The Volokh Conspiracy
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Today in Supreme Court History: November 19, 1969
11/19/1969: Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York argued.
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Appellant property owner unsuccessfully sought an injunction in the New York courts to prevent the New York City Tax Commission from granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for properties used solely for religious worship, as authorized by the state constitution and the implementing statute providing for tax exemptions for property used exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes. Appellant contended that the exemptions, as applied to religious bodies, violated provisions prohibiting establishment of religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/397/664/
The Supreme Court, with only Douglas dissenting, upheld the tax exemption. So, Justice Black went along. Justice Harlan concurring, stating a philosophy later shared by Justice Breyer:
I think it relevant to face up to the fact that it is far easier to agree on the purpose that underlies the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses than to obtain agreement on the standards that should govern their application. What is at stake as a matter of policy is preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point.
Harlan argues the two basic requirements are "neutrality" and "voluntarism." The tax break (not a more direct subsidy, which he argues causes more difficulties) here is general. It is not only for religious institutions. He grants no rule will always be obvious:
Like THE CHIEF JUSTICE, I am of the view that it is the task of this tribunal to "draw distinctions, including fine ones, in the process of interpreting the Constitution."
Those distinctions, especially in the context of education funding, would split the Court many ways in the 1970s and beyond.