Dean's Desperation

How desperate is Howard Dean? He's willing to state the obvious about politicians in these United States to a crowd in Manchester, New Hampshire:

"Listen to what they say. You can have middle-class tax cuts. You can have health care for every American … you can help every American go to college. Do you believe that?"

Too bad that Dean he fails to follow up his inarguable insight that the feds can't do everything with a message about leaner government. Especially in a time when a teetotaling Republican president is spending money like a drunken sailor, there's room for a candidate who is "fiscally conservative" and "socially liberal," as Dean used to tout himself early on. Instead, he now yammers on about increasing taxes and "reregulating" everything from the media to the economy.

Update: I've corrected my spelling of teetotaler. Thanks to the several readers who not only pointed out my error, but went the extra mile to shame me given my educational background. I should add that as someone who has been derided in the past as an "apologist for stupefaction," I am that much more embarrassed.

Comments

[Jason Ligon]

Nice serial killer look, joe.

[Xrlq]

“Socially liberal” is a nice, squishy phrase that means different things to different people. Libertarians say it to mean “leave everyone alone,” but I’m not the population as a whole understands it that way. Some – most, I suspect – read it to mean “ban handguns, support affirmative action, end the death penalty, and generally act like a liberal Democrat on every issue except the ones that require a massive tax increase.”

[Jason Ligon]

XRlg:

I think you have it. That is exactly how my socially liberal sister understands the term, for example. Raise taxes on rich people to ease the suffering of their fellow man would be the condensed version, but ban handguns is definitely in there somewhere, too now that I think about it.

[joe]

Jason,

pUt The bOtTlE in tHe gOdDaMn BAsKet!

[Chris Howell]

Saying that Bush is spending money like a drunken sailer insults drunken sailors…and all sailors, come to think of it.

[Milty]

Sadly, most people who say they are “socially liberal” are also fiscally liberal.

As much as it pains me, there are very few people who are really in the “socially liberal – fiscally conservative” quadrant.

http://politicalcompass.org/

[thoreau]

On the issue of social liberalism, maybe a better term would be cultural liberalism.

Say that, for the sake of gross simplicity, we take all domestic issues that aren’t primarily economic and lump them into one batch. I know, I know, it isn’t a perfect way to categorize issues, but it provides an OK first approximation. Now, libertarians would probably sort the possible stances into those where people are left alone by the government and those that favor government control. Fair enough.

But if you looked at how most non-libertarians stand on the issues you’d find a deviation from that paradigm. A lot of people who would fall on the libertarian side of most “social issues” would have a few glaring exceptions for things guns and discrimination laws (OK, maybe discrimination laws belong in the economic category, but we’ll worry about that later). Meanwhile, a lot of people whom libertarians might categorize as “socially authoritarian” would have some glaring exceptions for guns and discrimination laws.

Now, obviously when you look at individuals you’ll find all sorts of exceptions. But overall, a big proportion of the people would fit into one of those two camps. Because each major camp doesn’t quite fit onto the “libertarian-authoritarian” axis, it seems appropriate to look at it as a cultural divide rather than an ideological divide.

[Douglas Fletcher]

As a former drunken sailor in good standing, I’d say it’s pretty hard to insult a drunken sailor. By the time you reach that state you’re about as close to subhuman as you can get, short of being a glue-sniffing freak. And damn proud of it.

[thoreau]

many indicators show that the majority of americans want a social liberal and fiscal conservative government and the major parties simply seem to ignore this fact

The primary process is controlled by the left and right. They enforce the left-right spectrum, even though a lot of independents would prefer to jump off that spectrum and go with fiscally conservative/socially liberal candidates. They might not want the full-blown purist libertopia that is of course mandatory on this forum, but definitely something better than what the Dems and GOP offer.

Interestingly, a fiscally conservative and socially liberal and overall moderate and mainstream (i.e. not the blue-skinned druids that the LP runs, and not an ideological purist, just a guy who wants somewhat smaller government) candidate could probably beat either the Dem or the GOP candidates head to head, but would probably lose the 3-way fight. Why?

