Fifth Circuit Rejects Constitutional Challenges to "Campus Carry"

Texas, like some other states, allows law-abiding adults who have concealed carry licenses to carry at public universities as well as elsewhere; this was challenged on First Amendment, Second Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause grounds.


From yesterday's Fifth Circuit panel decision in Glass v. Paxton (curly braces used to mark moved text), written by Judge Leslie Southwick and joined by Judges Carolyn Dineen King and James Ho:

Three professors from the University of Texas at Austin challenged a Texas law permitting the concealed carry of handguns on campus and a corresponding University policy prohibiting professors from banning such weapons in their classrooms. The professors argued that the law and policy violate the First Amendment, Second Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the claims. We AFFIRM….

[I. First Amendment]

[Plaintiff Prof. Jennifer Glass] … argued her classroom speech would be "dampened to some degree by the fear" it could initiate gun violence in the class by students who have "one or more handguns hidden but at the ready if the gun owner is moved to anger and impulsive action." In an affidavit she expressed particular concern for "religiously conservative students [who] have extreme views," as well as "openly libertarian students," whom she "suspect[s] are more likely to own guns given their distaste for government." …

{In the context of the First Amendment, … "government action that chills protected speech without prohibiting it can give rise to a constitutionally cognizable injury." Such governmental action may therefore "be subject to constitutional challenge even though it has only an indirect effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights." Laird v. Tatum (1972).} [But in such cases, plaintiffs must satisfy] the "requirement that 'threatened injury must be certainly impending.'" Clapper v. Amnesty International (2013)….

[Texas argues that Glass's claim is too speculative to give her standing, because it] rests on the assumption students with concealed-carry licenses, as independent decision-makers, are virtually certain to illegally use their firearms to intimidate, threaten, or commit violence in response to controversial classroom discussion. Glass argues that her fears are neither speculative nor subjective. She challenges the district court's conclusion that she failed to present concrete evidence to substantiate her fears about students.

First, she cites to a "broader community of views" which believes that the presence of guns in the classroom will chill professors' speech. This community of views includes multiple University faculty members and multiple national educational organizations.

Second, she cites to various academic studies discussing a so-called "weapons effect." According to Glass, "[t]hese studies conclude that the hidden presence of guns does threaten disruption of classroom activities, increases the likelihood that violence will erupt in the classroom, and intimidates non-carrying students — and undoubtedly professors, too."

The problem with Glass's argument is that none of the cited evidence alleges a certainty that a license-holder will illegally brandish a firearm in a classroom…. Glass objects to a plain application of the "certainly impending" standard from Amnesty International, arguing that it sets the bar impossibly high. Instead, she asks us to confer standing on the basis that her fears are "objectively understandable and reasonable." We cannot adopt this standard because it was already rejected in Amnesty International. There, the Court rejected the Second Circuit's holding that the plaintiffs had standing because their injury was not "fanciful, paranoid, or otherwise unreasonable." Such a standard, the Court held, "improperly waters down the fundamental requirements of Article III." Parties' "contention that they have standing because they incurred certain costs as a reasonable reaction to a risk of harm is unavailing — because the harm they seek to avoid is not certainly impending."

Contrary to Glass's argument, Amnesty International reiterated that standing is not impossible in every instance in which independent decisionmaking comes into play. An example of the Court's willingness to depart from its "usual reluctance" was Meese v. Keene (1987). In Keene, the plaintiff, a California State Senator, argued that the Department of Justice's decision to label three films as "political propaganda" violated the First Amendment. Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, the Department of Justice labeled three Canadian documentaries as "political propaganda" because they could be "reasonably adapted" to "influence the foreign policies of the United States." In order to exhibit the films in public, the State Senator was required to provide a copy of the material to the Attorney General along with a report "describing the extent of the dissemination." Id. In addition, he was required to disclose that by showing the films, he was acting as the agent of a foreign principal.

The Court began by noting that "[i]f Keene had merely alleged that the appellation deterred him by exercising a chilling effect on the exercise of his First Amendment rights, he would not have standing to seek its invalidation." Instead, Keene alleged that the future reputational harm prompting his self-censorship was certain, and not merely possible. In support, he provided detailed affidavits citing public opinion polls showing that approximately one in two voters would be less inclined to vote for a candidate who showed a foreign film labeled as political propaganda by the Department of Justice.

