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"See MAGA, Shoot MAGA" in TikTok Video Was Criminally Punishable Threat
From U.S. v. Segari, decided today by Judge Kathryn Mizelle (M.D. Fla.):
In August 2025, Desiree Doreen Segari posted TikTok videos of herself announcing a "new movement," which she coined "see MAGA, shoot MAGA." In Segari's words, "if we all get our guns and use our second amendment right … and you see somebody with a MAGA hat, pew pew that's what we do, that's the way, it's the only way." Segari explained that "MAGA people deserve to be terrified and scared to walk in the streets because they should know that real Americans are gonna [mouths the word "fucking"] kill them." Based on these and similar statements in TikTok videos, a jury convicted Segari of transmitting in interstate commerce a true threat to injure another person….
In the first video, posted on August 17, 2025, Segari states that people wearing a MAGA hat should be shot:
Ok guys, so I would like to start a new movement called see MAGA [shoot] MAGA, because people like that respond to fear and terror and aggression not logic and empathy and I don't know, intelligence, it doesn't work for them so fear works so if we all get our guns and use our second amendment right and our common sense at this point this administration is begging us to rise up and revolt and you see somebody with a MAGA hat pew pew that's what we do, that's the way, it's the only way. Put them back in their basements, make them scared again to be racist, homophobic, and terrible just awful fucking pieces of shit because I would way rather live next to anyone other than MAGA people. MAGA people deserve to be terrified and scared to walk in the streets because they should know that real Americans are gonna [mouths the word "fucking"] kill them.
Segari balls her fist and points her index finger to mimic a firearm when saying, "see someone with a MAGA hat pew pew that's what we do."
The next day, Segari posted another video, continuing the same themes from the first:
See MAGA pew pew MAGA, see MAGA pew pew MAGA, see MAGA pew pew MAGA so these motherfuckers know we ain't here to play, you can't run around and fuck with our neighbors you can't be a homophobic piece of shit, you can't just be generally awful and be ok with kids getting ripped away from their moms and all these terrible things happening just because you think it won't happen to you even though anything that you allow your government to do to other people they will eventually do to you and that's why Trump is taking over in D.C. and we're living in a police state.
Segari continued to mimic a firearm when saying, "see MAGA pew pew MAGA." …
Segari contends that Section 875(c)'s prohibition on "any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another" limits its reach to threats directed at a singular, particular person but not threats against people or a "group of persons." …
Congress's use of "person of another" in Section 875(c) includes both the singular and plural form of person. This is simply good drafting. The formal rule adopted by Congress is "that unless the context indicates otherwise," "words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things." This semantic rule comports with "common sense and everyday linguistic experience." Scalia and Garner provide a good example: "'It is a misdemeanor for any person to set off a rocket within the city limits without a written license from the fire marshal' does not exempt from penalty someone who sets off two rockets or a string of 100." So too here. A threat to injure another person does not preclude from prosecution a threat to injure a group of persons.
Of course, the semantic rule of the singular-includes-the-plural yields when context indicates a different meaning, but none appears in Section 875(c). Instead, the context informs the reader that Section 875(c)'s use of "person of another" prohibits threats against other people, not against oneself….
Segari contends that Section 875(c) requires not only singularity, but also specificity of identity. Segari cites no caselaw for support nor explains what part of the text requires the degree of specificity that she demands. Regardless, it is properly the jury's prerogative to discern who the target of Segari's threat was and, relatedly, if the statement constituted a true threat against that target. See U.S. v. Khan (7th Cir. 2019) (rejecting a similar argument that the government failed to prove "the target of the alleged threats" when considering a sufficiency challenge to a Section 875(c) conviction for threats made to "targets," "college students," "people walking their dogs," and "truckers" "who happened to be in the wrong place (the defendant's defined 'free kill zone') at the wrong time").
And even if a case could present a threat that was so opaque and diffused that an identifiable target would be impossible, that is not this case. The government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude who Segari intended to threaten. Segari stated several times, "see MAGA, shoot MAGA," or "see MAGA, pew pew MAGA," and provided an example of how she would identify persons within that group: "you see somebody with a MAGA hat pew pew."