Say that, hypothetically, 40% of the electorate prefers the Dems, 40% prefers the GOP, and 20% prefers the quasi-libertarian (who shall of course burn in hell for deviating from ideological purity…). In a race between the Dem and the quasi-libertarian the GOP voters would take the quasi-libertarian candidate. At least they agree with him on half of the issues, while they disagree with the Dem on all issues. Similar thing holds for the GOP vs. the quasi-libertarian.

However, in the 3-way race the quasi-libertarian would always be trailing. Fortunately there are voting systems to correct that. See electionmethods.org for more details.

(And now I must do penance for praising the notion of a candidate who does not rigorously adhere to doctrinaire positions.)

[Andrew]

Thoreau

Approval voting is an interesting idea. I don’t think third parties would actually win many contests, but a surge in one could shape the behavior of mainstream candidates– both because it is real information about voter preferences, and an incentive in the form of a threat.

You seem to think a latte-drinking Libertarian would be the main beneficiary– and that could have been so, if that is how you read John Anderson. But the most energetic entrees in recent American politics have come from a sort of populist verve– Wallace, Buchanan, and (sorta) Perot…maybe Ventura. That’s OK too, I suppose…I don’t think I would use my second (n/1) choice very often.

Interesting that the Iowa caucus was, in effect, a kind of “approval” contest, and Edwards was everyone’s second choice. He won’t do nearly as well in NH.

[thoreau]

Andrew-

I don’t think a latte-drinking libertarian would do well. But a Ventura-style candidate might. Jesse Ventura is most certainly not a libertarian purist (gasp!) but his campaign rhetoric had some strong libertarian elements, and my brother bought me one of Ventura’s books which also had some strong libertarian elements in it. At the same time, Ventura had a populist aura. I’m not saying Jesse Ventura is an ideal template, just that it is possible to meld elements of both stances.

I think the biggest result of Approval Voting would be demands for proportional representation (PR) in the legislature. If the third parties start polling 20% consistently, a lot of people might start wondering why 20% of the voters got 0% of the legislators. Now I’ll insert all of my caveats that I always insert when I talk about PR.

1) In a bicameral legislature, it would be best to only elect one chamber by PR, not both. Obviously the US Senate shouldn’t be changed in that regard.
2) I’m not talking about statewide or nationwide elections for the lower chamber. In the US House, small to mid-sized states could serve as districts electing up to 10 or so legislators. Larger states could be divided into districts, with each district electing 5 to 10 legislators. On the state level, the lower (and usually larger) house could be divied up among districts of 5 to 10 members.
3) I’m not necessarily suggesting the party list elections that European countries often use. There are plenty of ways to keep the focus on individual candidates rather than parties. See Center for Voting and Democracy for more info.
4) I’m not suggesting a parliamentary system that goes unstable and requires a new election every time a legislative coalition falls apart. The executive would still be elected separately, but one house of the legislature would simply be elected by PR.
5) Yes, I realize that this is a republic, not a democracy. My goal is to get the best representation for the people, rather than a system where the majority in a district gets all the representation while the minority gets no representation.
6) For those who lament large district sizes distancing people from their legislators, when’s the last time the legislator from your gerrymandered district paid any attention to you?

[Andrew]

Thoreau

I would never want ot abandon single-member districts– approval voting supplies an adequate incentive for aspiring competitive parties to actually contest elections, and for voters to give them a chance as a second choice.

Winner Takes All in each particular race supplies parties a powerful incentive to craft a consensus, while allowing individual representatives to dissent and present the alternative case (there is a real “agree-to-disagree” safety valve inside American political parties…missing, alas, among Libertarians).

Interesting to figure the different effect of incentives: PR encourages factions to maintain “purity”; AV allows a party to “test-market” a candidate and approach, and possibly inch their way to an out-right winner.

In Mexico, the PRI is responding to PAN, rather than bitterly resisting– this is a good thing.

[thoreau]

Andrew-

I admit that PR doesn’t exactly punish purity, since a purist party can still win seats. However, a party that wants to win more seats and play a more important role in shaping policy has an incentive to compromise and win more votes. The relative number of purists and pragmatists in the legislature will be determined by the opinions of the voters. Last I checked, that’s sort of the idea in a representative republic.

