Duck and Cover

Getting weary of such ripped-from-the-headlines fears as bioterror and airline hijackings? This article from the New York Press will bring a pleasing frisson of nostalgia for old fears, like a planet-destroying U.S./Russian nuke exchange. The story is very long. Here are some excerpts that sum up its various contentions:

Against a backdrop of nuclear proliferation, both Russia and the U.S. continue to maintain and refine their own arsenals. They are also lowering the thresholds for their use. As Washington pushes forward with missile defense and a bonus round of NATO expansion, Russian generals are bristling, while Russia?s command and control system continues to deteriorate, increasing the chance that misjudgment, error or sabotage could trigger a missile launch against, say, New York City, which is still targeted for a couple hundred megatons. According to those analysts who never took their eyes off the nuclear threat, the danger of a missile exchange between U.S. and Russia is actually greater today than during the more stable periods of the Cold War.

Last week, Russia held a wide-ranging exercise simulating a nuclear war with America. Old Soviet Tu-160 strategic bombers launched cruise missiles over the North Atlantic and ICBMs were tested over Russia?s far northern region. Military satellites were launched under simulation battlefield conditions, and Russia?s beleaguered early warning system was put through the ringer.
…..
Call it the dirty little open secret of nuclear planning: Neither Russia nor the U.S. ever stopped viewing preparation for war against the other as the central organizing principle of its nuclear policy. February?s extensive war game wasn?t Russia?s first such drill since the end of the Cold War, and the U.S. military performs similar drills annually.
…..
The dangers of keeping nuclear forces on a high-alert, launch-on-warning footing were real enough during the Cold War, when U.S. and Russian command and control systems were reliable and followed a strict line of authority. This is no longer the case. Not only do Russian generals today have the power to launch Russian missiles independent of their political masters, Russia?s ability to accurately detect incoming missiles has eroded badly since the early 90s, adding to Russian insecurity and increasing the likelihood that confusing radar data could lead to a nuclear launch order.

The most famous example of this danger occurred on Jan. 25, 1995, when Norway launched a weather research rocket to explore the Northern Lights phenomenon. When Russia?s radars picked up the missile trajectory, it seemed to have been fired from a U.S. submarine in the Norwegian Sea?long suspected by the Russians as a likely first move in a U.S. surprise attack. Russian nuclear forces scrambled into position and bunker commanders inserted their launch keys, awaiting the order to turn them. Yeltsin, reportedly fuming drunk at the time, opened his nuclear briefcase and consulted with the frenzied General Staff. With their nerves screaming, together they watched the missile trajectory slowly turn away from any conceivable Russian target. When the crisis finally ended, they had less than two minutes to make a decision. (U.S. submarine-launched missiles can reach Moscow in 10 minutes.)
…..
Of the technology that makes up Russia?s early warning system, an estimated 60 percent is past its service life. Most worrisome of all, Russia?s global radar coverage?think of the "big board" in Dr. Strangelove?has deteriorated to the point where it is only fully operational between eight and 16 hours per day, leaving enormous holes in Russia?s view of what is happening in its air space and over U.S. missile silos.
…..
Meanwhile, America?s command and control system has its own problems. The network connecting U.S. launch centers to its Minuteman missiles is still in some cases powered by Eisenhower-era computers. Nor are the U.S. launch systems foolproof. In 1979, a training tape simulating a Russian surprise attack somehow made its way into the real system at the U.S. Strategic Air Command inside Cheyenne Mountain. Luckily, the officer in charge that day suspected the mistake and tracked it down. More recently, according to Bruce Blair, a classified Pentagon study found a back door into a military radio network that could be exploited to transmit phony launch orders.
…..
Russian hypersensitivity about U.S. intentions doesn?t exist in a vacuum. While the paranoia and bitterness at the highest levels of the Russian military are partly a result of history and disposition, U.S. policy can modulate how this paranoia and bitterness translates into policy.

