Civil Resistance and Security Studies
In a guest post at The Monkey Cage, Erica Chenoweth of Wesleyan's Program on Terrorism and Insurgency Research asks her field to pay closer attention to nonviolent conflict:
It is time for security studies to take nonviolent conflict seriously, and to incorporate such episodes and their dynamics into the canonical literature.
In fact, many of the concepts and strategic dynamics that dominate in the security studies literature are perfectly compatible with those discussed in the literature on nonviolent conflict. For instance, a key for any actor in an asymmetric conflict is to attack the opponent at its weakest point and, if possible, to create divisions within the opponent. Ivan Arreguin-Toft argues weaker powers can do this by adopting indirect (or "guerrilla") strategies against stronger opponents that use direct (or "conventional") strategies. Gil Merom and Robert Pape have made the argument that democracies are particularly susceptible to challenges by violent non-state actors, because they create unsustainable divisions within democracies. But few have directly compared how nonviolent challenges would line up compared with violent ones, because most of the security studies literature assumes that the most forceful, effective means of waging political struggle entails the threat or use of violence.
The same concept of attacking the opponent at its weakest point applies to nonviolent conflicts, except that I would argue that nonviolent mass movements are actually superior at undermining regime opponents through asymmetric approaches. This is not because of the "moral high ground," but rather because their reliance on nonviolent resistance confounds their opponents, whose usual response to internal challenge is to use force. As Qaddafi's response to the Libyan uprising shows, many dictators are willing to use force against nonviolent protestors; however, this is seldom costless for these dictators. They usually pay a major price in the form of loyalty shifts among security forces or civilian bureaucrats, who are more likely to defect to a nonviolent opposition--especially one that appears to represent diverse constituencies within the country--than to a violent campaign, where their survival is not assured.
Read the whole thing here. More from Reason on nonviolent conflict here. My most recent interview with Gene Sharp, the best-known scholar on the subject, is here.
[Via Jay Ulfelder.]
