The Volokh Conspiracy
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The Right to Ask Government Officials Questions
The Die Hard 2 Principle makes a special appearance.
From Fifth Circuit Judge James Ho's Monday opinion, joined by Judge James Graves, in Villarreal v. City of Laredo (Chief Judge Priscilla Owen dissented and stated she "will file a forthcoming dissenting opinion"):
If the First Amendment means anything, it surely means that a citizen journalist has the right to ask a public official a question, without fear of being imprisoned. Yet that is exactly what happened here: Priscilla Villarreal was put in jail for asking a police officer a question.
If that is not an obvious violation of the Constitution, it's hard to imagine what would be. And as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity for obvious violations of the Constitution….
Priscilla Villarreal is a journalist in Laredo, Texas. She regularly reports on local crime, missing persons, community events, traffic, and local government. But Villarreal is not a traditional journalist. Instead of publishing her stories in the newspaper, she posts them on her Facebook page. Instead of using a tape recorder to conduct interviews, she uses her cell phone to live-stream video footage of crime scenes and traffic accidents. Her reporting frequently includes colorful—and often unfiltered—commentary. Perhaps because of this, she is one of Laredo's most popular news sources, with more than 120,000 Facebook followers. See, e.g., Simon Romero, La Gordiloca: The Swearing Muckraker Upending Border Journalism, N.Y. Times (Mar. 10, 2019) ("[Villarreal] is arguably the most influential journalist in Laredo, a border city of 260,000.")…. [But] local law enforcement officials [have been] less than enthused with Villarreal's reporting….
In April 2017, Villarreal published a story about a man who committed suicide. The story identified the man by name and revealed that he was an agent with the U.S. Border Patrol. Villarreal first uncovered this information from talking to a janitor who worked near the scene of the suicide. She then contacted LPD Officer Barbara Goodman, who confirmed the man's identity.
The following month, Villarreal published the last name of a family involved in a fatal car accident in Laredo. She first learned the family's identity from a relative of the family who saw a video that Villarreal had posted. Again, Villarreal contacted Officer Goodman, and again, the officer verified this information.
Six months later, two arrest warrants were issued for Villarreal for violating Texas Penal Code § 39.06(c). According to Villarreal, local officials have never brought a prosecution under § 39.06(c) in the 27-year history of that provision—and Defendants do not contend otherwise.
Section 39.06(c) states that "[a] person commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit …, he solicits or receives from a public servant information that: (1) the public servant has access to by means of his office or employment; and (2) has not been made public." According to the affidavit in support of the arrest warrants, Villarreal solicited or received the names of the suicide victim and the traffic accident victims (which, according to the affidavit, was "nonpublic" information). The affidavit further alleged that Villarreal benefitted from publishing this information before other news outlets, by gaining additional followers on her Facebook page…. [After her arrest,] Villarreal filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Webb County district court. In March 2018, a judge granted her petition and held that § 39.06(c) was unconstitutionally vague. The government did not appeal….
An official who commits a patently "obvious" violation of the Constitution is not entitled to qualified immunity…. [It is] obvious that Priscilla Villarreal has a constitutional right to ask questions of public officials. Yet according to her complaint, Defendants arrested and sought to prosecute Villarreal for doing precisely that ….
This is not just an obvious constitutional infringement—it's hard to imagine a more textbook violation of the First Amendment…. If freedom of the press guarantees the right to publish information from the government, then it surely guarantees the right to ask the government for that information in the first place…. Put simply: If the government cannot punish someone for publishing the Pentagon Papers, how can it punish someone for simply asking for them?
Finally, if the First Amendment safeguards the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, then it surely safeguards the right to petition the government for information….
So it should be patently obvious to any reasonable police officer that the conduct alleged in the complaint constitutes a blatant violation of Villarreal's constitutional rights. And that should be enough to defeat qualified immunity. The Institute for Justice, a respected national public interest law firm, puts the point well in its amicus brief: There is a big difference between "split-second decisions" by police officers and "premeditated plans to arrest a person for her journalism, especially by local officials who have a history of targeting her because of her journalism." We agree that the facts alleged here present an especially weak basis for invoking qualified immunity. For "[w]hen it comes to the First Amendment, … we are concerned about government chilling the citizen—not the other way around." Cf. Hoggard v. Rhodes (2021) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of cert.) ("But why should university officers, who have time to make calculated choices about enacting or enforcing unconstitutional policies, receive the same protection as a police officer who makes a split-second decision to use force in a dangerous setting?").