Besides, bicameralism would provide an important check. The chamber elected by single member districts would still promote compromise. Also, while single member districts can promote compromise, that tendency can be undermined by gerrymandering. California is so gerrymandered that legislative elections are a mere formality. Elections are decided in party primaries, which means that we have some incredibly liberal Democrats and some incredibly conservative Republicans in the legislature, and not many moderates or mavericks.

Finally, compromise can be fostered by systems that emphasize individual candidates. A closed list system, where you vote for a party and the party officials determine which members are elected, might favor purists. But a system like, say single transferable vote (used in the Australian Senate) or even the Swiss version of open list (you vote for candidates, and the most popular candidates on each list are picked) forces a candidate to answer to the voters, not the people in smoke-filled rooms. If the party loyalists aren’t numerous enough to up the party’s seat total any further, then the “odd man out” candidates will have to seek votes from more moderate voters.

[Randy]

Teetotaling.

[Marcus Allen]

He’s finished.

[Brady]

ironic isn’t it. many indicators show that the majority of americans want a social liberal and fiscal conservative government and the major parties simply seem to ignore this fact. they wonder why voter turnout is low.

eventually someone has GOT to fill this niche. funny that Lieberman seems to try and be touting that position these days, but everyone knows he is really just Bush-lite.

[Irv]

Man, “tea-totaling” from a magazine editor and English PhD.

[joe]

Brady, this is a primary. He’s not going for “the majority of Americans” yet.

[Jim Henley]

Once Howard betrayed the “Libertarians for Dean” movement he was toast!

Okay, that’s extremely unlikely to be true. But I think we should TELL people it’s true. Just for the hell of it and to make ourselves feel better.

[Picker of Nits]

Brady,

Depressing and holding the shift key when you tap a letter gives you a cap, and burns .000000278 calories. FYI.

[Brady]

yo smartass…use caps lock. it is more efficient.

[joe]

oR maYBe We cAn go BacK tO dOinG ThIS, liKe laTe 80s pHonE PHreaKs.

[Andrew]

Well

One compelling advantage of AV is that it can be adopted at once, for congressional elections, and adopted by only as many states as wish to try it.
It would require minimal changes to existing voting equipment, and only a minimal injustice (if any) might be done to voters too confused to exercise all of their options (they would still be voting their strongest preference.

To adopt it for presidential elections would likely require a constitutional amendment, though.

[thoreau]

I’m not opposed to AV for single-winner offices like President or Senate. And even for US House or state legislature I recognize that AV is an improvement on the current situation.

A state could decide to implement AV tomorrow for Presidential races. In 2000 we learned all about the electoral college. Each state pretty much gets to set its own rules for appointing electors. Any state legislature could enact a bill specifying Approval Voting to select the winner in that state. It probably wouldn’t make a third party competitive (I hope not, since if somebody came in and denied either party a majority of the electoral vote the race would go to the House), but it would cure the spoiler problem. Greens could vote for the Dem as well as the Green.

It would also cure the problem of “over votes”: If a Floridian voted for both Pat Buchanan and Al Gore, the ballot would be counted for both rather than be discarded.

Of course, a “dimpled chad” for Buchanan and a “swinging chad” for Gore would still be problematic, but two clear punches for those candidates (assuming the retired Floridian can muster the manual strength to punch two consecutive holes…) would pose no problem whatsoever.

[Andrew]

Thoreau (if you are still there)

You talk of “representation” as if the inclusion of more political parties in a deliberative body automatically made minority voters more well represented; perhaps, but only in a bad way…at the expense of voters who (after all) were in the majority, and only (in effect) by enticing the minority voters to pursue anti-consensual strategies.

The evidence of democratic regimes with pronounced PR features is that voters feel more alienated– they feel their vote is diluted by political fragmentation (when you win, you don’t win anything).

[thoreau]

Most places that use PR also have parliamentary systems. Coheive coalitions form. The minority is frozen out.

