The Killing of 3 American Troops Was an Avoidable Tragedy

The U.S. base on the Jordanian-Syrian border has long been "strategic baggage."

American blood has been drawn in a Middle Eastern war for the first time in a while. Iraqi guerrillas allied with Iran killed three U.S. troops and wounded dozens more along the Jordanian-Syrian border on Sunday, using an explosive drone. President Joe Biden has promised to "all those responsible to account at a time and in a manner of our choosing." Members of Congress have called for a harsh response, with some Republicans demanding a full-on war against Iran.

The government of Jordan, clearly not keen on getting dragged into the conflict, has denied that the attack happened on its side of the border. Iran shrugged off responsibility for the bombing, insisting that the issue is entirely between the United States and "resistance groups in Iraq and Syria." The Iraqi fighters may have indeed been acting on their own accord. Iraqi commander Qais al-Khazali had complained about U.S. airstrikes on Iraq in a speech last November: "You are cautious when it comes to Iranian blood, but you pay no regard to Iraqi blood. Therefore, Iraqis should teach you a lesson for what you have done."

The immediate cause of the violence is the war in Gaza, which prompted Iraqi militias to break a truce they had with the U.S. military. But this particular attack was a long time coming. The target was Tower 22, an extension of al-Tanf, a base that the U.S. military maintains in Syria for murky and confusing purposes. Over the past few years, Israeli aircraft have used al-Tanf's airspace to strike Iran's forces, and Iranian forces have struck back at the base. It was only a matter of time before Americans were dragged into the proxy war, with tragic results.

U.S. Special Forces had first set up shop in al-Tanf during the war against the Islamic State. Their plan was to support the Revolutionary Commando Army, a friendly Syrian rebel group. That project failed embarrassingly. The Revolutionary Commando Army suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Islamic State in 2016, and one of its leaders ran off with American-made guns after he was accused of drug trafficking in 2020. Kurdish-led forces elsewhere in Syria became a much more reliable partner for the U.S. military.

Meanwhile, Russia—which is allied with the Iranian and Syrian governments—agreed to enforce a 55 kilometer "deconfliction zone" around al-Tanf. The zone also included Rukban, an unofficial refugee camp built by Syrians fleeing government persecution. (The Syrian government reportedly tortured two former Rukban residents to death in October 2022.) No country wanted to take responsibility for the camp, and it took almost a decade for the U.S. military to begin providing food aid to Rukban.

Washington, however, had a different purpose for al-Tanf in mind: countering Iran and its allies. The base's location near the Iraqi-Syrian border made it valuable real estate, especially for anyone intent on breaking up the "land bridge" between Iranian allies. It also allowed the U.S. military and Israeli intelligence to listen in on Iranian communications, according to Al-Monitor, a Washington-based magazine focused on the Middle East. So the Americans stayed.

"Control of [al-Tanf] neutralized a key border crossing point on the road between Baghdad and Damascus, which forced Iran and others to cross from Iraq into Syria at a more distant border crossing to the north," former Trump administration official John Bolton declared in his 2020 memoir, The Room Where It Happened. "Besides, why give away territory for nothing?"

More provocatively, Israeli forces began using al-Tanf's airspace to bomb Iranian and pro-Iranian forces in Syria. (Since American aircraft often fly the same route, Syrian "air defenses can't tell the difference until it's too late," a U.S. official told Al-Monitor.) The Israeli air campaign, known as "the war between the wars," was designed to prevent Iran from moving weapons into the region in anticipation of a future war. Israel dropped more than 2,000 bombs on Syria in 2018, through "near-daily" air raids, with the direct involvement of U.S. leaders.

"The Israeli strike plans were submitted through the U.S. military chain and reviewed at CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], usually days in advance of the strike; the strike plans outlined the purpose of the mission, the number of warplanes that would carry out the attack, and when it would occur," wrote Wall Street Journal reporter Michael Gordon in his 2022 book, Degrade and Destroy: The Inside Story of the War Against the Islamic State. "They also spelled out the routes the Israeli planes would take and the coordinates of the target that would be struck. CENTCOM would examine the request, which would also be shared with the U.S. defense secretary, who would have the final say."

It seemed like a win-win arrangement. Israel had a safe route for its bombing runs, and the United States could weaken a foreign rival without getting directly involved. But there was a problem: Iran was not stupid, and it could see that the American troops were facilitating the raids on its own troops. In retaliation for a series of Israeli attacks in October 2021, the Iranian military bombed al-Tanf the following month. No Americans were harmed at the time, but it was an ominous sign of the dangers involved.

The U.S. mission also lacked a legal mandate. Although the president arguably had a congressional mandate to fight the Islamic State, there were no legal grounds whatsoever to help Israel bomb Iranian troops. Former Trump administration official David Schenker, in a 2021 article defending the base at al-Tanf, admitted that "U.S. military officials are often loath to publicly acknowledge [their Iran-related goals] given concerns about the legal justification for America's presence in Syria."

When former President Donald Trump sought to withdraw from Syria, officials fought to keep U.S. forces in al-Tanf. Ambassador James Jeffrey, a former U.S. special envoy for Syria, admitted to "playing shell games to not make clear to our leadership how many troops we had" in the country. Bolton successfully pushed to have the garrison at al-Tanf counted separately from other troop deployments. The game succeeded. U.S. forces stayed until Biden took office, and the new president preferred to keep them in Syria.

Other officials and experts continued to worry that al-Tanf could become a liability. Former U.S. Air Force colonel Daniel L. Magruder Jr. called al-Tanf "strategic baggage" in an article published by the Brookings Institute a few weeks after Biden was elected. He recommended withdrawing U.S. forces in exchange for a deal to allow the refugee safe passage. The colonel warned that Russia and Iran had "acted provocatively" against al-Tanf in the past. "Would the U.S. be able to control escalation if an American were killed?" he wondered.

Three years later, Magruder's question is sadly relevant. It remains to be seen how Biden will react to the killing of the three American troops, and whether that reaction deters further violence or escalates the situation even more. But Washington can't say it wasn't warned.