Can Vanderbilt Student Suspended for Alleged False Accusations Sue Vanderbilt Pseudonymously?

No, says, a District Court judge.

From Judge Waverly Crenshaw (M.D. Tenn.) today in Poe v. Lowe, affirming an earlier decision by Magistrate Judge Jeffery Frensley:

[I]n Spring 2022 there were anonymous posts on social media that accused Vanderbilt University student Simon Roe of sexually assaulting women. Roe disputed these accusations and filed a lawsuit for defamation "to 'unmask' those who had posted anonymously about him." Discovery in Roe's lawsuit revealed that fellow Vanderbilt student Poe was one of the posters.

Roe and his father then "demanded Vanderbilt take immediate action" against the posters, and Vanderbilt launched an investigation against Poe for violations of the Student Handbook. Vanderbilt eventually found that Poe violated three provisions of the Student Handbook and other school policies, and the university placed him on academic suspension. Poe challenged Vanderbilt's investigation by suing the university and several Vanderbilt employees ….

[T]he general rule in federal court is that all parties to a lawsuit must use their real names. The Sixth Circuit recognizes that "[u]nder certain circumstances, however, the district court may allow a plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym[.]" "The key inquiry is whether the [plaintiff's] interest in privacy outweighs the presumption in favor of open judicial proceedings." This standard is difficult to meet, and "[i]t is the exceptional case in which a plaintiff may proceed under a fictitious name." forcing them 'to proceed with insufficient information to present their arguments.'" …

[C]ourts have found that plaintiffs may be compelled to disclose information of the utmost intimacy [which may justify pseudonymity] when they are "victims of sexual assault" or "accused of sexual assault." Those exceptional cases do not apply here, however, because Poe's "claims stem from an allegedly flawed student-misconduct investigation, [and] not from allegations of sexual assault."

There is a meaningful difference between Poe's litigation "position, as the accuser" of a third-party sexual assault, and a case where someone allegedly "had suffered a sexual assault or had been accused of committing sexual assault." Poe "is neither the victim" of sexual assault "nor the accused" in this case, and he "failed to identify a single case where a similarly situated accuser has been permitted to proceed pseudonymously." …

Although the Court does not make light of Poe's history of sexual assault and suicidal ideation, the disclosure of that information alone does not justify his request for anonymity. Indeed, courts have explicitly held that "allegations of sexual assault, by themselves, are not sufficient to entitle a plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym." The same is true with allegations of attempted suicide. So even if the Court found that Poe's personal experiences with sexual assault and attempted suicide constituted "information of the utmost intimacy," it would still need to conclude that Poe's privacy interests in these matters substantially outweigh the presumption of open judicial proceedings….

Poe next argues that he will face additional psychological harm if he reveals his identity because this case "has already garnered national media attention" and could cast him in a negative light. The Magistrate Judge rejected this argument because "allegations that proceeding publicly would cause [plaintiff] embarrassment and humiliation, standing alone, are not sufficient to justify permitting a plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym." … [Poe offers] new declarations … that Poe is anxious and fearful that revealing his name may derail his career and life. This emotional stress and anxiety also caused him to suffer negative physical symptoms, such as heart palpitations, rapid breathing, and appearing visibly distressed. The Court has no reason to doubt Poe's symptoms and general fears about associating his real name with his lawsuit, but his concerns about negative publicity do not rise to the level of "psychological trauma … that has prompted courts in other cases to permit litigants to proceed pseudonymously."

These new declarations segue into Poe's next objection, which is that the Magistrate Judge should have found persuasive his "argument about harm to his professional reputation and potential economic injury." Although Poe reinforces these factual concerns in his new declarations, he does not cite any legal authority in support of this argument, let alone distinguish or rebut the Magistrate Judge's list of cases holding that "economic harm and scrutiny from current or prospective employers do not involve information 'of the utmost intimacy.'" …

[T]he Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's ultimate conclusion as follows:

Plaintiff is not a child, is not challenging governmental activity, is not compelled to disclose information of the utmost intimacy, and is not compelled to disclose an intention to violate the law. Furthermore, Plaintiff's true identity has already been revealed in an associated state-court proceeding thus dispelling much of the speculative risk that Plaintiff alleges he will face if his name is made public in the present case. For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient justification to show that his privacy interests substantially outweigh the presumption of open judicial proceedings….

Lowe, incidentally, is a Vanderbilt professor who issued the decision in Roe's case; though it rhymes with Poe and Roe, Lowe is her real name. Mark A. Baugh, Ryan P. Loofbourrow, and Katelyn R. Dwyer (Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C.) represent defendants.