{A couple examples highlight why Segari's argument about Section 875(c) requiring singularity and specificity of the target cannot withstand scrutiny. Under her reasoning, each of the following defendants would be entitled to a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal. A Hamas member announces on social media, "see Jewish people, shoot Jewish people" and "if you see someone who is wearing a yarmulke, shoot them." Or a Ku Klux Klan member announces on social media, "see Black people, shoot Black people" and "if you see someone who looks Black, shoot them." These targets are numerous and differentiated, but both cases would properly remain a jury question.} …
Segari contends that her threats were "just too general in nature and not specific enough to be considered a 'true threat.'" By this she means that "generalized threats of violence" against members of "the MAGA movement—an incalculable and imprecise group of adherents of a political ideology" lack sufficient specificity to be a true threat, thus rendering her statements protected political speech. See also Mot. at 33 (pressing the view that her speech was "satirical" and "the mere advocacy of violence towards MAGA")….
"Whether a communication is a threat is a question of fact to be left to the jury." … Viewing the videos in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find that the evidence established that Segari's statements were true threats. In her first video, Segari's statement that "you see someone with a MAGA hat pew pew that's what we do … it's the only way," which she says while mimicking a firearm with her hand is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find her guilty. This is particularly so when she preceded the statement by noting that "fear works," and she referred to "get[ting] our guns."
Segari expounded on her threat by explaining that "MAGA people deserve to be terrified and scared to walk in the streets because they should know that real Americans are gonna [mouths the word "fucking"] kill them." In the second video, Segari repeats "see MAGA pew pew MAGA" multiple times while mimicking a firearm and then adds "so these motherfuckers know we ain't here to play." A reasonable jury could find that the statements in these videos were not satirical or "the mere advocacy of violence," and instead constituted a true threat.
As to whether the intended targets were too "incalculable and imprecise," Segari identifies the targets as the MAGA movement, and, in particular, people wearing a "MAGA hat." Segari's language of "see MAGA, shoot MAGA" similarly would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that she intended to target individuals who in their appearance identify as MAGA. A reasonable jury could conclude that the victims of her threat were not too general and unspecific to constitute a true threat….
The court cited U.S. v. Hussaini (S.D. Fla. 2022), which reached a similar result; an excerpt from Hussaini:
Mostafa Hussaini posted two videos on YouTube: in the first, he threatened to kill Christians by stabbing out their eyes with a knife; in the second, he promised to murder Black people by burning their bodies in a fire. After a concerned citizen brought the videos to law enforcement's attention, a grand jury in our District indicted Hussaini on two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which prohibits the transmission, in interstate or foreign commerce, of "any communication containing … any threat to injure the person of another."
It's … no surprise that the only federal circuit court of appeals to address [the] question … whether § 875(c) requires that the threat be directed at a specific individual or group … has squarely rejected Hussaini's position. See U.S. v. Cox (6th Cir. 1992) ("Cox would avoid responsibility under [§ 875(c)] by claiming that the alleged threat did not identify any specific person or group. We do not read the statute to be so limited, and Cox cites no cases that have placed this restrictive interpretation on the statute.")….
Hussaini's managed to dredge up only a single case—issued 26 years ago—by a district judge in Michigan. See U.S. v. Baker (E.D. Mich. 1995). In Baker, a college student was charged with violating § 875(c) for describing, in private emails to a friend, his violent fantasies—fantasies that included harming "a 13 or 14-year-old," injuring a "girl," and torturing a "petite and cute south American girl in one of my classes[.]" Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing (as Hussaini does here) that his private emails couldn't be construed as "true threats" because no specific person (or group of persons) was in fact threatened. The district judge agreed, noting that the emails did "not refer to a sufficiently specific class of targets." Baker thus "presented the rare case in which the language set forth in the indictment is so facially insufficient that it cannot possibly amount to a true threat." {The Sixth Circuit affirmed Baker, but on entirely different grounds.}
For two reasons, Baker cannot guide us here. First, it's the decision of a district court judge that no other federal court—at the trial or appellate levels—has ever followed. Second, the statements at issue in Baker were categorically different from ours in (at least) one critical respect. In Baker, remember, the defendant had exchanged private emails with a friend. And it seemed clear to the judge that the recipient of Baker's messages—the friend—had "apparently enjoyed" the exchange. Since the question in Baker (as here) was "how a reasonable person would expect" the recipient "to interpret the e-mail messages," the court easily concluded that "[i]t would be patently unreasonable after reading his messages to think that Baker's communications caused their only foreseeable recipient … to fear violence or caused him any disruption due to fear of violence." Here, by contrast, Hussaini posted his videos online for all to see. As we've explained, we have no idea who saw the videos, how those people perceived those videos, or whether their perceptions were reasonable in light of the circumstances in which they perceived them. Baker, then, is neither here nor there.
Michael Carl Sinacore represents the federal government in Segari.
