The Volokh Conspiracy
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Some Thoughts on Law Professor Richard Epstein's Ideas for Fixing FIFA's Flawed Rulebook
His proposal to limit the next-game consequences of yellow cards and red cards deserves serious attention. But his proposals for awarding two points for a run-of-play goal and only one for a PK is flawed, as is his idea for changing soccer's overtime rule.
Today law professor Richard Epstein published an intriguing blog post, entitled "FIFA's Flawed Rulebook." Epstein urges that we should reexamine some of the "rot" in soccer's current rules, which leads to unfair outcomes. He makes three recommendations for improving the great game: (1) revising yellow-card accumulation and automatic suspensions following red cards; (2) awarding two points for a run-of-play goal and only one point for a penalty-kick goal; and (3) changing overtime by gradually reducing the number of players on the field. As an avid soccer fan, I endorse Epstein's call for reviewing the rules and improving them where possible. But on the merits of his particular proposals, I like only the first but not the last two.

Revising the yellow card and red card next-game-consequences rules
Epstein proposes reconsidering how yellow cards and red cards currently operate. They both carry consequences over from one game to the next. A yellow card carries little immediate consequence in the first game where it is given. Indeed, because there is no real penalty, players often resort to "tactical fouls" to stop breakaways and other scoring opportunities. It is only when a player receives a second yellow card—even in the next game—that a serious consequence results: expulsion. Red cards also typically carry over to the next game: almost invariably, the player is suspended.
The problem with these next-game repercussions, as Epstein nicely explains, is that "they violate a fundamental principle of justice … by refusing to keep the pluses and minuses of each game self-contained, which could matter any time a red or yellow card is given." Thus, they carry "the sins of one game over to the next."
Epstein proposes that, instead of the current yellow card accumulation rule, a better approach is to track hockey by making the offending player sit out for a few minutes—an approach that can be further tweaked by extending the time a player is required to sit for a "major" foul. Similarly, for a red card in one game, the issue of a next-game suspension could be carefully reviewed during the several days leading up to the next game, with a focus on the intent of the offending player. For example, Balogun's red card suspension (which I discussed at length here and here) could have been reviewed under a predetermined set of principles and overturned.
Epstein's main point—generally keeping consequences of fouls contained to a single game—makes considerable sense. And, putting in place a more articulated set of principles for reviewing red card suspensions also makes sense, particularly in the wake of the way Balogun's suspension was reviewed under (seemingly) vague principles. Epstein's ideas should be given a test run in organized play to see how they work.
Awarding two points for a run-of-play goal and one point for a penalty kick goal.
Epstein's next proposal is much more controversial. Epstein argues that "it is imperative that scoring rules change so that a penalty shot is worth only one point and a goal from the field is worth two."
Epstein draws inspiration from fouls in basketball, where a foul shot is worth only one point while field goals are worth two (or three, if taken from long range). Epstein argues that the penalty calls by officials inside the box "are very hard to make." Given that a penalty kick (PK) has a roughly 70% chance of their success, the "likelihood that any foul in the field disrupts a 70% chance of scoring is highly unlikely." Accordingly, Epstein concludes, the penalty-kick goal should count for less, just as in basketball.
Epstein's proposal contains a fundamental flaw: it would encourage defenders to commit penalty-kick fouls in close games. Consider, for example, a situation where Team A has scored in the run of play—earning (under Epstein's plan) two points. Then, with time running down to the last minute, Team B desperately throws players forward, launching a long ball into the penalty box. Miraculously, the ball finds Team B's striker, who lines up the potentially tying shot from close range. But …
Just before Team B's striker can shoot, a defender throws both hands around him and pulls him down—a "tackle" in the American football style. The defender can be confident that this is the right tactical move, because the striker will then be awarded a penalty kick that, under Epstein's scheme, cannot tie the game. The striker will, at most, gain one point from the PK. And, of course, during the time it takes to do the penalty kick, return the ball to the middle of the field, and then finish the game, time will have expired—meaning that Team A has protected its two-point lead by deliberately surrendering only a one-point PK opportunity.
Thus, Epstein's rule change creates incentives for the ultimate "tactical foul"—defenders deliberately giving up one-point penalty kicks rather than the possibility of a two-point, run-of-play goal. I see no way around this basic problem, which is presumably why Epstein's idea (long advanced) has not gained any traction.
Deciding tied games
Epstein also takes a crack at changing soccer's overtime rules. Right now, a tied game is resolved by a thirty-minute overtime period (with no "golden goal"). If the game remains tied after those thirty minutes, then the game is decided through PKs, five per side, continuing if necessary until one team is ahead.
Epstein's proposal is to change how the thirty-minute overtime period operates. He would allow additional substitute players and require that, every ten minutes of the overtime period, a team would remove one player from the field. According to Epstein, this drop-off plan would "translate into more goals and an increase in the number of tactical choices."
I understand Epstein's intuition that fewer players on the field should mean more goals. But that assumes a static model of defensive tactics. Perhaps teams would adapt to the "drop-off" situation by organizing into tighter, more defensively oriented schemes, holding players in more defensive positions.
A more defensive posture was the result of the "golden goal" rule that FIFA followed for a short time. The rule was "widely perceived as [a] failed experiment[]." The rule did not bring about more active and attacking play as originally intended, but instead led to more cautious play. I suspect that Epstein's drop-off proposal might similarly lead to more defensive responses.
But even if Epstein were correct that the drop-off rule is an improvement over the current thirty-minute overtime period, there remains the question of whether a thirty-minute overtime period is good for soccer. The overtime period is clearly bad for television schedules, since it extends the length of the game in an unpredictable way. And, in turn, this is bad for TV viewers, who likewise can't count on knowing when a game will end.
A way to mitigate this problem is to bring a game that is tied at the end of ninety minutes to a rapid conclusion. If the game is tied at the end of regulation time, a PK shootout could be immediately held. But, in my view, a better approach would be to eliminate static PKs entirely and move to something like the old NASL/early MLS 35-yard shootout rule. This involved an attacker starting 35 yards out and having five seconds to score on the goalkeeper.
This general format has been tweaked by Tim Farrell into a more sophisticated proposal, known as ADG (attacker-defender-goalkeeper). The idea is that a single attacker would take on both a defender and a goalkeeper from 32 yards out, with fifteen seconds to score. Computer simulations suggest this creates about a 30% chance of scoring. And to help improve player safety, a short rest period (ten minutes is the suggestion) is given to players before the shootout. Farrell has urged that his proposal be given a trial in organized play. And it seems like a good idea to me, either immediately at the end of 90 minutes or at the end of an overtime period.
More broadly, it is great that Epstein, Farrell, and others are thinking about tweaks to the beautiful game. If experience reveals ways to improve the game, they ought to be adopted.
HT: Thanks to Josh Blackman for calling Epstein's Civitas article to my attention.