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What is the Jones Property Test, and How Is It Different From Katz?
The final version of my new article has been published.
The Washington University Law Review has just published my new article, "The Two Tests of Search Law: What Is the Jones Test, and What Does That Say About Katz?" Here's the abstract:
Fourth Amendment law has two "search" tests: The Katz privacy test and the Jones property test. Lower courts are not sure what the difference is between them, however, or whether the Jones test is based on trespass law or the mechanics of physical intrusion. The result is a remarkable conceptual uncertainty in Fourth Amendment law. Every lower court recites that there are two search tests, but no one knows what one test means or how it relates to the other.
This Article argues that the Jones test hinges on physical intrusion, not trespass law. Jones claimed to restore a pre-Katz search test, and a close look at litigation both before Katz and after Jones shows an unbroken line adopting an intrusion standard and (where it has arisen) rejecting a trespass standard. This understanding of Jones is not only historically correct, but also normatively important. How we understand Jones tells us how to understand Katz. The intrusion approach offers an accurate interpretation of both tests that shows the continuing importance of Katz.
I had a lot of fun nerding out on the often-forgotten case of Silverman v. United States (1961) when researching this article. Silverman is all but ignored these days, but I think it shouldn't be: You can't understand what Katz did in 1967, or what Jones did in 2012 in returning to pre-Katz law, without understanding what Silverman did (and didn't do) in 1961. Once you understand Silverman, what happened later fairly neatly falls into place, I think.
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What hearsay exception would even purport to allow the testimony in Silverman? The Court does not even mention it.
A statement against interest, one that would tend to expose someone to criminal liability, codified as Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)(B).
Really interesting breakdown of the Jones test. The way you connect Silverman to both Katz and Jones actually makes the whole evolution of “search” doctrine feel much more coherent. Most discussions treat those cases like disconnected pivots, but your argument that the intrusion framework runs straight through all three definitely clarifies why lower courts get tangled up trying to map everything onto “trespass.”
It’s also refreshing to see someone highlight Silverman again — it’s one of those cases everyone cites in passing but almost no one seems to revisit carefully. Your approach makes it easier to see why Katz didn’t completely replace physical-intrusion concepts and why Jones wasn’t as much of a doctrinal resurrection as people sometimes claim.
Looking forward to seeing how courts apply this interpretation in the next round of Fourth Amendment cases.
Thanks, I appreciate it!
All of which is why I say 4th Amendment law is the murkiest, and most incomprehensible area of constitutional law.
And unfortunately the area of constitutional law that effects the most citizens, the most often.
Ought to be pretty simple: if the cops and judge would object to the same search against them, then they don't get to do it either. This applies whether they think they don't need a warrant or whether they think a sloppy rubber-stamped warrant is good enough.
Pretty much.
As I understand it, at the time of the founding, an agent of the government engaged in law enforcement had no rights anybody else didn't have. If they invaded your land, they were trespassers, if they broke into your home they were burglars, if they took anything of yours thieves. And subject to being treated by you as such.
The warrant was what GAVE them the authority to exceed the powers of a regular citizen. Showing you the warrant was what deprived you of the right to treat them as exceeding their authority.
And these aren't quite the same thing. If a cop has a warrant to search your house, but neglects to show it to you, or fails to identify himself as a cop, you can get a situation where he's legally entitled to break into your house, but you're legally entitled to act on your own understanding that you're the victim of a home invasion.
Which is why no-knock searches should be much more limited, and the cops should not be excused from actually showing people the warrant.
No-knock warrants never seem necessary to me. If there's a hostage inside at risk of imminent harm, that's exigent circumstances, isn't it? No one's going to complain a cop had no warrant if he truly does save a hostage from imminent death or rape.
All the ones I have heard of, when they go wrong, could have been handled by stationing cops around the house, announcing that anyone coming out will be detained, and giving the occupants 24 hours notice of when they will come in. Let them flush their drugs; isn't the real goal getting rid of the drugs and putting the dealers out of business? Great, they flush their investment, can't pay it back, have no money left to buy replacements, and owe a fortune to bad guys. No need for no-knock warrants. That one in Tennessee or Kentucky, where the woman was shot because the cops riddled the house when the boyfriend defended their castle, all because some previous friend may or may not have been using her address for packages. There was zero need for any no-knock warrant. Same with that corrupt Houston cop and his fake informants.
I have never heard of any no-knock successes which actually needed warrants for real emergencies.
I don't want to exclude the possibility of circumstances where you have time to get a warrant, but don't dare let the subject of the warrant know you're coming. But they would be few and far between, to be sure.
Can you name any such circumstances? Like with the drugs, isn't getting rid of the drugs and turning the dealer into a pariah with a short expected life span better than an expensive trial and prison sentence?
I cannot imagine any situation short of an emergency where a no-knock warrant makes any sense. There may be some, but no one has ever described anything plausible.
Sure: You figure out where the hostage taker/kidnapper/fanatical terrorist is hiding, but he doesn't yet know it, so you haven't got exigent circumstances, there's time to get a warrant.
But you can't let him know in advance you're busting in, or innocents will die.
It's not hard to imagine, but it certainly doesn't come up often.
I don't see that. If there's time to get a regular warrant, yes, that's not an emergency. But if there's time to get a warrant and the claim is it must be no-knock because of the danger, that seems to me to put it in the emergency category too. Maybe there's some legal jargon at play.
Exigent circumstances hinge on whether there is time to get a warrant, no-knock hinges on the (anticipated) consequences of knocking...
"reasonable"
Something both reasonable and unreasonable people disagree about.
Keeping up with Jones and herding Katz.
Probably too late, but: “Paper and affects” p. 337 line 5
Congrats on the publication! Excited to give it a read.
Spike mikes!