Defendants respond that the officials were simply enforcing a statute. But "some statutes are so obviously unconstitutional that we will require officials to second-guess the legislature and refuse to enforce an unconstitutional statute—or face a suit for damages if they don't." … Texas Penal Code § 39.06(c) is one of those statutes….
It should be obvious to any reasonable police officer that locking up a journalist for asking a question violates the First Amendment. Indeed, even Captain Lorenzo, the stubborn police chief in Die Hard 2, acknowledged: "Now personally, I'd like to lock every [expletive] reporter out of the airport. But then they'd just pull that 'freedom of speech' [expletive] on us and the ACLU would be all over us." DIE HARD 2(1990).
Captain Lorenzo understood this. The officers in Laredo should have, too….
The matter strikes me as potentially more complicated than the panel majority concluded: If it's a crime for a government official to release information, then asking him to do so might well be viewed as solicitation of crime, and thus constitutionally unprotected (see pp. 989-997 of this article). Maybe then the government can punish someone for asking a government official to leak the Pentagon Papers or someone's income tax return or sealed documents in a sensational court case. (For a discussion of the similar tortious-inducement-of-breach-of-contract issue when it comes to seeking information from private individuals, see this post.) But perhaps I'm mistaken on this; in any event, the panel majority opinion strikes me as likely to become an important precedent on this question.
The court also concluded Villarreal's selective enforcement claim could go forward:
"[T]o successfully bring a selective … enforcement claim, a plaintiff must prove that the government official's acts were motivated by improper considerations, such as race, religion, or the desire to prevent the exercise of a constitutional right." "[R]etaliation for an attempt to exercise one's religion or right to free speech would be expected to qualify."
"As a prerequisite to such a claim, the plaintiff must prove that similarly situated individuals were treated differently." … Under Defendants' interpretation of § 39.06(c), any journalist who asks a public official a question regarding nonpublic information commits a crime. Villarreal's complaint sufficiently alleges that countless journalists have asked LPD officers all kinds of questions about nonpublic information. Yet they were never arrested.
Specifically, she alleges a similarly situated group that includes: "(a) those who had asked for or received information from local law enforcement officials, and (b) persons who published truthful and publicly-accessible information on a newsworthy matter." She points to "local professional newspaper journalists, local professional broadcast journalists, and citizens who published on matters of local public concern." She further alleges that Defendants "also knew that members of the local media regularly asked for and received information from LPD officials relating to crime scenes and investigations, traffic accidents, and other LPD matters." Finally, Villarreal alleges, and Defendants concede, that LPD had never before arrested any person under § 39.06(c)….
We have no difficulty observing that journalists commonly ask for nonpublic information from public officials, and that Villarreal was therefore entitled to make that same reasonable inference. Yet Defendants chose to arrest Villarreal—and only Villarreal—for violating § 39.06(c). We accordingly conclude that Villarreal has sufficiently pled the existence of similarly situated journalists who were not arrested for violating § 39.06(c)….
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That all seemed remarkably reasonable. I'd love to know what the rationale for the dissent is.
Patricia Owen. 'Nuff said.
The lady in The Fly?
I believe that was Patricia Owens. 🙂
I'm afraid that I'm insufficiently familiar for that to explain much of anything to me. I take it she's not a fan of ... holding government accountable for constitutional violations? Doesn't like journalists?
She's a nut case.
Kind of scratching my head about Jim Ho being the panel author on this one.
Yeah, and that a case where he found it was blindingly obvious that there was no QI, Owen still didn't agree.
Er, Priscilla. Typo because I was rushing for snark.
Priscilla. Even her name is from the '50s (or earlier).
Thanks for that deep legal analysis.
I corrected her name.
And pointed out that she, like you, is an obsolete clinger.
Yeah I can’t imagine what the dissent would be either.
Did a quick google on Villarreal and apparently she’s a super effective and popular reporter. Not the typical reporter of today that waits around for official press releases. Her nickname locally is La Gordiloca, which translates to The Crazy Fat Lady.
I bet she’s going to say that this was not a case to apply Hope v Pelzer’s “patently obvious violation” test instead of dismissing because the right was not “clearly established.”
" apparently she’s a super effective and popular reporter "
That is one perspective. Another is that she is a loud misfit with a tenth-grade education; a Facebook freak show operated without an editor from a 20-year-old pickup truck; and a $300,000 defamation judgment recorded against her.
From either perspective, she has rights, too.
In other words, she's a reporter, but I repeat myself.
