Book Review: The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity
Early cities' concentrated populations and burgeoning scale didn't spontaneously summon pharaonic god-kings or bureaucrats.

The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity, by David Graeber and David Wengrow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 704 pages, $35
There's a simple story about life before civilization, retold by evolutionary scholars and New York Times bestsellers like Yuval Noah Harari's Sapiens and Jared Diamond's Guns, Germs, and Steel. Anthropologist David Graeber and archaeologist David Wengrow summarize it skeptically in their big new book, The Dawn of Everything.
Long ago, the story goes, we were hunter-gatherers, "living…in tiny bands. These bands were egalitarian; they could be for the very reason that they were so small." We did this for hundreds of thousands of years, until an Agricultural Revolution fed an Urban Revolution, which heralded civilization and states. That meant "the appearance of written literature, science and philosophy," but also "patriarchy, standing armies, mass executions, and annoying bureaucrats demanding that we spend much of our lives filling in forms."
Or perhaps, interjects Steven Pinker, those bands weren't childlike innocents, but brutal and chaotically violent: We shouldn't regret armies or bureaucrats, but greet them as liberators. Either telling maintains the long arc: We were all one way for so long, until changes came and we were irreversibly another.
Dawn complicates this story, chapter by chapter. It begins not in prehistory but with how the Simple Story captured thinking about prehistory. In Graeber and Wengrow's account, theories of social evolution through stages of material progress first developed "in direct response to the power of the indigenous critique," a trans-Atlantic exchange anticipating the French Enlightenment.
Philosophe ideals of reason and individual liberty, they contend, drew directly from arguments French colonists encountered first in dialogue with Native Americans like Kandiaronk, a charismatic Wendat statesman-philosopher with a taste for skeptical debates and individual liberty. Kandiaronk's dinner table arguments reached Parisian salons through travelogues and Louis-Armand de Lahontan's 1703 Curious Dialogues With a Savage of Good Sense Who Has Traveled. Older histories dismissed the dialogues as exotic literary ventriloquism for Lahontan's own views, but Graeber and Wengrow marshal sources suggesting Lahontan actually conveyed his friend Kandiaronk's characteristic points.
Later European critics exploited technological gaps between French and native societies to sidetrack dangerous debates over liberty onto the social conditions for material equality. Small, simple societies could live like that, these theorists demurred, because they had so little to plan or fight over; Europe's complex, commercial societies depended on governments' civilizing constraints. Civilization, they argued, posed a tragic dilemma: wild, childish freedom or mature, comfortable confinement.
What if that dilemma is an illusion? Dawn's archaeological chapters slice up the Simple Story's film-strip progression of evolutionary stages and (pre)historical inevitability. There was no Age of Innocence: Prehistoric people were already smart; their world was already old, with long histories now lost to us. Ice Age excavations increasingly reveal sophisticated, polymorphous diversity that simplistic questions about "egalitarianism" or "hierarchy" obscure. Nomadic hunter-gatherers left remains that "defy our image of a world made up of tiny egalitarian forager bands" with evidence of "princely burials, mammoth monuments and bustling centres of trade."
Graeber and Wengrow invoke "seasonal duality," anthropologists' term for modern indigenous societies inhabiting "two social structures, one in summer and one in winter." They suggest similar revolving cycles in Pleistocene hunters' social worlds to explain "strange, staccato" patterns in Ice Age inequalities: following herds, gathering nuts, crowding into trade centers; seasons of equality and "hierarchies raised to the sky, only to be swiftly torn down again."
Foragers after the Holocene thaw remained fluid and diverse. Some developed small-scale, equalizing societies, like the Tanzanian Hadza people; others erected monumental stone sanctuaries, gathered seasonally, rejected farming but traded with early agriculturalists, founded sedentary villages and maritime kingdoms on coastal fishing and acorn gathering, and diverged radically even in virtually identical environments—from the Pacific Northwest's grandiose slave-raiding "fisher kings" to puritanical, energetically acquisitive Californians who repudiated slavery and glorified private property.
Agriculture and urbanization didn't impose sudden, one-way "revolutions" or trap farmers on demographic roads to serfdom. Early Fertile Crescent farming settlements like Çatalhöyük appear "relatively free of ranks and hierarchies"; experimentation, long-distance trade, reversals, and flexible strategies sprouted not for moments but over thousands of years before bureaucratic grain states appeared.
