove the case, is not some utilitarian trade-off. It's the least the system can do.
This post is outrageous.
Quick evictions!? You don't live in New York, I guess. I don't know what the process is like in San Diego.
Quick evictions is relative. You have to understand, without UD proceeding, a breach of a rental contract would be just like a breach of any other contract. You'd need a complaint, motion practice, discovery, and a trial, followed by an order of specific performance. Landlords are given a summary procedure that allows them to go much faster. It might not be fast enough, but it is faster than a normal suit.
Which is why banning someone is a multi month process and not something done in under five minutes. Also why restaurants can't just call the cops to kick someone off their property.
Rental contracts are the only contract I know of, where you are forced to continue providing a good or service to a in breach of contract customer until such time as you can prove in court they breached the contract.
Tenant law is a compromise between a regular contract case and having a deadbeat tenant arrested for trespass immediately after being told to leave.
In the District of Columbia where I used to live and practice, the statutory summary eviction process was held by the courts to supercede the common law right of the landlord to evict the defaulting tenant by self-help (i.e., change the locks, turn off the utilities, etc.). I was long gone, but I wondered why some courageous landlords didn't start using self-help when the DC Govt closed the L&T Court because of Covid.
The orerwhelming majority of American jurisdictions do not "allow" (in the nonstandard sense you're using it, to mean "guarantee and pay for") a lawyer in this situation. As they contemplate whether or not it's a good idea, isn't it a relevant consideration if, in fact, doing so doesn't actually do much to help the intended beneficiaries—and that a different policy would?
No. It's a procedural protection. We should make it universal, because unlike conservatives on the Internet, ordinary people might face eviction.
Hmm... Study shows that policy X hurts the very people it's intended to help. Dilan concludes that therefore we should impose policy X everywhere.
Did you even bother to read the article? Did you look at any of the supporting data or methodology? Do you have the slightest reason to disagree with the study of than that it reaches a conclusion you don't like? Yes, ordinary people can face eviction. And per the data of this study, lawyering up does not decrease the eviction rate - it merely slows down the evictions. In the process of slowing down those evictions, it raises costs (which are always eventually passed on to consumers) such that aggregate homelessness actually increases. How can you possibly want to make that evil universal and still call yourself a good person?
"convict more guilty defendants, by not providing public defenders "
Public defenders don't have much impact on conviction rates. We just like to think they do.
"In the United States federal court system, the conviction rate rose from approximately 75 percent to approximately 85% between 1972 and 1992." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conviction_rate
You didn't demonstrate a link between those things at all.
Its the defenders of public defenders who have to "demonstrate a link" between PDs and better defendant outcomes. Dilan asserted that a lack of PDs would mean increased convictions but there is little evidence they make any difference at all.
It's about how you'd expect government paid defense attorneys to work out when you're fighting the government in court. "He who pays the piper".
The presence of public defenders can increase conviction rates in two ways
A: Increase guilty verdicts by being actually worse than untrained criminals
B: Decrease the number of innocent people who are forced to trial.
The latter seems more probable. By forcing the DA to do their homework, knowing that they will be facing off against a professional, rather than someone who doesn't know what they are doing, public defenders prevent easily disproven junk cases from going to trial all the time, so the prosecutors don't bother bringing a case that your average Joe could defend against, but instead either drop it or build up the case until it passes muster.
The idea that they convince innocent people to plead guilty in huge numbers is an issue, but that wouldn't affect conviction rates.
"It's really fine for Cowan, Abramson, and Adler to say that the right to counsel in landlord-tenant cases fails some cost-benefit analysis: they live in safe assurance that they will never face eviction and end up on the street."
You aren't engaging with the central point of the post, which is that slowing down evictions makes things worse for poor people and better for the well to do.
That may or may not be true, but you aren't engaging it at all.
"Forcing a tenant out on the street is a drastic act"
No it's not - at least not where the tenant is not paying. Forcing somebody to let other people live in their house for free is a drastic act.
There's an old adage. The only thing worse than having a lawyer is not having a lawyer when you REALLY need one.
Even when no lawyers actually get involved, the threat of legal action is more than enough to push businesses and people to behave properly the majority of the time. Without that threat, the unscrupulous will be far more likely to push their luck, especially on those who may not be able to fight back.
Overall this all seems somewhat plausible, though the 15% increase in homelessness intuitively strikes me as pretty high. Basing the study on just one county certainly risks distorting the estimates severely.
I don't understand this part:
some richer households are better-off, as the risk-free rent they pay is lower due to the fall in housing supply and house price induced by the policy.
What mechanism is he suggesting is at work here?
A graph on page 79 of the paper shows an increase in the homelessness rate from 3.3% to 3.7% (rounded off).
As for mechanism, here is what I get from a quick scan. Eviction is almost always for non-payment of rent; only 2% of evictions are for tenant misconduct. (Page 15; note also 9% of evictions are not the tenant's fault.) Only poorer tenants should see rent increases due to a more difficult eviction process. The poorest tenants are priced out of the market. The middle group has to settle for lower quality properties. Now there are more properties for the richest renters (middle class professionals) to choose from, causing the market price to drop, and they are not charged a risk premium.
The middle group has to settle for lower quality properties.
That suggests the middle group also pays a default premium.
He appears to have coined the term "risk-free rent" to represent the portion of the rent payment not tied to default risk (which is a higher percentage of the overall rent payment for wealthier renters with low risk of default). From a quick skim, what I believe he's getting at is that if you lower the default risk, overall rental rates to the lower-income segment will tend to decrease because of a corresponding decrease in the risk-based component. That then lowers the market value of those houses (assuming income-stream valuation was helping to prop up the values before), which then in turn will lower the market value of the more expensive houses and thus the corresponding rents that can be charged to wealthier renters.
