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Today in Supreme Court History: November 4, 1992
11/4/1992: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah argued.

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Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah
Facts of the case
The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities.
Question
Did the city of Hialeah's ordinance, prohibiting ritual animal sacrifices, violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause?
Conclusion (Unanimous)
Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailored to that interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that they applied exclusively to the church. The ordinances singled out the activities of the Santeria faith and suppressed more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve their stated ends. Only conduct tied to religious belief was burdened. The ordinances targeted religious behavior, therefore they failed to survive the rigors of strict scrutiny. (oyez)
Huh, I just learned that Santeria =\= voodoo. From Gemini:
Santería and Voodoo are distinct but related Afro-Caribbean religions with roots in West African beliefs blended with Catholicism, though they developed in different regions and have unique characteristics. Santería originated in Cuba and is based on the Yoruba religion, while Voodoo developed in Haiti from the beliefs of the Fon and Ewe peoples. Both involve worshipping spirits (Orishas in Santería and Lwas in Voodoo), are monotheistic at their core, and incorporate elements like dancing, drumming, and rituals.
"I don't practice Santeria, I ain't got no crystal ball. Well, I had a million dollars ... but I ... I'd spent it all."
-A Vodou practitioner, probably.
I always though Scalia's concurrence here was obviously right. How can anyone disagree with this?
"I do not join that section because it departs from the opinion's general focus on the object of the laws at issue to consider the subjective motivation of the lawmakers, i. e., whether the Hialeah City Council actually intended to disfavor the religion of Santeria. ..
The First Amendment does not refer to the purposes for which legislators enact laws, but to the effects of the laws enacted: "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] .... " This does not put us in the business of invalidating laws by reason of the evil motives of their authors. Had the Hialeah City Council set out resolutely to suppress the practices of Santeria, but ineptly adopted ordinances that failed to do so, I do not see how those laws could be said to "prohibi[t] the free exercise" of religion. Nor, in my view, does it matter that a legislature consists entirely of the purehearted, if the law it enacts in fact singles out a religious practice for special burdens. Had the ordinances here been passed with no motive on the part of any councilman except the ardent desire to prevent cruelty to animals (as might in fact have been the case), they would nonetheless be invalid.
"Congress shall make no law" versus "Hialeah City Council"
Since when is Hialeah City Council also Congress?
The other "incorporated" amendments do not specify an entity or person so you can argue they are "incorporated" but no textualist or originalist should ever say 1A applies to a city council.
Same but reverse argument with the 2A "shall not be infringed" which is not limited to Congress, the President, states, cities, or any government period.
The argument is that a law by a state legislature or city council which prohibits the free exercise of religion substantively denies a person due process of the law under the 14A.
The exact wording of the 1A is not important---it is the principle that all free governments must recognize the freedom of religion. If they fail to do so that is so outrageous that no process that it provides for taking away that right could be justified as a process which is "due" to people.
"exact wording of the 1A is not important"
Oh. Exact wording of a Constitutional provision doesn't matter. Interesting.
"it is the principle "
A 1A penumbra so to speak.
Did you read what I said?
The 1A does not apply to the states of its own volition---the 14A does the work. Therefore words of limitation like "Congress" obviously don't apply when you are incorporating the right against the states.
That would be an odd sort of incorporation---would you require the States to look out and make sure that Congress doesn't violate the rights of speech and religion---but the States can if they want?
obviously!
You don't incorporate because it is limited to Congress by its terms.
"but the States can if they want"
I think every state has a 1A counterpart. States courts can enforce that, not everything should be a federal interest.
The exact wording doesn't matter because the 14th amendment doesn't say, "The Bill of Rights as written hereby applies to the states." The 14th amendment — whether through the privileges/immunities clause or the due process clause — incorporates the underlying rights, not the words.
"underlying rights"
The underlying right is the right not to have Congress pass a law restricting free exercise.
LOL. But that isn't even faithful to the wording of the first amendment that you pretend to have such fealty to.
Not sure what you mean, its not a quote but is still an accurate summary of the text.
Well, if you're making a narrow point about incorporation, that's one thing. But if you are defending the ordinance, consider that:
1. The Florida state constitution also guarantees free exercise of religion, using very similar wording.
2. The Taliban are also not Congress. It doesn't mean we need to accept what they do as legitimate.
"The Florida state constitution also guarantees free exercise of religion, using very similar wording."
Great. The Florida Supreme Court could then invalidate the ordinance. Not everything nerds to be decided by SCOTUS.
I do note its second sentence "Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety." might lead to a different outcome, which would be alright too. Federalism!
Do I get a slight whiff of maybe you approved of the ordinance?
Maybe I'm biased. On and off we keep chickens at home. For eggs only, but if sometime I wanted to kill and eat one it ought to be none of the government's business. It's even less their business whether my mind was free of religious motivation.
Your nose must be stuffed. I expressed no opinion on its wisdom.
Ok, I agree with you there.
But regardless of the incorporation issue, just assume it was the federal government here. Scalia was saying a law objectively either prohibits free exercise, or it doesn't. As opposed to judges divining subjective motives of the heart which they then deem to be legally sinful. That's how we got the new "animus" nonsense and a lot of "Trumplaw."
Let's try it this way. The entirety of the Bill of Rights was addressed to the new national government. That was their own reason for existence. The anti-federalists where concerned that without a BOR the federal government would run roughshod over the states. This was an attempt to restrict the power of this new government.
Many federalists complained that the BOR was unnecessary; that the limited powers granted by Article I, Section 8 did the job. As there is no power for Congress to pass a law about religion, or gun carrying, the argument went, then by definition there was no power to pass such laws and the BOR was superfluous.
That argument lost, but the BOR still only applied to Congress. That's why you are getting the pushback. Whether it was specifically addressed to Congress as in the 1A or to nobody named as in the 2A or other amendments, it changes nothing. The original direction was only to Congress and not to states.
The 14A fundamentally changed the government structure in this country. Not only did we need the handcuffs on the feds, but we needed them on states as well. So SCOTUS, through a series of incorporation decisions determined that the freedoms (not the plain text) contained in almost all of the first 8 amendments of the BOR applied to the states as well.
I don't know why this is so difficult. SCOTUS never held that the strict wording of the BOR was now binding on the states such that you can make the distinction of the 1A wording. It held that without those basic freedoms there was no due process of law. That takes the principle out of the literal wording.
That is classic Scalia, but IMHO that is too dogmatic. I take his point but when the argument is that law X violates my religion and the State argues that it is a neutral law of general applicability, I think it is a good data point if you can show that, no, this law was expressly meant to harm religion. We shouldn't just make up a rationale that nobody considered when it passed. That rewards pretext.
Likewise if there WAS indeed a neutral purpose behind the law, then that solidifies the government's argument. Yes, this isn't just lawyers making stuff up after the fact, that was really and truly the reason it was passed.
It isn't THE constitutional question; it is evidentiary on the question.
I dunno, seems like if we are going to look outside the objective effects of the law and to the supposed intentions, that is what will reward pretext. If intentions don't matter and only objective effects matter, then whether a rationale was pretext or not, doesn't make any difference.
I do see your point that subjective intentions might be probative evidence of objective effects, but it seems like a slippery slope in both directions, allowing actions to be either struck down or upheld based on supposedly righteous or evil motives (depending of course on the political and moral values of the judge).
Animus always struck me as basically about pretext. Courts don't love it when you lie about your real intent.
If the legislature is hiding its motive to intentionally discriminate against a specific group, the court doesn't need to pretend this is a law passed in good faith and then go through the motions to do a functional analysis.
Call it equity if it makes you happy.