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"The Moving Property Problem in Fourth Amendment Law"
A new draft article, now posted.
I recently posted to SSRN a new draft article, The Moving Property Problem in Fourth Amendment Law, forthcoming in the Virginia Law Review. Here's the abstract:
The Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to require many location-specific rules. There are different rules for searching homes, cars, spaces near people, and at the border. The Fourth Amendment's place-based rules create a puzzle: What rules apply when property is moved from one place to another? Can the police expand their search powers by grabbing a person's property and moving it to a new place where protections are weaker? And can suspects impede investigations by moving their property to new places where protections are stronger?
This is the moving property problem of Fourth Amendment law. This Article identifies the moving property problem, shows that it is a recurring issue, and offers a framework for solving it. It links a range of cases that have not been linked before, and it shows how courts have often divided when faced with facts involving moving property. It then develops a two-part framework for how courts should solve moving property cases. First, courts should ask whether the movement is consistent with the rationales for the place-based rules of the starting and ending places. Second, courts should ask whether the movement itself was lawful, which should depend on whether the movement violated the Fourth Amendment or was the result of government coercion.
Comments welcome, as always.
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"Can the police expand their search powers by grabbing a person's property and moving it to a new place where protections are weaker? And can suspects impede investigations by moving their property to new places where protections are stronger?"
These do not seem to be symmetric questions; The property is, after all, the suspect's, (And NOT the police's!) and being entitled to move property from place to place is a normal part of property rights. While in order for the police to move the property to a new place, they must have already seized it, the very thing the protection is protection against.
"As these examples suggest, Fourth Amendment protection is
fundamentally place-based. "
As these examples suggest, the Supreme court has chosen, for whatever reason, to MAKE 4th amendment protection place-based. This doesn't imply the place based nature of the right as adjudicated by the Court is actually fundamental. The Court may have simply found place based rules more convenient.
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons , houses , papers , and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Rather, the right seems, textually, to be more ownership based than place based. It doesn't say anything to suggest that one's papers and effects are lacking protection if they're not on your person or in your house; Your person and your house are additional things that are protected, on account of your ownership of them.
4th amendment rights are fundamentally property rights, not place based rights, even if some places are themselves property.
I am, of course, discussing the right guaranteed by the amendment, not the right the Court has created in its place.
Your second point is the one that jumped out at me from the article - this place-based hodgepodge is the court's own doing and they could simply reverse that back to the simple text of the 4th Amendment.
However, Prof Kerr has said several times that he prefers to state the law as it is and avoids normative statements of what the law should be. So I can't fault him for staying true to that principle here as well.
No, I understand that. But he's not really avoiding a normative statement about the law, he has chosen a normative statement: That we should treat the rulings of courts as the law, rather than the enacted texts that the courts are supposed to be basing their rulings on.
The problem with doing that is that it renders it impossible to recognize when the courts have made a mistake, because whatever they rule becomes correct by definition.
This assumes, of course, that there is some universally understood meaning of texts that the courts are just trying to work around.
Which is obviously dumb. There's some judge-made law that seems to have very little basis in text (e.g., qualified immunity), but here we're very much talking about how to interpret some words. We know you don't like it, but the way our legal system works is that we generally try to keep using past interpretations of words so that there's some predictability in the outcome of cases. The BrettLaw system would not scale very well since there is only one Brett and also one day you're going to die and then we'll be stuck trying to guess WWBD.
Rossami,
The second half of the article is a normative statement of what the law should be.
As for your idea that "the simple text" of the Fourth Amendment should answer this, what answer does that simple text provide?
In addition to your comment being pure BrettLaw, you are not even correctly reading the Fourth Amendment, which protects only against unreasonable searches, not all of them.
I literally included the text of the amendment in my comment, you might notice. This might clue you in to the fact I know what it says.
Yes, OF COURSE the 4th amendment only protects against unreasonable searches. If it protected against all searches, there could be no searches. Nothing I said even suggests that ALL searches are protected against.
Perhaps you meant to distinguish between "searches" and "warrantless searches"?
The warrant serves two purposes in the 14th amendment.
1. It forces the reasonableness of searches to be evaluated by an at least nominally disinterested party prior to the search happening. But the warrant can be dispensed with under very limited circumstances, subject to an after the fact evaluation of reasonableness.
2. It serves to notify the target of the search that the government's agent is doing something legal, rather than committing home invasion and burglary. This is that property right orientation that the courts have read out of the amendment.