In 1991, a recently retired member of the General Staff named General Yuriy Kirshin gave a talk in Washington, DC, in which he discussed the dilemma of overwhelming U.S. power in the face of Russian weakness. "The most important thing the U.S. can do to contribute to world peace," he said, "[is] convince the [Russian] General Staff that the U.S. does not want to conquer the world."
…..
The Iraq invasion, President Bush?s stream of imperial white papers, NATO?s imminent "big bang" and plans to develop a new generation of bunker-busting "mini-nukes" have all quickened the pattern in which U.S. policy sweats up the palms of an already nervous and distrustful Russian General Staff, not to mention the rest of the world. Cap it off with the recent announcement that the number of interceptors in the U.S. national missile defense system will be doubled while a new generation of nuclear weapons is pursued, and one is forgiven for wondering if anybody at the Pentagon or the White House has any appreciation of how foreign threat perception can adversely affect U.S. national security.
…..
That the nuclear firewall is being lowered even before it is breached is evident in Russia?s evolving nuclear doctrine as well. The Russians have made it clear that they now reserve the right to use nuclear weapons even in the face of conventional threats. This is a post-Cold War development for both countries.
…..
The Bush administration?s disdain for meaningful arms control measures even spreads into a lack of concern for securing Russia?s nuclear materials from sabotage and theft, a crucial component of any honestly fought "war on terror." The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, created to help the countries of the former U.S.S.R. guard and destroy nuclear materials, is viewed by the White House and the Republican majority in Congress as just another liberal foreign aid program; its funding was slashed in the 2003 budget. Former senator Sam Nunn, one of the program?s creators, is currently out raising his own private funds to implement the program.

Comments

[Umbriel]

Not only is the article laden with inflamatory rhetoric (as cited by Roger Sweeny) but I note a certain sloppiness with facts -- While some Tu-160s are over 20 years old by now, they're still pretty advanced (essentially a copy of our B-1 http://www.flankerman.fsnet.co.uk/tu-160.html ), and referring to them in passing as "old Tu-160s" is a little unfairly dismissive.

"...New York City, which is still targeted for a couple hundred megatons." I find it hard to believe the Soviets/Russians would be so wasteful with their targeting. Multiple warheads of 200-400 kiloton yields would be the likely weapons targeting a "soft" target like a metropolitan area. Even if one included refineries, airports, and satellite cities like Newark in the "New York" area, it shouldn't take more than a couple dozen such warheads to cover everything adequately. That would total less than 10 megatons.

A lack of attention to geeky technical detail always makes me wonder what other corners the author cut in fact checking.

I'm also skeptical about the traditional "Fail Safe" scenario of "You blew up our city! Now we have to blow up one (or more) of yours!" While a knee-jerk counterstrike is possible, I think enormous political benefits would accrue to the victim of an accidental strike if they responded with restraint and the proper tone of martyrdom.

[Kevin Carson]

The problem with both ballistic missiles and anti-missile defenses are that both are likely to be extremely unreliable under real-world conditions.

The US and Russia both test missiles under extremely controlled conditions, with the white suit guys going over the missile with a fine-toothed comb to make sure everything is in perfect working order. The official "reliability" figure for a particular weapon is established on the basis of tests conducted under such conditions. In a mass launch, they are likely to fail more often than not. In addition, their guidance systems have not been adjusted to compensate for the unique electromagnetic field patterns over each individual trajectory. So regardless of official CEP, they are likely to be so far off target as to be useless against hardened targets.

As for anti-missile sytems, the military tests them under conditions stacked to produce a success, because there's so much money at stake for the contractors and the R&D and procurement bureaucracies. For example, when testing a sytem against a MIRVed missile with lots of dummy warheads, they give the "real" warheads distinguishing features to fix the test; I doubt the Russians would be so helpful.

[Dan]

As for anti-missile sytems, the military tests them under conditions stacked to produce a success, because there's so much money at stake for the contractors and the R&D and procurement bureaucracies.