Without a parliamentary system there need not be such disciplined cohesion. Imagine 4 parties, each with 20% to 30% of the vote. One is fiscally conservative and socially liberal, let’s call them “libertarians with a small l”. (I say small l because Libertarians with a big L could never compromise enough to win anything.) Another is fiscally conservative and socially conservative. Let’s call them Republicans. Another is fiscally liberal and socially liberal. Let’s call them Democrats. And another is fiscally liberal and socially conservative. Let’s call them Populists. (Whether or not they resemble the original Populist party is irrelevant.)

Without the need to keep a coalition together for the stability of the executive, on different issues you’d see different alignments of legislators. On social issues you’d get a “small l”-Democrat pairing, and a Republican-Populist pairing. On economic issues you’d get a Democrat-Populist coalition and a “small l”-Republican coalition. One of those 4 parties would win all of the time, two others would get their way half the time, and only one of the parties would be really alienated.

Compare that with a 2-party system, where one party will win all of the time. It’s clear that PR will give people better representation.

Also, the notion that minority representation hurts the majority: First, most people of a libertarian persuasion make noise about tyranny of the majority, so who says the majority deserves to always win? Second, what would happen is that a majority party would break into multiple parties, so members of that majority would be leaving of their own free will. The only ones hurt would be those who stayed in the original party, and why are they somehow more deserving of having their interests prevail? Besides, if that party represented a real majority on the issues (as opposed to a gerrymandered majority) then their coalition will still come together on certain issues. If a majority of the country is really fiscally conservative, then the several fiscally conservative parties would vote together on economic legislation. If a majority of the country wants an invasion of Iraq then the various pro-war parties would come together to vote for the declaration of war or whatever you want to call that bill. And so forth.

[Andew]

Oh well,

I am not one of those “tyranny of the majority” types. In AV, the “threat” of the third party is to “split the difference”, when that in fact is the majority preference, and the two (previously major) parties had incentives to polarize the issue…abortion could serve as a good example.

In PR, the “threat” of the minor parties is to fragment the electorate and frustrate decision-making.

We won’t settle this here, You can respond, and then I will wait for it to pop up on a later thread (I’m sure). Had this all figured out years ago…now I forget:)

[thoreau]

We probably won’t settle this, but you raise good questions. If I’m going to support these ideas then I had better hear all the good questions and mull them over. So I consider it a fun and instructive debate.

[James Anderson Merritt]

Thoreau doubts that big-L Libertarians (i.e., Libertarian Party members) could “compromise enough to win anything.”

Putting aside the fact that hundreds of Libertarians serve in elected or appointed office across the country, or have been key participants in winning lawsuits or voter initiative campaigns, thereby having won something with or without compromise, I think it’s important to understand the difference between “compromise” and “capitulation.”

When you compromise, you get something that you want — perhaps not all of what you want, but something — and the other party gets something, though not necessarily all of what he wants. If the other party gets anything of what he wants while you get nothing, however, then you haven’t compromised. You have simply lost.

Libertarians often find themselves in situations where they are offered “compromise” that actually amounts to a “defeat.” For example: a flat tax to replace the income tax. Yes, that would simplify the tax collection process, take the IRS’s nose out of our private financial affairs, and put the burden of federal tax in the face of everyone, all the time, which would seem to indicate a win for Libertarians. On the other hand, it would dragoon merchants into becoming tax collectors, it could disproportionately burden the poor (absent complicating exceptions for things like food and medicine, e.g.), it would probably not lessen the federal take (indeed, one of the reasons we don’t yet have a flat federal sales tax is that the rate would have to be so high, in order for the take to be “revenue neutral” in replacement of the income tax, that people wouldn’t stand for it), and it wouldn’t do much, if anything, to restrict government’s ability to tax or spend. Libertarians probably could compromise to support a flat tax at a low rate, provided that government spending was also reduced commensurately — but that is never on the table! Other Libertarians I know of have said, “fine, keep excise taxes and tariffs, but get rid of the income tax, replace it with NOTHING, and have the government make do with that revenue, which will still amount to the hundreds of billions.” THAT option is never on the table, either.