Badam boom, thank you I'll be here all week. Try the veal...
She is a reporter in the way a two -year-old who reports ‘I pooped pants’ is a reporter.
Mutatis Mutandis, you are a blog commenter the way a five year old opining, "I hate broccoli, yuck," is an opinion maker.
Well, let's take a shot at the dissent.
The issue here isn't the Police's conduct necessarily. Someone with a valid arrest warrant presented themselves to the Police. Are the police supposed to say "no, we can't take you in even though you have a valid arrest warrant?"
It's that the arrest warrant was pursued, approved (by a Chief ADA) and presumably granted by a judge. And the real issue there is, this may fall under absolute immunity (on the part of the ADA and judge), not qualified immunity.
A lot of qualified immunity decisions seem to assume that the typical police officer is an idiot savant who has memorized the holdings of every single case involving the use of police force, but is unable to perform simple logical reasoning. What this means is the qualified immunity can attach not only to behavior where there is a close question about where the Constitutional limits lie, but also in cases where the official behavior is so obviously wrong that no court has had occasion to address the issue before.
The majority opinion in this case is a refreshing departure from that practice. It states that “If freedom of the press guarantees the right to publish information from the government, then it surely guarantees the right to ask the government for that information in the first place.” Surely it does, even if they don't cite a prior case that says precisely that. But a dissent might argue that a police officer shouldn't be expected to figure that out.
Indeed. If we're to argue this from the police officer's perspective...imagine a person with a valid, signed arrest warrant walks into your station, and says "I have an arrest warrant issued for me, for this crime. I'm turning myself in"
And as the cop on duty, you look in the computer, and see, this person does indeed have an arrest warrant. It's a little odd on the crime, but still. What are you going to do? The DA has signed off on it, and the local judge may have as well. Are you really going to put your knowledge of the law, as a police officer, over the signed arrest warrant by the DA, who presumably knows the law far better?
https://archive.md/xqqjX
'GOVERNMENT ARRESTS IGOR DANSCHENKO, "PRIMARY SUB-SOURCE" FOR CHRISTOPHER STEELE'S FAKE "DOSSIER"'
...
The people familiar with the matter spoke on condition of anonymity because the indictment of Mr. Danchenko had yet to be unsealed. A spokesman for Mr. Durham did not respond to a request for comment.
Unless we need to arrest the person who asked Durham for a comment, then the arrest of Villarreal is clear BS. In which case we need to arrest every single reporter who does more than republish press releases.
Sorry, the cop who doesn't understand that is an idiot
I'd love to know what the rationale for the dissent is.
You don't think is could have anything to do with this then ?
"The matter strikes me as potentially more complicated than the panel majority concluded: If it's a crime for a government official to release information, then asking him to do so might well be viewed as solicitation of crime, and thus constitutionally unprotected .."
Presumably there may be a question as to whether it's a crime for the police officer to release the information, or simply a breach of the terms of employment.
If you ask for drugs, and get them and take them, that's a crime.
If you ask for info that someone cannot legally obtain, and get it, and publish it, the second half of that cannot be a crime, and therefore should the first?
It's different from paying someone, or helping them track down passwords or other hacking capacity. You are not participating in the illegal activity, and are receiving info that cannot be illegal for you to have and publish.
Should you go to jail for asking for the Pentagon Papers?
I suppose it's some progress, anyway, that government has to shift the goalposts.
What is your authority for this claim? To extent that the payee's conduct was illegal, you would be equally culpable under federal law and under the vicarious liability principles in every American jurisdiction I'm familiar with. And I can't recall encountering any suggestion that there is any constitutional issue with imposing that liability.
Huh? He's talking about a situation where there isn't a payee.
Completely misread the comment I was responding to. Withdrawn.
If you ask for info that someone cannot legally obtain, and get it, and publish it, the second half of that cannot be a crime, and therefore should the first?
Not sure I'm following the logic here. I might cosh you over the head, drag you round to my garage, chop you into small pieces, saute a few of them for dinner, and then - in defiance of local refuse statutes - litter the street with what remains. I might then write an account of this activity on my blog, with photos.
If, as I assume, the blog entry is 1A protected and so cannot be a crime, is it your position that the antecedent coshing, kidnapping, murdering, chopping, saute-ing - and even littering - are thereby inoculated from being crimes ?
Asking for a friend.