Glass analogizes to Keene by arguing that the same rationale confers standing here. She misreads Keene. Although Keene's allegation of harm involved the contingency of individual voter decisions, he nonetheless alleged certainty about voter decision-making based on supporting affidavits and opinion polling. Indeed, he alleged that "if he were to exhibit the films while they bore such characterization, his personal, political, and professional reputation would suffer and his ability to obtain re-election and to practice his profession would be impaired." By contrast, Glass alleges reasonable probability of future harm from concealed-carrying students. According to her, she is "faced with the knowledge that there is a reasonable probability that sitting at one of the desks in [her] enclosed classroom is a young student" who believes that a "gun can be used when the appropriate circumstances present themselves."

Glass further argues that a denial of standing would improperly fail to construe the factual allegations of her complaint in her favor. Her argument is misplaced for the same reason that Keene is distinguishable. The issue here does not concern the weight given to her factual allegations, but rather the absence of any allegation of certainty about the students' future decisions. Keene alleged certainty about the voters' future decisions based on polling, which empowered him to allege certainty about future reputational harm. Construing the factual allegations of Glass's complaint in her favor, she nonetheless fails to allege what is required under Amnesty International. The requirement is that harm from concealed-carrying students be certainly impending.

The same concerns fueling the Court's "usual reluctance" in Amnesty International are present here. Although Glass's claim centers on the First Amendment, her standing arguments invoke notable separation of powers concerns. By adjudicating claims for which the alleged harm is not certainly impending, federal courts risk disregarding their constitutional mandate to limit their jurisdiction to actual cases and controversies and thereby avoid the issuance of advisory opinions.

Glass cannot manufacture standing by self-censoring her speech based on what she alleges to be a reasonable probability that concealed-carry license holders will intimidate professors and students in the classroom. The district court did not err. Glass lacks standing to bring her First Amendment claim.

[II. Second Amendment]

Glass argues that the Campus Carry Law and University policy violate the Second Amendment because firearm usage in her presence is not sufficiently "well regulated." The Second Amendment states: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II. The Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment "guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." District of Columbia v. Heller (2008). The Court also held that "individual self-defense is 'the central component' of the Second Amendment right." McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010).

Glass contends that to the extent the Second Amendment recognizes an individual right to carry firearms, persons not carrying arms have a right to the practice being well-regulated. Glass's argument collapses the distinction between the Amendment's two clauses: the militia-focused prefatory clause and the operative clause. In Heller, the Court relied on text, history, and tradition to interpret the prefatory clause as "announc[ing] the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia." Notwithstanding this distinction, Glass advocates an "independent meaning" of the prefatory clause which recognizes "a constitutional right not to have the government force [individuals] into allowing guns in their professional presence as a condition of public employment unless gun possession and use are 'well-regulated.'" "Like it or not," Glass argues, "there is specific constitutional language that premises the right, whatever its extent, on the use of guns [as] 'well-regulated.'" She argues that the prefatory clause places a "condition" on the individual right.

Her "admittedly fresh" take on the Second Amendment therefore turns on the proper interpretation of the Amendment's prefatory clause. In support, Glass cites to a line in Heller where the Court interpreted "well-regulated" as "the imposition of proper discipline and training." She further relies on one of our opinions where we stated that "gun use and gun control have been inextricably intertwined" such that "an expectation of sensible gun safety regulation was woven into the tapestry of the [Second Amendment] guarantee."

Glass's argument is foreclosed by Heller. In two separate locations in the majority opinion, the Court held that the Second Amendment's prefatory clause does not limit its operative clause: "The [prefatory clause] does not limit the [operative clause] grammatically, but rather announces a purpose." Indeed, the "prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause." The Amendment's first clause "is prefatory and not a limitation on the amendment itself." Because the operative clause provides the codification of the individual right, the prefatory clause cannot "limit or expand the scope" of the individual right.

The prefatory clause does not limit the scope of the individual right codified in the operative clause. She has failed to state a claim under the Second Amendment.

[III. Equal Protection Clause]

Finally, Glass argues that the Campus Carry Law and University policy violate her right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because the University lacks a rational basis for determining where students can or cannot concealed-carry handguns on campus…. The parties do not dispute that rational basis review applies because the professors are not members of a protected class nor does the alleged classification infringe a fundamental constitutional right. Under this standard, a legislative classification "must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Parties attacking the presumption of validity extended to legislative classifications "have the burden 'to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.'" …

[Glass] argues that there is no rational basis for Texas to allow private universities to ban concealed carry but not public universities. In addition, she argues that there is no rational basis for the University to allow concealed carry in classrooms while simultaneously prohibiting the practice in other campus locations such as faculty offices, research laboratories, and residence halls.