Early cities' concentrated populations and burgeoning scale didn't spontaneously summon pharaonic god-kings or mandarin bureaucrats. Wengrow and Graeber favor recent reinterpretations of the Indus Valley metropolis Mohenjo-daro as organized with no evident palaces, rulers, or institutional government. Bustling cities from Uruk to Teotihuacan seemingly alternated epochs when rulers took hold with centuries when the populace repudiated them.
Again and again, stereotyped stages and "origins of social inequality" obscure more than they reveal about prehistoric complexity. Dawn shifts focus from equality to fluidity: "If human beings, through most of our history, have moved back and forth fluidly between different social arrangements…maybe the real question should be 'how did we get stuck?'…How did we come to treat eminence and subservience not as temporary expedients…but as inescapable elements of the human condition?"
Dawn's longest chapter revisits stuckedness in "state formation." If farming and cities lasted centuries without governments, how did states arise? Wengrow and Graeber reject one-track theories, distinguishing three paths to domination: sovereignty (spectacular violence, dynastic divine kingship), information control (administrative technique, bureaucracy), and charisma (competitive conflict, conquering warlords).
Regimes that master just one path may appear state-like but exhibit decidedly weird patterns of rule. Consider the Great Sun of the Natchez, a Mississippian god-king whose word carried the power of life or death over his subjects—but only in his physical presence. The Sun's sovereignty couldn't be delegated to emissaries; his writ couldn't run past the sacred city limits. Unsurprisingly, this prompted a flight to the Natchez exurbs, where people lived prosperously, disobeyed orders, and avoided the sacred city whenever possible.
Stable state politics congealed when "second-order regimes" interlocked multiple forms of domination, keeping societies "stuck" in each—but with no predictable sequence that everyone followed. Pharaohs arose one way in Egypt; lugals commandeered Uruk in another. Modern nation-states aren't the end of "a long evolutionary process that began in the Bronze Age," just the peculiar confluence of three dominations we got stuck with, and "there was nothing inevitable about it."
This is an enormously ambitious book, evoking the grand style of Enlightenment treatises. But Dawn is never ponderous in style. Graeber and Wengrow are lively and lucid in analytical passages, and compelling narrators of archaeological interpretations. Their descriptions of lost landscapes and spectacular sites like Göbekli Tepe and Chavín de Huántar sometimes approach the lyrical.
No book so ambitious could completely avoid moments of hubris or overconfidently idiosyncratic readings of sources. How much trust you place in evocative reconstructions of silent ruins depends on your confidence in the conjectural process of archaeological interpretation. Graeber and Wengrow are forthcoming about that, frequently noting the limitations of the evidence ("Much of this remains speculative…"). But cautionary hedges sometimes vanish when earlier conjectures return to bolster later conclusions. Many interpretations are best read with a cautious eye to possibilities, probabilities, and certainties.
Dawn is at its weakest when the authors are most polemical. Their rebuttals to Pinker on prehistoric violence uncharitably discount his engagement with paleoanthropological evidence, replying with facile competing anecdotes. Elsewhere they glibly dismiss neo-Hobbesian historical outlooks as "extremely popular among billionaires but [holding] little appeal to anyone else." (Anyone?) Their handling of economic thought is sometimes tendentious and caricatured.
Dawn's archaeologically grounded discussions of trade and private property nevertheless can be thoughtful, curious, and nondogmatic. Graeber and Wengrow's view of private property's sacral origins suggests polychromatic pictures, not a single simplistic story. They're eager to dissociate agriculture from the advent of private property in land; but note their sympathetic discussion of private property's role in Yurok foragers' repudiation of slave raiding. Libertarians could profitably engage a Big History framework that takes human agency seriously as a historical force, questions the necessity of Leviathan states for complexity and technological development, and renovates Enlightenment liberties as a hopeful program for urbanized global society.
The Dawn of Everything was finished weeks before Graeber's untimely death in 2020. In the foreword, Wengrow recalls how their collaboration grew luxuriantly from a decadelong sprawling correspondence. Seeing how much was left to say, the authors "planned to write sequels; no less than three." The book we have is a worthy capstone to Graeber's work, bursting with exhilarating possibilities and provocative questions. I can only hope Wengrow will continue the conversation, despite the loss of his co-conspirator.
This article originally appeared in print under the headline "Unstuck in Deep Time.."
