Revised Versions of Articles on "The Constitutional Case Against Exclusionary Zoning" and "Land Use Regulation" Now Available

Revised versions of both publications are now up on SSRN.

I recently posted substantially revised versions of two new articles on land use and property rights issues to SSRN. The first is "The Constitutional Case Against Exclusionary Zoning" (coauthored with Josh Braver, forthcoming in the Texas Law Review). Here is the abstract:

We argue that exclusionary zoning—the imposition of restrictions on the amount and types of housing that property owners are allowed to build— is unconstitutional because it violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Exclusionary zoning has emerged as a major political and legal issue. A broad cross-ideological array of economists and land-use scholars have concluded that it is responsible for massive housing shortages in many parts of the United States, thereby cutting off millions of people – particularly the poor and minorities—from economic and social opportunities. In the process, it also stymies economic growth and innovation, making the nation as a whole poorer.

Exclusionary zoning is permitted under Euclid v. Ambler Realty, the 1926 Supreme Court decision holding that exclusionary zoning is largely exempt from constitutional challenge under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by extension also the Takings Clause. Despite the wave of academic and public concern about the issue, so far, no modern in-depth scholarly analysis has advocated overturning or severely limiting Euclid. Nor has any scholar argued that exclusionary zoning should be invalidated under the Takings Clause, more generally.

We contend Euclid should be reversed or strictly limited, and that exclusionary zoning restrictions should generally be considered takings requiring compensation. This conclusion follows from both originalism and a variety of leading living constitution theories. Under originalism, the key insight is that property rights protected by the Takings Clause include not only the right to exclude, but also the right to use property. Exclusionary zoning violates this right because it severely limits what owners can build on their land. Exclusionary zoning is also unconstitutional from the standpoint of a variety of progressive living constitution theories of interpretation, including Ronald Dworkin's "moral reading," representation-reinforcement theory, and the emerging "anti-oligarchy" constitutional theory. The article also considers different strategies for overruling or limiting Euclid, and potential synergies between constitutional litigation and political reform of zoning.

The second is "Land-Use Regulation," a chapter in the forthcoming Routledge Handbook on Classical Liberalism (edited by Richard Epstein, Liya Palagashvili, and Mario Rizzo). Here is the abstract:

Land use regulation is a major function of every government in the world. It raises many issues for classical liberalism. This chapter provides an overview of three of the most important areas of land-use policy: the use of eminent domain to forcibly take property for government-approved projects, regulations that restrict property owners' use of their land, and the relationship between property rights in land and migration restrictions.

Part I covers the use of eminent domain to take private property, and arguments for its limitation to genuinely "public" projects, as opposed to coerced transfers between private owners. Advocates of the latter argue they are needed to overcome "holdout" problems. But unconstrained use of eminent domain is a serious threat to property rights and hampers economic development.

Part II considers regulatory restrictions on land use that do not involve physical occupation of property. There is a longstanding debate about the value of such restrictions and whether the government should pay owners compensation. The most significant regulatory restrictions of this type in many nations are zoning rules restricting housing construction.

Finally, Part III provides a critical overview of property-rights rationales for restricting mobility, particularly in the form of international migration. Such theories justify severely constraining the liberty and property rights of both migrants and natives.

In addition to contributing to this volume, I am also a contributor to Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism, edited by Jason Brennan, Bas van der Vossen, and David Schmidtz, and the Cambridge Handbook of Classical Liberal Thought, edited by M. Todd Henderson. Yet, I'm far from clear on what, if anything, differentiates libertarianism and classical liberalism. I explored that question  in a previous post.