Texas argues that simple explanations provide the needed rational basis. First, the Campus Carry Law distinguishes between public and private universities in order to respect the property rights of private universities. Second, public safety and self-defense cannot be achieved if concealed carry is banned in classrooms because attending class is a core reason for students to travel to campus. Texas argues that public safety and self-defense can still be achieved if concealed carry is banned in less-frequented areas such as faculty offices and research laboratories.

I think the result is right, but I think Glass should have lost even if the Court had held that she had standing to bring her challenge: There is just no First Amendment right to whatever crime prevention techniques a judge can find to be valuable for protecting speakers.

There is a First Amendment right not to be stripped of normal protections because of what you say, or even because you are a speaker: If the government were to, for instance, refuse to provide police protection to certain kinds of political rallies, that would be unconstitutional. But here there is a broadly applicable, speech-neutral rule—concealed carry licenseholders may carry in a vast range of public places. It's up to the legislature to decide which forms of crime control (ones consistent with the Second and Fourth and other Amendments, of course) best prevent crime at the optimal cost, and courts can't second-guess that just because some speakers complain that these general rules aren't sufficiently protective.

Here's a simple analogy: Say that courts say that the government many search the bags of everyone going to an event on university property, without violating the Fourth Amendment. (Let's set aside here whether or not that's the correct reading of the Fourth Amendment.) But say that a university concludes that this unduly interferes with people's privacy rights, and chooses not to allow such searches at any places that are open to the public—football games, cafeterias, or auditoriums. One can debate whether or not that is a good policy, and properly balances the costs and benefits (financial and otherwise). But a court can't strike it down, and order the government to perform searches, simply because it agrees that the policy puts some speakers at risk and thus deters their speech (since then some attendees could bring weapons to a speech and use them against the speaker).

As to the Second Amendment, even if you think the Amendment's prefatory clause should in some measure influence the scope of "the right of the people to keep and bear arms," that would at most mean that the government may impose certain extra gun controls that wouldn't have been allowed absent the prefatory clause. It doesn't mean that the government must impose particular gun controls.

NEXT: Delaware Court Rejects Temporary Restraining Orders Against Alleged Libel

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  1. Glass argues that the Campus Carry Law and University policy violate the Second Amendment because firearm usage in her presence is not sufficiently “well regulated.”

    She ain’t a law professor, is she?

    1. Remember the social justice warriors who complained that Title IX was not meant to be used by white males? Law is just so 20017, doncha know.

      1. The chair of the department of rhetoric was just in the NYT making this very claim.. More prominent feminists, like Judith Butler, were simply claiming that academic stars shouldn’t be punished for sexual harassment.

        1. *The chair of the department of rhetoric at this very university.

    2. “She ain’t a law professor, is she?”

      Just because she’s incompetent, you think that a major state university wouldn’t hire her to teach? Sorry. Academia is rotten with utterly incompetent teachers, in law, economics, and (I assume) many other areas. Hell, I once had a Chemistry professor who was trying to demonstrate the math of the entropy principle using an inequality on the board; he manipulated the inequality by multiplying both sides by -1. When I pointed out that when any inequality is manipulated by multiplying both sides by a negative number, the direction of the inequality must change – that is, a < must be changed to a >, and vice versa. Basic math. His response? “This isn’t a class in math, it’s a class in chemistry!” As if the basic laws of mathematics were malleable, depending on the subject! I dropped that class and waited until I could take it from a competent professor.

      1. I’m not sure where we’re getting the idea that Prof. Glass is “incompetent.” She may or may not be good in her academic field, but we can’t tell that from the brief. And she is doubtless not an ace lawyer — but why should she be? She has lawyers, who I assume are the ones who wrote the briefs. When judges say things like “plaintiff argues that …,” that’s just legal idiom for “plaintiff’s lawyer argues that ….”

        I’m not even sure, from these arguments, that her lawyers were incompetent — these were not good arguments, but they might have been the best arguments they could have made for the result they wanted to achieve. But in any event, I don’t see any evidence of Prof. Glass’s incompetence here.

