Republics of Fearlessness?

On conjugating liberalism in Syria and Lebanon. An interview with journalist and author Samir Kassir

Michael Young | June 8, 2004

Every Friday, readers of Lebanon's most respected daily, Al-Nahar, can read a front-page column by Samir Kassir. On a bad day, Kassir (who also teaches history at Beirut's St. Joseph University) is merely annoying to those in power; on a good one, he is infuriating enough to earn newspapers irate telephone calls from the gentlemen at the security agencies, an open-ended ban from political talk shows, and, even, at one time, a detail of trailing intelligence agents seeking to make Kassir's life wretched. His story, then, is that of the liberal intellectual facing down a Middle East suffused with the futility of autocracy. Reason spoke to Kassir on Syria and Lebanon, the past and present of Beirut, and the limbo of free expression in Arab societies.

reason: You've just published two books, Syrian Democracy and Lebanon's Independence and A Soldier Against Whom?, both collections of weekly columns for Al-Nahar. Why republish the articles?

Samir Kassir: Let me admit, first, that almost every columnist has a secret dream that what he writes will stand the test of time. I am personally sensitive to this, maybe because my academic background leads me to seek coherence in my articles from week to week. Yet, publishing the books was not, or not only, a narcissistic decision. Both are intended to feed the political debate in Lebanon, especially as we are supposed to have a presidential election this year and that a great concern is that the current president, Emile Lahoud, will impose a renewal of his mandate—or that Syria might do so—despite the fact that the constitution mandates a single presidential term. The process implies that the security services, which are already pulling the strings, will go further in suppressing opposition to this scheme on behalf of the president, but also of a hegemonic Syria.

My book on Syria is a reminder that the problem we have with the Syrian regime is not merely that it has imposed itself against the free will of the Lebanese people, but also that of the Syrian people—a dimension many Lebanese choose to ignore. I want to remind everyone that the demands for reform in Syria came long before President George W. Bush chose to express them. Furthermore, both books are a signal, both to colleagues and to readers, that they don't have to buckle under pressure from those in positions of power—that they must persist in writing what they want, even if they are threatened.

reason: The book on Syria, which you've subtitled "In Search of the Damascus Spring," appears to be an admission that Syrian reform is an illusion. True?

Kassir: If you mean by Syrian reform a reform conducted by the regime, I've always been skeptical of this. In all that I've written since Bashar Assad inherited power from his father, I never succumbed to the illusion that he would willingly reform his regime. At the same time, I saw in the process of succession an opportunity for Bashar to gain real legitimacy by undoing what his father had done. That's why I've been asking for the release of political prisoners, the ending of the state of emergency, and political liberalization, including allowing freedom of expression, as prerequisites for this new legitimacy. I have refused to see the small steps Bashar has taken in this regard as gifts we should thank him for.

That doesn't mean things haven't changed in Syria. But they have changed thanks to the courage of intellectuals and political militants who decided to voice their demands publicly, through the press—the Lebanese press I should add—or through the so-called Manifesto of the 99 and other manifestos. If the "Damascus Spring" [the short-lived period of relative openness that followed Bashar's arrival to power in June 2000] means anything, it is embodied in the courage and the quest for freedom expressed by the Syrian opposition. The Syrian regime understood this and cracked down on dissidents. But that hasn't worked. Though the opposition in Syria is not in good shape, it has widened its margin of expression, though not enough to propose an alternative to the Ba'ath regime.

reason: You have written that the elephant in the living room of the Syrian opposition is its unwillingness to raise the matter of the Syrian presence in Lebanon. How is Syrian democracy related to Lebanese independence?

Kassir: I think things have evolved, especially since Riad Turk, the key figure in the Syrian opposition, addressed this issue in one of his interviews with Al-Mulhaq, the literary supplement of Al-Nahar, in early 2003. In the interview, he asked for a restoration of Lebanese independence and questioned the manipulation by the Syrian regime of the resistance, through Lebanon, against the Israeli occupation. When I meet my friends from the Syrian opposition, I feel the issue of Lebanese independence has imposed itself and that nobody questions the need to put an end to this hegemony. However, this doesn't mean they are willing to give top priority to the issue. As one Syrian dissident once told me: "We want to address the core issue, the Ba'ath regime's hegemony over Syria; once we've done that, its hegemony over Lebanon will fall apart." But I maintain the reverse is also true.

Here, I must add that my criticism was not a moral one; it was not intended to compel Syrian dissidents to feel they owed the Lebanese something because our press has been a platform for their ideas. My criticism was political: I meant that one couldn't understand Syrian politics if one didn't consider what Syria had done in Lebanon for over a quarter of a century. I feel the Syrian dissidents must be aware of this, as they know better than anyone else that their regime's raison d'�tre is to project itself across the Middle East, beginning with Lebanon. After all, if Syria is a regional power, it is because of its intervention in Lebanon.

reason: Is the Syrian-Lebanese relationship as it is shaped today sustainable?

Kassir: Let's try to characterize this Syrian-Lebanese relationship. It is not an occupation, nor is it a free association between two sovereign countries. Rather, Lebanon is a Syrian protectorate, similar to what we used to see in Eastern Europe under Soviet rule. I should add it is also a mafia-type protectorate, since Lebanon is not only a place of strategic importance for the Syrian regime, it is also a place where Syria's ruling elite, in association with Lebanese counterparts, exploits all kinds of, often illicit, economic and business opportunities.

Clearly, this situation is no longer sustainable—it never was, to my mind, given the resilience of Lebanese civil society. What has changed are two factors that helped shape this relationship: The first is the internal cohesion of the Syrian regime. It seems obvious that things are no longer as cohesive as they were under the late president, Hafez al-Assad. The second is the end of the conspiracy of silence that surrounded the Syrian takeover of Lebanon beginning in 1976, and which has continued during the post-war period, with the tacit backing of the US. Tremendous change has taken place and, although I don't agree with the principle of unilateral sanctions imposed by the Bush administration against Syria, I think the measures taken under the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act have opened a new page, one that is not to the benefit of the Ba'ath regime. I know that Syria can still provide "services" to the US. But in the changing Middle East, you no longer have to "reimburse" such services by "offering" a third country as reward.

reason: What of the reports from Damascus that Bashar Assad is essentially the weakest link in a Syrian system that he fails to control, thanks to the existence of more powerful networks—the intelligence services, the Ba'ath Party, even people in his family who are the real powers in Syria?

Kassir: "Qassiounology" [for Jabal Qassioun, the Damascus hill where the presidential palace is located] is even more uncertain than was Kremlinology. Because of the absence of transparency in Syrian politics, but also the confusion surrounding Bashar's succession, one cannot say who is in charge. Clearly, Bashar is not. But it doesn't seem that anyone else is either, except maybe for the shadow of Hafez al-Assad. Nobody has the strength to change anything. It seems there are rival centers of power inside the ruling elite—the heads of the security services, crony capitalists inside the "royal family" and Ba'ath apparatchiks. It is the shifting equilibrium among them that drives Syria today.