Going along with a shuffling of the deck chairs isn’t a compromise, yet if Libertarians don’t play that game, they are accused of being unable to compromise.

If you want to see see how quickly and well Libertarians can compromise, then offer them a REAL compromise, rather than a perfumed defeat or crumbs from the table. Here’s a thought: Libertarians would end the drug war entirely. Maybe we can’t have the full loaf. A compromise might be to make clear that state drug laws can indeed trump federal law, at least for intrastate matters, since control of food and drugs is not a power that is granted explicitly to the federal government by the constitution, and so is properly the concern of the States, where they wish to exercise their authority. But that isn’t on the table, either.

Maybe there are Libertarians who can’t compromise. Maybe the uncompromising types are the only ones with the motivation to endure in party organizations, and so end up representing all Libertarians. But maybe, just maybe, even Libertarians who know the meaning of compromise and are willing to compromise, never find themselves in a position where they CAN compromise, as opposed to a position where their only choices are surrender or boycott.

[thoreau]

James-

Good point on the difference between a lesser good and a lesser evil. And I know that there are hundreds of libertarians in local office. The thing is, local offices aren’t as powerful as state and federal offices, so there’s no point in presenting a platform of “abolish public education and repeal all drugs laws.” Local officials simply don’t have that discretion in most places that I’m aware of. One can run a local campaign without unveiling the entire list of Big Ideas that scare people.

But when I look at websites of libertarian candidates for state and federal office, I rarely see lesser-good compromises like “I will cut spending 15%, repeal this tax in particular, abolish this particular set of drug laws, repeal this particular set of regulations, etc.” It’s usually “I want to tear the whole thing down.”

Now I’ll grant that most of those LP candidates would be willing, if actually elected, to vote for a good compromise bill. The problem is that if you decide to compromise after the election then you’ve already lost. Those compromises are all compromises to be made with other legislators. But before election day the compromises that count are the ones you make with the voters. You can’t say to the voters “I’m giving you my full list of goals, but I’ll compromise with the other politicians if elected.” The voter will think “Well, why won’t he compromise with me? I don’t like all of his ideas, but I like some of them, so if he compromises on one or two points I’d vote for him.”

Obviously I haven’t examined campaign materials by every single LP candidate for state and federal office. But from what I’ve seen, compromise platforms are rare. A compromise platform could consist of 3 things:

1) An agenda of reforms that the candidate will actively pursue
2) Limits to how far the candidate plans to push on those issues (e.g. only going for pot legalization and a 15% tax cut right now, rather than the complete package)
3) A promise that, while the candidate won’t actively pursue items not on this agenda, if a piece of legislation arises outside the scope of his agenda he’ll vote against bigger government.

[James Anderson Merritt]

Thoreau suggests that a respectably “compromising” Libertarian candidate might call for a 15% cut in a tax (say, the state or federal Income Tax), instead of its complete abolition. Sure, that is something that Libertarians could support, but at that point, of course, we would jump into the deep end of the political semantic pool, in which sincere attempts at compromise usually drown.

When the Libertarian candidate says “cut,” what does the Libertarian mean, and what do the voters and establishment politicians hear?

A Libertarian thinks of a cut relative to everything else remaining the same: a true reduction in the total amount of revenue received by the state, however small, which will perhaps inspire commensurate spending reductions. Cutting one group’s taxes, while increasing those of another group to make up the difference (or yield even higher revenues!) is not a cut. A cut in taxes, which causes a deficit that is in turn financed by general bond obligation, is not a cut. A cut in the rate of growth in either taxes or spending is not a cut. Yet, establishment pols sell these kinds of shell-game maneuvers as “cuts” to voters, who seem to eat up the lies as long as their own personal oxen aren’t gored. For a Libertarian, having to go along with such fraud is neither a victory, nor any proper compromise. It’s a defeat, pure and simple.

Sadly, in the current political environment, Libertarians get reputations for being “uncompromising,” simply for insisting that a “cut” be an actual cut!