        1. You are correct. It was unfair of me to assume that Professor Glass was incompetent; if she is not a law professor, she might well be competent in her chosen field. On the other hand, if she IS a law professor, then your standards for judging incompetence are much more demanding than my own, and I stand by my original judgment of incompetence based upon the quality of the arguments presented.

          1. Eugene’s point is valid: Competency can’t conjure up good arguments for lousy cases. If your client wants you to argue something stupid, be you ever so competent, you’re going to be limited to stupid arguments.

            1. Actually, competency also requires a lawyer to comply with the ethical obligation not to present frivolous arguments. See Texas Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.01. Granted, State Bar Associations almost never (never?) take action to enforce that obligation; nevertheless, the obligation exists. If there are no non-frivolous arguments for the client’s position, a lawyer has an obligation to decline the representation.

              1. But, by functional standards, no argument in favor of gun control can ever be “frivolous”, because no matter how loony, there’s always going to be a substantial chance of prevailing at least in the lower courts. And an argument with a decent chance of prevailing can’t be frivolous, right?

                1. “And an argument with a decent chance of prevailing can’t be frivolous, right?”

                  True, IF you are unwilling to make any judgment about the competence – or fitness for the bench – of the same judges willing to accept whatever completely loony legal arguments can be used to rationalize their desired outcome. Personally, I’m not unwilling to make judgments about the fitness (or rather the lack of fitness) of such judges for the bench.

    3. ” Dr. Glass is a Liberal Arts professor in the Department of Sociology and Population
      Research. Dr. Lisa Moore is a professor of English. Dr. Mia Carter is also a professor of

      Apparently any fool can get hired at UT to teach.

    4. ===[Glass] argues that there is no rational basis for Texas to allow private universities to ban concealed carry but not public universities.===

      The same principle applies — the owners of the university in question may decide. For public universities, that’s the State of Texas.

  2. The 2A part seems especially strange to me.

    Even using the left’s claim that “a well regulated militia” limits whose rights to keep and bear arms can be infringed, 2A simply prohibits infringement: it doesn’t require any restrictions, and states would be free to allow poorly regulated militias, or non-militias, to keep and bear arms as they please.

    1. Anti-gunners look at “a well regulated militia.” Pro-gunners look at “shall not be infringed.” It seems neither group gets what it wants.

      1. Yes but her argument is bizarre because she’s claiming that, by actually regulating guns by considering, then allowing campus carrying, they’re not regulating enough, or the wrong way, or she’s conflating regulating with implied mandatory banning, or something.

        1. Her team conflated martial training (the purpose of the prefatory clause) with product regulation.

    2. More to the point, as I keep having to point out to gun controllers, grammatically, it’s the militia that’s supposed to be well regulated, not the right.

      If that “well regulated” bit were mandatory, the only result would be a legal obligation to own a gun and visit the range periodically, which I seriously doubt would have made the plaintiffs here any happier.

      1. The Watauga Association militia men who mustered at Sycamore Shoals were expected to have arms that met military regulation but at home they also had deer, bird and squirrel guns that were not regulation military arms. Requiring members of a well-regulated militia to have arms that met military standards, suitable for military combat, and to muster and train with army regulation or mil spec weapons, did not mean that all non-regulation non-military arms were illegal or something.

    3. “The left” would include conservatives like Chief Justice Burger, right?

      The argument works off the text: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

      A well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free state. It follows that states would not be free to allow poorly regulated militias. At least, if they claim to be free states. Since a well-regulated militia, by definition, is necessary for the security of a free state.

      That doesn’t match Heller but there is a certain logic to it.

    4. As a card-carrying lefty progressive, let me object to the characterization of your first point as “the left’s claim…”

      I am a strong 2ndA rights supporter, and I have noted before that Texas universities — and universities in other states — who seem to think that they can ban weapons on campus have the burden of showing why they should be exempt. As an academic myself, I feel more danger in the parking lot of my local grocery store, when some jerk who thought he should get my parking space slams to a halt and starts to open his door….

      Statistically, it might be that liberals are more likely than conservatives to support some restrictions on gun ownership (and eligibility), but infringement of 2ndA rights is not part of any liberal political platform that I would support.

  3. The problem with Glass’s argument is that none of the cited evidence alleges a certainty that a license-holder will illegally brandish a firearm in a classroom

    Is this really the requirement? They don’t understand probabilities very well, do they? (Neither does Alito).