Editor's Note: As of February 29, 2024, commenting privileges on reason.com posts are limited to Reason Plus subscribers. Past commenters are grandfathered in for a temporary period. Subscribe here to preserve your ability to comment. Your Reason Plus subscription also gives you an ad-free version of reason.com, along with full access to the digital edition and archives of Reason magazine. We request that comments be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment and ban commenters for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please
to post comments
Unbelievable. Things got done without big government? How can that be?
Not the point.
Civilization was fine when we all understood that we all were entitled to equal results.
I’ve made so far this year and I’m a full time student. I’m using an online business opportunity I heard about and I’ve made such great money. (res25) It’s really user friendly and I’m just so happy that I found out about it. Here’s what I do.
.
For more details visit:>>>> https://brilliantfuture01.blogspot.com/
This is quite interesting. I have long been skeptical of people who claim small tribes were egalitarian or communist or lacking for property rights. Spend any time watching some of these Disco or Nat Geo channel shows where people spend months embedded in indigenous tribes, and a much different picture comes into view.
Sort of same here. The standard story always struck me as too tidy. Thought experiments led me to wonder what an alternative path would be, particularly why, if homo sapiens' Adam and Eve lived 200,000 years ago, did it take 190,000 years to develop agriculture and cities? Either humans developed the basics of agriculture a lot sooner, or the 200,000 years ago homo wasn't quite as sapiens as the current model.
Seems to me, based on the people I know, that foragers and hunters would have found good spots and settled down for spells; if you find good fishing or hunting in one spot, with wild fruit and veggies nearby, why would you move on? You'd develop seasonal camps. Good stone tool makers, good hunters, others would arise as natural leaders in their own specialties. Without pack animals, moving would mean starting over, and DNA evidence suggests horses weren't domesticate until pretty recently. That tells me people didn't move around much, preferring to keep the caves they'd found or dug out, or the shelters they'd built.
What did change was population size. As more people were born and surviving, favorite camps got crowded, new families grouped together and moved no more than a days' walk away. They'd still want to stay in touch with family and friends.
But there was still no need for political leaders. I sort of get stuck there, how to bridge the gap from settlements with tech experts being leaders in their specialty, to political leaders raising armies and inventing religion to justify their leadership. Maybe settlements got bigger, real farms developed into permanent year-round settlements, and the population got crowded enough that group thievery became a real problem; some charismatic leader with no practical skills collected a bunch of similarly lazy but greedy "friends" into raiding the farmers, so the farmers had to also band together.
Seems to me that population growth is the key, secondarily being the spread of agricultural knowledge and the collection of specialized tools (plows, hoes) making migration more troublesome and settlement easier. Eventually grain surpluses attracted animals to domesticate, the surpluses and herds made seasonal moving impossible and thievery easier, especially by parasitical groups which we now call "politicians".
But there was still no need for political leaders. I sort of get stuck there, how to bridge the gap from settlements with tech experts being leaders in their specialty,
Introduce conflict from still nomadic raiders with the now specializing agrarians. In order to fight them off some people specialize in warfare which others support with their production. Once these specialists develop their trade there's nothing to stop them from using that power to force extortionary trade within the group. As this evolves they develop morality tales to justify themselves.
See, Stationary Bandit.
Same way all pack animals do it: biggest/best fighter becomes dominant.
Read Joseph Campbell's Primitive Mythology for insight into early human societies, and the hunter-gatherer vs agrarian differences.
It's great stuff
Read it years ago, Maybe time to reread it.
Added to the cart, have a feeling it'll be every bit as 'informative' as "Guns, Germs and Steel"; not much.
See "Horses, Wheels and Language" (Anthony), below.
Diamond makes the claim that draft and riding animals were not available to those in Africa since Zebras "bite and don't let go"; a general claim regarding a group of individuals.
Anthoy suggests the same was an issue in the northern hemisphere; there has been just ONE male progeniture blood line identified in all domesticated horses.
Yes, they were nearly all obstreperous, fractious beasts, but, by effort, someone found a stallion which could be tamed.
Are we to believe that the difference in economic development between the northern and southern (old world) areas depending on finding one tamable male horse.
I do not claim to know the causes of the delta, but that sure doesn't pass the sniff test.
"Added to the cart, have a feeling it'll be every bit as 'informative' as "Guns, Germs and Steel"; not much."
It's not really fair to compare the two -- totally different takes on the human condition. I found G,G & S interesting, but not revelatory. Campbell's "Primitive Mythology" is one of four books in a series called, collectively: "The Masks of God."
"The Hero With A Thousand Faces," in my opinion, is still his most important work.
