The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
Plaintiff Zachary Greenberg challenged the newly adopted Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g):
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: … in the practice of law, by words or conduct, knowingly manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment or discrimination, as those terms are defined in applicable federal, state or local statutes or ordinances, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, harassment or discrimination based upon race, sex, gender identity or expression, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, or socioeconomic status. This paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not preclude advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.
Comment : For the purposes of paragraph (g), conduct in the practice of law includes participation in activities that are required for a lawyer to practice law, including but not limited to continuing legal education seminars, bench bar conferences and bar association activities where legal education credits are offered.
Comment : The substantive law of antidiscrimination and anti-harassment statutes and case law guide application of paragraph (g) and clarify the scope of the prohibited conduct.
In yesterday's Greenberg v. Haggerty, Judge Chad F. Kenney (E.D. Pa.) held this rule was likely unconstitutional, and issued a preliminary injunction against its enforcement. (Congratulations on the victory to the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute, founded by Ted Frank, and to HLLI counsel Adam E. Schulman.) First, the court concluded that Greenberg had standing to challenge the law even before it had been enforced:
Plaintiff alleged specific examples of individuals filing disciplinary and Title IX complaints against speakers who were presenting on similar topics as those discussed by Plaintiff, which he alleges will "force[ him] to censor himself to steer clear of an ultimately unknown line so that his speech is not at risk of being incorrectly perceived as manifesting bias or prejudice." Therefore, in addition to showing that the "chilling effect on his speech … is objectively reasonable," Plaintiff has shown that he will "self-censor as a result." …
Plaintiff has also clearly shown a likelihood that the activity in which he intends to engage is "arguably proscribed" by the Amendments. Plaintiff has alleged that he intends to mention epithets, slurs, and demeaning nicknames as part of his presentation on First Amendment and Due Process rights. Rule 8.4(g) explicitly states that it is attorney misconduct to, "by words or conduct, knowingly manifest bias or prejudice." Both parties agree that the language used in Rule 8.4(g) mirrors Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.3, which provides, in Comment 2, that "manifestations of bias include … epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping …."
Plaintiff has shown that by repeating slurs or epithets, or by engaging in discussion with his audience members about the constitutional rights of those who do and say offensive things, he will need to repeat slurs, epithets, and demeaning nicknames. This is arguably proscribed by Rule 8.4(g). [The court doesn't mention this, but I should note that Central Michigan University has fired a tenured journalism professor, Prof. Tim Boudreau, precisely on the theory that quoting epithets from court opinions and from government documents, in the course of discussing cases, was forbidden "harassment." -EV]
Defendants further contend that, "to the extent that Plaintiff intends to advocate that certain cases were wrongly decided or advanced a different interpretation of relevant law," Rule 8.4(g)'s "clear safe harbor for advocacy" would protect Plaintiff. However, the "advice or advocacy" safe harbor was plainly intended to protect those giving advice or advocacy in the context of representing a client, and not in the context of Plaintiff's intended activity.
Therefore, Plaintiff has shown that his intended conduct is arguably proscribed by the Amendments.
Third, Plaintiff has shown that there exists a credible threat of prosecution…. Plaintiff alleged specific examples of individuals filing disciplinary and Title IX complaints against speakers who were presenting on similar topics as those discussed by Plaintiff. [Complaint] at ¶¶ 73, 74 [pp. 12-19].
Ultimately, the Court is swayed by the chilling effect that the Amendments will have on Plaintiff, and other Pennsylvania attorneys, if they go into effect.
Rule 8.4(g)'s language, "by words … manifest bias or prejudice," are a palpable presence in the Amendments and will hang over Pennsylvania attorneys like the sword of Damocles. This language will continuously threaten the speaker to self-censor and constantly mind what the speaker says and how the speaker says it or the full apparatus and resources of the Commonwealth may be engaged to come swooping in to conduct an investigation.
Defendants dismiss these concerns with a paternal pat on the head and suggest that the genesis of the disciplinary process is benign and mostly dismissive. Defendants further argue that, under the language of Rule 8.4(g) targeting "words," even if a complaint develops past the initial disciplinary complaint stage, actual discipline will not occur given the conduct targeted, good intentions of the Rule and those trusted arbiters that will sit in judgment and apply it as such. But Defendants do not guarantee that, nor did they remove the language specifically targeting attorneys' "words."
Defendants effectively ask Plaintiff to trust them not to regulate and discipline his offensive speech even though they have given themselves the authority to do so. So, despite asking Plaintiff to trust them, there remains the constant threat that the Rule will be engaged as the plain language of it says it will be engaged.
It can hardly be doubted there will be those offended by the speech, or the written materials accompanying the speech, that manifests bias or prejudice who will, quite reasonably, insist that the Disciplinary Board perform its sworn duty and apply Rule 8.4(g) in just the way the clear language of the Rule permits. Even if the disciplinary process does not end in some form of discipline, the threat of a disruptive, intrusive, and expensive investigation and investigatory hearing into the Plaintiff's words, speeches, notes, written materials, videos, mannerisms, and practice of law would cause Plaintiff and any attorney to be fearful of what he or she says and how he or she will say it in any forum, private or public, that directly or tangentially touches upon the practice of law, including at speaking engagements given during CLEs, bench-bar conferences, or indeed at any of the social gatherings forming around these activities. The government, as a result, de facto regulates speech by threat, thereby chilling speech….
