The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
Justice Thomas, Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Argue for Broader Scope of Constitutional Ban on Ex Post Facto Laws
Brief excerpts from today's concurrence in Ellingburg v. U.S., though the whole opinion is worth a read:
I join the Court's opinion in full because it correctly applies our precedent. I write separately to clarify the foundation of that precedent. This Court's 1798 decision in Calder v. Bull established that the Ex Post Facto Clauses forbid only those retroactive laws that impose "punishment" for a "crime." Over the 228 years since Calder, the Court has struggled to articulate what it means for a law to impose punishment for a crime, and thus to be subject to the Ex Post Facto Clauses.
The Court's more recent precedents have implemented Calder through two multifactor tests that turn largely on whether the legislature labels the law as criminal or civil. But in 1798, "punishment" for a "crime" would have been understood to refer to any coercive penalty for a public wrong. Many laws that are nominally civil today would therefore have been subject to the Ex Post Facto Clauses under Calder. I would restore Calder's approach to the Ex Post Facto Clauses….
Calder's understanding secures Ex Post Facto Clause protection in a wide range of contexts involving nominally civil laws. Those contexts include civil proceedings seeking fines for public offenses. See, e.g., Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co. (2016) (describing "civil penalties of up to $37,500 for each day [the challenger] violated the Act"). They include enforcement proceedings brought by administrative agencies. See Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC, 598 U. S. 175, 196 (2023) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the 20th-century rise of such proceedings). And they include municipal sanctions like speeding tickets. "If one were to commit a minor traffic offense at a time the offense was to be punished by a $25 fine, and the government were to then amend the statute and impose a fine of $1,000,000 dollars, it would be nonsensical to treat that fine as non-punitive simply because the offense was processed civilly." Brief for Professor Beth Colgan as Amicus Curiae. Because all of these offenses impose punishments for public wrongs, Calder would treat them all as subject to the Ex Post Facto Clauses.
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please to post comments
This ex post facto jurisprudence has the similar flaws as the double jeopardy jurisprudence.
Renaming a criminal fine as a civil fine doesnt make the criminal fine a civil fine. Its just a game to circumvent the direct language of the constitution
Same with the double jeopardy - See gorsuch dissent in Gamble.
In both cases it's just an excuse to negate an inconvenient prohibition in the Constitution. The Court does that a lot, the Constitution is littered with words and phrases the Court has found some excuse to deny effect.
Agreed - long history of cases that limit ex post facto law changes to criminal law changes, though little or nothing in the historical record that the ex post facto law would be limited to the criminal arena. I could be wrong on that point, so I would welcome anyone that has better information.
I suspect that in 8-10, the SC will have an opportunity to revisit the ex post facto clause. The big beautiful tax bill added a provision that changed the statute of limitations date for filing refund claims for the employer retention credit back to Jan 2025. Quite a few refund claims were timely filed in the summer of 2025 and were valid refund claims when filed. The change in statute date made those timely filed claim late and thus ineligible for refunds.
I expect a case on this issue getting to the SC.
Its possibly a taking since, the refund is a valid asset (receivable) of the taxpayer once timely filed.
"[T]he Constitution is littered with words and phrases the Court has found some excuse to deny effect."
The Double Jeopardy Clause says, "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...." Why does it not only apply to crimes where the punishment is the loss of life or a limb? By its terms, it doesn't apply to fines or prison sentences. Likewise, why doesn't it allow successive convictions as long as the second isn't punished by the loss of life or limb?
And "life or limb" wasn't just a turn of phrase. At the Founding, felonies could be punished by death or the cutting off of a limb.
Renaming a criminal fine as a civil fine doesnt make the criminal fine a civil fine.
See also "civil asset forfeiture"
Thomas has expressed his displeasure with the lack of due process with civil asset forfietures.
The application to the Lautenberg amendment is pretty obvious. It not only deprived those convicted of crimes of domestic violence after enactment of their right to keep and bear arms, it did so for people who had been convicted prior to its enactment.