Societies don't get political leaders because they need them. They get political leaders because the bands of robbers realize it's easier to take over than to just keep raiding.
I understand all the answers related to brigands, etc. But it seems to me that only happens with a crowded population; when there's plenty of sparsely populated land, people can spread out, forage and hunt at will, and there aren't enough parasites to allow group thievery. It takes crowds to start permanent settlements and enable groups of political thugs, and that transition period is kind of a mystery to me.
I don't think you realize how difficult it is to live off the land. It is highly likely that any given tribe was constantly under pressure of not having enough food to eat. Hunts went bad. Berries were over-grazed. Even when you look at historical texts of early civilizations, they were generally one bad harvest away from famine.
When you have scarce resources, and do not have a robust trading body of knowledge, it comes down to people having to make decisions about who gets food. That is how leaders arise.
I'd modify a couple things in your statements:
1) Settling Down for Agriculture: The reason primitive tribes weren't doing a lot of agriculture was that they couldn't. Grasses (and ultimately grains) were not dropping large seeds. Before this your "harvest" was from fruits, nuts and berries, and bushes and trees required significant forethought and planning to cultivate. Many years were required for them to yield fruit.
1a) You cannot take the 'hunter' out of the hunter gatherer societies. Animals don't just sit around waiting to be eaten. Various animals migrated, which meant going where they were. And hunting pressure has a way of turning "good fishing spots" into "empty fishing spots".
"But there was still no need for political leaders."
2) Families have political leaders. Tribes have political leaders. Go check those indigenous tribes and they all have some sort of chieftain. In general I think this happens because resources are scarce, and at some point you have to make decisions of who gets which resource. Not surprisingly, the person who tends to get this Decision authority is the strongman.
Actually, chimps and hyenas have political leaders. Becoming alpha takes more than brute strength. Alliances, favoritism, and even hereditary count for as much if not more.
It's doubtful religion was invented by leaders for the explicit purpose of political control. Rather, religion probably emerged as a tradition of explanation of the natural world, and then got coopted by elites.
Maybe. But when you want to really motivate masses to follow along, you might have to craft and sell a single religious doctrine. Letting each tribe worship their favorite gods in their own ways will not get you far.
The discovery of Gobekli Tepe and it's companion sites changed everything.
Discovering that 12,000 years ago, pre-pottery hunter gatherers were coordinating large groups of people to create temple complexes with carved pillars and terrazzo floors, is like discovering someone in the 1700's built a 747.
Gobekli Tepe was a party site, like Burning Man. People got together to drink beer.
And feast. It's littered with cooked game bones.
Çatalhöyük is a similar type site that was residential.
"...like discovering someone in the 1700's built a 747."
Yeah... no. More like discovering someone in the 1500's drew a picture of an airplane (and a helicopter, of sorts).
Much of human history remains a mystery, even after the advent of written records. The fact that the people in that time and place built a permanent monument is surprising but, the fact that people then were getting together to feast, drink, trade and pray to their gods is less so. People have probably doing that for a very long time. Building a permanent structure was the great leap forward.
A few months ago I tried reading (actually, listening) to The Dawn of Everything, but gave up. Their incessant harping on inequality was just too much.
Plus, "Their rebuttals to Pinker on prehistoric violence uncharitably discount his engagement with paleoanthropological evidence, replying with facile competing anecdotes."
Rebuttals of not only Pinker but many anthropologists, and the physical data. High proportions of paleo skeletons with war wounds and bashed skulls defy any simple idealized models of peaceful, sharing communes. Not to mention that up to half of those noble people were somehow killed by others without guns.
I'm debating whether to read this book or not, and if they really do dismiss Pinker's book on violence that trivially, it makes me wonder how serious the rest is. Pinker's thesis was a slow sell; surely dismissing the two world wars, and socialism's 100 million murders, as somehow less violent than earlier periods, made no sense. But his book did make sense, he had a lot of references to back it up, especially those skeletons with so many mortal wounds you mention, and if these authors just glibly dismiss him, I'm not sure I could read their book with an open mind.
Pinker's book made sense because it was telling you a familiar story. Playing to the cheap seats IMHO.
Pinker's book was NOT telling a familiar story, it was telling a very unfamiliar story. The familiar story is "it takes a village", treating hunter-gatherer and other "indigenous" peoples as wholly non-violent until mean white people came into the picture and messed everything up. That's the "familiar story" I literally grew up with.