Right, but if that had been the case, then presumably the ruling would have mentioned that fact. Since this appears to be more about the non-granting of QI due to the "patently obvious" notion, it didn't seem super relevant. Particularly since the government of Laredo didn't charge her with that. Like, if they could have gotten her on "soliciting a crime", I'd have expected them to go with that instead of this pretty bloody obviously 1A violating mess.
*shrug* But I'm also not a lawyer, so I could well be full of shit about that.
I'm not sure I understand your confusion.
In order for the plaintiff to prevail, the court would need to find that 1. It was unconstitutional to arrest her for violating this statute; and 2. The unconstitutionality was so obvious that the police officer knew or should have known that enforcing it would violate the constitution. Accordingly, if there is in fact a decent argument that the statute is not unconstitutional, then under the qualified immunity framework set out by the Supreme Court, the defendants should prevail. Which, I'd imagine, is the general logic of the dissent.
(The dissent may also say that the statute is in fact constitutional, which I think is my position. Although I also think it's dubious whether the conduct here actually meets the elements of the statute, and the prosecution was plainly inappropriate even if it did, so I'm not exactly going to lose any sleep over it.)
A Texas court found it unconstitutional; while that was after her arrest (and therefore can't be the basis for liability) it would be difficult for Owen to argue that it's actually constitutional.
Why? Especially since the basis for that finding doesn't seem to be the one either the plaintiff or the majority relies on.
If the information is something that reasonably might be disclosed to the public, then even if it would actually be illegal for the government to disclose it, merely asking for its release should not be a crime.
There should have to be some further element, such as knowledge that the release would be illicit. Maybe some kind of specific pressure to release the information, but I tend to think only actual knowledge of a prohibition against release would suffice. This would be analogous to, but obviously different from, the threshold for someone to assert an entrapment defense for a crime that law enforcement agents recruited or directed the person towards.
I was thinking that as well. Like, if the person asking doesn't know that the release would be illegal, then the response to such a request should just be "I can't release that information", not, "you're under arrest".
Yeah, I agree with that completely.
No one asks a question of a public official if there is absolutely no possible benefit by any stretch of the imagination to themselves to know the answer.
So anyone could be prosecuted just for asking a question because any sufficiently imaginative prosecutor could find some sort of benefit coming to the questioner.
The intent of the law is probably to stop public officials from becoming chummy with private investigators and routinely leaking information. But the law is written so broadly that anyone could be prosecuted, even if they weren't aware that the information they're asking for hasn't already been made available to the public.
The law requires a questioner to have an encyclopedic knowledge of which information has, and has not, been made public before asking the question in order to avoid breaking the law.
Requiring the public official to tell the questioner that he's not allowed to answer the question then punishing the public official for breaking the law would be a MUCH better way to handle this situation.
Not quite sure whether you're saying what the law ought to be, or whether you're saying you think it actually is. I have nothing to say on the latter point, but on the ought point, I agree that asking for info in blissful and reasonable ignorance that it would be illegal for the person to give it to you ought to be some kind of defense.
But how much of a defense ? Ignorance is seldom a legally good excuse. Is it OK if your ignorance is deliberate and you could reasonably expect that it is illegal to release the info ? So if I ask Admiral Doberry for the nuclear codes, I may not know that it would be illegal for him to supply them, but would it be reasonable for me to believe, or purport to believe, that it was legal ?
If you're a journo, whose beat is local crime and punishment, would it be reasonable never to wonder whether it's legal for the public official to give you apparently confidential information ? Would it be reasonable, as a journo, never to have heard of the FOIA, knowledge of which might lead you to suspect that there's some sort of process you're supposed to hack your way through before you get to peek.
I am not a journo, and so the extent of my reasonable ignorance is far wider than that of a journo patrolling her regular beat, but even I suspect that there are plenty of things that police officers, prison guards, parole officers, child support workers, tax officials etc are not supposed to share. Hell, I've even heard of government "leak" enquiries.
So actual knowledge seems to me to be perhaps too high a bar.
My "should not be" was meant as "ought not to be", not a positive description of what the law currently says.
I was talking cases where there is a clear policy against disclosure. I purposely did not draw the line at disclosure being a crime, as I think a knowing request to violate clear policy might not be protected by the First Amendment. (After some more thought, I would probably draw the line somewhat above that. If the government rule against disclosure exists but violates broader public policy, for example some applicable sunshine law, the requester probably should not be culpable even if they know the policy exists.)
