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Judge's Having Referred Lawyer to State Bar for Alleged AI Hallucinations Doesn't Require Judge to Recuse
From Friday's order by Judge William Ray (N.D. Ga.) in Boston v. Williams:
The Plaintiffs, acting through their attorney Loletha Denise Hale ("Attorney Hale"), have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's granting of summary judgment to the Defendant on the Plaintiffs' Complaint against him. The basis for the Court's granting summary judgment was that the Plaintiffs, through the inaction of their attorney, did not display the due diligence required under Georgia law to serve the Defendant with the Complaint within the applicable statute of limitations….
Rather than simply appealing that ruling, which the Plaintiffs have every right to do, Plaintiffs now asks the Court to reconsider it on the basis of their previous argument that the Court is biased against them due to the Court's alleged bias against their lawyer, Attorney Hale. Their claim in that regard is centered on comments that the Court made at the oral argument on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, a little review of the case history is in order.
The Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. And, in preparing for oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court read that brief, wherein Attorney Hale wrote (and cited case authority for the proposition) that the issue as to whether the Plaintiffs exercised due diligence in their efforts to serve the Defendant with process was a question of fact for the jury to decide.
This argument was interesting and very strange. In the Presiding Judge's 35 years [by "Presiding Judge," the judge presumably means himself -EV] as a member of the State Bar of Georgia, 23 which have been as a judge at the State and Federal level, it had always been his understanding that the issue of diligence in service efforts was one for the Court, not for a jury. But, as the Plaintiffs cited case precedent for this proposition, the Presiding Judge read the cited authority to see if the Plaintiffs might be right (and whether the Presiding Judge might be wrong).
Upon reading the case, it was clear that it was the Plaintiffs (or rather, Attorney Hale) who were wrong. As the Defendant pointed out in his Reply Brief, an overwhelming number of the cases cited throughout the Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment either were completely fabricated/hallucinated or did not stand for the proposition for which they were cited. In other words, they were fake.
At the ensuing oral argument, Attorney Hale's explanation for the situation was just as bad: she admitted that the original brief she filed included many misrepresentations, but she contended her only mistake was filing the wrong brief. Attorney Hale represented to the Court that the original brief was drafted by her daughter (who does not appear to be an attorney) using AI. Attorney Hale contended that her daughter was helping her, as Attorney Hale was indisposed due to health issues of a friend. Attorney Hale contended that she had prepared another, real brief without false or fraudulent cases, but that she mistakenly filed with the Court the one that her daughter drafted for her that contained the AI hallucinations.
This explanation was concerning to the Court. Not only had Attorney Hale filed a brief which was rife with misstatements of the law, but also she was admitting that she had her non-attorney daughter draft it for her. The Presiding Judge certainly did express his belief that her actions may have violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, at that hearing the Presiding Judge also articulated that he was particularly surprised that Attorney Hale would submit such a grievously fraudulent pleading given a previous occasion where Attorney Hale, then as a plaintiff in a case, had provided testimony in a jury trial before the same Presiding Judge that she later admitted was misleading and/or untrue.
The argument on the merits of the Motion for Summary Judgment fared no better for the Plaintiffs, as it was clear that the Court likely would grant the Defendant's motion, although the Court reserved ruling. The Court also issued a show cause notice on September 8th of a possible Rule 11 violation by Attorney Hale and scheduled a hearing thereon to occur on September 29, 2025. Coincidentally (or not), the Plaintiffs thereafter filed a Motion to Recuse the Presiding Judge. The Court denied that motion in an order dated September 23, 2025.
The Rule 11 Show Cause hearing wasn't particularly illuminating in explaining how the bad brief with fraudulent case cites came about, as Attorney Hale presented no evidence, such as having her daughter testify about the drafting of the brief. She also declined to make much of an argument in her defense, claiming she would rest on the record. Her basic position and tone were that the Presiding Judge was being unfair and that this was much ado about nothing.
The Court issued an order on October 28, 2025, finding that Attorney Hale had, indeed, committed a Rule 11 violation. The Court exercised its discretion not to levy a fine against Attorney Hale, but did sanction her by requiring her to notify [existing] clients of the violation and also requiring her to file a notice of the violation in any case in which she appeared as counsel in the Northern District of Georgia for the next 5 years. [The Court later granted summary judgment.] …
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Granting Summary Judgment is largely a repackaging of the arguments which the Plaintiffs previously have made that the Presiding Judge should have recused himself and why the Defendant wasn't entitled to summary judgment on the service issue. What is new, however, it that the Plaintiffs point to a recent complaint lodged against Attorney Hale by the State Bar of Georgia regarding her filing of the AI infected brief with the Court. The Plaintiffs claim that the Presiding Judge filed a bar complaint against Attorney Hale, which allegedly further supports their position that the Presiding Judge should not have decided the merits of the Motion for Summary Judgment….