You're spinning a basic R&D strategy as a military-industrial-complex conspiracy to bilk money from the taxpayers.

New systems, regardless of what kind -- cars, software, aircraft, microwaves, whatever -- are always tested under ideal circumstances before they are tested under field conditions. The reason for this is glaringly obvious, if you stop to think about it: until you've perfected the system enough that it can perform as desired in an "ideal" environment, there's no point in introducing lots of extra random variables. So (for example) first you try shooting down missiles that have homing beacons attached to them. Then you try shooting down missiles with known flight paths, but no homing beacons. Then you try shooting down missiles with unknown flight paths... etc.

[grylliade]

Not only that, but I for one would rather have a highly imperfect defense in place than none at all. A 2 % chance of survival is light years better than a 0.001 % chance. I've always liked the characterization of mutual assured destruction as two boys in a pool of gasoline with lit matches, watching for the other to drop his match. Can't remember who said it (Arthur C. Clarke?), but surely some form of defense would make sense, even given the changing political reality. Even if the terrorists are more likely to deliver the bomb by truck rather than missle, shouldn't we make sure they can't deliver it by missile? Why not close as many avenues as practical?

[Frank]

>>While a knee-jerk counterstrike is possible, I >>think enormous political benefits would accrue >>to the victim of an accidental strike if they >>responded with restraint and the proper tone of >>martyrdom.

Knee-jerk counterstrike? Most people properly characterize this as the proper function of the military.

Yes, the American electorate (and the opposition party) would be VERY understanding of an administration that didn't wipe out an enemy who erased tens of millions of American lives.

What fools we were to miss out on the enormous political benefits of failing to respond to the 9/11 attacks.

[bennett]

I enjoyed the first half of the article. But the farther I read, I noticed that my bullshit meter started to go off. The whole thing started boiling down to the author's ultimate argument, which was in order to be safer we need to make ourselves weaker. Nice example of "doublespeak".

[Jean Bart]

Umbriel,

At one point it was Soviet military doctrine to target areas like New York in such a way; they did not feel that their weapons systems were reliable enough not to do so, and they thought it made people "frightened."

[Jean Bart]

Dan,

So far, the ratcheting up of difficulty you describe has not occurred; indeed, there are engineers and scientists associated with such R&D projects which argue that America lacks the technical ability (and will for many years or decades) to create a credible anti-ballistic missile system.

[Umbriel]

Frank --

I don't think the "proper function" of the military is the mere extraction of blood vengence. The US response to 9/11, fears of the pacifist left to the contrary, was not simply to go out and blow away 3,000+ A-rabs in a tit-for-tat -- it was to support Afghan insurgents in destroying the Taliban government which sheltered and supported Al Qaeda.

My point with regard to political benefit was that, faced with a clearly accidental attack, it would make more sense to seek to exact political concessions rather than to incinerate a few hundred thousand or million clueless Russians and feed a nuclear blood feud.

Even if the attack was intentional, I suspect there would be political benefits to restraint. While a retaliatory strike to demonstrate US unwillingness to back down might be called for, I doubt it would be targeted simply to amass a comparable pile of bodies. The risk of escalation might make other options attractive, such as precision conventional (or low yield nuclear) strikes against the leadership responsible for the original attack, support for dissident elements in Russia opposed to the warmongering lunatics who dared risk nuclear war, etc.

Jean Bart--

I've long suspected the potential for inaccuracy that Kevin Carson pointed out above. No ICBM has ever really been test-fired over the pole under conditions resembling actual use, after all. While I gather a certain amount of overkill would be planned in, I doubt that it would ever be twenty plus fold. And remember that while there might be a certain intimidation value to /claiming/ massive overkill, the Soviets were under no obligation to actually implement it. No one under conditions of all-out war would likely care or be impressed by how many times the Soviets churned the rubble over.

