UW Professor's Parody of Land Acknowledgment in Class Syllabus Protected by First Amendment

"[I]n the public university setting, student disagreement with a professor's academic speech on an issue of public concern cannot alter the Pickering analysis in the government's favor."

A short excerpt from today's long Ninth Circuit decision in Reges v. Cauce, written by Judge Daniel Bress and joined by Judge Milan Smith (note that the university apparently didn't argue that the speech was unprotected because it was off-topic for a computer science class, presumably because the university itself had encouraged non-parody land acknowledgments in such syllabuses):

A public university investigated, reprimanded, and threatened to discipline a professor for contentious statements he made in a class syllabus. The statements, which mocked the university's model syllabus statement on an issue of public concern, caused offense in the university community. Yet debate and disagreement are hallmarks of higher education. Student discomfort with a professor's views can prompt discussion and disapproval. But this discomfort is not grounds for the university retaliating against the professor….

In 2019, the Allen School [of Computer Science & Engineering at the University of Washington] revised its "Best Practices for Inclusive Teaching" to recommend that instructors include an "Indigenous Land Acknowledgement" in their course syllabi. This document offered UW's official land acknowledgment as an example, while making clear that its suggestions were "not prescriptions," but only "ideas" intended to help faculty be "more effective teacher[s] and better role model[s] for more of your students."

Professor Reges viewed UW's land acknowledgment, and the recommendation to include it in syllabi, as a political statement. Reges believes that land acknowledgments are part of "an agenda of 'diversity, equity, and inclusion' that treats some groups of students as more deserving of recognition and welcome than others on account of their race or other immutable characteristic." He therefore did not think it was appropriate for the Allen School to recommend the inclusion of this "political statement" in syllabi. Reges also disagreed with the factual premise of the land acknowledgment, as he believed that "most of the land currently occupied by UW was densely forested before the land was cleared to make way for the campus." He thought the land acknowledgment expressed "that UW's presence is somehow illegitimate, shameful, morally wrong, or unlawful," and considered it "an empty, performative act of moralism" ripe for parody….

On January 3, 2022, the first day of UW's Winter Quarter, Reges met with his Computer Science and Engineering 143: Computer Programming II (CSE 143) class in an online session. This introductory course is required for certain majors and included roughly 500 students. During the session, students accessed Reges's syllabus, which contained the following statement: "I acknowledge that by the labor theory of property the Coast Salish people can claim historical ownership of almost none of the land currently occupied by the University of Washington." Although Reges briefly mentioned the statement during class, it appears most students did not notice it at the time.

This led to an uproar, which is described in much more detail in the opinion. That in turn led to the university's "opening a lengthy disciplinary investigation (during which a merit pay increase was withheld), reprimanding Reges, and threatening him with further discipline—plainly qualifies as adverse employment action under our precedents."

Reges sued, claiming that this constituted unconstitutional retaliation based on his First-Amendment-protected speech. The panel concluded that the First Amendment presumptively protects a university professor's speech while teaching (it had settled that general question in Demers v. Austin (9th Cir. 2014)). And while such speech, like other government employee speech that's presumptively protected by the First Amendment, could be restricted under the so-called "Pickering balancing test" (named after Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. (1968)), that test had to be applied in an especially speech-protective way in a public university:

Under Pickering, … we … assess whether "the employee's interest 'in commenting upon matters of public concern' … outweigh[s] 'the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.'" …

In a standard Pickering inquiry, we consider the fact that "government employers have a strong interest in prohibiting speech by their employees that impairs close working relationships among co-workers, impedes performance of the speaker's job duties, interferes with the effective functioning of the employer's operations, or undermines the employer's mission." But "the Pickering analysis 'requires a fact-sensitive, context-specific balancing of competing interests.'" What counts as a legitimate administrative interest in managing a police department, for example, does not necessarily carry over to the public university setting.

We have already recognized that in the context of higher education, the government does not have the same interest in maintaining "close working relationship[s]" between professors and university leadership, because "anyone who has spent time on college campuses knows that the vigorous exchange of ideas and resulting tension between an administration and its faculty is as much a part of college life as homecoming and final exams." Given the vital First Amendment interest in promoting the free exchange of ideas in the university setting, this insight about Pickering's application in the university context extends to relationships within the university more broadly.

In this case, it is readily apparent that the disruption that occurred at UW after Reges included his land acknowledgment in his Winter 2022 syllabus is attributable to one irreducible source: student discomfort and anger with Reges's views. It is unclear from the record whether the complaints were limited to a relatively small subset of the student population. Some of the written complaints may have been prompted by the Allen School's own possible solicitation of student complaints.

But the larger point is that in the public university setting, student disagreement with a professor's academic speech on an issue of public concern cannot alter the Pickering analysis in the government's favor. The reason is foundational: the First Amendment's protections for academic freedom in public universities will necessarily lead to disagreements on campus. Student unrest is an inevitable byproduct of our core First Amendment safeguards in the higher education context. This unrest therefore cannot be the type of disruption that permits restricting or punishing a professor's academic speech.

Higher education may reaffirm students' perspectives, but it can also challenge them. And to have one's views challenged can be unsettling. But that is the very nature of the public university experience under a First Amendment that reflects "this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom."

If student anxiety or outrage toward a professor's academic speech could justify restricting what a professor says, then universities would cease to occupy any "special niche" in our First Amendment traditions. Student discontent that leads university administrators to censor professors would "cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." And the tides of popular campus sentiment would drown out dissenting viewpoints, with the adverse reactions of students and staff operating as an impermissible "heckler's veto" that restricts speech based on a hostile audience reaction.

If criticizing land acknowledgments creates disruption on campus and warrants investigation and reprimand, what other views would cause offense and be excluded next? All of this would be contrary to long-established First Amendment precedents, which protect academic freedom to promote the development of ideas and expose students to a range of views.