In hindsight, perhaps it would have been more advisable for the Court not to have sent the Rule 11 Order to the State Bar until after the forthcoming appeal in this case is decided. But, at the time that the Court sent the order to the State Bar, it had already issued summary judgment to the Defendant, there were no pending matters in this case, and the case had been terminated in the Court's records.
In the Court's view, the actions of Attorney Hale of filing a brief loaded with hallucinated cases and incorrect statements of the law (in addition to having a non-attorney draft the brief) in an effort to convince the Court to rule in favor of the Plaintiffs on the Motion for Summary Judgment warranted investigation by the State Bar. Honesty of attorneys appearing before the Federal and State courts of Georgia is not a trivial matter.
The Court was also mindful of Rule 8.3(a) of the Code of Professional Conduct applicable to lawyers in this state, which states that "[a] lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, should inform the appropriate professional authority." Given that appeals can take anywhere from 6 months to a year or longer to get a ruling, giving notice to the State Bar of this issue when the Presiding Judge did seem appropriate.
This Court denies the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Vacate Judgment. It contains the "same old - same old" allegations, supplemented only by the additional fact that the Court forwarded its Order on the Rule 11 violations to the State Bar, an act that the Presiding Judge believed he was obligated by ethical considerations to do.
In closing, it's not lost on the Court that the filing of this current motion drips with irony, as the Plaintiffs are arguing that the Presiding Judge cannot be fair (or that at least the situation presents an appearance of a conflict of interest). Yet, the Plaintiffs seek another ruling from the Presiding Judge, which is seemingly acceptable—as long as it's in their favor. They can't have it both ways.
In any event, the best course going forward is for this matter to end in the District Court and for the Plaintiffs to take their grievances to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. If the Circuit Court agrees with the Plaintiffs and disagrees with this Court's judgment, either in how it handled this matter procedurally or in how it resolved the Motion for Summary Judgment, that is ok. This Court has no interest in this case, other than it should be decided fairly pursuant to the substantive law and consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure….
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"she contended her only mistake was filing the wrong brief"
Then she must have the right brief ready to file. She must have had it ready to file when opposing counsel pointed out the errors in the AI brief.
Wait, you mean lawyers lie?
[Faints on the couch.]
That has to be what sunk her. If her good brief/bad brief story was true, at the very least she would have submitted the good brief along with metadata showing when it was written (i.e., establishing that she didn't just write it after the fact). But at the show cause hearing, she apparently didn't submit the alleged "good brief" or present sworn testimony from her daughter, who supposedly drafted the bad one. So it seems highly likely the good brief/bad brief story was false.
No, the notion that she didn't offer the "good brief" is incorrect. From a review of the docket, here's the timeline:
July 16: Defendant files its summary judgment motion.
August 5: She files her opposition brief.
August 13: Defendant files a reply brief, accusing her of making stuff up.
August 19: She files a motion to substitute a different brief, claiming that she had prepared several versions of the brief; that she had inadvertently filed the wrong one because she was dealing with a laundry list of personal issues; and that she only realized her mistake when she read the reply brief. She does attach a copy of this "good brief."
August 27: There's a hearing on the summary judgment motion, at which time she offers the "my daughter did it" excuse.
September 8: Judge issues order to show cause, setting it for 9/29.
September 12: She throws the hail mary of trying to recuse the judge.
September 23: hail mary fails.
September 29: order to show cause hearing. She apparently presents no evidence.
Now, I have no way to know whether she wrote the "good brief" only after she was caught — at no time did she offer metadata or her daughter's testimony, and the "good brief" was dated 8/19, the date it was submitted, rather than 8/5, the date it was supposedly originally completed — but she didn't just handwave about its existence.
The Judge wrote "[i]n hindsight, perhaps it would have been more advisable for the Court not to have sent the Rule 11 Order to the State Bar until after the forthcoming appeal in this case is decided." I think that's wrong.
The point of lawyer discipline is to protect the public. Regardless of the merits of the case and its prospects on appeal, it is abundantly clear that discipline is warranted. Thus, it is better to initiate that process right away than to wait months (or years) for the appeal to wind up. If the GA bar wants to stay a decision on the disciplinary matter pending the outcome of the appeal, it can always do so. But the judge was correct to make the report promptly, regardless of any pending appeal.
I agree. The right social answer is to sanction bad lawyers out of existence as soon as possible. Allowing them to continue to waste resources, even in current cases, is bad or everyone including the current plaintiff(s).