[Dan]

So far, the ratcheting up of difficulty you describe has not occurred

If you'll please bother to actually read what I wrote, you'll note that I said that the "ratcheting up of difficulty" should only take place once the "non-difficult" tests are regularly successful. Current missile defense tests still regularly fail, even under ideal circumstances. Also note that the military has, over the past few years, begun classifying test details, so it will likely be impossible to say with any accuracy when the tests begin to grow more difficult and "realistic". It is possible, if unlikely, that it has already happened.

indeed, there are engineers and scientists associated with such R&D projects which argue that America lacks the technical ability (and will for many years or decades) to create a credible anti-ballistic missile system.

If you're trying to say that some people say it's impossible, I agree; some people do say that. If you're trying to claim that there's a consensus, or even a noteworthy minority opinion, among "engineers and scientists" associated with missile defense R&D that the technology is impossible in the near term -- well, I'm sorry, but that's not the case.

In any case, if we lack the technological capacity to produce an effective missile defense system -- which is, of course, possible, though by no means demonstrable -- we will achieve such technological capacity much faster if we're actively pushing for it than we will if we just stand around waiting. We undeniably lacked the technology to produce nuclear weapons in 1940; we wouldn't have had it in 1945, either, if we hadn't actively tried to produce one.

Umbriel - the USSR (and USA, last I heard) follow a policy of "overkill" not because they want to "churn the rubble over", or because they're worried about electromagnetic interference, but in case some of the silos get taken out in a first strike; enough of a threat must remain to guarantee the annihilation of the other country.

It's a moot point, anyway; even if every single ICBM went wildly off course and splashed impotently into the ocean, the bomber and sub fleets -- which don't use ICBMs -- could wipe out Russia. And the technology used in sub-launched missiles *has* been tested, numerous times, under field conditions.

[thoreau]

I have deep skepticism about the feasibility of missile defense. Before I explain, let me make an aside on ideology:

When I watch pundits on TV debate missile defense, any pundit who happens to favor Democrats is suddenly a technical expert who simply knows for certain that these technical obstacles will NEVER be overcome. And any pundit who happens to favor Republicans is suddenly an expert engineer who knows for certain that we'll overcome these technical obstacles tomorrow. Simply amazing how ideology trumps technical expertise.

Here's why I doubt it: Any defensive system can be overwhelmed by throwing more forces at it. It might take a LOT more forces to overwhelm, but it can be done. In the case of missile defense, enemies who can't afford to or don't know how to build countermeasures can instead just build more missiles. The end result may be an arms race.

Now, that could be said of any weapons system, to be sure. But it appears that the cost side will favor our enemies, in that defensive measures will be more expensive for us than new missiles will be for them. OK, maybe not small rogue nations, but I assume that a small rogue nation will deliver its nuclear weapons via car or boat, not ICBM.

When the situation is such that a new defensive weapons system is more costly than the measures to overwhelm it, the rational approach is to ask 2 questions:

1) Would deterrence via an overwhelming offense be cheaper?
2) If we still want to pursue this idea, might it make sense to develop successive generations of prototypes but postpone for a few (technological) generations the massive expenditures needed to deploy the weapons? i.e. make a handful of defensive weapons from each new generation and test them, but don't make and deploy the hundreds or thousands needed to defend the US until we have a more reliable system in place, and in the interim work on the deterrence side of the equation.

Now, before anybody assumes I'm just a pacifist and pessimist, let me make 2 points not normally made by foes of missile defense:

1) Missile defense, if feasible, would be the most progressive step in the history of warfare. Here would be a weapon that is only used to destroy weapons, not soldiers or cities. So I hope my technological worries are wrong.

2) Contrary to popular belief, it is actually possible to develop missile defense systems, as a simple statistical argument will show. The only problem is that it may be prohibitively expensive.

