Eleventh Circuit Upholds Dismissal of Trump v. Clinton and Affirms Sanctions Against Trump (Updated)

A rare instance in which courts were willing to impose sanctions upon sanctionable conduct.

Today the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit largely upheld the district court's dismissal of Donald Trump's lawsuit against Hillary Clinton and others and affirmed the district court's award of sanctions against Trump and Alina Habba. Chief Judge William Pryor wrote for the panel, joined by Judges Brasher and Kidd.

Judge Pryor's opinion in Trump v. Clinton begins:

These four consolidated appeals concern five separate orders. In 2022, between his terms of office, President Donald Trump filed a lawsuit against dozens of defendants, alleging several claims, including two under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and three under Florida law. The district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. On the defendants' motions, the district court also entered sanctions against Trump and his attorneys, under Rule 11 and under its inherent authority. While those orders were on appeal, Trump and his attorneys moved the district court to reconsider each order in the light of a report by Special Counsel John Durham. They also moved to disqualify the district judge. The district court denied both motions. Two defendants ask us to sanction Trump for bringing a frivolous appeal.

We affirm the orders with a caveat. Because the district court lacked jurisdiction over one defendant, it erred in dismissing the claims against that defendant with prejudice. So we vacate the dismissal of those claims and remand with instructions to dismiss them without prejudice. Because Trump's remaining claims are untimely and otherwise meritless, we affirm the dismissal of the amended complaint with prejudice for the other defendants. And because Trump and his attorneys committed sanctionable conduct and forfeited their procedural objections, we affirm both sanctions orders. The Durham Report does not change our conclusions, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the disqualification motion. Yet, because the appeal of the dismissal order is not frivolous, we deny both motions for appellate sanctions.

Update: Here are some portions of the opinion discussing the sanctions:

Federal courts have the inherent authority to "fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991). This authority arises from the "control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962). To "unlock[] that inherent power," a court must find that a party or his attorney acted in "bad faith." Sciaretta v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 1205, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015). On a finding of bad faith, the district court may "assess attorney's fees." Id.

The district court ordered Trump and Habba (along with her law firm) to pay nearly $1 million in attorney's fees under its inherent authority. On appeal, Trump and Habba present several arguments against the sanctions. We discuss and reject each in turn. . . .

After noting that Trump and Habba abandoned some of their arguments against the sanctions (because Trump only ever hires the best lawyers), the opinion addresses some of the arguments on the merits.

We review a finding of bad faith for clear error. Bagelheads, 75 F.4th at 1311. Clear error review requires "that a finding that is plausible in light of the full record—even if another is equally or more so—must govern." Grayson v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 121 F.4th 894, 896 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish bad faith under the inherent authority standard, a court must find "subjective bad faith." Purchasing Power, 851 F.3d at 1224. "A finding of bad faith is warranted where an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent." Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An egregious failure to pursue "reasonable inquiry into the underlying facts" of a claim can also support a finding of bad faith. In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court rested its bad faith finding on three features of the amended complaint. First, it found that the amended complaint was a shotgun pleading filed for a political purpose. Second, it found that the amended complaint contained factual allegations that were "knowingly false or made with reckless disregard for the truth." Finally, it ruled that the amended complaint was based on patently frivolous legal theories. Trump challenges all three grounds. We affirm on the first and third. . . .

The district court bolstered its finding of bad faith by pointing to Trump's litigation conduct in other cases. It found that Trump's activity showed a "pattern of misusing the courts." Trump and Habba argue the district court was wrong to consider Trump's other litigation conduct.

The district court did not clearly err. We have affirmed a sanctions award based on a review of "similar cases" brought by a plaintiff and his attorney. Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf, Inc., 9 F.4th 1300, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2021). Trump and Habba cite no contrary authority. Although they tell us that the district court misread Johnson and other cases, they never explain why the principle it drew from those cases is wrong. Nor do they explain how the district court clearly erred in concluding that Trump's litigation conduct in other cases was "similar" to the conduct here. All they offer is the cursory statement that the other cases were "brought for different, good faith reasons." We have no basis for vacatur.

I challenge anyone to read this opinion and conclude that Alina Habba has any business working in a U.S. Attorney's office, let alone being an actual U.S. Attorney, acting or otherwise.