As far as candidate websites, Thoreau may need to get out more. While I myself have seen the kind of “uncompromising” campaign material that Thoreau criticizes, there are a growing number of practical Libertarian candidates out there, too. As just one example, Judge Jim Gray is running against needs-to-be-retired-in-the-worst-way Barbara Boxer, here in California. Check out this website:

Judge Jim Gray for US Senate

Judge Gray strikes me as a “compromise” Libertarian in the Charles Murray mold — that is to say, someone who understands and appears to support Libertarian principles sincerely, even if his policy prescriptions don’t match mine in every detail. For instance, he wants to end the drug war, initially proposing to decriminalize marijuna and tax it. I don’t want new taxes, increased tax rates, or new classes of taxable goods or services, so I am uncomfortable with his proposal to tax newly-decriminalized pot. Still, as long as there is no special tax on pot or any pot-targeted increase in existing tax rates — if something that was once contraband might now be bought and sold openly, subject only to previously-established taxes on commerce — I would judge that as a compromise I could accept. We could return to the issues of commerce taxes themselves, and the general ending of the drug war, another day.

I’d like to hear the LP Presidential hopefuls proposing similarly respectable compromises on the Drug War and other issues; perhaps if they did so, we (both the LP and the country!) would get somewhere.

[thoreau]

James-

You’re right about Jim Gray. I forgot to mention him. And if a new breed of pragmatic candidates is emerging, one that says “All I’m pushing for right now is some solid measures to cut the size of government without freaking out the electorate”, I’m all in favor of it. Perhaps I was too harsh.

As to taxes: I’d actually be in favor of revenue-neutral tax simplification coupled with a balanced budget brought about entirely by spending cuts. Here’s why I think “revenue neutral tax simplification” (emphasis on “revenue neutral”, i.e. no additional revenue collected, and my adamant insistence on balancing the budget only with spending cuts) could be a good thing if implemented via a flattening of the income tax and the elimination of all loopholes, deductions, exemptions, credits, etc.:

There are 3 problems with the income tax. (1) It takes money away from people who earned it. (2) It finances a leviathan state. (3) The often-overlooked aspect that the Byzantine list of loopholes, exemptions, deductions, credits, etc. are basically tools that politicians use to micromanage personal and economic decisions. This micromanagement generally favors groups that have political clout and/or good lobbyists. By distorting the market they inevitable interfere with the proper functioning of the economy.

If we eliminate this tool from the politicians’ kits, we move closer to a true market economy. If this results in more wealth creation via economic activity then however big or small the government might be, we can fund that sized government with a lower rate of taxation.

Why do I favor a flat income tax over a sales tax? Any politically feasible proposal for a sales tax inevitably includes exemptions for certain products, usually food and medicine. It would be a field day for lobbyists, constant pitched battles over every product imaginable. Does fatty food count? High carb food? Are vitamins medicine? Acupuncture supplies? What about baseball bats? After all, we do want to encourage atheletic activity, so maybe the baseball bat should be considered health-related.

The list goes on-and-on. Of course, even a flat income tax would still have deductions for business expenses. But that is, at least in principle, a technical matter that accountants routinely deal with. I can live with some disputes over whether the cop who had to buy his own weapon for work gets to deduct all 4 of his guns. But I can’t accept a society where the IRS actually gives you deductions for diet products (yes, that’s true), or where your choice of car or your adopted children affect your tax bill. (And I say that as somebody who plans to buy a hybrid in the next 5 years, and who hopes to adopt kids.) Those things are nothing more than politically motivated micromanagement.

[Thorley Winston]

Xrlq wrote:

“Socially liberal” is a nice, squishy phrase that means different things to different people. Libertarians say it to mean “leave everyone alone,” but I’m not the population as a whole understands it that way. Some – most, I suspect – read it to mean “ban handguns, support affirmative action, end the death penalty, and generally act like a liberal Democrat on every issue except the ones that require a massive tax increase.”

Actually they tend to favor massive tax increases (while opposing any sort of entitlement reform ? which is the real driver behind future expansions of government spending) or passing it along through regulation and litigation (e.g. Kyoto) without it showing up on the federal balance sheet as taxes, they just promote the fiction that it is a balanced budget rather than a smaller, less costly government that is the be all, end all of being ?fiscally conservative.?

