Calling Teacher "Bully," "Lunatic," "Woke," "God Complex," and "White Savior" Is Opinion and Thus Not Defamation

Yesterday's Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision in MacCudden v. Johnson (Justice Joseph Donald, joined by Justice Maxine White), involved a former high school English teacher (MacCudden); at the time of the statements, she had resigned from the school district, but hadn't updated her LinkedIn profile.

Johnson received a screenshot from a friend of a portion of MacCudden's LinkedIn profile, which Johnson subsequently posted on social media. Johnson's post included the portion of MacCudden's LinkedIn profile which stated that she worked as a "Social Justice Coordinator" circled in red and Johnson wrote, "[w]hy the hell am I paying for a 'Social Justice Coordinator' in my school district?" Johnson further stated, "[t]his is just what @mtschools needs; more woke, white women w/ a god complex. Thank you, white savior."

Later, Johnson added, "[i]f [MacCudden] really wants to promote equity, perhaps she should forfeit her job to a person of color?" Johnson also replied to a social media user that:

Teachers who educate are paid a fraction of what these DEI "specialists" earn. Parents know these woke lunatics are bullies. They are bullying you into silence and compliance.

Good teachers should earn more, get support & feel safe. Partner with us and let's put kids first.

The court concluded that these statements weren't actionable defamation:

First, Johnson refers to MacCudden as a "bully." The term "bully" is a subjective assessment that cannot be proven as true or false. Johnson's statements do not allege any specific act of bullying or a specific victim that could be proved or disproved at trial.

Second, the term "lunatic" is also a subjective assessment that cannot be proven true or false. Johnson's statement referring to MacCudden as a lunatic is her opinion.

Third, the terms "god complex," "woke," and "white savior" are vague and do not have a clear meaning or definition. For example, some Americans define "wokeness" as "being informed, educated on, and aware of social injustices;" other Americans use it to mean "being overly politically correct and policing others' words." We are not persuaded that the terms are definitive enough to allow a jury to determine whether these terms are true or false.

In addition, the statement that "[i]f [MacCudden] really wants to promote equity, perhaps she should forfeit her job to a person of color?" is not actionable. This is a statement about what Johnson believes that MacCudden should do in the future, not about what she has done in the past. Thus, it is not a statement of fact that can be proven or disproven.

The circuit court found that some of Johnson's statements … "impl[ied] the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts," namely that MacCudden "abuses her position of power over students" and is "unfit[ ] to teach." … [W]e are not convinced that a reasonable person reading Johnson's statements would have understood her to be implying that MacCudden abused her position of power or was unfit to teach. Johnson was not commenting on MacCudden's teaching record or qualifications. Further, Johnson did not indicate that she had any personal experience with MacCudden or was basing her statements on anything other than what she disclosed from her LinkedIn profile….

Judge Pedro Colón dissented:

While Johnson did not provide any specific examples in her posts, the fact that Johnson specifically identified MacCudden and her position as a Social Justice Coordinator in the posts imply the possibility that Johnson is aware of, but has not disclosed, specific defamatory facts.

Johnson's posts were not merely general statements that Johnson did not support public school systems having a social justice coordinator position or that Johnson found woke ideology offensive. General statements of this nature constitute opinions that cannot serve as the basis of a defamation action.

Here, however, I cannot ignore the context that the posts were specifically about MacCudden and her holding the specific position of Social Justice Coordinator. This specific identification of MacCudden and her position as a Social Justice Coordinator creates the possibility that Johnson's statements are more than mere opinions. I would, therefore, send this case to the jury to decide whether Johnson's statements—that have been specifically connected to MacCudden—are defamatory.

Comments

[Milhouse]

The decision is obviously correct, and Colón is just being a woke bully, wanting to subject her to the expense and distress of a trial just to punish her for having an opinion he disapproves of.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

I suppose I should have some sympathy for the dissent, since it focuses on the importance of the jury as trier of fact, a role guaranteed to juries by the Seventh Amendment (but the Supremes haven't incorporated the Seventh against the states yet!).

I would think it would be an issue of fact what insinuations (if any) the defendant is making.

If the matter had gone to the jury, and supposing (just for the purposes of discussion) that the jury rejected the plaintiff's claims, then there would be a good case for a "loser pays" law to make the plaintiff pay the defendant's expenses. Is there such a law available in the present litigation?

[AmosArch]

Also truth is an absolute defense against defamation claims.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

Even if the dissent had prevailed, the matter would have gone to the jury with truth as a defense.

[wvattorney13]

The whole point of the summary judgment is that there is no "proof" that can prevail. What quantum of proof or what evidence would be used to show whether a person is a bully, lunatic, woke, has a God complex, or is a white savior?

Those are all clearly incapable of proof as they are opinions/insults.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

First, the dissent believes that a jury could find defamatory inferences.

And second, from my point of view, the language of the seventh amendment is fairly explicit in its requirements of jury trials in cases at common law (which includes defamation). Maybe the judge could set aside a pro-plaintiff verdict, but refusing to summon a jury at all seems unconstitutional (unless we adhere to the idea that states don't have to obey the Seventh).