However, I think actual knowledge is the right basic standard for two reasons: First, the First Amendment is generally held to have very strong protections for people making requests of government. Second, as you mention with the examples of prison guards, tax officials and others, those with access to sensitive government information are generally expected to be familiar with -- and responsible for abiding by -- the applicable disclosure rules. They can easily tell someone something to the effect of "I must not release that information", perhaps giving the policy or statutory reason, which establishes actual knowledge in case the person repeats the query.
I think your FOIA example is useful to illustrate another side of that approach. A few years ago, some of my colleagues wanted a government employee to release certain information. They asked if it was possible for the govvie to properly release that information to a member of the public, and called to verbally say they would rather not file a FOIA over it. The government reviewed the information, recognized the information was subject to FOIA, clarified its release policies or interpretations of those policies, and the government employee was able to legitimately release that information. Using FOIA would have created more work and delay for all involved. As a result of following those non-FOIA -- but authorized -- channels, other members of the public who ask for release of such information would now be able to get it much more easily and quickly.
My colleagues used to work for the government, so they appreciated the restrictions and burdens of their request, but I assume journalists on that beat have enough people skills to read the room and empathize with their prospective sources.
Or suppose a journalist is working a crime story, and asks a police officer for confirmation or details about a story in the public interest, as happened here. Unless the journalist exploits a private relationship with the officer or commits some other crime by making the request, I cannot think of any time that the journalist should be charged with asking the police to disclose that kind of information. "You know I can't comment on an active investigation" is one of those stock lines from TV dramas that reflects a deep-seated value in this country about the importance of journalistic persistence.
"Some other crime" would be things like blackmail, extortion or harassment. I think EV has previously written about the difficulty of prosecuting someone for harassing a government official on the job, though; that is a particularly high bar to clear.
I don't, because
(a) that's not what she was charged with;
(b) it can't possibly be the case that merely asking someone "Is X true?" can be a crime just because the person isn't authorized to answer;
and (c) by the way, the Texas courts declared the statute she was charged under unconstitutional.
She was not charged with soliciting someone else to commit a crime; she was just charged with soliciting non-public information. There was no allegation that the officer she got the information from committed a crime (and without more facts, there's no evidence that the officer did so).
She was charged with violating a section of a statute that makes it a crime to solicit or receive non-public information from a public servant with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another. (The term "non-public" is defined, but not in a way that I think helps the government.)
But a different subsection of that same statute makes it a crime for the public servant (i.e. the officer) to give the information, so I'm not sure I appreciate the distinction you're drawing.
I am highly dubious that the information at issue here was in fact was covered, or that she had the requisite intent.
No. The subsection you're referring to, 39.06(b), only makes it a crime for the officer to give the information "with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another." With respect to the plaintiff here, they argued that because she made some money off her reporting, she was obtaining this information with intent to obtain a benefit.¹ But there's no allegation that the officer from whom she got the information² derived any benefit at all. (There's certainly nothing to suggest that the officer was charged.) Obviously that would cover the situation in which someone paid a public official for non-public information.
¹Like you, I find it rather dubious that she actually violated the statute.
²Strictly speaking, she used the officer to confirm information she already had, not to get information. But that may not be legally significant under the statute. Though it certainly goes to show how ludicrous the prosecution is.
Oh, let me try:
"It is entirely reasonable for the police officers to rely on the judge who issued an arrest warrant as to the constitutionality of a statute for which the arrest warrant was issued, particularly if the statute is long-standing with no previous case of the statute being held to be unconstitutional. No rational person (a class that clearly excludes my colleagues on this panel) expects police officers to be playing amateur Constitutional lawyer and second-guessing judges every time they're handed an arrest warrant to carry out."
That sounds an awful lot like the "just following orders" excuse.
There's a huge difference between "You should know that participating in mass murder is wrong" and "You should have to second-guess whether or not an arrest warrant issued by a judge is constitutional every time you carry one out".
Is there? They both seem to be things that are utterly unarguable. Want to be a police? Then man up, take responsibility. You want the special privileges, then take the special responsibilities that come with them.
_Of course_ a police has the duty to examine every order he is given and analyse it for legality before acting. If he isn't sure about the legality, then he must _question_ said order and gather information until he _is_ sure.
It is deeply depressing that anyone would suggest even for a moment that anything else is, or should be, the case.
Why the reference to Die Hard 2? Kindergarten Cop came out the same year. I'm sure there's something 1A related in there.
The Judge is a fan of Dennis Franz, I know I am.
Dexter had a fun case where he sends out a dummy kitchen sink manifesto as if from a deranged serial killer. The press gets it and starts to publish it. Somehow the FBI gets a restraining order, then sits down in a meeting with the paper and acknowledges they will lose, and requests the press hold off publishing for a few days so they can investigate it for leads without spooking the suspect, which the paper does.
