Ex-Employee Can Sue Planned Parenthood for Race Discrimination as a "Jane Doe," Because Abortion Providers Had Been Physically Attacked

Jane Doe, a former Planned Parenthood employee, is suing Planned Parenthood for race discrimination (and some related employment claims). Usually, employment claims are brought in the plaintiff's own name, at least unless there's some highly personal element (such as alleged sexual assault) that's part of the case.

But Doe asked to be pseudonymous—and was allowed to be pseudonymous—simply on the basis that her having worked at Planned Parenthood might expose her to criminal attack. On this theory, anyone who worked for an abortion clinic would likewise be entitled to pseudonymity in any case in which such employment would be disclosed. In principle, the same would be true as to any other occupation where there appears to be some general risk of violence due to public hostility—or for that matter any case where the person's political or religious views might expose them to some such general risk. And the judge just granted the motion (Doe v. Planned Parenthood of Illinois (N.D. Ill.)).

That strikes me as not right: As I've argued (citing various precedents),

Public access to information about civil cases "serves to promote trustworthiness of the judicial process, to curb judicial abuses, and to provide the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system, including a better perception of fairness." This access "protects the public's ability to oversee and monitor the workings of the Judicial Branch," and the Judiciary's "institutional integrity." "Any step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view makes the ensuing decision look more like a fiat and requires rigorous justification."

And this applies to the names of the parties as well. "[A]nonymous litigation" thus "runs contrary to the rights of the public to have open judicial proceedings and to know who is using court facilities and procedures funded by public taxes." "Identifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness. The people have a right to know who is using their courts."

Party names often offer the best clue for discovering further information about the case. Consider journalists who write about civil litigation. Without party names, they are limited to what they can glean from the filings and what the pseudonymous parties' lawyers are willing to reveal.

But armed with the names, they can investigate further. They can contact the parties' coworkers, business associates, or acquaintances. They can search court records in other cases to determine whether the fact pattern in this case had led to other litigation. They can more generally see what other cases have been filed by the plaintiff or against the defendant and see whether the parties have been found to be credible or not credible in the past. They can determine whether the parties might have ulterior motives for litigating.

Pseudonymity also tends to lead to additional restrictions on public access as a case unfolds. Because filed documents will often contain information that indirectly identify a pseudonymous party, courts may need to outright seal other case information or enjoin a party from publicly revealing the pseudonymous party's name (or other details of the lawsuit) in order to maintain effective pseudonymity.

And allowing pseudonymity in one case invites pseudonymization of all other cases that raise similar concerns, "open[ing] the door to parties proceeding pseudonymously in an incalculable number of lawsuits" of that kind. See, e.g., Doe v. Fedcap Rehab. Servs. (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("At bottom, Plaintiff wants what most employment-discrimination plaintiffs would like: to sue their former employer without future employers knowing about it."). Courts have therefore treated litigating under a pseudonym as implicating the right of public access to judicial proceedings. And, because of this, all "circuit courts that have considered the matter have recognized a strong presumption against the use of pseudonyms in civil litigation."

Concrete evidence of specific threats to this particular person might suffice to justify a rare exception to this general rule. But it can't be enough that there's some evidence of past attacks against some Planned Parenthood ex-employees, Jews suing over anti-Semitism, police officers, employees of controversial political organizations, etc.

This having been said, I appreciate that the caselaw on this (as on most things having to do with the law of pseudonymous litigation), is mixed; see, e.g., this case and pp. 1412-14 of my The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation article. In any event, I thought this decision was worth noting; here is an excerpt from the motion that the judge just granted:

Plaintiff respectfully requests leave to proceed under a pseudonym to protect her personal safety and privacy in light of the well-documented risks associated with her former employment at a major abortion provider in Illinois. Given the hostile political and social environment following the Dobbs decision and documented incidents of violence and threats targeting abortion providers and their staff in Illinois, anonymity is both necessary and justified….

There is a real danger of physical harm to Plaintiff as evidenced by the following:

• The Illinois abortion provider community has been subject to severe and escalating threats, including arson and stalking, exemplified by the 2023 Peoria Planned Parenthood firebombing and the Danville attempted arson attack.
• Statewide statistics reveal a sharp increase in harassment, death threats, clinic invasions, and stalking targeting providers and their staff.
• Plaintiff's firsthand experience working at the provider during these incidents gives her a credible basis to fear retaliation, harassment, and physical danger if her identity is publicly disclosed.
• Plaintiff's identity is not essential to the adjudication of her employment discrimination claims.
• Illinois courts have previously granted anonymity and protective orders under analogous circumstances where parties faced credible risks of harm or harassment.

