Palestinian Youth Movement Social Media Posts with "No Justice, No Peace" Urging Protest Outside Synagogue Are Protected Speech

From Helmann v. Codepink Women for Peace, decided June 13 by Judge Stephen Wilson (C.D. Cal.), but just posted on Westlaw; I blogged earlier today about a different facet of the case, which allowed a threats claim to go forward against CodePink for its social media posts, but the court also rejected the claim against the Palestinian Youth Movement for its posts. First, the background:

This case arises out of the events that took place at the Adas Torah [Orthodox] Synagogue … on June 23, 2024 … in Los Angeles's Pico-Robertson neighborhood.

On June 23, 2024, the Synagogue held its usual religious services: a morning, afternoon, and evening prayer. That same day, the Synagogue also hosted a special "Aliyah Event," where a real estate company presented opportunities to purchase homes in Israel. According to the complaint, this event held religious significance for many attendees, who view moving to Israel as a fulfillment of a religious commandment. Similar events often include prayer or Torah study and are generally understood by the community as religious in nature.

{Defendants contest the religious nature of the Aliyah Event, largely because Plaintiffs' claims depend in part on whether they were attempting to enter the Synagogue to exercise their First Amendment rights. The complaint contains detailed allegations regarding the religious nature of the Aliyah Event, e.g. that a common belief among Orthodox Jews is that returning to and dwelling in Israel is a religious commandment. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court takes Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the religious nature of the Aliyah Event as true and therefore that attempts to enter the Synagogue to attend that event pertained to an exercise of First Amendment rights. In any event, several Plaintiffs allege that they attempted to enter the Synagogue at least in part for a squarely religious purpose, e.g. to attend prayer services.}

Plaintiffs sued various defendants over various roles in what they characterized as "a mob" that assembled outside the Synagogue; some members allegedly engaged in violence against some of the synagogue-goers. Here, I'll focus on claims that certain posts were "threat[s] of force" and thus violated the FACE Act, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994; that law bars interference through obstruction, force, or threat of force not just with reproductive health facilities but also with places of religious worship.

The PYM social media posts call on their supports to "STAND AGAINST SETTLER EXPANSION AT SUNDAY'S REAL ESTATE EVENT SELLING HOMES TO BUILD 'ANGLO NEIGHBORHOODS' IN PALESTINE." The post continues by describing the Aliyah Event as a "blatant example of land theft" perpetrated by "[r]acist settler expansionists."  The posts finish with "FROM THE BELLY OF THE BEAST NO JUSTICE, NO PEACE."  Plaintiffs allege, "upon information and belief," that the phrase "belly of the beast" refers to a synagogue.

Even if "belly of the beast" refers to the Synagogue, these posts are not true threats. At most, they express a political message: if there is no justice for Palestinians, there will be no peace—even in religious spaces.

That kind of message is too vague to qualify as a true threat. To be sure, the posts may invoke violent imagery—"no peace" inside of the Synagogue. But "mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection of the First Amendment." NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982). For example, in Claiborne, even the statement, "if we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck," was protected speech.

To lose this First Amendment protection, a statement must be "a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals"—i.e., a "true threat." PYM's post does not meet that standard. It targets no individual. It makes no specific threat.

The Supreme Court has upheld similar speech. In Watts v. United States (1969), a protester said: "if they ever make me carry a rifle, the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." The Court held that the statement was not a true threat. Rather, it was "political hyperbole."

PYM's post follows the same structure: a conditional statement tied to a political grievance. To paraphrase PYM's posts, "if there is no justice, then there will be no peace—even in a synagogue" mirrors the logic of the statement in Watts: if the speaker is drafted, he will target the President. Both are vague expressions of protest—not direct, credible threats. Like the language in Watts, PYM's statement is "political hyperbole," "expressly conditional." and too imprecise to strip it of First Amendment Protection.

This difference between PYM's posts and true threats is well illustrated by Planned Parenthood. There, anti-abortion activists published "GUILTY" posters naming abortion providers that closely resembled earlier "WANTED" posters. Id. at 1085. After doctors appeared on those earlier posters, they were murdered. Id. at 1085. In that context, the Ninth Circuit said the "GUILTY" posters' message was clear: "You're Wanted or You're Guilty; You'll be shot or Killed."

And of course, the Court applied that same reasoning to CodePink's posts. CodePink's posts placed the Synagogue's address in an inverted red triangle. Plaintiffs alleged that symbol is used by Hamas to identify Jews and Jewish targets for "extermination." That kind of symbol, placed over a specific address, sends a "serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm."

PYM's posts are different. They do not use symbols historically linked to violence. And there are no allegations that phrases like "no justice, no peace" or "belly of the beast" have led to violence. Without that kind of context or history, there is no basis to infer that these posts are true threats. They are political speech that call for protest—such speech is protected by the First Amendment.

Because PYM's posts are not true threats, they cannot serve as a "threat of force" under the FACE Act. The Court therefore does not need to analyze Plaintiffs' FACE Act claims against PYM any further—they fail at step one….

Thomas Harvey represents PYM.