That's a lot of coordinated dominos and it's hard to imagine the effect being dramatic due to the number of confounding factors in the real estate world, but it doesn't seem crazy as an academic theory.
That part confused me, too. I believe the author is using the term "risk-free rent" to refer to mortgage payments. If that is the case, the logic would go:
- Policy X decreases the profit of rental property
- Some landlords respond by getting out of the rental business. This creates a fall in the rental housing supply.
- However, it also increases the supply of houses for sale to homeowners. This depresses the price.
- Result: Housing costs for low-income families increase (because they are more likely to rent) but the same costs for higher-income families decrease (because they are more likely to buy).
- Secondary result: Rental rates for the highest end of rental properties (those where the substitution with home ownership is driven by desire or other intangibles rather than economic need) will have to decline to match the lower costs of home ownership.
"What mechanism is he suggesting is at work here?"
Rent assistance increases the demand for rental properties (more people have more money to spend on the product), which results in increased prices in the rental market. Rich people don't care because they can afford it. Poor people don't care because they get the assistance. But the middle class (which is who is meant by "richer" - richer than the people getting the assistance) suffer.
Which is basically how all government assistance works.
No doubt this is a very learned paper, with much fine mathematics, and it is even possible that their conclusions are correct. Though I wonder if the second order consequences of rent subsidy have been thought through.
But the more important question is the economic value of the landlord's right to discriminate between good tenants and bad tenants, which an eviction moratorium eliminates. Generally, landlords do not wake up in the morning and think "Aha, let's evict ten tenants today ! That'll ruin their Christmas ! "
Eviction - even if it were completely at will" - is a pain and an expense. If a previously good tenant falls on hard times, a landlord will only want them out right away if there's a better, solvent, new tenant ready and waiting. Whereas a bad tenant who trashes the place, the landlord would want rid of asap.
Much the same applies to good employees and bad employees. Employers do not generally twirl their moustaches in delight at the prospect of firing good employees. It's the bad ones they want out.
And ditto anything else in the way of commerce. We are all happy to "evict" bad restaurants, bad dentists, bad hairdressers from our life, while keeping the good ones.
Anything that gets in the way of our ability to discriminate forces us to average out the costs of good and bad customers or suppliers, landing the good with a risk premium lest they be bad, but once installed, difficult to get rid of. And if we are not allowed to discriminate freely, then of course the good has no incentive to be good, and the bad has no incentive to reform.
As "progressives" see it, some people have rights, others don't. Tenants have rights, landlords don't. Employees have rights, employers don't. Would-be customers have rights, business-owners don't. "Progressives" are funny like that...
Lee,
No doubt this is a very learned paper, with much fine mathematics,
You sound like a lawyer, scoffing at the idea that mathematics could tell us anything useful. 🙂
Actually I wasn't intending to scoff at the mathematics, I was merely suggesting that the idea that modelling aggregates of renters overlooks the critical point that all tenants are not equal.
Garbage in, etc.
I'll scoff at the mathematics.
It's a model based off an estimate based on an approximation based off countless wild guesses.
The conclusion does make a logical argument, but I don't trust the mathematics involved as far as I can through a 747.
The same can be said for every other rule and standard for housing. Anything that raises costs leads to less affordability and more homelessness.
The simplest way to curtail homelessness would be to allow some landlords to provide some very small, very dense, unfit- or barely-fit for human habitation housing, with few rules (e. g. no electricity in the shelter). The alternative is people living in their car or on the street.
But it won’t happen because specific types of people are too self-involved and precious about standards. So people sleep in cars or on the street.
(Obviously affordability is only a factor for homeless individuals who are homeless due to money issues. Others would still be homeless.)
The same can be said about the labor market. The more "protection" workers receive from the government, the higher the unemployment level.
Here's a comment I saw in La NaciĂłn (an Argentinian newspaper) on a 2019 article about U.S. unemployment rate being 3.5% (translated from Spanish): "With the labor laws we have here, it's unlikely we'll ever see such low unemployment numbers."
Readers may have missed the fact that what Professor Adler is discussing is a model, not a study. Models start with assumptions, apply fancy mathematics, and spit out logical consequences of those assumptions. You can reach any consequences you want just by manipulating the assumptions, the mathematics, or both.
Studies make some effort to look at what’s actually going on in the real world. People go out there and actually try to see something. Looking at what’s going on helps people check if their assumptions are wrong.
Models provide no such check. They take place entirely inside people’s heads and computers. They make no attempt to have any actual contact with the real world. We have no idea if what’s in these models has any relevance to the real world or not.
These models can tell you if people’s theories are internally logically consistent, that is, if their assumptions can in fact lead to the conclusions they claim.
But while internal logical consistency is a necessary condition for a theory to be true, it is by no means a sufficient condition.
Treating the creation of these models as if they were determiners of truth is an occupational disease of academia. The mathematics are often impressive. They make one look smart.
As Lawrence Summers famously said, in his day academia was divided into the smart people, econometricians and such, who spent their time building ingeniously complex fancy models, and the dumb people, sociologists and such, who spent their time on empirical studies and used simple methods for the obvious reason, all the smart people knew, that they just weren’t smart enough to handle the math.
But as he said in his lecture, the predictions made by the dumb people a few decades ago have largely borne out, while those made by the smart people haven’t. The dumb people were right. The smart people were wrong.