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Court Rejects Oklahoma Education Department's Lawsuit Over Letters from Advocacy Group
"How do Defendant's letters interfere with Plaintiffs' authority or ability to administer Oklahoma's public schools?"
From Judge John F. Heil III (E.D. Okla.) yesterday in Okla. State Dep't of Ed. v. Freedom From Religion Found.:
On March 31, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief from this Court. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Defendant "has interfered with and will continue to interfere with [Plaintiffs'] statutory authority to govern Oklahoma's public schools." Plaintiffs urge that both declaratory and injunctive relief are necessary "to ensure that [Plaintiffs] can faithfully execute their duties, as well as protect the constitutional rights of Oklahoma's public school students." …
On December 17, 2024, Defendant, a nonprofit advocacy group, sent a letter to Achille Public Schools ("APS") Superintendent Rick Beene ("Superintendent Beene") regarding "unconstitutional school-sponsored prayer and [B]ible readings." Specifically, the letter stated that "[a] concerned parent report[ed] that [APS] implemented a policy allowing teachers to read Bible verses at the beginning of their classes" and, further, that APS "has a custom and practice of beginning each school day with a 'mandatory student-led prayer' over the schools' intercom systems."
The letter requested that APS "cease permitting teachers to give students Bible lessons" and "ensure its schools refrain from coercing students to observe and participate in school-sponsored prayer." The letter set forth the legal basis for its assertion that school-sponsored prayer and Bible readings are unconstitutional. The letter concluded with a request that Superintendent Beene "respond in writing with the steps [APS] is taking to address" the complaint so that Defendant may inform the concerned parent.
Separately, on February 7, 2018, Defendant sent a letter to Putnam City Schools ("PCS") Superintendent Fred Rhodes ("Superintendent Rhodes") regarding a complaint from a "concerned area resident" regarding a designated "team chaplain" for the Putnam City High School football team. Specifically, the letter detailed concerns that the team chaplain was leading the team in prayers and proselytizing to the players. The letter set forth the legal basis for its assertion that school-sponsored prayer and the advancement or promotion of religion by a public school through a team chaplain are unconstitutional. The letter asked PCS to "commence an immediate investigation into this complaint and take action to stop coaches and other school representatives from organizing, leading, or participating in prayers with student athletes at practices or games" and to "take appropriate actions to end its chaplaincy program." The letter further requested that Superintendent Rhodes respond in writing with the steps taken to remedy the complaint….
Defendant argues that the Complaint is insufficient on its face to demonstrate an injury in fact [and thus to establish Plaintiffs' standing]. To establish an injury in fact, Plaintiffs must show that they suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest" that is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." A "particularized" injury means that it "must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." For an injury to be "concrete," it "must actually exist" and be real. Further, a "threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact."
The Complaint alleges that Defendant "has interfered with and will continue to interfere with [Plaintiffs'] statutory authority to govern Oklahoma's public schools" and further argues that "[d]eclaratory and injunctive relief is both necessary and proper to ensure that [Plaintiffs] can faithfully execute their duties, as well as protect the constitutional rights of Oklahoma's public school students." Plaintiffs clarify in their response that they have been injured because Defendant has infringed on their "statutory and constitutional authority to administer the public school system."
However, this bare assertion is neither concrete nor particularized. How do Defendant's letters interfere with Plaintiffs' authority or ability to administer Oklahoma's public schools? In what way are Plaintiffs precluded from administering Oklahoma's public schools because of Defendant's letters? What have Plaintiffs intended to do, but have been unable to, because of Defendant's letters? The Complaint does not answer these questions. Plaintiffs have not alleged that they have suffered some actual or threatened injury. Plaintiffs' generalized statement of injury is nothing more than conjecture.
