No Pseudonymity for Yale MBA Student Suing Over Discipline for Alleged Use of AI on Exam

From today's decision by Judge Sarah Russell (D. Conn.) in Doe v. Yale Univ.:

John Doe brought this action after he was suspended from graduate studies at the Yale School of Management ("SOM"). After completing his undergraduate degree at Rice University in 2012, Doe pursued a career as an entrepreneur and investor. Doe enrolled in 2023 in SOM's Master of Business Administration for Executives (EMBA) program as a member of the class of 2025.

In the summer and fall of 2024, SOM convened disciplinary proceedings against Doe after an instructor accused Doe of using generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) during an examination. After various proceedings, SOM found that Doe engaged in academic misconduct; in response, SOM imposed a one-year suspension from campus and a mandatory "F" grade in the class.

Doe asserts in his Complaint that SOM instructors and administrators scrutinized his exam because he is a non-native English speaker {Doe is a French national and a United States resident}, that administrators retaliated against him after he accused them of national origin discrimination, and that SOM disciplined him without regard to the procedural safeguards for students provided by SOM's Honor Code.

Doe sues Defendants for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, national origin discrimination in violation of Title VI, retaliation in violation of Title VI, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Doe seeks money damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief removing the mandatory "F" grade from his transcript and permitting him to resume studies immediately at SOM.

The court doesn't deal with the substantive claims, but concludes that Doe can't proceed under a pseudonym:

Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs that "[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties." "This requirement, though seemingly pedestrian, serves the vital purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of judicial proceedings and therefore cannot be set aside lightly." Indeed, this rule has "constitutional overtones," in that it gives effect to the First Amendment's guarantee of public access to courts by informing the public "who is using their courts." … To overcome the presumption of disclosure, a plaintiff must demonstrate that their interest in anonymity outweighs the public interest in identifying the plaintiff.

[1.] I take seriously Doe's contention that he would be humiliated if he were to disclose that he was accused of academic misconduct. But "the potential for embarrassment or public humiliation does not, without more, justify a request for anonymity." Courts have often granted anonymity where a case involves "claims relating to sexual misconduct; highly personal medical decisions, such as abortion; or minors." That is not the case here….

Reputational harm is a risk common to parties in a majority of lawsuits and is not sufficient support for a request to proceed anonymously. Indeed, courts routinely decline requests for anonymity "predicated on reputational harm and lost economic and professional opportunities." And although courts are at times receptive to protecting the reputation of young litigants from forever being associated with a particular set of accusations, graduate students and other adults are less likely to be afforded anonymity. Compare Doe v. Gerken (D. Conn. 2022) ("plaintiffs are not particularly vulnerable to the harms of disclosure based on their status as graduate students") with Doe #1 v. Syracuse Univ. (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (allowing anonymity to protect college students from permanent association with what university had already publicly asserted was serious misconduct).

Courts are particularly skeptical of requests to procced under pseudonym where, rather than admit to embarrassing conduct, a plaintiff "seeks to vindicate his name" in the face of what he characterizes as wrongful accusations. Where courts do grant anonymity, they do so on a particularized showing that disclosure would harm a plaintiff more than the typical litigant. See Doe v. Wesleyan Univ. (D. Conn. 2020) (permitting pseudonym where plaintiff provided "medical documentation that she is diagnosed with recurrent major depressive disorder and has already engaged in self-harm and battled suicidal ideations in response to [Defendant's alleged actions]"); Doe v. Univ. of Conn. (D. Conn. 2013) (allowing pseudonym because plaintiff's history of serious mental disorders—which qualified him for Social Security disability benefits—meant plaintiff was "particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure"); Doe #1 (noting that disclosure would subject plaintiffs to retaliatory harm from members of the public).

[2.] Doe's strongest argument is that disclosure will aggravate the harm he seeks to redress here. Litigating in his own name will mean that more people will know that he was accused of academic misconduct at SOM. But that is a risk that all litigants must face in choosing to vindicate their rights in this public forum.

More critically, Doe has not shown that he is more vulnerable than the typical litigant: he is a graduate student who has advanced in his career, making him quite distinct from the plaintiffs entitled to anonymity because of their young age. {Indeed, Doe submits his aspirations to run for public office mean he has more to lose in terms of reputational harm than the typical litigant. That fact has little bearing on my assessment of whether he is more vulnerable than the typical litigant to the potential harms associated with public scrutiny of a litigant's background. If anything, those who volunteer to enter public life may be less susceptible to the harm of public disclosure than the typical litigant because they have willingly submitted themselves to public scrutiny.}

And although I do not doubt that these allegations have caused Doe considerable stress, he has not shown that he would suffer the degree of emotional distress required to warrant anonymity. Further, Doe has presented no evidence that he will face retaliatory harm from disclosure. Indeed, Doe acknowledges he has previously litigated several commercial disputes under his own name. He should then understand that "public disclosure is in general an inherent collateral consequence of litigation." …

[3.] Courts decline anonymity where media outlets have already identified a litigant in connection with a case. But courts sometimes afford anonymity even where details in the filings make a plaintiff identifiable to a knowledgeable observer, reasoning that there remains a benefit to preventing a casual internet search from connecting a plaintiff with their lawsuit.

I cannot conclude from the record before me that Doe's name has been publicly linked to this case. Although I appreciate the subtle point that Doe seeks to avoid casual acquaintances—not knowledgeable observers—from connecting him to this lawsuit, I note that his disclosure of extraneous biographical details in the Complaint makes it all the more likely that even casual acquaintances will eventually connect him to this case. But as his name is not yet widely associated with this lawsuit, I find that this factor weighs against disclosure.

[4.] Finally, I conclude that the remaining factors I must consider—public interest in disclosure, whether the suit challenges private parties or the government, the prejudice to defendants of litigating against an anonymous plaintiff, and the existence of alternative mechanisms to protect a plaintiff's interests—favor disclosure. Doe has brought a factually intensive challenge to how Defendants conducted disciplinary proceedings; this is precisely the type of fact-sensitive inquiry where there is a strong public interest in disclosure. Doe v. Weinstein (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (noting that "open proceedings … benefit the public as well as the parties and also serve the judicial interest in accurate fact- finding and fair adjudication"). Disclosure advances fact-finding because it alerts third parties who possess knowledge of contested facts to "step forward with valuable information."

Furthermore, Defendants are instructors and administrators at a private university. Doe identifies and accuses each of these individuals of misconduct. When a litigant publicly accuses a private actor of misconduct, "[f]airness requires that []he be prepared to stand behind [his] charges publicly."