Hell, I remember back in the early 90s a group of researchers discovered archeological evidence that a group of native American tribes had been in a state of war and sure enough, they got pushback because there was no War until the White Man showed up!
True. Many anthropologists fervently believed the Mayans were civilized, friendly people even when evidence of their brutality started popping up.
Mostly peaceful human sacrifices.
Definitely a ground breaker. The previous paradigm of peaceful beautiful wild people always seemed a bit sus to me, denying human nature, and I was first surprised Pinker would write such a book,, second surprised he had such a solid narrative which all hung together, and third surprised he could make out the 20th century as continuing the trend.
The other familiar story that Pinker challenges is how people just know the world is going to hell, and that things are now worse than they have ever been. That might be emotionally appealing to the ignorant, and useful for Machiavellian types, but it ain't true.
The Patriarchy!
THE PATRIARCHY!
"Do you deny that women have had a hard time in history?"
"Not at all, good *checks with biologist* sir! For men have had a gravy-train cake walk, so good, so easy, that they comfortably die earlier than women, leaving behind even MORE chores and housework for them to do, the ingrates!"
Women! Wanting it both ways since sexual reproduction of multi-cellular organisms.
What happened today?
We literally sent millions of men into the meat-grinder of industrialized warfare, many of them will never return home again, and those who do will be changed forever!
Anything else?
Yes, the women were left at home with the domestic chores with no help from their selfish, self-centered men while they bask in the glory of prestige employment!
Ugh, really? God, what an awful patriarchy!
In my new book, the Ultimate, Super duper History of Everything, I discovered conclusively that no man ever cared for, loved or made accommodations for his wife or any of the women in his family or community, from paleolithic times right up until the 1960s when... ALL OF A SUDDEN, men were awakened to their patriarchal crimes against women and slowly (too slowly we've got a lot more work to do, I assure you) began the slothful, grinding process of atoning for their sins against the female of the species.
So, to sum up your position - actually reading the book is too much to ask.
I'll read Pinker's book first.
Excellent, you'll be caught up to a decade ago.
Better than mislead by NEW bullshit.
And by the way, this is classic... CLASSIC:
CLAAAAASIC. Find the exception that obliterates the rule.
This rather reminds me of the debate about a video game (if I recall) called "Kingdom Come", an immersive RPG set in 12th Century Bohemia.
Sure enough, in came the complaints: Where are the strong women of color and other BIPOCS? Score: ONE STAR!
12th... century Bohemia. Historically speaking, it was not uncommon for many people in villages to never wander far outside of their villages and even seeing a STRANGER on the road could sometimes be unsettling. But... SURE ENOUGH half-baked Twitter historians proved that THERE WERE IN FACT accounts of black people wandering about in 12th Century Bohemia... so the game failed because it should have been chock-a-block with black folks!
How can we pre order your seminal work?
I see what you did there. 🙂
See "War Before Civilization" by Lawrence Keeley.
I greatly enjoyed this book. While I did notice some of the thinner conjectures (hard not to) and the attitudes of the writers showing through, I viewed it as a healthy eye-poking. Some of these long-held anthropological shibboleths need a good poke in the eye.
Stationary people are easier to conquer and control.
Nomadic people can just move out of the way.
Hunter gatherers tend to be better fighters too -- they hunt for a living and are skilled with weapons, and they are used to skirmishing with other bands of hunter gatherers.
"Nomadic people can just move out of the way."
Until they encroach on the territory of another group of hunter-gatherers, who will try to kill them for invading their land. If there are no other tribes in the area, there is probably no viable source of food either. So, it's death either way.
"patriarchy, standing armies, mass executions, and annoying bureaucrats demanding that we spend much of our lives filling in forms."
"Patriarchy"? Really? This is how we begin our thesis? And "Patriarchy" is at the head of the table?
Seems like chicks have been telling me what to do since I made my way out of the womb. Right up to my GPS telling me where to go. Missed out on that patriarchy completely.
I’ll have to read this book. Prehistoric times couldn’t have all been about cave people. I always figured that between the time when the ocean drank Atlantis and the rise of the sons of Aryas there was an age untold of.
Contemplate this on the Tree of Woe.
"The Dawn of Everything" is a biased disingenuous account of human history (www.persuasion.community/p/a-flawed-history-of-humanity ) that spreads fake hope (the authors of "The Dawn" claim human history has not "progressed" in stages, or linearly, and must not end in inequality and hierarchy as with our current system... so there's hope for us now that it could get different/better again). As a result of this fake hope porn it has been widely praised. It conveniently serves the profoundly sick industrialized world of fakes and criminals. The book's dishonest fake grandiose title shows already that this work is a FOR-PROFIT, instead a FOR-TRUTH, endeavor geared at the (ignorant gullible) masses.