    1. Do you? What’s your threshold to trigger the reduction of personal rights in public? Simply non zero? You’re more likely to die or get injured on the way to a class than in class from the illegal use of a weapon.

        1. That MIGHT be true, but it’s certainly not apparent from any of your comments.

  4. Very interesting that Judge King (for whom I clerked in 1980-1981) joined in this decision. Without a dissent from her, the chances of this getting en banc review are slim to none.

  5. >”As to the Second Amendment, even if you think the Amendment’s prefatory clause should in some measure influence the scope of “the right of the people to keep and bear arms,” that would at most mean that the government may impose certain extra gun controls that wouldn’t have been allowed absent the prefatory clause. It doesn’t mean that the government must impose particular gun controls.”

    Prof. Volokh: Many people?including yourself?leave off the last four words: “shall not be infringed.” As one of the many non-lawyers who reads the blog, can you explain how that phrase has no practical or legal significance? I used my Google-fu skills, but I couldn’t find anything credible. I don’t think that portion of the Second Amendment has ever been adjudicated.

    1. I didn’t think “shall not be infringed” was that complicated. What did you have in mind?

      1. If the right “shall not be infringed,” why did Justice Scalia write “the Second Amendment right is not unlimited” in the Heller decision and why are gun control laws upheld as being constitutional? I’ve only heard two answers, but they aren’t plausible. The first is because that the government can regulate interstate and international commerce. However, I believe the Second Amendment should have precluded “arms” from the commerce clause given that the Second Amendment chronologically follows the US Constitution proper. The second reason is that it follows the English common law traditions. Last time I checked, constitutional protections are supposed to always triumphs over common law.

        And thank you for trying to help. I’m trying to ask a serious question instead of writing a whiny “but my guns!” statement disguised as question. I could ask the same thing about how obscenities are not protected by the First Amendment given how amendment states “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” Or I could ask for that matter how the First Amendment applies to the actions of the Presidency given that it appears to only restrict Congress. (And yes, I understand the principle there.)

        1. The third reason is because Scalia was a lousy originalist, who explicitly denied being principled about it. He only looked like a good originalist because of the company he was in at the Court.

          1. He didn’t actually say he was not “principled.”

            He talked about being a “nut” or such but then he lived in the real world and even Justice Thomas has to compromise given the realities of precedent and such.

            Not being 100% pure is not the same as not being principled.

        2. The First Amendment has the word “no” but freedom of speech etc. doesn’t mean speech is not regulated. “Freedom” includes some sort of regulation. “Shall not be infringed” follows standard phrasing there — the 2A covers a right that warrants careful scrutiny before the government can burden it, but that doesn’t mean that it is an absolute right. Rights in a society generally are not absolute.

          1. >”The First Amendment has the word “no” but freedom of speech etc. doesn’t mean speech is not regulated. “Freedom” includes some sort of regulation.”

            Can you explain the paradox? If federal and state legislatures cannot pass laws “abridging the freedom of speech,” it stands to reason that they can’t regulate it either.

        3. I’m a lawyer but not a professor. I think the “shall not be infringed” language reflects that the Second Amendment did not purport to grant or confer a right to keep and bear arms; it merely purported to protect from infringement by the new federal government a pre-existing right, and “the right . . . shall not be infringed” accomplished that without getting into particulars concerning the scope of the right. I don’t think it was commonly understood that the pre-existing right was boundless or absolute, so the right protected by the Second isn’t either.

    2. The reason is a mind-blowingly simple matter of grammar and boils down to one word: the. That one word is critical because it is a definite article and so it is referring to something specific, which in this case is the right as understood by the Framers. Determining that is not straightforward, though, and is done by looking at colonial laws and case law, how state constitutions protected these rights, the origins of the right in English history up to the Revolutionary War, looking at contemporary British legal texts (like, and especially, Blackstone’s commentaries), etc. I don’t know a lot about how that applies in the Second Amendment case, but that’s why certain types of speech (defamation, obscenity, fraud,, perjury) are outside the protection of the First Amendment. Now that you know this, look at the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting THE free exercise thereof; or abridging THE freedom of speech, or of the press; or THE right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

  6. No sua sponte sanctions? Disappointing.

    It was a frivolous suit brought in bad faith. Unless courts punish lawyers and their clients, such suits will continue to clog up the courts.