I just wonder how it got that far.
seems to me that if she got the name confirmed by a public official, it 'has' been made public
James Ho and the Fifth Circuit get a QI case correct, with a citation to Hope v Pelzer!? I’d say it was Opposite Day there, but Owen dissents.
Well, Judge Ho had a pretty detailed critique of qualified immunity in his Horvath v. City of Leander separate opinion last year.
But see:
http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2019/images/10/23/james.ho.5th.circuit.pdf
Ho's summary:
I don't see the opinions you're quoting (particularly the one he wrote himself) as being in any particular tension with that.
Just because he’s criticized it and welcomed a reevaluation doesn’t mean he’s not committed to rigorous application while it still exists, as his Cole dissent and dissent from denial of en banc demonstrate.
Isn't rigorously applying it his job as a circuit judge until the Supreme Court or Congress says otherwise?
Did I say it wasn’t? As I’m sure you know, judges have some different conceptions of how rigorous to get with QI in which you can get extremely granular with the “clearly established” test to the point of absurdity. Ho in those other opinions (in dissent mind you) showed a deep commitment to being granular that his colleagues didn’t share. Hence my surprise he went the other way on a case and hooked it in part on Hope.
See also:
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/14/14-10228-CV3.pdf
Given https://reason.com/2021/11/01/the-supreme-court-declines-to-determine-if-you-have-a-first-amendment-right-to-film-the-police/ obvious constitutional violations are not enough to remove immunity: it has to have been specifically ruled as such by a court first.
"[I]n any event, the panel majority opinion strikes me as likely to become an important precedent on this question."
But here's a fun question: Can an opinion that is later vacated in part because it was wrong that something was clearly established law make clearly established law in the future?
In other words, suppose the Supreme Court reverses on qualified immunity grounds but only reaches the "clearly established law" question and not the underlying constitutional issue. Going forward, is the Fifth Circuit's opinion clearly established law?
(Standard caveat: The journalist should not have been arrested for this. That being said).
One question we can ask in this situation is, what did this law mean to apply to? For example, if the person requested the patrol routes of the police officers, then passed that knowledge onto criminals, who used the information to commit crimes, would that be illegal? Or would using the private information in the police databases for commercial gain...would that be illegal? Likely yes.
The second question we should ask is, what was the nature of the arrest warrant? Did the prosecutor request the warrant. If so, would that fall under prosecutorial absolute immunity? Did a judge issue the arrest warrant? If so, wouldn't that fall under judicial absolute authority?
It may be this lawsuit fails due not to qualified immunity, but due to absolute immunity.
Can Texas just rewrite the unconstitutional law to make it a civil matter instead of a criminal one? Kind of their thing now.
I expect most of the problems deriving from stupid Texas laws to be resolved toward the end of this decade.
Obsolete clingers to be hardest hit.
"The matter strikes me as potentially more complicated than the panel majority concluded: If it's a crime for a government official to release information, then asking him to do so might well be viewed as solicitation of crime, and thus constitutionally unprotected [...]" Maybe if the officer said, "We're not allowed to release that information" and she said, "I'll give ya' $20" or "I'll buy you dinner." But I cannot see how just calling up an officer and saying, "Who was the victim?" and having the officer answer could be solicitation of a crime. At that point it is the officer's responsibility to respect the confidentiality, not the person asking the question. It is the officers' job to know what information has been cleared for release to the press and what has not. The press cannot know that without asking.
I agree with you, but the facts here make the prosecution even more egregious. She didn't call the officer and say "Who was the victim?" She called up and said, "I heard the victim was John Smith; can you confirm?" And the cop said, "Yep."
"But perhaps I'm mistaken on this;"
No, you are not.
There is a distinction between the national "media", and "independent" media, and a growing belief that there should be a difference between the two. I'm guessing the Laredo TX authorities wouldn't have arrested Brian Stelter if he were the reporter in question. I wonder how much that plays into the case?
Legally, there is no such distinction. And to the extent that there is a "growing belief" that there should be one, I challenge you to find evidence of that trend outside the members of the 'traditional media' who are feeling threatened by the loss of their cartel.
Seconded.
Can you be guilty of solicitation if you had no reason to think what you solicited is a crime? If she has seen public officials release this type of information to journalists many times and not get prosecuted (despite this happening in full public view), why would she think what she's asking them to do might be a crime?