Fact is human history has "progressed" by and large in linear stages, especially since the dawn of agriculture (www.focaalblog.com/2021/12/22/chris-knight-wrong-about-almost-everything ). This "progress" has been fundamentally destructive and is driven and dominated by “The 2 Married Pink Elephants In The Historical Room” (www.rolf-hefti.com/covid-19-coronavirus.html ) which the fake hope-giving authors of "The Dawn" entirely ignore naturally (no one can write a legitimate human history without understanding the nature of humans). And these two married pink elephants are the reason why we've been "stuck" in a destructive hierarchy and unequal class system (the "stuck" question, "how did we get stuck?," is the major question in "The Dawn" its authors never answer, predictably), and will be far into the foreseeable future.
A good example that one of the authors, Graeber, has no real idea what world we've been living in and about the nature of humans is his last brief article on Covid where his ignorance shines bright already at the title of his article, “After the Pandemic, We Can’t Go Back to Sleep.” Apparently he doesn't know that most people WANT to be asleep, and that they've been wanting that for thousands of years (and that's not the only ignorant notion in the title) --- see last cited source above. Yet he (and his partner) is the sort of person who thinks he can teach you something authentically truthful about human history and whom you should be trusting along those terms. Ridiculous!
"The Dawn" is just another fantasy, or ideology, cloaked in a hue of cherry-picked "science," served lucratively to the gullible ignorant underclasses who crave myths and fairy tales.
"The evil, fake book of anthropology, “The Dawn of Everything,” ... just so happened to be the most marketed anthropology book ever. Hmmmmm." --- Unknown
I agree with you but, I would make one point.
"Gullible ignorant underclasses" don't do a lot of reading, generally, and what they do read isn't this sort of high-minded twaddle.
This book is squarely aimed at the gullible, ignorant upper-middle classes of the sort that go to college to study feminist ideology and queer theory. It panders to all their stupid notions that result from living thoroughly sheltered lives. The phrase that best suits them is: educated but not smart.
Found the book unreadable; one of perhaps five on all the shelves not completed. It's telling that one of the authors taught at London School of Economics and the book in general seems an attempt to revivify communism by several means: suggesting that our lack of detailed knowledge of much of human existence might mean 'other forms of organization' (hint, hint - communism) might have been successful; offering a fig leaf of 'diversity' (read 'non-white'), suggesting it originated in the new world prior to 1492.
Oh, and the definition of the word seems a bit flexible.
Rousseau's quote, is offered approvingly:
"The first man, having enclosed a piece of land, though or saying, 'This is mine', and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. How many crimes, wears and murders, how much misery and horror the human race would have been spared if someone had pulled up the stakes and filled in the ditch and cried out to his fellow men: 'Beware of listening to this imposter. You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to everyone...'
Read "The Horse, the Wheel and Language" (Anthony) for history backed by archeological finds and the logic of what they suggest about human social development rather than an agenda supported by cherry-picked data.
No, personal property is not evil; no, it did not come about when someone arbitrarily bounded some land. But, yes, property and the actual markets of those goods (not the lefty parody of a "Market") presented in "The Dawn...") seem to have provided the foundation upon which civilization developed.
"A New History of Humanity?"
More like "A History of Humans Fucking Up."
When I hear about a new non-fiction book being widely discussed that might be of interest to me I often check out the author's twitter account if any. You get a good sense of people's biases, (mis)use of evidence, how they deal with complexity in news/policy, ability to spot flaws in their own arguments, obvious blindspots, etc. David Graeber and David Wengrow's accounts were enough for me to suspect that Dawn of Everything was going to be a mess with limited evidence stretched beyond the breaking point to support theories they needed to believe in for their current political ideologies/activism. I admit to not finishing the book either which is rare for me but given the sloppy evidence, arguments, and activist nature of the text I didn't see the point. If you are going to title your book "The Dawn of Everything" and attempt to explain the origin of inequality and how the current sociopolitical system gained dominance then you'd better have command of all applicable evidence and not resort to ignoring or excusing away inconvenient facts. The authors wave away a great deal of complexity by basically saying "people chose to do something else" which ignores known reasons why a particular "choice" wasn't really optional and instead was a logical reaction to changing circumstances.