Further, the following documented incidents of violence and threats in recent past further support Plaintiff's valid concern for her safety:

• January 15, 2023 – Peoria Clinic Firebombing: A Molotov cocktail-style device was thrown through the window of the Peoria clinic, causing approximately $150,000 in damages and forcing closure for over a year. The suspect was federally prosecuted and sentenced to 10 years in prison. (Sources: AP News, DOJ Press Release)
• May 20, 2023 – Danville Arson Attempt: A suspect rammed a vehicle loaded with gasoline into a Danville clinic. The suspect was arrested and sentenced to 5 years in prison. (Sources: Local news reports) March 2024 – Storming of Chicago Corporate Office: A male intruder breached security at PPIL's downtown Chicago administrative offices, leading to a police lockdown and significant trauma among staff. (Sources: PPIL Annual Safety Report, Chicago Tribune)
• Multiple Bomb Threats & Vandalism (2022–2025): PPIL clinics in Aurora, Springfield, and Champaign have been targets of at least 22 documented threats, including bomb scares, graffiti, smashed windows, and aggressive protester actions. (Sources: NBC Chicago, ABC7 Chicago)
• March 2025 – Closure of Englewood Clinic: PPIL shuttered its Englewood location— the sole clinic serving the historically Black and economically marginalized South Side of Chicago. Community members protested the closure, citing disproportionate impact and neglect. (Source: Chicago Sun-Times, March 2025)

In addition, the volatility surrounding abortion services in Illinois continues to escalate amid national and regional political tensions. While Illinois generally supports reproductive rights, it remains a target for extremist groups, particularly given its proximity to more restrictive states. Notably, national and regional anti-abortion protests have intensified, often naming or doxxing individual clinic employees and former employees; current federal and state political climates have emboldened groups that openly threaten abortion providers and their supporters; former and current employees have been surveilled, harassed, and publicly threatened following media or legal exposure; and groups such as the Pro-Life Action League actively oppose abortion services and contribute to this hostile environment.

Therefore, as a former employee of Defendant, Plaintiff faces credible threats to personal safety, including harassment, doxxing, and physical harm. The hostile climate is underscored by documented acts of violence and harassment against abortion providers and their staff. While Plaintiff does not currently reside in the community served by the Englewood Clinic, which closed in March 2025, she has visited the location multiple times in her official capacity. This clinic served the historically Black and economically marginalized South Side of Chicago community experiencing ongoing unrest and heightened tensions, including pronounced hostility toward abortion services, current employees, and former employees. The closure of the only clinic servicing this area sparked significant outrage among community members. This geographic and social context significantly elevates the risks to Plaintiff's personal safety and privacy….

Due to the credible threats of violence, ongoing political extremism targeting abortion providers, the sensitivity of the organizational misconduct involved, and the high stakes to Plaintiff's personal safety, there are exceptional circumstances warranting Plaintiff's anonymity in this matter. In sum, this identity of Plaintiff puts her in real danger of physical harm.

As such, and for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant her motion to proceed under pseudonym and for a protective order limiting disclosure of her identity to counsel for Defendant.

Comments

[John 4]

Right wing violence is an epidemic, so this makes perfect sense to me.

There are several right wing extremists who post comments here that I don’t doubt would kill a women’s health provider without a second thought judging by their weird, crude posts.

[JohnSmith97]

More projection from someone who does nothing but drink the lefty koolaid..

[BadLib]

It's interesting that specific cases that the judge itemized were all attacks on clinics rather than individuals.

While it is true that an employee might be injured or killed in such an attack on a clinic, a former employee would, presumably, not be at the clinic now. Even if they happened to visit a clinic they once worked at (perhaps to greet old friends), any injury to them in an attack would likely be a random chance event and unrelated to that individual person being in the clinic at that moment.

If the judge had given specific examples of former employees being targeted the argument would be much stronger.

[Joe_dallas]

especially true if the former employee has in some form renounced his/her belief in the sanctity of the murder of unborn babies.

[Absaroka]

That does seem to spread the net (umbrella?) pretty wide, Just pulling from recent headlines, it would grant anonymity to health care CEOs, employees of TPUSA, employees of ICE, employees of ABC, employees of CDC, and on and on.

[Life of Brian]

See, e.g., Doe v. Fedcap Rehab. Servs. (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("At bottom, Plaintiff wants what most employment-discrimination plaintiffs would like: to sue their former employer without future employers knowing about it.").

