Missing the Point in Iraq

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Mickey Kaus and Andrew Sullivan are still going at each other over the real meaning of the Iraqi election on Sunday. In a way, however, I feel that the issue entirely missed by most U.S.-based pundits is that that they are focusing on how the election, particularly the participation level, will affect America's interests in Iraq.

Witness this typical question put to Sullivan by Christopher Matthews (as highlighted by Kaus):

MATTHEWS: [snip] Does they war in Iraq increase or decrease American power in pushing democracy in other countries? Nine of you say Iraq hurts, three say it helps the president's chances of achieving his goals in the world.

Andrew, you say it helps. A bloody war helps us sell…

SULLIVAN: Of course it helps. When we see, as we will, see ordinary Iraqis voting for the first time to forge their own destiny in the future, it's going to be an extraordinary moment.

Or:

MATTHEWS: But if you polled Iran, would it be hostile to America?

KLEIN: They're overwhelming faithful.

SULLIVAN: No, it would be overwhelmingly positive towards the United States…

MATTHEWS: Would it be?

SULLIVAN: …and that's the other point about Iraqi democracy. The signal it will send to Iran, which is our real enemy right now, will be enormously helpful. I'm a--I'm a complete optimist about this. I think it'll--I think it'll work.

This focus on the U.S. seems to me basically irrelevant to gauging a successful election or not. The real issue is how the Iraqis, who don't give a damn about how the whole thing plays out in Kalamazoo, will interpret their election--I repeat, their election. How many Iraqis vote is far less important than the fact that a truly Iraqi parliament will emerge from the process to write a constitution (which will indeed spur the "insurgents" to escalate their bloodletting, since nothing worries them more than the threat of a potentially legitimate Iraqi--not U.S.-appointed--authority).

Yes, Sunni participation is an important issue, but not in the way people presume. If a post-election regime can shape a compromise system that gives all Iraqi communities a stake in the new political order, then two things may well happen: the aftereffects of a low participation level may soon be erased by the more urgent matter of communal compromise; and the fearful Sunnis may begin disagreeing with themselves over how to deal with the new authority. Already there are several reports of Sunni election boycotters who have made it clear they intend to negotiate with a new post-election parliament and regime. America, for them, is completely secondary at this stage.

I partly tried to make this argument in the Daily Star, here.