We can only hope that with sufficient wisdom and a lot of good luck, our Iraq editorial will get this right; if so, it would truly be stunning
A Nov. 6 New York Times editorial makes you wonder whether editorial writers read their own newspaper. The editors praised the decision last week of the United States and the ruling coalition in Iraq to invite "mostly Sunni Arab junior officers of Saddam Hussein's disbanded military to enlist in Iraq's new national army." The editorial describes the move as "historically stunning" and necessary to "try to undo as much of [former U.S. proconsul in Iraq Paul] Bremer's disastrous decision [to disband the Iraqi army] as possible, as one element in a broader effort to reintegrate the deeply estranged Sunni Arab community into the nation's military, political and professional life."
It was so stunning a move, apparently, that the editors missed that Bremer had, on April 23, 2004, "reached out to officials of the old regime–and offered a faster way to rebuild the Iraqi army, disbanded by Mr. Bremer a year ago–by reinstating many of the "honorable men" who had served as senior officers in Mr. Hussein's army." At least that's how the New York Times put it. Indeed, the paper went on to say at the time:
The Baathist rehabilitation plan is a major rollback of a policy aimed at purging the Iraqi government of members of Saddam Hussein's former governing party. The change represents a sharp split with the American-appointed Iraqi Governing Council. The Americans are breaking in particular with Ahmad Chalabi, a former exile, who is now the council member in charge of the purges.
Bremer's shift, like the one last week, involved reinstating mostly Sunni officers. Of course, one can limply defend the Times by arguing that in 2004, according to a U.S. military spokesman, the policy change involved only senior army officers, including generals and full colonels, whereas the latest invite supposedly involves "junior officers." Perhaps, but that distinction is not the gist of the editorial–in fact it's not even mentioned–nor are we left much the wiser about how successful Bremer's initial reversal of course was. The question the editors should have asked, but didn't, is whatever happened to that earlier policy? Or, do Sunnis today actually want to rejoin an army that is increasingly controlled by Shiites? And of what value is a national army in the context of an increasingly federal Iraq, where regional governments will have greater power?
Instead, what we get are these wilting closing lines:
We can only hope that the encouraging shift that produced last week's plea to ex-soldiers runs deep enough and lasts long enough to divert Iraq from imminent civil war toward constructive, democratic nation-building. With sufficient wisdom and a lot of good luck, it is not necessarily too late for Iraqis to salvage something positive from their long ordeal of dictatorship, war, invasion and occupation.
We can only hope? With sufficient wisdom and a lot of good luck? Not necessarily? If waffling were a sport, the Times' editors would be awash in gold. The common man must pay a stiff fee to excavate from the paper's archive, but not the editors. Doing so might have helped determine if Bremer's reinstatement policy actually worked. If it did work, it was worth a mention, though it would have made the latest development much less "stunning." If it did not work, then the policy reversal last week has all the makings of a dud, and the Times looks incredibly naive. Instead of solid information, though, we get an editorial written with one hand on the keyboard and the other on an Ouija board.