General principles of public access aside, this to me is the bottom line under these facts. She's getting a free swing here, and the more bad decisions like this one that end up out there as citeable persuasive authority, the higher the odds she'll be able to lather/rinse/repeat in the future.

[David Welker]

Because plaintiff's attorneys who handle these cases on a contingency don't care about the outcome, right?

[Stephen Lathrop]

Always unanswered: Why it is imperative to identify folks who use the courts, and imperative to not identify folks who fund the political system.

[mulched]

Nearly everyone's a taxpayer. What else do you want to know?

[Stephen Lathrop]

Come to think of it, is there is notable asymmetry in current anonymity practice? Plaintiffs who sue corporations get identified by name. Does a corporation answering the complaint provide for the public record the personal names of its officers and directors?

[Absaroka]

You don't even need to sue a corporation to find that out.

First hit on google! Lots of other resources. If you want to browse SEC filings, here you go.

[David Welker]

The argument that Eugene Volokh makes about news organizations is interesting. But there is a better way.

(1) Have whatever media organization or other party to file a motion to get the pseudonym. As part of its motion, it must explain why the case is particularly newsworthy or how it is in the interest of the public for the name to be disclosed and the steps it will take to ensure that the name is not further disclosed.

(2) If the motion is granted, it should be accompanied by a protective order forbidding the news organization or other party from disclosing the name without further motion.

(3) If, after its investigation, the party that sought disclosure of the name believes that wider dissemintation of the name is necessary, it can use the results of its investigation to support such a motion.

- - -

In general, I do not buy into the general framework that the public right to know the identity of private litigants is somehow sacred. Yes, there must be a way for the public to know how the courts are being used, but that does not mean that civil disputes should undermine the privacy of individuals anymore than say, mediation or arbitration undermines that privacy.

In general, we have arbitration which PROTECTS PRIVATE information, and the outcome of that arbitration is COERCIVELY ENFORCED upon the loser.

This proves that the mere use of government power to coercively resolve a private dispute does not require the loss of privacy. In general, there should not be a two-tiered system of justice where the coercive power of the state is employed in one case with a presumption of a loss of privacy and in another case without loss of privacy.

I think this case is illustrative of the problem with Eugene Volokh's position. A person could be killed or maimed based on their previous association with an abortion clinic. Knowledge of the particular plaintiff's name is NOT particularly valuable or highly interesting to the public. Knowing that name does not shed light on the operation of the justice system in MOST cases. In the cases where it does, there should be a procedure to allow the release of that information.

The First Amendment does not generally require that individuals know everything about the operations of government, especially as it relates to the private information of individuals. For example, school records are NOT public information despite being held by government entities. The public does not have a general right to a list of the individual names and addresses of all of the children who attend a public school, merely because the school is a government agency. The same is true of people who receive medical services from the Veterans Administration. There isn't a general right of the public for the private medical information of every patient just because the VA is a government agency.

The same principles that are applicable schools or the Veterans Administration are applicable to the courts. Privacy, of course, imposes costs upon society. For example, in the case of the Veterans Administration, not having the private details of patients means that people can't be marketed treatments that might genuinely help them, greatly improve their quality of life, or even save their life. In the case of school records, privacy means that someone who is sexually assaulted by a teacher or a staff member may have difficulty doing an investigation to see if there are other similarly victims. The costs imposed by privacy in the context of services provided by courts are not unique. And it is important that the customers of the courts (i.e. litigants) feel as though they can reasonably comfortably use the courts to assert their legal rights.

[ReaderY]

I don’t necessarily disagree with the decisiongiven the legal standard being applied. Multiple firebombings reflect a level of violence and threat considerably greater than the shovings, blockings, being locked out of class, and similar incidents that are the subjects of many of the recent campus civil rights complaints.

That said, I think the judge here used a tone that is no longer appropriate to use after Dobbs. The opinion not only clearly favors “abortion rights,” it tends to associate opposition to abortion with extremism and violence in a case like this. This will not do.

Employees of abortion clinics are entitled to the benefit of the law in jurisdictions where abortion is illegal. And I think a neutral view of the situation leads to questioning whether Professor Volokh’s proffered comparables are really legitimately comparable. The evidence suggests that the probability of an abortion clinic employee being the subject of an attack with potential for serious injury or death is simply a lot higher than a Jewish university student. The judge is entitled to take that difference into account.

But the judge should be careful to review and explain the evidence in a neutral way, without expressing an opinion on the merits of abortion,and without using language that might suggest that the judge’s personal opinion of abortion supporters or opponents colored the outcome.

[ReaderY]

Sorry, in jurisdictions where abortion is legal.