Say that we use missiles to shoot down missiles, or lasers to shoot down missiles, or whatever. Say that each shot fired has only a modest 1% success rate. Well, we can turn that 1% success rate into something much higher simply by firing multiple shots at each incoming missile. This simply means we need LOTS of lasers or LOTS of missiles, in order to increase the probability of a successful hit.

This is in stark contradiction to those who say "Nope, can't be done." The real question is "Can it be done at a given price tag?" If the price tag is too high, then deterrence and other measures become more attractive.

The problem is that our enemies can reduce the number of shots we fire per incoming ICBM, simply by increasing the number of incoming ICBMs, and by using decoys. Sure, even with decoys we'll still get some of the real ones, and some of the ones getting by will be decoys. But if your goal is to maximize the number of live warheads that DO get through, rather than minimize the number that DON'T get through, then decoys make sense.

[Frank]

Umbriel -

>>I don't think the "proper function" of the military is the mere extraction of blood vengence.

Who says the retaliation would be designed to extract "blood vengeance?" Why would the target of retaliation would be a civilian site rather than ICBM launch sites -- with the idea being the prevention of additional "accidents?"

>>My point with regard to political benefit was that, faced with a clearly accidental attack, it would make more sense to seek to exact political concessions

Enforceable how...without resort to retaliation?

>>The risk of escalation might make other options attractive, such as precision conventional (or low yield nuclear) strikes against the leadership responsible for the original attack,

I see. Of course, this type of response wouldn't lead to an escalation of exchange...

>>would make more sense to seek to exact political concessions rather than to incinerate a few hundred thousand or million clueless Russians

I should have typed "wipe out the enemy's capacity for military action" rather than "wipe out the enemy." My bad.

>>Even if the attack was intentional, I suspect there would be political benefits to restraint

Gossamer webs of purest speculation here...

Frank

[kuros]

Great article and probably one of the few places you will see a discussion about it. But who cares ? Were going to Mars!

[Jean Bert]

Well, the U.S. is not the only country pursuing and developing new generations of nuclear weapons: the U.K., France and Israel all have new generations of nuclear missile systems that are more powerful, have greater striking range, etc. The nuclear arms race has stopped for no one.

[Ghost of Petr Beckmann]

Know nukes!

[chthus]

This seems to indicate that attempts to develop a functional missile defense system is not the huge waste of time and money some have claimed it to be.

Yes there will be many failures and seemingly wasted money along the way, but if the difference is one day waking up to find a US city destroyed by an accidentally (or otherwise) launched Russian nuke versus waking up to find a Russian nuke has been destroyed relatively harmlessly in flight, the monetary cost could run pretty fucking high before it wouldn't be worth it.

It is possible that this article is overstating the risk, but given the proliferation of Russian nukes and the somewhat shoddy oversight they shown post-CCCP, it isn't likely by much.

[hey]

us missile defence protects russia...

since if they accidentally or erroneously launch and its is stopped, we don't need to eliminate them..

stupid "peaceniks" hate the world and want it dead

[dan]

Duck and cover! Duck and cover!
That is the A Bomb drill.

Stop, drop and roll is the fire safety mantra taught to kids today. But in the bad ol' days we baby boomers were drilled to Duck and Cover, like that would prevent one from being cooked to a crisp.

Kids today.....

[Roger Sweeny]

I would be more inclined to take this article seriously if it didn't include things like, "President Bush?s stream of imperial white papers" and "The Bush administration?s disdain for meaningful arms control measures."

The Bush administration has not done nearly enough to get rid of all the aging and superfluous nukes out there. But then neither did Clinton or Bush I. I fear this kind of rhetoric doesn't help.

[chthus]

While duck and cover may not save you from being burned to a crisp if you are close enough to ground zero, it isn't useless. Given that somewhere between burned-to-a-crisp zone and no-structural-damage-to-buildings zone is the blast-the-windows-in zone. Duck and cover just might save you from glass in your eye. Sorry if I used the less than technical terminology.