In the founding era an officer of the government who searched private property, or seized it, without either a warrant or exigent circumstances, was guilty of a criminal act, just as much as if a private citizen had forced their way into a home and taken something. And could legally be treated accordingly.
The warrant protected them from being perfectly legally shot as a burglar.
Nope. The mere fact that you cut and pasted the text does not mean you understand. The 4th amendment does not textually require warrants. It requires that searches be reasonable. Having a warrant is prima facie evidence of reasonableness, and so it also specifies what is necessary for the issuance of a warrant. That certain searches — for instance, of a home — are deemed inherently unreasonable without a warrant (except for various exigent circumstances) is historical judicial gloss on its text.
The issue Orin is discussing is not in any way resolved by reading the text of the 4th amendment, because the issue is whether searches in specific situations are reasonable despite the lack of warrant.
The right is described in terms of *unreasonable searches* but the protection is spelled out thusly
" no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Not the place OR things.
However, I don't think it likely that the authors really intended for this to be a game of cat and mouse.
I'm not understanding your point. That clause says the warrant has to identify the location(s) to be searched, not that the standards for a warrant are different depending on the location.
There appears to be a typo in the first sentence of the first full paragraph on p. 9: "...lower court rulings involving with defendants who moved property..." Shouldn't that "with" be deleted, so it's "rulings involving defendants"?
Another typo, p. 15, first full paragraph, second sentence: "...officers would wrong expand government power...". Shouldn't that be "wrongly"?
Same page, second full paragraph, second sentence: "...the government does need warrant..."; should be "a warrant"?
Question from this non-lawyer concerning Knight v. Jacobson, discussed on p. 16. An officer "ordered Knight to step outside" and, once Knight had obeyed, arrested him. Could Knight have legally declined to obey that order?
"In Newsom, that officers would wrong expand government power by forcing property to be returned to the place where the search would occur"
Should be "wrongly"?
(assuming you want typo's identified)
FWIW, I kinda disagree with State v. Steele. If I take a taxi, I don't want my luggage searched if the taxi driver gets arrested.
Thanks Professor Kerr. This is an issue that comes up, and judges should occasionally take a step back and look at the forest.
My only comment. In the Movement by Private Parties section, some of the judges seem to assume everyone is a criminal. The rules apply to everyone. Is it improper for an innocent person to thwart a government search? Isn’t it very human to move an item to a more private location (your home, your safe, your pockets) to protect its privacy? Textually, that seems to be a purpose of the Fourth Amendment. The ability of a person to keep something private in a private location—absent a judicial finding of probable cause.
"Searching a purse outside a car requires a warrant, but searching a purse inside a car does not. "
The fundamental flaw in legal precedent is that it's a conglomeration of different rulings in different cases with different facts.
The problem isn't that property is moving.
The problem is that legal precedent needs to be worded in such a way that even a cop can understand it.
Cops understand whether a purse is inside or outside the car. They don't understand how to differentiate between a driver consenting to the search of a car, and the driver consenting to the search of his passengers.
Do we really believe that a driver can consent to the search of a passenger's pockets? Purses are just fancy pockets.
Any sentient adult should be able to distinguish the two. Cops aren't held to that standard.
The article is infuriating (because of the underlying precedents, not because of the writing).
If there's an automobile exemption to the 4th amendment, why not a "walking exemption"? Or an "owning a car exemption"? Or a "living near a bus stop exemption"?
On the flip side, why on earth would a warrant to search someone's home not also extend to his laptop even if it's not currently located at his home?
This article illustrates how broken our laws are. Pulling someone over for speeding doesn't justify searching them for bootleg CDs. Yes, if you confiscate suspected contraband at the border you can ship it to a central location for investigation. No, you can't coerce someone at gunpoint. No, person A can't consent to a search of person B.
I'd suck as a judge. My opinions would be 3 sentences.
"On the flip side, why on earth would a warrant to search someone's home not also extend to his laptop even if it's not currently located at his home?"
Because it's a warrant to search his home, and "not at his home" isn't his home? Warrants are, constitutionally, supposed to be specific about where, what, who, because the founders had had their fill of "general warrants" that let somebody just poke their nose into or seize whatever they felt like.
p. 4: “old or new or old place” seems like a mistake.
p. 32: “The list of exceptions [..] include” - should be “includes”
p. 33: “‘particularly describe[e]’” - typo
p. 45: “placed-based” - typo