That does raise the potential for bad-faith accusations in disciplinary hearings resulting in rework - but that same rework risk is present to an even larger degree if a mere disciplinary report is enough to force a judge to recuse.
I also agree. I suppose their are limits to what a judge should say to third parties about attorneys appearing before them in active cases, but providing the bar association with an order already filed on the public docket doesn’t seem in any way improper.
The judge was contacted by the bar association and provided, at their request, “an excerpt from the previous matter where Attorney Hale was the plaintiff and had testified untruthfully before a federal jury.” Presumably the bar association made the request because judge mentioned the untruthful testimony at during the Rule 11 hearing, and the bar association read the transcript.
The Court has already sanctioned Ms. Hale. I believe the Ms. Hale had the option of appealing the sanctions, but the filing deadline has passed. Having failed to establish that the sanctions were themselves the result of bias, it’s hard to see how Ms. Hale has any basis for challenging basic cooperation with the bar association.
Seems right to me, although I'm baffled that the judge is annoyed that they requested reconsideration prior to appeal.
"Rather than simply appealing that ruling, which the Plaintiffs have every right to do, Plaintiffs now asks the Court to reconsider it "
They had exactly the same right to request reconsideration as they did for appeal. And I'm not sure in what world an appeal is simpler than requesting reconsideration. The judge waxes on about how he won't mind if they appeal, but he sure didn't take the reconsideration motion well.
If this is how the judge comports himself, it's no wonder they think he's biased. He sounds like a bit of a drama queen. Don't get me wrong, in the end there's a statute of limitations and a date of service and if those aren't in the correct order then of course the complaint gets dismissed.
They want the judge to reconsider because they think he's so biased against them that he won't render a fair decision. If they're right in their request for reconsideration, then there's no chance the biased judge will grant their request. On the other hand, if they're wrong in their request and the judge is unbiased, then the judge also shouldn't grant their request. In other words, by their own theory of the case (at least as it applies to this request), there is no way to get the relief they want. They're just wasting everyone's time. Yeah, I'd be pissed at having to deal with a self-contradictory filing, too.
On the other hand, their theory of the request could work in an appeal - and while they can waste their own lawyer dollars however they like, they have no inherent right to demand that the rest of us go along with their silliness.
Reconsideration is not (supposed to be) a substitute for an appeal. Reconsideration is only supposed to be when there's newly discovered evidence (that couldn't have been timely discovered with diligence) or a change in the law. It's not an "Are you sure? Don't you want to rethink your original decision?" An appeal, on the other hand, is the proper procedure for saying, "The judge misapplied the law."
Their claim is, "You're biased so you shouldn't even be allowed to hear the case." So what sense does a motion for reconsideration make?
Or manifest error, as alleged. Funny that you left out the justification used in this case, almost as though you were being deliberately dishonest. The sense of it is that it's something you're allowed to do that could in theory work. I mean, the appeal is going to be a loser too, but if the client wants you to try every tack then you try every tack.
Part of the ideal judicial temperament means not getting snarky even when annoyed. Judges gotta keep an even keel when dealing with all kinds of bullshit. This guy is hanging by a thread.
This opinion could have been written more simply. PREjudice (with enphasis on the pre- is an opinion formed BEFORE somebody comes into court. Opinions formed based on evidence observed in court itself are never prejudice. They are judgements.
This is another "What were they thinking?" moment.
I'm gonna go ahead and suggest that maybe this person does not have the mental character to be a particularly competent lawyer.
https://www.news-daily.com/news/attorney-arrested-for-terroristic-threats-toward-client-s-husband/article_df5540ab-5693-5b3f-b184-aa6585808b5f.html
Apparently she also tried to run for county judge.
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2024/04/25/disqualified-challenger-loletha-hale-booted-from-judicial-race-but-not-ballot/?slreturn=20251211001848
While I think it’s good for judges to take a sympathetic approach to plaintiffs who have been hurt (or even feel hurt) but don’t have a valid legal claim, I don’t think an apologetic tone should extend to attorneys who have committed misconduct and whose excuses are baseless. Society needs competent, effective, honest representation from lawyers. When a lawyer behaves like this one did, the judge should not be apologetic about having referred her to the state bar. The judge should instead adopt a stricter tone, emphasizing that the lawyer deserved what she got and that people who behave similarly should expect to be treated similarly.
The judge was not at all apologetic about having referred her. He only said, "Maybe I should've waited until the appeal was over, so that she couldn't cite the referral as evidence of bias."
I don’t see why he needed to do that. Let her appeal and cite whatever she wants to cite. Just because she says it’s evidence of bias doesn’t make it so.
If she does appeal, I think it would be a good idea for the 8th Circuit to straighten her out on this point, and in no uncertain terms.