[Trey]

Check this out for a sobering read on why we might have too many nuclear weapons.
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2004/jf04/jf04eden.html

[Shannon Love]

It's a major mistake to believe that one can control the perceptions of others. The more insular the organization the more likely it is that its perceptions are driven by internal imperatives and not on a empirical evidence. It seldom matters what the external agents actually do, the organization will interpret the actions to fit their preconceptions.

Attempts to ameliorate an opponents fears and appear less threatening will be perceived as an indication of fear and weakness. "Look," the internal analysis will say, "we scared them into making concession. If we are more aggressive we will get even more." Taking the opposite tack of appearing powerful will be perceived as aggression requiring the same response.

In this particular case, we see a military subcomponent looking for a threat in order to justify its existence and a strong psychological need for national greatness. I very much doubt the policies of any external agent will influence those imperatives very much.

[Shannon Love]

dan,

Although roundly mocked by the historically ignorant today, duck and cover drill made sense given the level of threat presented by the Soviets in 50's and early 60's. Defense planners of that day faced a threat of hundreds, not tens of thousands of nuclear weapons delivered primarily by bombers or relatively inaccurate primitive ballistic missiles. People outside the immediate zone of total destruction stood an excellent chance of surviving especially if they had even minimum protection from fallout.

It wasn't until the late 60's-early 70's that the numbers and size of weapons reached the point were a war could wreck the entire ecosystem and make long term survival of even those far removed from the actual detonation unlikely. At that point duck and cover drills and fallout shelters fell out favor.

[Brian Doherty]

Indeed, "stop, drop, and roll" is absolutely the wrong safety phrase. I have no idea what I was thinking. I've retitled the entry to the more appropriate "duck and cover"

[Randall Loffelmacher]

Well put Shannon. I like it when the options are spelled out in such a succinct fashion.

[Randall Loffelmacher]

Well put Shannon. I like it when the options are spelled out in such a succinct fashion.

[Kevin Carson]

thoreau,

Missile defense isn't necessarily a progressive development. A missile defense that is genuinely effective against low-level attacks could be used as a component of a first-strike strategy, to degrade the enemy's second-strike. The knowledge that a potential enemy has a missile defense system that could be used as part of such a first-strike could, rationally, lead to some undesirable responses. One might be an offensive-defensive arms race, to guarantee that a surviving second-strike force could still saturate the enemy's defense; the other, and more scary, response would be to adopt a more trigger-happy posture, including more serious consideration of preemptive attack in a crisis period, to avoid being the victim of a first-strike.

That's why missile defense is potentially so destabilizing.

[Nemo Ignotus]

Considering the way that the most recent Russian "anti-terrorism" (where the terrorists apparently have the same exact capabilities as the United States) exercise has gone, I'm not terrified.

For those of you not in the know, Putin boarded a Typhoon ballistic missile sub and went to sea as part of the exercise. While he watched, another sub's attempt to launch ballistic missiles failed.

If Russia ever launches their missiles at the US, I suspect it would be more likely that half of them will blow up on the lauch pad, and the other half will be lucky if they have a CEP of 1000 miles. (I'm a bit more confident in US missiles, though, as one commentator here has already noted, the testing of them gives us no clue how they'd actually perform in wartime conditions).

John Le Carre's description from the book Russia House is still true: the West has nothing to fear. The Russian knight is dead in his armor.

[Jean Bart]

thoreau,

Excellent post. 🙂

[wade]

with nuclear weapons, like guns, the fewer of them are lying around the less chance there is of someone getting hurt.

[Umbriel]

Frank --

I don't think we're as far afield as you think here. My original theme was simply that most discussion of accidental nuclear launches I've heard seems to accept unquestioningly the "Fail Safe" scenario of a nuclear eye for an eye/city for a city. I think the reality would likely be more nuanced, depending on the global political conditions and precise circumstances of the attack. More generalized pronouncements about what we or they would or wouldn't do are indeed gossamer speculation.