The court then went on to hold that, on the merits, the rule likely violated the First Amendment. First, it rejected the argument that it was justifiable because of the lower protection given to some attorney speech and professional speech:
The Court recognizes that Pennsylvania has an interest in licensing attorneys and the administration of justice. However, contrary to Defendants' contention, speech by an attorney or by a professional is only subject to greater regulation than speech by others in certain circumstances, none of which are present here…. In contrast, Rule 8.4(g) does not limit its prohibition of "words … [that] manifest bias or prejudice" to the legal process, since it also prohibits these words or conduct "during activities that are required for a lawyer to practice law," including seminars or activities where legal education credits are offered. Rule 8.4(g) does not seek to limit attorneys' speech only when that attorney is in court, nor when that attorney has a pending case, nor even when that attorney seeks to solicit business and advertise. Rule 8.4(g) much more broadly prohibits attorneys' speech.
This Court also finds that Rule 8.4(g) does not cover "professional speech" that is entitled to less protection. The Supreme Court "has not recognized 'professional speech' as a separate category of speech." "Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by 'professionals.'" … [Nor does] Rule 8.4(g) … regulate professional conduct that incidentally involves speech. The plain language of Rule 8.4(g) explicitly prohibits "words" that manifest bias or prejudice. Furthermore, a comment included in a May 2018 proposal of Rule 8.4(g) "explains and illustrates" that Rule 8.4(g) was intended to regulate speech …[:] "[e]xamples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to personal characteristics." This proposed comment reveals that the drafters of Rule 8.4(g) intended to explicitly restrict offensive words in prohibiting an attorney from "manifest[ing] bias or prejudice."
Although the final version of Rule 8.4(g) does not include this comment, the fatal language, "by words … manifest bias or prejudice," remains. Removing this candid comment about the intent of the Rule does not also remove the intent of those words. That this language, "by words … manifest bias or prejudice," remained in the final version of Rule 8.4(g) illustrates the Rule's broad and chilling implications. If the drafters wished to reform the Rule, they could have easily removed the offending language from the Rule as well the proposed comment….
Defendants try to deflect our attention away from the clear speech regulation in the Rule because they themselves had to know in drafting the Rule they were venturing into the narrowest of channels that permit government to regulate speech. They merge "words" into "conduct" by blithely arguing that the shoal that confronts us is a mere illusion to be ignored and is simply nothing but part of the deep, blue channel. Yet, when the reality of the shoal hits the ship, it will not be the government left ensnared and churning in the sand, it will be the individual attorney and the attorney's practice embedded in an inquisition regarding the manifestation of bias and prejudice, and an exploration of the attorney's character and previously expressed viewpoints, to determine if such manifestation was "knowing." …
Defendants cite Rumsfeld v. FAIR (2006), to support their contention that Rule 8.4(g) is intended to prohibit "conduct carried out by words," and not speech. In Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that speech was incidental to the challenged law's requirement that law schools afford equal access to military recruiters…. [But w]hereas the challenged law in Rumsfeld required the plaintiffs to provide equal campus access to military recruiters, a law that clearly regulates conduct, the Amendments explicitly limit what Pennsylvania attorneys may say in the practice of law. Rule 8.4(g)'s prohibition against using "words" to "manifest bias or prejudice" does not regulate conduct "carried out by means of language." It simply regulates speech….
And the court held the rule discriminated among speech based on viewpoint:
"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." … The Supreme Court has "said time and again that 'the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.'" …
Rule 8.4(g) states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer, "in the practice of law, by words or conduct, to knowingly manifest bias or prejudice …. " Pa.R.P.C. 8.4(g) (emphasis added). While Rule 8.4(g) restricts Pennsylvania attorneys' ability to express bias or prejudice "based upon race, sex, gender identity or expression, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, or socioeconomic status," it allows Pennsylvania attorneys to express tolerance or respect based on these same statuses. Defendants have "singled out a subset of message," those words that manifest bias or prejudice, "for disfavor based on the views expressed." As in Matal v. Tam (2017), Defendants seek to remove certain ideas or perspectives from the broader debate by prohibiting words that manifest bias or prejudice….
This Rule represents the government restricting speech outside of the courtroom, outside of the context of a pending case, and even outside the much broader playing field of "administration of justice." Even if Plaintiff makes a good faith attempt to restrict and self-censor, the Rule leaves Plaintiff with no guidance as to what is in bounds, and what is out, other than to advise Plaintiff to scour every nook and cranny of each ordinance, rule, and law in the Nation….
There is no doubt that the government is acting with beneficent intentions. However, in doing so, the government has created a rule that promotes a government-favored, viewpoint monologue and creates a pathway for its handpicked arbiters to determine, without any concrete standards, who and what offends. This leaves the door wide open for them to determine what is bias and prejudice based on whether the viewpoint expressed is socially and politically acceptable and within the bounds of permissible cultural parlance.
Yet the government cannot set its standard by legislating diplomatic speech because although it embarks upon a friendly, favorable tide, this tide sweeps us all along with the admonished, minority viewpoint into the massive currents of suppression and repression. Our limited constitutional Government was designed to protect the individual's right to speak freely, including those individuals expressing words or ideas we abhor.
I expect Pennsylvania will appeal, but we'll see soon enough.