Further, Plaintiffs acknowledge that "[w]hen school districts are accused of violating either the Oklahoma Constitution or the policies and procedures implemented by the OSDE, it is the OSDE's responsibility to address those accusations, make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and implement any necessary corrective measures." In essence, Plaintiffs concede that addressing the types of letters it complains of in this lawsuit is part of Plaintiffs' duties. Yet, Plaintiffs say that they are harmed because "[e]ach time a district receives a cease-and-desist demand from [Defendant], OSDE must expend valuable time and resources to address it." Both things cannot be true. Plaintiffs cannot be both performing their duties by addressing the letters and impeded from performing their duties by addressing the letters.
The Court also notes that while Plaintiffs complain of "Defendant's continued interference with the day-to-day-operations … of Oklahoma's public schools … ," Plaintiffs only complain of two (2) letters sent by Defendant to two (2) Oklahoma public schools in the past seven (7) years. Again, the Complaint does not explain how these letters have interfered with day-to-day operations in any real way. Indeed, it appears that upon receiving these letters, the recipient schools simply forwarded the letters to OSDE for guidance, which, as discussed earlier, appears to be within the scope of Plaintiffs' duties.
Plaintiffs' Complaint also vaguely alludes that Plaintiffs' injury is the "chilling effect" caused by Defendant's letters…. [But the precedents Plaintiffs cite] considered the chilling effect on nonprofit advocacy groups based on government action. Here, Plaintiffs ask the Court to consider the chilling effect on the government based on a nonprofit advocacy group's action. The Court finds that the [precedents] are plainly distinguishable, and, following, the framework [they] set forth … is inapplicable in this case.
However, even if it did apply, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently demonstrate standing under the framework. {"[P]laintiffs in a suit for prospective relief based on a 'chilling effect' on speech can satisfy the requirement that their claim of injury be 'concrete and particularized' by (1) evidence that in the past they have engaged in the type of speech affected by the challenged government action; (2) affidavits or testimony stating a present desire, though no specific plans, to engage in such speech; and (3) a plausible claim that they presently have no intention to do so because of a credible threat that the statute will be enforced."} …
[T]he Complaint does not allege that it has stopped executing its duties or ceased administration of Oklahoma's public schools because of Defendant's letters. {Notably, despite Defendant's letters, the Complaint states that "[t]hroughout his tenu[r]e in office, Superintendent Walters has actively sought to address the dismantling of faith and family values in public schools …," including announcing a "directive to provide Bibles 'explicitly for use in schools'" and establishing the "'Office of Religious Liberty and Patriotism' at the State Department of Education." This runs contrary to the assertion that the letters had any sort of a "chilling effect."} …
Nor does the Complaint allege that the schools have ceased any policies or practices because of Defendant's letters. {The Complaint alleges that, contrary to the accusations in Defendant's letters, the schools are acting lawfully. For example, while the letter to APS accused the school of beginning each school day with "mandatory student-led prayer," Plaintiffs state that APS actually provides "daily student-led morning announcements which include a statutorily required moment of reflection." If the letters inaccurately described the schools' conduct, it seems that the easiest course of action would have been to respond explaining the misunderstanding, or to simply take no action at all.}
{Notably, despite Defendant's letters, the Complaint states that "[t]hroughout his tenu[r]e in office, Superintendent Walters has actively sought to address the dismantling of faith and family values in public schools …," including announcing a "directive to provide Bibles 'explicitly for use in schools'" and establishing the "'Office of Religious Liberty and Patriotism' at the State Department of Education." This runs contrary to the assertion that the letters had any sort of a "chilling effect."} …
Adam Hines and Megan Lambert (ACLU of Oklahoma) and Ben Wizner, Scarlet Kim, and Vera Eidelman (ACLU Foundation-NY) represent Freedom From Religion Foundation.
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Should plaintiffs be sanctioned?
One can imagine a flood of letters overwhelming officials. Such a situation is not alleged here.
A flood of letters might be actionable? You’ve got to be fucking kidding me.
If someone encourages the public to send a thousand letters a day, sure, why not? There's a point at which it turns into harrassment.
Petitioning the government is harassment? No, never. Not even at a thousand letters a day.
