Louisiana Act of Terror Claim Can Go Forward Based on Alleged Violent Attack on Pro-Israel Demonstration

From Judge Jane Triche Milazzo's decision yesterday in Mann v. Quraan (E.D. La.); recall that the factual assertions are just those alleged in the Complaint—there hasn't yet been factfinding as to whose side of the factual story is correct:

Plaintiff Dylan Mann, an undergraduate student at Tulane University, alleges that on October 26, 2023, he participated in a demonstration in support of Israel in uptown New Orleans in response to a pre-planned anti-Israel protest. He alleges that the anti-Israel protest was organized by non-Tulane students and specifically targeted Tulane due to the significant number of Jewish students enrolled there.

Plaintiff alleges that during the protest Defendant Abraham Quraan drove back and forth in his vehicle between the two protests in order to cause a disturbance or provoke the Tulane students. At some point, Defendant Quraan exited his vehicle, violently assaulted Plaintiff, and ripped an Israeli flag off of Plaintiff's body. Defendant Alaa Salam allegedly joined in the attack and struck Plaintiff with a bullhorn. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants verbally expressed hate for Jewish people during the incident. After assaulting Plaintiff, Defendants allegedly continued to aggressively approach other Tulane students and Quraan removed his belt with the intent to use it as a weapon.

Plaintiff also alleges that, after the incident, Defendants utilized social media to "espouse implied threats of violence" toward Jewish people and Plaintiff personally….

Plaintiff brings an act of terror claim pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.9, which provides that:

In addition to general and special damages, a prevailing plaintiff shall also be awarded court costs and reasonable attorney fees in the appropriate district or appellate court upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were caused by an act of terror or terrorism resulting in injury to the person or damage to the person's property, regardless of whether the defendant was prosecuted for his acts.

The article goes on to define "act of terror" or "terrorism" as, relevant here, the "[i]ntentional infliction of serious bodily injury upon a human being" occurring "when the offender has the intent to intimidate or coerce the civilian population, influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion." …

"A complaint may allege knowledge and intent generally, though it must still contain factual support making the plaintiff's claims plausible." While this Court agrees with Defendants that the Complaint is lacking in detail, it must view the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and finds that he has alleged sufficient facts for his act of terror claim to survive this stage of litigation.

Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendants' actions were intended to intimidate or coerce Plaintiff and the other Tulane students at the protest. He alleges that Defendants' presence at the pro-Israel demonstration was for the purpose of inciting or provoking the Tulane students. According to the Complaint, Defendants violently attacked Plaintiff without warning and acted aggressively toward other students while spewing hatred toward Jewish people.

These acts could reasonably be seen as intending to intimidate or threaten the students, prevent them from protesting or supporting Israel, and chill their freedom of speech and assembly. The Court notes that article 2315.9 is broadly worded, and there is no case law interpreting its meaning. However, the facts as pleaded sufficiently allege that Defendants acted with intent to intimidate the civilian population….

Paul Sterbcow (Lewis, Kullman, Sterbcow & Abramson, LLC) represents plaintiff.

Comments

[ReaderY]

This was clearly an assault, and an assault designed to prevent people from engaging in speech. But it isn’t clear that it was in any way preplanned. Recognizing people are in fact more volatile and inclined to get angry at each other than the law would like them to be, I find myself disinclined to take situations where people get angry and get into a fight and maximize the consequences when nobody actually gets seriously hurt. This was wrongful conduct, but I wouldn’t call it terrorism.

Of course because it’s a civil suit with only civil penalties, what it’s called doesn’t matter so much.

[Lee Moore]

I wouldn’t call it terrorism

Perhaps not, but in the relevant statute that is a defined term, which speaks of "intent" which can be formed in an instant, it doesn't need to be pre-planned. Moreover :

Plaintiff alleges that during the protest Defendant Abraham Quraan drove back and forth in his vehicle between the two protests in order to cause a disturbance or provoke the Tulane students.

could easily be understood as intentional intimidation, particularly given the prior examples of people using cars as weapons in crowded areas.

[Malika la Maize]

Acting in order to cause a disturbance or provoke=intentional intimidation?

[Lee Moore]

What part of "particularly given the prior examples of people using cars as weapons in crowded areas" were you struggling with ?

I assume that, being a regular and unidirectional lefty poster here, you are a card carrying anti-gun nut. Would you say that someone counter-demonstrating in front of a group of demonstrators who had unholstered his gun and was waving it about could not be taken as engaging in "intentional intimidation ?

[Malika la Maize]

Driving back and forth from one place to another=waving a gun around? Cars have a normal, non-weaponized function that guns don’t. I think a better analogy would be driving up to a crowd and revving your engines.

Also, I own and like guns. And I only consider myself “lefty” in that I think Trump and MAGA are ridiculous at so many levels.

[Stupid Government Tricks]

Guns also have a normal, non-weaponized function, ie hunting, competition, and plinking. This car was not being used in any typical car-using function.

[Malika la Maize]

Uh, Bambi’s mom and that old beer can would, could they, tell you those other uses you mention are weaponized.

The point of a gun is to fire a projectile with destructive force. You can destroy skeet or soup cans or targets with them, sure, but let’s not pretend they aren’t what they are. Cars, on the other hand, are designed to transport people. They can be used to destroy people and things but that’s not their normal function.

[Stupid Government Tricks]

Every object can be weaponized. I can fling a dinner plate like a frisbee as a weapon. But until it's used as a weapon, it's not weaponized. Waving a gun is weaponizing it, just as driving a car in that manner was weaponizing it.

[Rossami]

More to the point, it doesn't have to be clear yet - this is still only the complaint phase. Clarity that you've met the criteria of a specific law is something you'd expect after discovery and consideration of the merits.

[John F. Carr]

How few people must be targeted by an act of intimidation to fall below the "civilian population" threshold? Was the "offer he couldn't refuse" in The Godfather terrorism because it targeted a civilian? Does the intimidation have to relate to government policy somehow? Constitutional rights?