The most classic case imaginable of changing the penalty for a crime after the crime was committed, even after the conviction. In many of these cases, people had plead guilty simply because the only penalty was a fine, and paying the fine had been cheaper than contesting the charge.
The Court upheld this ex post facto application on the grounds that being deprived of the right to gun ownership was a mere "civil disability" rather than a criminal penalty... A pretty difficult to defend stance even before Heller, but I don't see how it can survive admitting that gun ownership is an actual constitutional right.
I’d like to see an argument on the other side, that conviction of say domestic violence precluded one from working around children in any capacity, as an absolute lifetime ban. Or that any psych commitment with serve a lifetime ban against having an abortion, with a very same rationale that it is a lifetime ban against gun ownership.
And while we’re at it, why not make a drug conviction a lifetime band against having a drivers license? Lord knows we have a real problem with drugged drivers, it’s a way bigger a problem than alcohol at this point, although a lot do both.
Likewise, a lifetime ban on driving for anyone diagnosed with anger, management or defiance disorder disabilities. Clearly such drive as a dangerous….
Or if you really wanna go into the woods, mandatory sterilization for any woman convicted of child abuse. Civil rights be damned….
But guns are somehow different…
I don't think this would solve the problem, fwiw. The civil/criminal divide might be a factor, but the Second Amendment question would dominate regardless. If the Second Amendment allows the prohibition of firearms for people who possess certain characteristics or have committed certain acts, the legislation is merely banning the possession of firearms for those individuals. Even if the law at the time the person committed the offense was different, it's not an automatic effect of the criminal conviction. For example, a person could commit a crime in State A, which would make them ineligible to possess a firearm in State B. There's no Ex Post Factor issue under those circumstances even if the person who entered a guilty plea in State A had no reason to be aware of the consequences in State B.
The fundamental problem is that, once you admit that the right to keep and bear arms really IS a genuine, full blown, not 2nd class, constitutional right, it becomes very hard to dismiss stripping somebody of it as just a "civil disability".
Which was the justification for not admitting that it invoked the double jeopardy clause.
I’d like to see a due process challenge to criminal offenses being charged as civil ones.
In theory, civil law is a trial between two parties who are equal before the law. Such is not the case with civil offenses for two reasons first, the state can hide behind sovereign immunity, and second the state has the means to collect that a private account doesn’t have.
Let’s take a speeding ticket in Massachusetts. In order to even get a hearing before the clerk magistrate you have to pay $25 and that is essentially pro forma because the officers report is considered an impeachable evidence, from an officer who isn’t even present. In order to get an actual trial, you’re paying an additional hundred dollars.
And if you win, you don’t get this $125 back from the losing party.
So much for the provision of the state Constitution that says trust shall be free, but I digress.
And Gideon doesn’t apply to civil proceedings. Other rights don’t apply either.
Hence, I’d like to see an explanation as to why this isn’t the state playing both ends against the middle. Exercising state authority on the one hand while using a proceeding where it is intended on the other.
I do think that approach would be an improvement, although not without flaws. The current approach, which seems to turn on labels (or, worse yet, intended labels) strips a Constitutional right of its teeth (I think Blockburger as a statutory construction rule is another).
I think there is a separate issue about what part is a punishment. Imprisonment and fines seem easy. Administrative suspensions of licenses would be more difficult. I had a case where the law change would require an ignition interlock of a vehicle for those requesting restricted licenses after being suspended for DUIs. A DUI is obviously criminal. The license suspension is more ambiguous. What about required terms in order to get a restricted license? Is that part of the punishment? It was DUI-specific (restricted licenses on other charges did not require it), but it was two steps removed from incarceration and fines at that point.
So, long story short, it doesn't resolve all problems but might be a step in the right direction.
I would think the major civil/criminal distinction is that criminal offenses carry the possibility of consequences beyond just a monetary fine (even if those consequences are not actually applied in a particular case). Possibility of jail term, restrictions on freedom of movement, criminal offenses carry a huge range of potential non-monetary penalties.
Prediction: The disgraceful sex offender registry laws will fall in the next five years, and not a moment too soon.