That is the only reason why Dean who grew his own State?s budget by 109-176% is called ?fiscally conservative? by some ? because he raised taxes several times over his term of office to balance the budget.

As bad as Bush has been, there are two mitigating factors that make him still the better choice: (1) he is the only candidate to favor any sort of entitlement reform and (2) the NTU study (click on my name for the link) confirms what many of us have suspected all along – each of the Democratic nominees wants to spend even more money than Bush.

[thoreau]

My understanding of Dean’s record (and please correct me if I’m wrong) is this:

1) A state court decision shifted public education funding from the local level to the state level. The state’s budget ballooned, but total public sector spending wasn’t significantly affected by that decision. And total public sector spending is what really matters. I don’t get any less upset if my money goes to city hall instead of the state capitol.

2) Dean actually cut taxes. Tax revenues increased when local taxes were diverted to state coffers for schools, but at the same time he cut some of the pre-existing taxes. Once again, although everybody paid much more in state taxes, they paid less in local taxes, and mixed in with all that was a cut in some of the taxes.

Please correct me if I’m wrong.

[anonymous coward]

Don’t you guys remember the days of cohabitation, when the Republicans would say, oh you dems are spendthrift wastrels, and the Dems said, Yeah? Just watch us balance the budget.

Bring back cohabitation. Dean’s a reasonable guy. He’ll listen to the libertarians, in the face of Delay and company.

[Thorley Winston]

Thoreau wrote:

A state court decision shifted public education funding from the local level to the state level. The state’s budget ballooned, but total public sector spending wasn’t significantly affected by that decision.

Note quite. The range I gave reflects two alternate views of the State of Vermont?s takeover of education with the 109% figure assuming that it was a wash with local funding (discounting both the State?s assumption of the remainder of education funding as well as the double-digit increases in spending that occurred afterwards) and the 176% figure assuming that it was not. My own State?s experience with similar proposals (the misnamed ?Minnesota Miracle?) is that when the State attempts to ?buy down? local property taxes is that the local governments usually increase their local levies and you end up with the worst of both worlds ? higher local taxes and higher State taxes as well.

Since I do not have the actual numbers for what happened with local tax levies (although I have read several accounts that they have increased although it is unknown if they are at or higher than their 1991 levels when Dean took office), I offer both as a range in that Dean at the very least increased State spending by 109% (plus the doublte-digit increases in funding which occurred afterwards which were not ordered by any court) and probably closer to the 176% – either of which is worse than Bush.

And total public sector spending is what really matters. I don’t get any less upset if my money goes to city hall instead of the state capitol.

If you aren?t than you ought to be since (a) it is generally easier to control taxing and spending decisions (or at the least protect yourself by moving in the worst case scenario) the more local they are and (b) it usually ends up being that you get higher State and local taxes.

Dean actually cut taxes. Tax revenues increased when local taxes were diverted to state coffers for schools, but at the same time, he cut some of the pre-existing taxes. Once again, although everybody paid much more in state taxes, they paid less in local taxes, and mixed in with all that was a cut in some of the taxes.

Nope, untrue for several reasons:

First, Act 60 (the Vermont law which took over education spending) actually swapped higher property taxes on some people for lower property taxes on others (it just went to the State rather than local governments) and the net effect was higher taxes overall.

Second, spending on education after Act 60 increased by about 17.3% after the State take over which was over and above what the Brigham decision required. Meaning that, the choice to increase funding afterwards by 17.3% was entirely voluntary.

Third, there were still local levies enacted which reversed many of the property tax cuts which Act 60 had enacted for some people (even though the aggregate was higher property taxes overall).

Finally and most importantly, the 109% figure increase I gave (which understates State spending) is actually the increase in the budget if you discount entirely the increase in the State of Vermont?s share of education spending (as well as the double-digit spending increases enacted afterwards). Meaning that even if this had never happened, Dean would still have more than doubled his States budget.

[thoreau]

I stand corrected.