The Volokh Conspiracy
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Note to Second Circuit: Antisemitic Violence Shouldn't Get a Judicial Pass
Torres v. Carlson, currently pending before the Second Circuit, is a case brough by two Columbia University janitors under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (KKK Act).
According to their complaint, masked individuals from Columbia University's anti-Israel alliance, armed with hammers, knives, bolt cutters, chains, and zip ties, stormed Columbia's Hamilton Hall and confronted the two men. The janitors' refusal to yield drew the ire of the rioters, who then assaulted them, detained them, and slurred them as Jew-lovers, Jew-workers, and Zionists. The rioters proceeded to seize the building, break windows to chain the doors shut, barricaded themselves inside, and unfurled banners declaring an "Intifada."
Assuming the allegations are true, this seems like an open and shut case under the KKK Act, which the Supreme Court has described as reaching organized mob violence directed at a protected group and those perceived as standing with it. See Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
Nevertheless, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Jon D. Michael of UCLA Law School, Matthew Segal of Tufts, and I have filed an amicus brief with the Second Circuit, taking issue with the district court's decision to:
(1) resolve at the pleading stage questions of motive in the defendants' favor, crediting the defendants' characterization of their own motives over the plaintiffs' allegations and dismissing explicit antisemitic epithets as irrelevant;
(2) treat supposed political motive as categorically negating discriminatory animus—disregarding both the mixed-motive framework that operates across federal antidiscrimination law and the settled principle that speech, even on political subjects, can evidence discriminatory intent; and,
(3) view Jewish disagreement about whether all anti-Zionism is inherently antisemitic as dispositive proof that the specific anti-Zionist rhetoric in this case was not plausibly antisemitic—a standard that conflicts with binding precedent, contradicts how courts apply antidiscrimination law to groups other than Jews, and improperly gives any individual Jew the power to veto discrimination claims by all other Jews.
As an aside, there are several federal court decisions arising out of post-October 7 protest activity that strike many, including me, as applying stricter standards to civil rights plaintiffs claiming anti-Jewish violations of civil rights laws than precedent suggests applies to other plaintiffs.
Finally, in fairness to Jon and Matthew, I should note that they were the primary authors of the brief.