"Merely Correctly Advising … Daughter of Her Constitutional Rights Did Not Constitute … [Criminal O]bstruction … of a Governmental Function"

From today's decision in Keeton v. State, written by Arkansas Court of Appeals Judge Cindy Grace Thyer, joined by Judges Brandon Harrison and Casey Tucker:

Appellant Doralee Keeton was found guilty by a Dallas County jury of one count of obstructing governmental operations, a Class C misdemeanor, and sentenced to pay a $500 fine….

Police had come to the home of Doralee's daughter, Madeline, to arrest her for possession of methamphetamine, but Keeton had apparently talked to Madeline on the phone and "told her don't answer the door. They don't have a no-knock [warrant]." (It may be that she just meant that they didn't have a warrant.) This led to Keeton being prosecuted, but the court reversed the conviction:

A person commits the offense of obstructing governmental operations if the person knowingly obstructs, impairs, or hinders the performance of any governmental function. "Governmental function" means any activity that a public servant is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of any governmental unit he or she serves.

Arkansas case law appears to require actual interference with law enforcement officers or government activities in order to sustain a conviction for obstruction of governmental operations. For example, in Kelley v. State (Ark. App. 2001), this court affirmed an obstruction conviction when the defendant caused a physical disruption to officers who were attempting to administer a field-sobriety test to another individual by shouting, physically approaching the officers, and fleeing back into his home. The officers testified that Kelley's actions hindered their ability to administer the field-sobriety test and interfered with the officers' ability to provide backup for each other. This court held that Kelley's actions "obstructed, impaired, and hindered the officers' ability to perform their governmental functions as law enforcement officers during the investigation of a DWI traffic stop."

In RB v. State (Ark. App. 2013), the appellant, a juvenile, was convicted of obstructing governmental operations after he repeatedly refused orders from a law enforcement officer to return to his room in a detention facility. The officer testified that RB resisted her orders for at least two hours and that she eventually had to call for back-up officers from the adult detention facility to assist her. This court held that RB's refusal "obstructed [the officer's] ability to secure the [juvenile detention] facility for the evening and impaired the orderly function of the detention center."

The State relies on Gordin v. State (Ark. App. 2021) as holding that the defendant's attempt to alert her brother that officers were outside his residence to serve a warrant constituted substantial evidence to support a conviction for obstructing governmental operations. The defendant in Gordin, however, actively engaged with the law enforcement officers, blocking her brother's driveway and honking her car horn repeatedly to alert her brother that officers were approaching and give him time to escape. This supports the conclusion that actual interference with law enforcement or governmental operations on the part of the defendant is required under our obstruction statute.

Here, by way of contrast, by the officers' own testimony, there was absolutely no contact between them and Keeton. The governmental function that the State alleged was obstructed was the service of the arrest warrant on Madeline. Keeton did not take any action to obstruct, impair, or hinder the officers from approaching the house and attempting to make contact with Madeline in order to serve that warrant….

Keeton spoke to Madeline—not the officers––and told her that she did not have to open the door if the officers did not have a search warrant. Merely correctly advising her daughter of her constitutional rights did not constitute the knowing obstruction, impairment, or hindrance of a governmental function required by section 5-54-102. Providing such advice is not physically interfering with police activities, or preventing officers from performing lawful duties. See RB, supra….

Because we reverse on Keeton's first argument, it is unnecessary to reach Keeton's First Amendment argument ….

S.L. Smith (The Firm, PLLC) represents Keeton.

Comments

[John F. Carr]

As far as the federal constitution is concerned, an arrest warrant for Madeline is as good as a search warrant to enter Madeline's house and arrest her. But the police in Arkansas went back to get a search warrant after she refused to open the door.

[MollyGodiva]

Holy hell it is scary that the case went that far. The judge should have dismissed the charges right off the bat.

[wvattorney13]

I agree with the outcome on these facts. I think it is a different case if the mother was present and instructing the daughter.

I was once of the opinion that these obstruction statutes should be all struck down as unconstitutional for vagueness, free speech or other issues. I am slowly changing after seeing more modern police videos with people insisting that they have the right to stick phones in an officer's face while the officer is trying to cuff them, scream 3 feet away from an officer's face, scream "I can't breathe" when the encounter is not to one's liking, and roll up on a traffic stop and loudly demand answers repeatedly or fill the detainee's head with Sov Cit advice.

The internet is not always a good thing.

[Soronel Haetir]

You think it should matter that the mother was on the phone rather than standing beside the daughter inside the closed door? As long as the mother does not push on the door trying to keep it closed I do not see that difference making a difference.