    1. I wish courts would make the losing party pay for everything in both civil and criminal cases. We’d have fewer frivolous and borderline suits.

  7. I see this professor is another one who has no idea which definition of the word “regulated” is being used in the Second Amendment.

  8. “As to the Second Amendment, even if you think the Amendment’s prefatory clause should in some measure influence the scope of “the right of the people to keep and bear arms,” that would at most mean that the government may impose certain extra gun controls that wouldn’t have been allowed absent the prefatory clause. ”

    Based on the Militia acts, what this would actually mean is not anything that would be normally characterized as “gun control”, but instead mandatory firearms ownership and training.

    The exact opposite of what gun control aims to achieve.

    1. Gun control (as the term is often used, apart from using it as a trope) involves any number of regulations that traditionally (for those who care about that, as you do at times) involved more than mandatory firearms ownership and training. Though even training is too much for some so-called 2A enthusiasts. Tell them that 2A includes mandatory training or guns would be taken away and they will call you some sort of anti-gunner.

    2. I do think the prefatory clause sheds some light on the scope of the operative clause, but not by restricting the protected right to members of a state militia or to citizens of a state whose militia meets minimum standards of “regulation.” By specifying the essential purpose to be served by protection of the right, the ratifiers made clear that, whatever sorts of regulations may be permissible, individuals in the US have at a minimum a right to keep and bear such arms as would enable them to participate effectively in a militia; i.e., weapons appropriate for military use. Depriving individuals of such arms would defeat the core purpose of the guarantee, while other sorts of regulations (mandatory training, perhaps) might be Constitutionally tolerable.

  9. “In an affidavit she expressed particular concern for “religiously conservative students [who] have extreme views,” as well as “openly libertarian students,” whom she “suspect[s] are more likely to own guns given their distaste for government.” ?”

    I guess she doesn’t fear closet libertarians.

    1. “religiously conservative students”

      She is both a fool and a bigot.

      A “religiously conservative student” should file a Title IX complaint against her.

      1. Maybe she meant Muslims?

  10. Based on her own words, Prof Glass is an ignorant bigot who should not be trusted with scissors, much less with the education of the nation’s youth. Her fears may be objectively ‘understandable’ but only because we know ‘understand’ the causes of many clinical psychoses, phobias, etc. That does not make those fears reasonable.

  11. “According to her, she is “faced with the knowledge that there is a reasonable probability that sitting at one of the desks in [her] enclosed classroom is a young student” who believes that a “gun can be used when the appropriate circumstances present themselves.” “

    Appropriate circumstances would be self-defense against an attack by Glass that would put a reasonable person in fear of imminent death or greivous bodily harm. Glass needs to avoid attempting murder, assault or rape against young students in her classroom so no reasonable person would feel the need to defend themselves.

    The kind of person who would use lethal force at a lower threshold and without legal or logical justification would also be the kind of person who would carry illegally anyway. Banning licenced/permitted self-defenders does not ban armed criminally minded types who consider themselves above reasonable rules and carry and use arms for trivial excuses.

    Texas has kept stats on crimes by carry permit holders since the law was passed. The published stats show that Texas permit holders are much less likely to commit crimes than the average Texas adult. Her fear of permit holders is not supported by stats.

  12. I think there’s a Prager video that breaks down the history and relevant verbiage of 2A.

    1. Good luck finding it, with the way Prager is being banned. He’s only a couple steps behind Infowars on his forced march to the dark web.

      1. Is it this one by some dude named Volokh?

  13. “In an affidavit she expressed particular concern for “religiously conservative students [who] have extreme views,” as well as “openly libertarian students,” whom she “suspect[s] are more likely to own guns given their distaste for government.” ?

    – Oh, yes. We can’t have THOSE KIND of people congregating around here… this is a RESPECTABLE establishment… why they would lower our property values if we allowed them to move in next to us! And whatever would our daughters do if they were to walk down the streets with some of those savage (shudder) GUN OWNERS loitering about… reeking of gun oil and corrupting the neighborhood with their weird ideas… why can’t their kind just move and go live somewhere else?

    There is a word for all that. Can anyone name It? Maybe someone from the ACLU? Or maybe the NAACP? How about the Anti-Semitic League? Can anyone from any civil rights organization name that word? Yes! You right there in the t-shirt that reads “the NRA – America’s Oldest Civil Rights Organization”; what is the word?
    Correct! It is called “bigotry”!

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