The Volokh Conspiracy
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Didn't I See That Guy on All Those Medical TV Shows?
Plus an interesting discussion of implied facts, and Virginia libel law on the requirement that a statement sufficiently tend to damage reputation.
From Judge Norman Moon (W.D. Va.) Wednesday in Smith v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.:
The University of Virginia's ("UVA") Post-Baccalaureate Pre-Medical Program is a one-year curriculum designed for pre-med students who did not complete all prerequisites during their undergraduate study…. The Program … boasts a 94% medical-school placement rate and, accordingly, is highly selective ….
Plaintiff … did exceptionally well [in the Program], earning a "near-perfect" GPA and a 96th-percentile score on the Medical College Admission Test …. [After finishing the Program,] Plaintiff applied to thirty medical schools …. Plaintiff asked the [Post-Baccalaureate Pre-Medical Program Committee] for a letter of recommendation. These "Committee Letters" reflect "the Program's collective institutional assessment of the applicant," scaled on a score of 1 (unable to recommend at this time) to 5 (recommended with enthusiasm)…
Plaintiff alleges that he received "highly favorable" letters from his individual recommenders, who praised his intellect, work ethic, personality, and overall potential to succeed in medical school. In contrast to these letters, however, the Committee allegedly wrote a "materially adverse" letter and assigned Plaintiff a score of 2 (recommended with reservations)….
Plaintiff was rejected by all thirty medical schools he applied to, twenty-eight rejecting him without an interview. Given his otherwise strong qualifications, Plaintiff identifies the Committee letter as the clear explanation for this failure. But not only did the letter devastate these thirty applications, Plaintiff maintains—it also "derail[ed] his entire future and eradicate[ed] his chances of pursuing a career in medicine." …
Plaintiff sued for, among other things, defamation, based on these statements from the Committee Letter:
- Plaintiff "would benefit from some maturing years before heading to medical school."
- Plaintiff "was not as consistent with keeping his shadowing assignments … as expected."
- Plaintiff "was not as consistent with … communicating his intended class absences as expected."
- Plaintiff "at times had difficulty following the flow of conversation in class."
- "[M]any social interactions with" Plaintiff "felt awkward or disjointed." …
The court held that "Statements 1, 4, and 5 are pure expressions of opinion":
The operative parts of these statements are that Plaintiff, relative to other students, was immature, awkward, and had occasional difficulty following class conversation. It is indeed true, as Plaintiff points out, that the Committee's assessments differ from those of his professors in their individual letters of recommendation. But that only suggests a difference of opinion between the professors and the Committee.
One person, endowed with the gift of gab, might believe an individual to be a poor conversationalist, while another person, more maladroit in nature, might believe that same individual to be perfectly charming. Likewise, someone with a particularly high standard for maturity might conclude that someone is immature where most others would disagree. This is to say that the Statements 1, 4, and 5 are "relative in nature and depend largely upon the [Defendants'] viewpoint." {To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that his level 2 "recommended with reservations" rating was itself defamatory, the Court finds that it is also a pure expression of opinion.}
The court concluded that statements 2 and 3 included factual implications, and thus weren't pure opinion:
It is impossible to separate the negative import of each statement from the assumptions that Plaintiff, in fact, did not "keep[ ] his shadowing assignments" and did not "communicat[e] his intended class absences" at least once, as even a single instance of either might reasonably fail to meet expectations in a "highly selective" program. These assumptions, moreover, are susceptible to empirical proof. That the Committee Letter ultimately phrases each statement as a relative assessment does not negate that, if the factual predicates are false, then the assessment must also be false.
But the court concluded that statement 3 was true, since Plaintiff had "acknowledg[ed] three unexcused absences in a class." And it also concluded that statements 2 and 3 weren't sufficiently damaging to reputation to be defamatory:
Statements that are merely "insulting, offensive, or otherwise inappropriate" are not defamatory. The bar is much higher: "Reputation must be affected to a magnitude sufficient to render one odious, infamous, or ridiculous, or subject to disgrace, shame, scorn, or contempt."
Therefore, and relevant here, negative assessments of a person's professional conduct are rarely defamatory unless they suggest "an unfitness to perform the duties of a job or lack of integrity in the performance of duties." … "[A]llegations of unsatisfactory job performance do not in and of themselves so harm [one's] reputation …." …
Statements 2 and 3 do not plausibly rise to this level. The purpose of the Committee Letter was to "convey[ ] UVA's institutional assessment of Plaintiff's readiness and suitability for medical school," and its general tenor was that Plaintiff possesses the raw intellectual capability but would first "benefit from some maturing years," reflected in its recommendation "with reservations." To concretize the Committee's "reservations," the letter stated that Plaintiff "was not as consistent with keeping his shadowing assignments or communicating his intended class absences as expected."
These statements criticize Plaintiff's communication and consistency regarding his attendance—they do not, for instance, suggest that he was chronically absent or that he abandoned his clinical duties. See, e.g., Fuste v. Riverside Healthcare Ass'n, Inc. (Va. 2003) (a statement suggesting two doctors "'abandoned' their patients and that there were 'concerns about their competence'" was defamatory per se); Fleming v. Moore (Va. 1981) (requiring that a statement be "necessarily hurtful" to a plaintiff's occupational fitness to be defamatory per se). Moreover, and as Plaintiff recognizes, these statements were not offered to suggest that he was wholly unsuited for medical school—they were offered in support of his assessment as capable yet not presently ready for medical school. See Dkt. 32 at 20 ("[The Committee Letter] conveyed that Plaintiff presently lacked the maturity, judgment, and readiness required to enter medical school."); id. ("Read in that context, the Committee was telling medical schools that Plaintiff was not yet fit to begin medical training and should not be admitted during the current application cycle."). While this assessment may have harmed Plaintiff's candidacy in the 2025 application cycle, it did not malign his reputation as to render him "odious, infamous, or ridiculous" or subject him to "disgrace, shame, scorn, or contempt."
Charles Walker Terry and Samantha Rosalie Romano (Byrne Canaan Law) represent defendants.