Then at what level? A million letters a day? A billion? There is a point at which "petitioning" turns into "harassing".
Nope, not even at a billion a day. I reject the idea that there is a meaninful threshold because the downside of letting the government set such a threshold is greater than the cost of making them deal with it.
So it’s uncomstitutional for courts to sanction frivolous lawsuits? See my comment below.
In a context where a school district is legally required to investigate and adjudicate complaints, I don’t see why frivolous complaints can’t be treated just like frivolous lawsuits are by courts. They have a similar effect of wasting public resources. Why does the fact that the tribunal involved is an administrative rather than a judicial one change the constitutional issues? It seems to me that administrative tribunals have the same right to avoid being abused as judicial ones.
The opinion basically says that the school district alleges only two complaints in seven years, and even if both were unfounded this just isn’t enough to be disruptive. But a sufficiently frequent frivolous complainer would be disruptive, and absolutely could be treated the same way courts treat frequent frivolous plaintiffs.
After all, a judicial complaint is just a letter to a judge asking him to help you solve your problem with somebody. Sure, there are lots of special formalities and rituals added. But at bottom the heart of a complaint to a court is no different from a complaint to another government body.
You have a right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. But that doesn’t give you the right to throw a 16-ton petition through the window and have it injure somebody. The government has a right to ensure that petitions are channeled in a way that doensn’t disrupt it.
And when a government body is legally required to adjudicate complaints, the adjudicator has a right to manage the complaints in a manner similar to a court, including sanctioning frivolous ones. Ignorance of this isn’t an excuse.
I am curious about two things:
1) What if anything has OSDE done in the time (7 yrs & 7 mos respectively) since the original accusations wrt their "responsibility to address those accusations, make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and implement any necessary corrective measures," beyond taking their accuser to court?
2) Is there a respectable argument for *not* sanctioning Plaintiffs and their counsel when they make patently false claims at the level done here?
I have read the order of dismissal, but not the complaint. Because the District Court found a lack of Article III standing, the Court did not need to address the merits of whether the Plaintiffs had presented a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
How did Plaintiffs' counsel fancy that there is any federal question presented on these facts?
If there is an appeal taken from the dismissal, will such appeal be frivolous for purposes of Fed.R.App.P. 38?
The civil cover sheet lists 42 USC § 1983 (I shit you not) and the declaratory judgment act, but the actual complaint does not mention 1983, so that was presumably just careless. However, the actual complaint only lists the Declaratory Judgment Act, which is not actually a source of jurisdiction, so the bottom line is that there isn't even a colorable claim to federal jurisdiction.
The defendants correctly spotted the issue you raise and briefed it; the plaintiffs' lawyers bizarrely argued in response that this case arises under the constitution because "The Plaintiffs’ claim is brought pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." The plaintiffs' lawyers also bizarrely argue that (a) federal law requires them to provide certain services; (b) the defendants' actions interfere with their ability to do so; and (c) therefore the plaintiffs have a cause of action under that federal law.
There are two possibilities: the plaintiffs' lawyers are deeply stupid, or the plaintiffs' lawyers are deeply stupid and unethical, knowingly filing a lawsuit that has no colorable legal basis or jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs may well have no cause of action. But they are alleging an injury in fact.
They are not. Which is why the court held that they have not alleged an injury-in-fact.
I think there was enough of an injury in fact to support Article III standing here, although I completely agree that the district loses on the merits.
A federal court can sanction a single frivolous complaint. I don’t think this could be the case unless we accept that a single allegedly frivolous complaint creates enough of an injury to justify federal justicial action. That has to mean it’s enough to support standing.
The question then becomes whether the conduct was in fact frivolous or disruptive enough, and whether the law permits provides a cause of action and supports the requested remedies. I see that as fundamentally a merits issue, not a standing issue.
This is nonsensical. It's just random word soup. Sanctions for filing a frivolous complaint have nothing to do with "injury" or standing. Standing is something that applies to litigants, not courts.
And the district can't lose on the merits because, separate from standing, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.