Under Pickering, therefore, avoiding the disruption on college campuses "that necessarily accompanies controversial speech" cannot justify the suppression of the very diversity of views that is central to the mission of higher education. Some types of government employers depend on command and control. But under the First Amendment, a public university's oversight of academic speech lacks any comparable justification…. "[T]he desire to maintain a sedate academic environment, 'to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint,' is not an interest sufficiently compelling … to justify limitations on a teacher's freedom to express himself on political issues in vigorous, argumentative, unmeasured, and even distinctly unpleasant terms." …

The dissent's focus on student "distress" fails for the same reason, as it would allow students' emotional reactions to academic speech to "cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." Although the dissent would hold that universities can retaliate against professors for their academic speech when it causes "distress" that impacts "student learning," exposure to views that distress and offend is a form of education unto itself. As the Supreme Court has said, "[t]he Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through any kind of authoritative selection." The dissent would seemingly grant college students the power to restrict their professors' academic speech in the name of avoiding distress—a surefire way to silence unpopular or controversial speech that the First Amendment robustly protects….

UW nevertheless argues that it relied on more tangible forms of disruption beyond student unrest, such as Native students dropping out or taking leaves of absence, greater difficulties recruiting Native students, and students in Reges's computer science course switching to the other section that the Allen School made available. Our fine dissenting colleague raises some of these same points. But all these forms of disruption are just further manifestations of on-campus disagreement with the message in Reges's syllabus statement and the way Reges communicated his views. For the reasons we have just explained, these disruptions cannot alter our Pickering calculus.

On this record, the alleged disruption also suffers from problems of proof. Under Pickering, speech "is disruptive only when there is an 'actual, material and substantial disruption, or there are reasonable predictions of disruption in the workplace.'" Even setting aside that the disruption that invariably accompanies controversial academic speech is insufficient, UW's claims of more tangible disruption are inadequately substantiated. [Details omitted. -EV]

Judge Sidney Thomas dissented as to the application of the Pickering balance:

The disruption Reges's speech caused to Native students' learning outweighed his own First Amendment interests…. Educating and enrolling Native students is a core part of the University's "mission," as well as the "effective functioning" of its "operations." Universities have a responsibility to educate all their students. American universities, especially in the West, have a special responsibility to their Native students.

The University has repeatedly acknowledged this responsibility. The University has a memorandum of understanding with regional tribes, which commits the University to, among other things, "[e]nhance efforts to recruit, retain[,] and successfully graduate more American Indian undergraduate, graduate and professional students." The University's Office of Tribal Relations has said that "it is important for the University of Washington to work together to develop strong working relationships with tribal citizens and leaders. Existing relationships between the UW and certain tribal communities have demonstrated benefits for both sides including sharing knowledge, research opportunities, and educational opportunities for tribal members and descendants." And of course, the University has its own land acknowledgment, which it developed in consultation with tribal leaders throughout the state and region.

Reges's "land acknowledgment" disrupted student learning, especially for Native students. Students reported that "they will not attend class or will be dropping [Reges's] course rather than take the course." One Native student took a leave of absence, in significant part because of Reges's statement. To be sure, as the majority notes, this student had other reasons for taking leave. But Reges's "land acknowledgment" was one of the primary reasons that student stopped receiving an education. As any educator knows, students cannot be educated when they are absent.

Moreover, several students, in written complaints, showed how Reges went beyond offense to threaten their learning: "this whole incident has made me feel so directly despised and unsafe that I'm certain if I hadn't transferred in I wouldn't be at the Paul Allen school right now"; "I am intimidated and already do not feel welcome in this class, nor do I feel like I will be supported and led to be successful in this required course for my major." The University noted that the volume of written complaints was "unprecedented." Based on all this information, the University reasonably concluded that there was "significant impact" to the "morale of Native American students, and their learning." That is a disruption to the University's ability to educate its Native students.

It also matters that Reges included the statement on a syllabus for a fundamentals of computer science class. That is part of the "context" of the statement. Reges has not argued that the propriety of land acknowledgments on syllabi is remotely related to the fundamentals of computer science. The University has an interest in their students learning about topics related to their classes, rather than engaging in whatever controversial discussion their professor feels like having; that interest is part of the University's interest in the "effective functioning" of its educational curriculum.

The majority suggests that this kind of disruption to student learning is categorically inadequate to outweigh a professor's speech interests. It holds that "[t]his [student] unrest … cannot be the type of disruption that permits restricting or punishing a professor's academic speech," and it reasons that "First Amendment protection that rises and falls depending on how upset students become at a professor's message is little protection at all."

There are good reasons to be concerned about student unrest becoming a heckler's veto. But student learning is the heart of any university's mission, and it is common sense that students do not learn well when they experience extreme distress, as happened here. In a case like this, where student unrest went beyond mere offense and rose to the level of distress and absences, and where the University's particular responsibility to Native students is implicated, such disruption can outweigh a professor's speech interests….

The University also reasonably predicted that Reges's "land acknowledgment" would disrupt enrollment of Native students. A current Native student complained that they would never have enrolled had they seen Reges's statement. The University's diversity and access recruiter noted that Reges's "land acknowledgment" undermined her operations: "How am I supposed to recruit students into an environment where their history is questioned and their rights are denied?" Contrary to the majority's reasoning, the predicted disruption to enrollment was not mere "speculation." The current students' statements, along with the "unprecedented" volume of complaints, make the prediction of disruption reasonable.

In sum, the actual and reasonably anticipated disruption to the University's education and enrollment of Native students was significant….

Joshua Bleisch, Ronald London, Sara Berinhout, and James Diaz (Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression) and Carl J. Marquardt represent Reges.